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FOREW ORD
This volume developed as a result of the interest shown by readers of
Chapter 6 of the “CPA Handbook,” on the legal responsibility and
civil liability of certified public accountants. T h at chapter referred to
various American and English court cases and included numerous quota
tions therefrom. This has suggested the practical value of reprinting
these judicial opinions, for the most part in their entirety, so that prac
ticing accountants might explore the subject further without the need
for searching for this material in a law library.
Familiarity with the facts and the law involved in these cases will
serve to give the accountant a much better understanding of the legal
responsibility inherent in the practice of public accountancy. The re
sulting awareness of the hazards which have arisen in the past should
equip the accountant to avoid such difficulties in the future.
The full text of the chapter in the “CPA Handbook” is reprinted in
slightly re-arranged form as a further convenience to the reader.
I wish to extend my thanks to Alan F. McHenry, director of the Legal
Department of the American Institute of Accountants, and to Irving
Novick, member of the Editorial Board of the New York University Law
Review, for their assistance in connection with the editing and compila
tion of the collection of cases.
S. L.
New York, New York
September 1954
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PART ONE

An Analytical Survey

CHAPTER 1

FUNDAM ENTAL

CO NSID ERA TIO NS

There are certain fundamental considerations with which the account
ant is confronted. Some of these matters apply in general to practitioners
in all professional fields, and some have special importance and special
emphasis only in relation to accounting activities.
This preliminary phase will be approached from the following four
angles:
1. Certified public accountants are members of a skilled and learned profession
and as such are subject generally to the same responsibilities as members of
other skilled professions.
2. Public accountancy is a relatively new profession, the status of which has
been growing steadily in importance in these recent decades of dynamic
economic change.
3. The nature of accounting services has an important relation to questions
of legal responsibility.
4. Numerous parties other than clients often rely upon the opinions of ac
countants.
Members of a Skilled Profession

The general principles affecting the responsibilities of members of
learned professions, and, for that matter, the responsibility of anyone who
undertakes employment because of his possession of exceptional skill,
have been concisely summarized in Cooley’s Torts, which is nearly always
quoted as the primary authority on this subject. So many essential aspects
of the accountant’s problem are here touched upon that the quotation
itself bears repetition:
In all those employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his
services, he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing
the degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment,
and if his pretensions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon
every man who employs him in reliance on his public profession. But no
man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that the task he assumes shall
be performed successfully, and without fault or error; he undertakes for
good faith and integrity, but not for infallibility, and he is liable to his
employer for negligence, bad faith, or dishonesty, but not for losses con
sequent upon mere errors of judgment.1
1. 3 Cooley, T orts 335 (4th ed. 1932).
3

4

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

T he relatively recent Restatement of the Law of Torts, (1938) in dis
cussing negligent misrepresentations, comments upon “expectable care
and competence” in the following language:
Where the information concerns a fact not known to the recipient, he is
entitled to expect that the supplier will exercise that care and competence
in its ascertainment which the supplier’s business or profession requires and
which, therefore, the supplier professes to have by engaging in it. . . . Where
the information consists of an opinion upon facts supplied by the recipient
or otherwise known to him, the recipient is entitled to expect a careful con
sideration of the facts and competence in arriving at an intelligent judgment
thereon.2

These principles have long been applied to public accountants in juris
dictions abroad where the accounting profession has an older history and
where the principles of common law govern. In the United States, as early
as 1905, there was specific judicial recognition “that public accountants
now constitute a skilled professional class, and are subject generally to
the same rules of liability for negligence in the practice of their profession
as are members of other skilled professions.” 3
Certified public accountants have always recognized their professional
responsibility for care and competence in the performance of their work.
However, the precise boundaries of civil liability have posed many prac
tical problems as well as highly technical legal questions, many of which
will be dealt with in this chapter. T he general attitude of the profession
in the relatively early years of its growth and development was set forth
by J. E. Sterrett, in a paper read at the annual meeting of the American
Economic Association in 1908, from which the following is quoted:
It must be borne in mind that a balance sheet of any large corporation is
not a statement of facts that can be demonstrated with mathematical ac
curacy so much as it is an expression of an honest and intelligent opinion.
In this expression of opinion the public accountant is now being recognized
as an authority, and what is being widely done through the voluntary action
of corporations that desire to deal fairly with their investors will doubtless
become a legal requirement, and before many years the independent audit
of all corporations offering their securities to the public will be firmly es
tablished.
With this, or possibly preceding it, will also come a civil liability on the part
of the accountant for the faithful and diligent performance of his duties.
As yet there are no decisions in this country upon the question of the liability
of an auditor, but under the English law his liability both civil and criminal
is pretty well established. . . .
Civil liability on the part of the accountant is, I believe, certain to come
in this country, and while each member of the profession may well pray
that the offense shall not come by him, it is, nevertheless, true that the effect
of a clearly defined civil liability will be salutary. It will give confidence
2. 3 R estatement, T orts §552, comment c (1938).
3. Smith v. London Assurance Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N.Y. Supp. 820 (2d Dep’t
1905). R eprinted at p. 71 infra.
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to the business public in the accountant’s certificate as nothing else will do,
and while the best accountants to-day recognize their moral responsibility
quite as much as it will ever be necessary for them to recognize any legal
responsibility, the knowledge that a civil and possibly a criminal liability
attaches to them will deter the careless or the indifferent.4

This statement by one of the most distinguished leaders in the account
ing profession is remarkable for its prophetic anticipation of the present
Federal regulation of securities and the vital role of public accountancy
in connection with it. It also expresses a positive and constructive accept
ance of legal responsibility growing out of the work which accountants do,
an attitude which is as relevant to the accounting profession today as
it was when expressed. It recognizes the fact that civil liability is a normal
aspect of professional status and that being subject to it is an inevitable
attribute of the development of the profession. It follows that the ac
countant’s understanding of the problem is an essential part of his educa
tional equipment for the performance of his technical functions.
Public Accountancy, a Relatively New Profession

W hen speaking of public accountancy as a learned profession it must be
realized that in this country, at any rate, it is a relatively new profession,
one, however, which has been steadily growing in importance and useful
ness in these recent decades of dynamic economic change. All of this has
been so generally recognized in the business community that it hardly
requires documentation.5
Legal precedents involving public accountants in the United States
are relatively few and are closely tied up with the facts involved in each
situation and with the then existing practices of the profession. Even at
this date, the standards are still in a state of development and clarification.
As members of a skilled profession, it is the right of every accountant to
be judged by the standards of the accounting profession. Correlatively,
it is the duty of the accountant to establish and clarify these standards,
not only for the public but for themselves. Otherwise, standards not of
their own making will be imposed upon them.6
Expanding opportunities to serve inevitably create broader responsibili
ties. This has been recognized in the continuing drive within the profes
sion to measure up to growing obligations. W ithout further elaboration,
the following lines of endeavor have been followed:
4. Sterrett, T he Present Position and Probable D evelopment of Accountancy as a
Profession, 7 J ournal of Accountancy 272 (1909).
5. Brundage, Milestones on the Path of Accounting, 29 H arvard Business R eview
71 (1951); Brundage, Roadblocks in the Path of Accounting, 29 H arvard B usiness
R eview, 110 (1951).
6. Levy, Accountants’ Liability, W artime Accounting 146 (papers presented at the
55th annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants 1942). R eprinted at
p. 72 infra.
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1. The movement for obtaining legislative recognition and control of our pro
fessional activities has already resulted in CPA laws in all forty-eight states.7
The accountant should continue to seek improvement of these laws, based
upon judgment and experience. In many states there has been a transition
from the permissive type of legislation to a form of regulatory statute which
places accountants in a status more closely comparable to that of the medical
and legal professions.
2. The development of higher educational standards and techniques for a
professional career in accountancy, and the contemporaneous lifting of edu
cational requirements for admission to the profession.
3. The development, acceptance and enforcement of a code of ethical conduct
consistent with professional ideals and essential for the protection of the
public interest. While this is a usual feature in the case of the regulatory
type of statute, there is a trend to provide for an enforceable code of pro
fessional conduct in permissive statutes as well. In 1952, a statute of this
latter type was enacted in the State of New York.
4. The growth in size, influence and effectiveness of professional societies de
voted to the clarification and codification of ethical and technical standards
and the extension of the usefulness of the profession in terms of the public
interest. The expanding program of the American Institute of Accountants
is addressed toward these objectives. More than twenty thousand members
are co-operating actively in this endeavor.
The Nature of Accounting Services

Although accountants render many other types of services, it is chiefly
the auditing work which differentiates the problem of legal responsibility
from that of other professions. Accountants review, examine into, and
consider the factual representations of management or others, and report
thereon in the form of a professional opinion (where the accountant so
believes) that the statements of management fairly present financial posi
tion and results of operations.
T he accountant’s responsibility is for the expression of a professional
opinion in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as
the result of an examination conducted in accordance with generally ac
cepted auditing standards.8 The accountant does not make factual rep
resentations as to the content of financial statements; that is the function
of management. He does not insure, guarantee, or warrant the accuracy
of management’s representations, which in turn include matters of esti
mate, judgment and opinion. He does assume responsibility for his own
opinions, and represents, that in order to place himself in a position to
express such opinions, he has complied with generally accepted auditing
standards,9 which provide for:
7. Accountancy Law Reporter (Commerce Clearing House) gives full text of all
legislation for states, territories and the District of Columbia.
8. Accounting Series Release No. 62, Securities and Exchange Commission, Wash
ington, 1947.
9. T entative Statement of Auditing Standards, American Institute of Accountants,
1947; Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure, American Institute of
Accountants, 1951.
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1. An expert opinion — implying adequate technical training, proficiency and
due care in the performance of the audit;
2. An independent opinion — the result of an objective, impartial, and unbiased
mental attitude;
3. An informed opinion — the result of a proper study and evaluation of in
ternal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for determining the extent of
tests in the application of auditing procedures; and based upon competent
evidential matter sufficient to supply a reasonable basis for the expression of
an auditor’s opinion;
4. A technical opinion — that the statements are presented in accordance with
generally accepted principles of accounting applied on a basis consistent with
that of the previous year;
5. A candid opinion — that the financial statements are reasonably informative
as to all material facts, unless otherwise stated.
Parties Other Than Our Clients Often Rely Upon Accountant's Opinions

In many instances the opinions which are expressed and the reports
which embody such opinions reach innumerable interested parties other
than the clients by whom the accountant has been engaged. T he occa
sional claims of such “third parties” against accountants have raised some
difficult problems of legal responsibility. Some of the leading cases dealing
with such claims will be dealt with in considerable detail later in this
text.
The potential and largely undefined duty under the common law to
third parties has led to statutory rules of civil liability to investors, which
go far beyond the limitations of the common law in such matters as duty,
proof of reliance and burden of proof as to negligence or fraud.
It is in this area particularly that the accountant must realize the grow
ing need for informing the public as to the nature of the services rendered
and the standards by which such services should be judged.

CHAPTER 2

LIA BILITY

TO CLIENTS

In order to obtain a better understanding of possible civil liability, both
to clients and to third parties, it is helpful to draw upon decided cases
which may serve as legal precedents in future situations.
W ith respect to clients, there is a contractual relationship which is the
foundation of the accountants’ responsibilities and rights. This contract
may be formalized in a very explicit writing. More than likely, however,
if a writing exists, it is apt to be very general in its terms, setting out little
more than the period to be covered, the arrangement concerning fees,
with a statement that an audit is to be made in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards. Compliance with such standards ordinarily
would be implied even if not expressly included in the writing. In this
regard, recent literature of the American Institute of Accountants10,
serves a most useful function in defining the nature and content of what
the accountant undertakes to do in making the usual audit which is to
culminate in the expression of an opinion on financial position and op
erating results. Not so long ago, it was often an open question as to
whether a so-called cash audit, a balance sheet audit, a detailed audit or
some other variety of examination was contemplated. Not only was the
accountant lax in definitely confirming the scope of his work at the outset
of an engagement, but there was great variety and often little clarity in
the form of certificate or opinion that was issued at the end of the en
gagement.11 When the public accountant became involved in litigation
concerning his work, the heart of the controversy often related to what
he had agreed to do. Courts were inclined to take the accountant to task
if he had failed to be explicit in his engagement writing. This judicial
attitude is illustrated in the following admonition by the court in the case
of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jonathon Cook 12, where the court said:
I think that it is high time for accountants to know that if they want a
particular contract which they enter into to be measured in the technical
10. See note 9 supra and the following publications of the American Institute of

Accountants: Accounting Research Bulletins; Case Studies in A u diting Procedure; and
Audits by Certified P ublic Accountants, 1950.
11. Levy, T h e Legal Liability of Public Accountants in its Relation to a Standard
Classification o f Accounting Services, 12 Certified P ublic A ccountant 695 (1932).
R eprinted at p. 81 infra.
12. 35 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Mich. 1940). R eprinted a t p. 84 infra.
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terms of a cash audit, or a balance sheet audit, or a detailed audit, they
should insist that their contract and the specifications which they agree to
comply with in their contract should plainly state the facts.
So I interpret this contract with its specifications according to the plain
language used.
The witnesses have all agreed that no technical terms or language has been
used in either the contract or the specifications. Ordinary, everyday English
has been used. It is easily understood and interpreted. If accountants wish
a contract construed in accordance with their own technical language, then
they must see to it that their technical language is used in their contracts.
(Emphasis added)13

This case dealt with an audit of the accounts of a municipal treasurer
where the engagement had been accepted subject to “specifications for
audit” which had been prepared by the client, which provided, among
other things, that “any other duties or procedures which ordinarily be
come a part of a complete audit although not specifically stated herein
shall be deemed a part of these specifications.” T he defendant-accountant
sought to construe the vague expression “complete audit” in terms of
the more technical concepts of a cash audit, a balance sheet audit, or a
combination of the two. Such efforts were unavailing for the reason stated
above. There was a further attempt by the defendant to construe the
audit contract in the light of prior conversations and instructions. The
court disposed of this effort in the following manner:
The defendant, Jonathon Cook testified that on receiving these specifications
and on reading the specifications, he did not know just what work was re
quired to be performed for the City of Flint and so he went to the City of
Flint and had a talk with the Director of Finance and thereafter entered
into the contract in reliance upon that conversation had prior to the execu
tion of the contract. The conversation with the Director of Finance does not
mean a thing. The contract was with the City of Flint and not with the
Director of Finance. It is the contract which Jonathon Cook made with
the City of Flint which must be construed and not conversations or oral
agreements reached with independent officers of the City prior to the execu
tion of the contract. Those prior conversations, in order to become binding.
should have been embodied in the written contract and signed pursuant to
proper authority. Therefore, the court has no alternative but to hold this
defendant to performance in accordance with the terms of his written con
tract. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 237.14

This case emphasizes the need for being explicit if the accountant is
to rely upon technical terms and technical concepts in defining the scope
of his duty. Obviously the use of such vague terms as “complete audit”
or “detailed audit” must be avoided. If technical terms such as “generally
accepted auditing standards” are used the security of the accountant’s
position depends upon the extent to which such terms have been clarified
by accountants in their own practices and in the literature of the accou nt-15
15. Id. at 164-165.
14. Id. at 165.
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mg profession. While established standards of today 15 afford substantially
better grounds for reliance than they did during the years 1931-1932
(which were involved in the above quoted case) it is im portant to realize
that the situation has improved only relatively. Accountants must con
tinue to develop and clarify their own standards so that they may be
judged by professional criteria of their own making and not by the factual
findings of juries of laymen.
Another fairly recent case which involved construction of a contract for
audit services was that of O’Neill v. Atlas Automobile Finance Corp.16
Here the firm of certified public accountants contended that their con
tract was for a limited examination and a financial review of the client’s
books without verification. T he client contended that the engagement
“contemplated the making of a complete and detailed audit and the fur
nishing of certified reports which should have uncovered the shortage”
here involved. It was admitted that the original retainer had been under
an oral contract. The accountants testified that it was not agreed or con
templated that “certified reports” would be issued and in support of
their testimony offered the letters of transmittal of their reports which
used this phraseology:
We have prepared from the records of Atlas Automobile Finance Corpora
tion and information submitted to us a balance sheet as of (designated month
and year) and a comparative statement of profit and loss based on the month
of (name of month) together with relating schedules. (Italics by Court)

When the accountants were re-engaged, the extent of their undertaking
was set forth by them in a letter to the client which was accepted by it as
satisfactory. The letter read, in part:
Confirming our recent conversation we agree . . . to make a monthly
examination of the transactions and submit monthly reports in substantially
the same form as heretofore. . . . (Italics by Court)

The accountants produced an expert witness who corroborated their own
testimony with respect to the difference between “an ordinary audit and
report and a certified one verified from independent sources.” The client
offered no expert testimony to contradict that offered by the accountants.
Because the contract was partly oral and partly written and its terms were
disputed, the trial court submitted the question of its construction to the
jury. T he jury accepted the accountants’ version of the terms of the audit
contract and the nature of the accountants’ duties under it. Incidentally,
the appellate court confirmed the charge to the jury on the following
points, citing Cooley’s Torts 17 as one of the supporting authorities:
Magee, Liebman, and O’Neill, as accountants, are not guarantors or in
surers of the correctness of their accounts.156
15. Smith, Written Contract With Client Should Not Be Necessary to Define Audit
Engagement, 93 J ournal of Accountancy 210 (1952).
16. 139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A.2d 782 (1940). Reprinted at p. 95 infra.
17. See note 1 supra.
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Magee, Liebman and O’Neill as accountants, do not say to the public “Let us
examine your books and vouchers, and we will with absolute certainty dis
cover any dishonesty, every mistake, that exists in those books, and we will
protect you against that.” That is not what they undertook to do. They
agreed to use such skill in the performance of their agreement as reasonably
prudent, skillful accountants would use under the circumstances.

T he result in this case, in comparison with that in the Maryland
Casualty Company case,18 does not support a conclusion that the account
ant is likely to be better off with an oral agreement than with a detailed
contract specifying particular procedures. T he weakness of the ac
countant’s position in the Maryland Casualty Company case was that
there was an omnibus provision which used the vague term “complete
audit.”
H ad the more technical phraseology “generally accepted auditing
standards” been used, the court doubtless would have given greater weight
to technical literature and expert testimony as an aid to the interpretation
of the contract. Of special interest in the O’Neill case are the facts that
there was a course of conduct in performing prior audits which was con
tinued by specific reference in the letter of arrangements with the client,
and there was further confirmation of the client’s acceptance of the scope
of prior audits in the letters of transmittal which were an integral part of
the audit reports. All of this was persuasive corroboration of the testi
mony of the accountant as to the limited scope of his engagement.
In this branch of the subject, namely the accountant’s possible liability
to clients, the claims usually are based upon the failure of the auditor to
discover defalcations or other similar irregularities. It may be the client
who presses the claim. It may be a surety company that is the plaintiff,
having been subrogated to the rights of the client upon payment of a loss
under the terms of a fidelity bond.
Where it is claimed that the accountant was negligent in the perform
ance of his duty, and that the loss occasioned by the dishonesty of the
client’s employee or agent went undiscovered and unrecovered because of
that negligence, the controversy concerning the accountant’s work usually
raises these basic factual questions:
1. What was the scope of the audit for which the accountant was engaged and
which he agreed to make?
2. Was the negligent conduct of that audit responsible for the failure to un
cover the defalcations and for the resulting loss?
3. Were there circumstances present which aroused or should have aroused
the suspicion of the accountant and should have resulted in a more search
ing inquiry than would have been obligatory in the absence of suspicious
circumstances?

The responsibility of the accountant in this situation is limited neces
sarily to the competent performance of the audit which he has been en
18. See note 12 supra.
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gaged to make. This usually involves compliance with generally accepted
auditing standards. T he accountant does not insure or guarantee the
client against loss through the dishonesty of his employees, nor does he
warrant that the audit will uncover any and every irregularity. T he audit
is nevertheless likely to safeguard the client against dishonest manipula
tion of his accounts. Such protection to the client might well result from
the work of the auditor in reviewing the system of internal accounting
control and suggesting needed improvements therein. An audit will deter
dishonest practices because, from the culprit’s viewpoint, it enlarges the
danger of discovery. Very often an audit results in the actual discovery
and exposure of dishonest practices when they do occur. All of these ad
vantages to the client are substantial and add measurably to the value of
an audit. They should not be minimized in any of the discussions of the
limitations of the accountant’s responsibility. On the other hand, it
should be recognized that in the usual audit the primary purpose is not
the discovery of defalcations but rather the expression of a professional
opinion concerning financial position and operating results. T he audit
program involves a judicious amount of testing and sampling. It does
not contemplate an all-inclusive detailed examination of all transactions
and all entries with respect thereto. Thus it is not intended or designed
for the purpose of uncovering or preventing all conceivable irregularities
in the accounts. It should be accepted and relied upon for what it is, an
examination not unlim ited in scope but adequate for the purpose of ex
pressing an opinion concerning financial position and operating results.
All this has been summarized recently by the committee on auditing pro
cedure of the Institute, as follows:
The well-established custom of making test checks of accounting records
and related data and, beyond that, relying upon the system of internal con
trol after investigation, through appropriate checks, of its adequacy and
effective functioning, has with very few exceptions proved sufficient for the
purpose of expressing an opinion.
The ordinary examination incident to the issuance of an opinion respecting
financial statements is not designed and cannot be relied upon to disclose de
falcations and other similar irregularities, although their discovery frequently
results. In a well-organized concern reliance for the detection of such irregu
larities is placed principally upon the maintenance of an adequate system of
accounting records with appropriate internal control. If an auditor were to
attempt to discover defalcations and similar irregularities he would have to
extend his work to a point where its cost would be prohibitive. It is generally
recognized that good internal control and surety bonds provide protection
much more cheaply. On the basis of his examination by tests and checks,
made in the light of his review and tests of the system of internal control,
the auditor relies upon the integrity of the client’s organization unless cir
cumstances are such as to arouse his suspicion, in which case he must extend
his procedures to determine whether or not such suspicions are justified.
In no sense is the independent certified public accountant an insurer or
guarantor, nor do his training and experience qualify him to act as a
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general appraiser, valuer, or expert in materials. Obviously his functions
do not include matters of law which require the judgment of an attorney.19

T he foregoing is implied in the standard short-form of accountant’s
report or certificate which defines the scope of the audit in the following
general terms:
Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and
such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circum
stances.

It should be noted, however, that while the report or opinion of the
accountant is always evidence of what he understood the scope of his
audit to be, and while it is always evidence of what was the client contract,
it is not necessarily conclusive evidence. Unless confirmed by a writing
signed by the client, either in the form of a letter of arrangements before
the commencement of the audit or included in the letter of representa
tions of the client at the conclusion of the audit, it would be a self-serving
document which the client might dispute. Of course, it also might be
confirmed by a continuous course of conduct over a series of prior years
when the same type of audit had been made, reported upon in the same
way, and the reports had been accepted by the client. This is what hap
pened in the O’Neill case 20 mentioned previously.
There has recently been some difference of opinion among leading ac
countants as to whether there is adequate protection for the accountant
against unfair claims for failure to discover defalcations unless the limited
responsibility of the accountant in this area has been defined and con
firmed in an explicit written contract signed by the client. Some ac
countants have gone so far as to state specifically in letters to clients
outlining the conditions under which an engagement is accepted, “that
their examination cannot be relied on to disclose defalcations and other
irregularities of the same general nature, and they therefore do not assume
responsibility for detecting such irregularities.” 21
Other accountants have felt that a disclaimer, so worded, is too broad
and unqualified, and consequently it might reflect unfavorably on the
value of the ordinary audit. They would contend that our position should
be that such examinations cannot be relied upon to disclose all defalca
tions, and that therefore the accountant does not assume responsibility
for detecting irregularities where he has complied with generally accepted
auditing standards and the irregularities have nevertheless remained un
discovered. Furthermore, while it may be desirable to have a written
agreement or letter of arrangements confirmed by the client, it is argued
19. Codification of Statements on Auditing P rocedure, American Institute of
Accountants, 1951, p. 12.
20. See note 16 supra.
21. Independent A udits and Defalcations, 91, J ournal of Accountancy 387 (1951).
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that it should not be considered mandatory to have such a letter. In many
instances, the audit engagement is renewed from year to year in a more or
less informal manner. The scope of the examination is evidenced by a
continuous course of conduct by the accountant and the acceptance of
his work by the client on the basis of the representations concerning the
scope of the audit as set forth in the standard short-form certificate or
opinion. T he practice with respect to formalizing the audit contract
varies to such an extent that the preferences of those who consider an
explicit written client contract desirable should not, by implication, leave
unprotected the accountant who chooses to place his chief reliance upon
our professional standards and his compliance with them. The latter
viewpoint is discussed fully in a recent article which quotes many rele
vant statements from authoritative literature and concludes with the
following:
It should be evident to all thinking people that the work of the independent
public accountant is not intended to take the place of, or duplicate the
protection afforded by, a system of internal control supplemented by various
types of dishonesty insurance. The fact that accountants have an under
standable fear of the publicity resulting from legal action may have motivated
those who have suffered losses from defalcations and similar irregularities to
threaten suit against an accountant who did not assume responsibility for
discovery of the losses. Such tactics should be resisted by the profession. A
written contract with each client, however, does not go to the root of the
problem. In any case, the problem seems to call for a uniform position on
the part of the profession, and the above citations would appear to mean
that the profession has taken a position which it has repeatedly and con
sistently promulgated in its authoritative statements of auditing procedure.
If further clarification seems desirable, the place for that clarification is in
our published statements defining generally accepted auditing standards.
These standards are the yardstick of our professional responsibility and for
this reason are specifically incorporated in our opinions. Our contractual
relations with clients as well as our third party responsibility will, in any
event, depend upon our adherence to our generally accepted auditing
standards.22

It should be added, however, that in any situation where there are limi
tations upon the scope of the ordinary audit, such as the requested omis
sion of the independent confirmation of receivables or the omission of
the usual procedures with respect to observation and checking of in
ventory, it is without doubt advisable to confirm such limitations in a
writing which is countersigned or acknowledged by the client. If the
engagement contemplates the preparation of statements without audit,
obviously it is advantageous, if not altogether necessary, to reduce such
an engagement to some explicit form.
In Great Britain there is the distinction between the type of audit which
the accountant is required to make to fulfill his obligations under the
22. Smith, W ritten Contract W ith Client Should N o t Be Necessary to Define A udit
Engagement, 93 J ournal of Accountancy 213 (1952).
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Companies Act as against the varying types of work he may be engaged
to perform for so-called private companies. There it is urged that in the
latter situations an explicit client contract is essential. This warning was
repeated in a recent edition of one of the leading English texts on T he
Principles of Auditing, where it was stated:
In the case of a company, the auditor’s responsibilities are governed by
statute, and it is impossible for the auditor to limit his responsibilities. In
the case of a private concern, the auditor’s responsibilities are governed
by the terms of the contract with his client and therefore his responsibilities
can be limited by agreement, but in practice it is feared that in many cases
there is no written evidence of the exact terms of the contract. This position
is fraught with grave danger, and in every case the practitioner is strongly
advised to see that the exact terms of the contract are clearly understood by
both his client and himself, and that these terms are recorded in writing.
In the event of a loss through fraud occurring and remaining undetected by
the auditor he may be placed in a position of grave difficulty. It is easy to be
wise after the event and to see what audit tests must have revealed the fraud.
On the other hand it is so difficult to define exactly what is reasonable care
and skill, which is governed by the general standard of the profession. In a
case before the courts expert evidence would be called, but here again the
expert would have knowledge of the exact form the fraud took, and it is
therefore very easy to see what checks should have been applied in order to
detect the fraud and to form the opinion that one would without question
have adopted them.23

English Cases
Although adjudicated cases in the courts of the United States involving
claims of clients against accountants are limited in number, they are of
great significance. T he earlier English cases supply im portant legal back
ground and have usually been cited as authority in the opinions of Ameri
can judges. These English cases are quite numerous and go back more
than sixty years. Apparently the profession in G reat Britain has directed
considerable attention to these precedents. This is reflected by the fact
that Dicksee’s Auditing, the leading English text, in its seventeenth edi
tion, published in 1951, assigns almost three hundred pages of fine print
to a collection of some fifty-seven cases, reprinting most of the opinions
in full. Numerous other cases are referred to and discussed elsewhere in
the text. Apparently the British practitioner considers this source ma
terial an indispensable part of his technical equipment.
Those English cases which deal with claims arising out of defalcations
add little, if anything, to the law established by our own leading cases.
For the most part, the English cases deal with the responsibilities of ac
countants functioning under the authority and jurisdiction of the English
Companies Act. In such situations, the accountant is held to be an officer23
23. D ePaula, T he Principles

of

A uditing 244 (11th ed. 1951).
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of the corporation and is responsible as such to its stockholders. This
relationship, of course, is technically different from that assumed by the
auditor of the accounts of a corporation in the United States, even of a
corporation whose stock is publicly held and traded in on a stock ex
change. However, since the enactment of the Federal Securities Act of
1933 and the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, statutory obliga
tions have been imposed upon the independent accountant (to be con
sidered later in this chapter) which make some of these English cases
significant in relation to our possible liability to investors. This is all the
more so in view of the absence of adjudicated cases under our own statutes.
Some of the pronouncements of the English cases concerning their un
derstanding of the responsibilities of public accountants have been cited
so frequently that they have acquired the status of classic utterances.
Thus, in 1895, it was said of the auditor in the famous London and Gen
eral Bank case: 24
His business is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the
company at the time of the audit, and his duty is confined to that. But then
comes the question: How is he to ascertain such position? The answer is,
by examining the books of the company. But he does not discharge his
duty by doing this without inquiry and without taking any trouble to see
that the books themselves shew the company’s true position. He must take
reasonable care to ascertain that they do. Unless he does this his audit would
be worse than an idle farce . . . An auditor, however, is not bound to do
more than exercise reasonable care and skill in making inquiries and investi
gations. He is not an insurer; he does not guarantee that the books do cor
rectly shew the true position of the company’s affairs; he does not guarantee
that his balance sheet is accurate according to the books of the company. If
he did, he would be responsible for error on his part, even if he were himself
deceived without any want of reasonable care on his part, say, by the fraudu
lent concealment of a book from him. His obligation is not so onerous as
this. Such I take to be the duty of the auditor; he must be honest—i.e., he
must not certify what he does not believe to be true, and he must take
reasonable care and skill before he believes that what he certifies is true.
What is reasonable care in any particular case must depend upon the cir
cumstances of that case. Where there is nothing to excite suspicion very
little inquiry will be reasonably sufficient, and in practice I believe business
men select a few cases at haphazard, see that they are right, and assume that
others like them are correct also. Where suspicion is aroused more care is
obviously necessary; but, still, an auditor is not bound to exercise more than
reasonable care and skill, even in a case of suspicion, and he is perfectly
justified in acting on the opinion of an expert where special knowledge is
required. . . .
. . . A person whose duty it is to convey information to others does not dis
charge that duty by simply giving them so much information as is calculated
to induce them, or some of them, to ask for more. Information and means of
information are by no means equivalent terms. . . . [A]n auditor who gives
shareholders means of information instead of information respecting a com
24. In re London and General Bank, [1895] 2 Ch. 678 (C.A.), 21 Acct. L. R . 173,
D icksee’s Auditing 584 (17th ed. 1951). R eprinted a t p. 100 infra.
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pany’s financial position does so at his peril and runs the very serious risk of
being held judicially to have failed to discharge his duty.25

This was followed shortly thereafter by the Kingston Cotton Mill
Co. case 26 which exonerated the accountants from responsibility concern
ing the independent verification of inventory and approved the account
ants’ acceptance of and reliance upon the management’s certificate with
respect thereto in the absence of circumstances which would arouse sus
picion. This case is no longer an authority for American practictioners
with respect to inventory verification, since it has been superseded by our
own extensions of auditing procedure which impose mandatory obliga
tions in this area. However, it will continue to be quoted as a basic
authority for the reasonable limitations upon the responsibility of
accountants where an audit has failed to uncover defalcations and other
similar irregularities. In this connection it was there stated:
It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to perform
that skill, care, and caution which a reasonably competent, careful and
cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care and caution must
depend on the particular circumstances of each case., An auditor is not
bound to be a detective, or as was said, to approach his work with suspicion
or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is a watch
dog, but not a bloodhound. He is justified in believing tried servants of the
company in whom confidence is placed by the company. He is entitled to
assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided
he takes reasonable care. If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion
he should probe it to the bottom; but in the absence of anything of that
kind he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful.
. . . Auditors must not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and
carefully laid schemes of fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion,
and when those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and
are undetected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the position
of an auditor intolerable.27

It remained for the Irish Court of Appeal in The Irish Woollen Co. Ltd.
v. Tyson 28 to indicate how precarious it is to rely upon a figure of speech
as a substitute for a more technical statement of legal principle, when it
stated in discussing the foregoing quotation from the Kingston Cotton
M ill Co. case:
Now, time after time, this passage about the “watch-dog and the bloodhound”
has been made use of, and I would wish to say a word regarding it, too. His
lordship then read from Lord Justice Lindley’s judgment the passages deal
ing with the duties of auditors, in one of which it was laid down that “an
auditor was a watch dog, but not a bloodhound.” This, Lord Justice Fitz25. Id. at 682-685.
26. In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 279 (C.A.), 22 Acct. L.R. 77,
Dicksee’s Auditing 598 (17th ed. 1951). Reprinted at p. 119 infra.
27. Id. at 288-290.
28. 26 Acct. L.R. 13 (1900) (Irish C.A.), Dicksee's Auditing 608 (17th ed. 1951).
Reprinted at p. 122 infra.
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gibbon remarked, was very unfair to the bloodhound, who was just as little
likely to have his sense of suspicion aroused as the watch-dog. Applying this
instance of the dogs to the present case, was not the watch dog bound to bark?
and if, when sniffing round, you hit upon a trail of something wrong, surely
you must follow it up, and there is just as much obligation on the auditor,
who is bound to keep his eyes open, and his nose, too. As in the case of
the hound, the auditor will follow up this trail to the end, and the first things
he will “root up” are those statements of account, and then the fraud is dis
covered.29

Attention will now be directed to outstanding American cases which
have dealt with the responsibility of public accountants.
Craig v. Anyon 30

The plaintiffs in this action were members of a firm of brokers in
stocks and commodities operating on the New York, New Orleans and
Chicago exchanges. Their accounts were audited by the defendant firm
of accountants during the years 1913 to 1917, under an arrangement which
provided for quarterly audits and reports. The business was apparently
prosperous. In May 1917, through the confession of Moore, an employee
in charge of their commodities department, following an office investiga
tion, the plaintiffs learned that their prosperity had been an illusion.
T heir books had been falsified by Moore throughout a period of nearly
five years during which time they had been defrauded of over one million
dollars. In this action they alleged that the audits by defendants had been
negligently made and that had the audits been made with reasonable care
the falsification of the books would have been discovered and the losses
would not have occurred.
The case was tried in May 1922 in the Supreme Court of New York
County, before a jury, to whom were submitted the following two specific
questions:
1. Were the defendants negligent in the performance of their agreement with
Craig and Co.?
2. If so, what damages to the plaintiffs resulted directly and proximately from
such negligence?

T he trial judge charged that if the defendants were found to be liable,
the verdict must be either for $2,000, the aggregate amount paid as com
pensation for the defendants’ services, or for $1,177,805.26, the amount
of plaintiffs’ actual loss as proved. The jury found the accountants negli
gent and brought in a verdict for $1,177,805.26. Upon motion, the court
then directed a general verdict for the plaintiffs in an amount limited to
$2,000 “on the ground that as a matter of law the only loss which resulted
29. Id. at 17.
30. 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N.Y. Supp. 259 (1st Dep’t 1925), afl’d without opinion,
242 N.Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431 (1926). Reprinted at p. 131 infra.
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directly and proximately from negligence of the defendants was the
sum of $2,000.” Thereupon the case was carried on appeal to the Ap
pellate Division, which affirmed the trial court. Three judges concurred
in this result. T he presiding justice dissented and set out his views in a
short dissenting opinion, to which reference will be made later. T he liti
gation was then carried to the Court of Appeals, the highest appellate
tribunal, which in turn affirmed the judgment and the order of the T rial
Court and the Appellate Division, without opinion, with a single judge
again dissenting. This final decision on appeal was handed down in
April, 1926.
Upon the trial the defense rested without offering evidence in its own
behalf, thus limiting its own proof to the cross-examination of the wit
nesses produced by the plaintiffs. T he chief issue in the case became the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs themselves. Did such negligence
contribute predominantly or materially to the loss sustained, or were
the damages the proximate result of the accountants’ negligence? The
accountants had been paid an annual fee of only $500 for four quarterly
audits. There was no independent confirmation of customers’ accounts
nor was any attem pt made to compute the status of the open contracts
which would have been necessary in order to calculate the actual liability
of customers at the time of each audit. Plaintiffs testified that many years
before it had been agreed that the audit would include this work, as a
member of the accounting firm himself had said: “We have to make that
calculation both for straddles and open accounts before we can tell you
what is the actual standing of the firm.” T he alleged arrangement was
oral and the member of the accounting firm who made it was no longer
living at the time of the trial. However, plaintiffs admitted that they were
aware that these calculations had not been made by the accountants for
many years nor during any part of the period when the defalcations
occurred.
T he losses arose in a single account in the commodities department.
This was a discretionary account operated by Moore, who was in charge
of the department. It had been started with a margin of only $200 with
instructions that it be closed as soon as the losses exceeded that amount.
These facts had not been communicated to the accountants nor did they
become aware of them in the course of their audits. The accounting
records relating to commodities were all kept in the commodities depart
ment and under the control of Moore. This had been done over the
objections of the accountants, who protested that a certain ledger pre
viously maintained in the general office was a check on this subsidiary
commodities department and should not be transferred to it. T he ac
count involved was so active that it represented between 75% and 85%
of the firm’s Chicago commodities business. Between audit dates plain
tiffs paid out large sums of money from day to day and executed orders
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from hour to hour without any investigation or examination of the
account or check on the sufficiency of margin, relying implicitly upon
the honesty of Moore. T he Appellate Division found that the plaintiffs
could have prevented the loss by the exercise of reasonable care and that
“they should not have relied exclusively on the accountants.” I t was
further stated:
We think the damages cannot be said to flow naturally and directly from
defendants’ negligence or breach of contract. Plaintiffs should not be allowed
to recover for losses which they could have avoided by the exercise of reason
able care. . . .
The plaintiffs in effect contend that defendants are chargeable with negli
gence because of failure to detect Moore’s wrongdoing, wholly overlooking
the fact that, although they were closely affiliated with Moore, who was con
stantly under their supervision, they were negligent in failing properly to
supervise his acts or to learn the true condition of their own business and
to detect his wrongdoing.31

It should be noted that the Appellate Division did affirm the verdict of
the jury that the accountants had been negligent in the performance of
their audit. This was so in the face of the court’s instructions to the jury
that these auditors did not guarantee the correctness of their accounts;
that they do not say to the public: “Let us examine your books and
vouchers, and we will with absolute certainly discover any dishonesty,
every mistake that exists in those books, and we will protect you against
that”; that that is not what the auditors undertook to do; that they agreed
to use “such skill in the performance of their agreements as reasonably
prudent, skillful accountants would use under the circumstances”.
In limiting the recovery of the client to the amount of the fees paid, the
courts followed through on the theory that the client was damaged to
that extent by the failure of the accountants to render competent serv
ices,32 but that any additional losses were the result of the client’s own
negligence. However, a decision relieving the accountants from liability
cannot be regarded as the inevitable result where contributory negligence
is proved. T he result in Craig v. Any on must be confined to the ex
traordinary facts of this case, which nevertheless failed to impress the jury
before whom the case was tried. T he question as to what damage was
proximately caused by the negligence of the accountants, as well as the
question as to whether the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs was
predominantly the cause of the damage, are ordinarily factual issues for
the jury. All this was emphasized in the National Surety Corporation
case which is about to be discussed.
31. Id. at 66-67, 208 N.Y. Supp. at 268-269.
32. Even in the absence of proof th at the client suffered any other damage, if the
audit report was one which involved defective performance on the p art of the ac
countant, it has been held th at the client was damaged to the extent of the fees paid.
Board of County Comm’rs v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164, 102 P. 2d 1006 (1940). R eprinted
at p. 139 infra.
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Particularly in the light of the adverse verdict of the jury, it should be
obvious how vital to the accountant it is to clearly define and evidence
his own limited responsibility in situations where the client insists upon
limiting the scope of the examination. Such limitations should be con
firmed in writing at the outset of the audit and should be reiterated in
the letter of representations signed by the client before the completion
of the audit. They should again be set out explicitly in the report of the
accountant on the audit. If the limitations are as material as they were
in this case, there should be an express denial of an opinion on the state
ment as a whole.33 Our present-day standards and practices make all of
this mandatory. Had these standards been observed in the Craig v. Anyon
case the accountants would have been in a position to put in an affirmative
defense and the jury’s verdict in the first instance might have been favor
able to the accountants.
Before concluding the discussion of this case, it would be well to quote
the dissenting opinion of Presiding Justice Clarke:
I dissent from the affirmance of so much of the judgment as sets aside the
verdict of the jury assessing the damages at $ 1,177,805.26. The contract of
audit was not one merely to discover if inadvertent clerical errors had been
made in the bookkeeping, but was one of protection of the plaintiffs’ firm
from their own failure to find any error in their books of account. This con
tract the defendants failed to perform. Admitting the neglect of the plain
tiffs to discover the embezzlement and falsification of the accounts through
an examination of the books on their own part, the defendants’ work in
pursuance of the contract, owing to the manner in which it was performed,
failed to save plaintiffs from the consequences of such failure and neglect,
which was the very subject of the contract.34

This minority viewpoint seemed to influence the court in the later
National Surety Corporation case, which now follows.
National Surety Corporation Case 35

T he plaintiff in this action was the surety company on a fidelity bond
issued by them to the stock brokerage firm of Halle & Stieglitz under the
terms of which the surety had paid the losses sustained through the de
falcations of the cashier in the main office of Halle & Stieglitz. The
defendants were members of three different firms of certified public
accountants who had at different times, during the years 1928 to 1933
audited the books of account of the stock brokerage firm. T he plaintiff
claimed that the losses which its assignor had incurred had resulted from
the failure of the accountants to discover and report substantial cash
33. See Codification of Statements on Auditing P rocedure, American Institute of
Accountants, 1951.
34. Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55, 67-68, 208 N.Y. Supp. 259, 269-270 (1st Dep’t
1925).
35. National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (1st Dep’t
1939). Reprinted at p. 146 infra.

LIABILITY T O CLIENTS

23

shortages, which had continued during all of these years and had finally
amounted to a total of $329,300.
Four separate causes of action were stated as against each of the three
firms, namely: breach of contract in the alleged faulty performance of
the audit, breach of warranty in representations in their reports as to cash
in bank, negligence in the conduct of the audit, and fraud in the alleged
misrepresentation of material facts in their reports.36
The case was tried before a judge and jury in the Supreme Court, New
York County, in May, 1937. At the conclusion of the case, and before its
submission to the jury, the trial judge dismissed the complaint and dis
charged the jury, stating that “the Court is unable to discover anything
in the testimony indicating a violation of the obligations of an expert
accountant’’, and on the further ground that “the principle laid down in
Craig v. Any on . . . is the one to be here applied”. It appeared obvious
to the trial judge that “more glaring than any negligence on the part of
the defendants is the contributory negligence of the plaintiff’s assignor,”
and accordingly that the loss incurred could not “be said to flow naturally
and directly from defendants’ negligence or breach of contract.”
An appeal was taken to the Appellate Division, where the dismissal
below was reversed and a new trial was ordered. The court could not
have been more closely divided; three judges voted for reversal, and two
judges dissented and voted to affirm. This appeal did not dispose of the
issue of negligence on its merits. It merely decided that on the whole
record plaintiff had established a prima facie case which should have
been submitted to the jury, and that the trial judge was in error in
not so doing. It was pointed out also that it was for the jury to say whether
the defendants were liable for defalcations subsequent to their audits
“depending upon whether such losses could reasonably have been antici
pated at the time they were engaged in the performance of the work.”
36. In Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156
So. 116 (1934) the court held that in these situations, causes of action for breach of
contract, for negligence and for fraud might exist simultaneously. The action was held
to be not for the mere nonperformance of the contract but was said to be based “. . .
upon an alleged breach of duty to skillfully perform and truly report the condition of
accounts. . . .” The court quoted from 26 R.C.L. (Ruling Case Law) 758: “Whenever a
negligent breach of a contract is also a violation of a common-law duty, an action ex
delicto will lie. Accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform the
thing agreed to be done with care, skill, reasonable expediency, and faithfulness, and
a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of
the contract. If the transaction complained of had its origin in a contract which placed
the parties in such a relation that in attempting to perform the promised service the
tort was committed, then the breach of the contract is not the gravamen of the suit. The
contract in such case is mere inducement, creating the state of things which furnishes
the occasion of the tort. And in all such cases the remedy is an action on the case.
Based on the principle above indicated, the firmly established rule is that for injuries
resulting from unskillful or otherwise negligent performance of a thing agreed to be
done, an action ex delicto will lie, notwithstanding the act complained of would also
be ground for an action ex contractu.” Reprinted at p. 153 infra.
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T h e court also dealt at some length with the question of contributory
negligence. Not only did it hold that this defense presented a factual
issue which should have been submitted to the jury, but it discussed and
interpreted the rule of Craig v. Any on 37 and stated views with respect
thereto which would indicate that such a defense might not be effective
unless the facts relating to it were extraordinary, as they were in Craig v.
Anyon. In this connection it was said:
The defendants assert that they are not liable, no matter how negligent
they may have been, because Halle & Stieglitz were guilty of contributory
negligence. If it be true that Halle & Stieglitz so conducted their business as
to make possible Wallach’s defalcations, it did not necessarily excuse the
defendants from the consequences of their negligence in failing to discover
and report the facts. The action here, it must be remembered, is not to re
cover for the thefts committed by Wallach as it would be if it were against
Wallach or against the surety. The action is for errors of the accountants
in failing to discover Wallach’s defalcations, thereby making further defal
cations possible and rendering more difficult recovery for defalcations of the
past. The measure of damages in two such classes of actions is not the same.
We are, therefore, not prepared to admit that accountants are immune from
the consequences of their negligence because those who employ them have
conducted their own business negligently. . . Accountants, as we know, are
commonly employed for the very purpose of detecting defalcations which
the employer’s negligence has made possible. Accordingly, we see no reason
to hold that the accountant is not liable to his employer in such cases.
Negligence of the employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the
accountant’s failure to perform his contract and to report the truth. Thus,
by way of illustration, if it were found that the members of the firm of
Halle & Stieglitz had been negligent in connection with the transfer of
funds which occurred at about the time of each audit and that such neg
ligence contributed to the defendants’ false reports it would be a defense
to the action for it could then be said that defendants’ failure to perform
their contracts was attributable, in part at least, to the negligent conduct of
the firm. That was the principle applied in Craig v. Anyon, . . . where the
embezzler had been negligently represented to the accountants as a person
to be trusted. In the present case, the loss consisted of thefts by a cashier
not so represented “whose own account of his receipts and payments could
not reasonably be taken by an auditor without further inquiry.” (Matter of
Kingston Cotton Mill Company, No. 2 [1896] L.R. 2 Ch. Div. 279). (Emphasis
added)38

W hile this decision was not carried to the Court of Appeals, and there
fore it cannot be said to overrule Craig v. Anyon which was affirmed by
the higher court, nevertheless it lends support to those who have con
tended that the result in Craig v. Anyon was to be limited to its facts and
was not to be construed as a holding that contributory negligence, as a
m atter of law, would necessarily lim it the plaintiff’s recovery to the
amount of fees paid.
37. See note 30 supra.
38. N ational Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 235-236, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 554,
563 (1st Dep’t 1939).
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This case also is of interest to the profession because of the method
employed by the embezzler in concealing his abstractions from petty cash.
T he shortages thus created were in the first instance covered up by tem
porarily placing in the petty cash box checks which should have been
promptly deposited. This resulted in a series of delayed and substituted
bank deposits from day to day. During the period involved, Halle &
Stieglitz maintained about twenty-seven accounts, nine of which were in
New York City. Wallach, the cashier, apparently knew when audits were
to be made and boldly resorted to “kiting” from one bank to another at
the audit date. Through the use of this system of “lapping” deposits
almost from day to day, and “kiting” checks at the audit date, he suc
ceeded in avoiding detection for a period of years, while his defalcations
mounted steadily. It was contended that these fraudulent practices were
well known to all accountants and that the normal audit procedures
usually employed in the verification of cash to guard against such prac
tices were negligently omitted. T he court made the following reference
to this phase of the case:
The evidence in this case discloses similar conditions at the time of all
the audits in question. It was for the jury to say whether the practice of
“lapping” and “kiting” of checks should have put the defendants upon inquiry
which would have led to discovery of the defalcations, and whether, if de
fendants had exercised ordinary care and used proper methods of accounting
as established by the expert testimony, they would have observed checks
drawn out of numerical order. If they had checked “outstandings” they would
have noted that the check or checks by Wallach at the audit dates were
returned with the cancelled vouchers accompanying the next bank statement.
Again, if there had been any substantial compliance with the requirements
for verifying cash in banks, the cash shortages would have been detected, as
the jury might have found. Their representations that there had been a
verification of cash was a pretense of knowledge when they did not know
the condition of the bank accounts and had no reasonable basis to assume
that they did. This, the jury could have found, amounted at least to a con
structive fraud. (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 190, 191; State
Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, supra, page 112.) 39

Flagg v. Seng40
This was an action by a trustee of a bankrupt corporation for damages
for alleged fraud where the defendants, who were accountants, were em
ployed by the corporation to make periodic audits of its books and re
ports to its directors. T he case was tried on the issue as to whether the
defendant-accountants knowingly submitted false reports which deceived
the directors and which caused them to declare dividends which could
not be legally declared. T he trial court found in all respects in favor of
39. Id. at 235, 9 N.Y.S.2d a t 562.
40. 16 Cal. A pp£d 545, 60 P.2d 1004 (1936). R eprinted a t p. 163 infra.
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the defendants. The judgment in favor of the accountants was affirmed
on appeal.
The case is of special interest because of the activity and knowledge of
the directors who were alleged to have been deceived and because of the
reliance of the accountants upon the opinion of the attorney for the cor
poration concerning matters which, upon the trial of the case, were alleged
to be illegal. These aspects of the case are discussed in the following ex
cerpts from the court’s opinion:
Appellant’s main contention seems to be that stock in the corporation was
exchanged for real estate in violation of the permit issued by the state cor
poration department and that when a parcel of real estate was exchanged
for other property at a price in excess of its original cost, the difference was
entered on the books as a profit before the second piece was sold. The matter
last referred to represents an established policy on the part of the directors,
the books were thus kept on their order, and they were in no way deceived
by anything done by the respondents in this connection. With respect to the
other matter it appears that stock was, in effect, exchanged for real property.
This was done by putting through escrows whereby the corporation’s check
was given in payment for the land and the other party’s check was given in
payment for the stock. While there is some evidence that certain papers
in the files of the corporation indicated the true situation, although the same
was not indicated by the books of the corporation, there is other evidence to
the effect that this could not be learned from an examination of the books
and records of the corporation, that it was unknown to the respondents ex
cept in one instance, and that in that case the respondents took the matter
up with the attorney for the corporation who assured them that the matter
was perfectly legal. It further appears that whatever illegality existed and
whatever harm arose therefrom was caused directly by the action of the board
of directors, and that all such exchanges were made with their full knowledge
and consent and in accordance with their fixed policy, and no inference could
be drawn that anything done by the respondents had any casual relation to
any part of this situation. (Emphasis added)
Not only are the findings sustained by the evidence, but we are unable to
see how the matters particularly relied upon by the appellant can justify or
compel any other conclusions than those drawn by the court. Conceding that
certain sales of stock were illegally made this was not only well known to the
directors but was intentionally done by them. They were not only not
deceived by the audits and reports but they had intentionally handled the
transactions in such a manner as to make them appear on the books as a cash
transaction. While the court found upon sufficient evidence that the re
respondents had no knowledge of those parts of these transactions which had
been thus covered up and conceding, for the sake of argument, that the
respondents might have found out the true situation by a more extensive
investigation, it in no way appears that any discovery they might have made
would have affected the result. The method pursued by the directors was
followed on the advice of their attorneys and although the same has since
been declared illegal, no such blame can be attached to the respondents,
under the circumstances here appearing, as would justify a reversal of the
judgment.41
41. 60 P.2d at 1007-1008.
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Suits by Surety Companies

Where losses occur as the result of defalcations by an employee of the
client or through similar irregularities, it often happens that the client
is protected by a fidelity bond. As a result, the surety company which
issued the bond will indemnify the client for such losses to the extent of
the fidelity bond coverage. Upon such payment, the surety company be
comes subrogated to whatever claims the client may have had against the
accountant for alleged negligence or fraud in the performance of auditing
services. T h at is to say, a surety company, to the extent that it has made
good such losses, succeeds to whatever rights the client may have had
against the accountant for the failure of the accountant to discover such
defalcations. This equitable principle of subrogation is defined as fol
lows in Section 141, Restatement of Security:
Where the duty of the principal to the creditor is fully satisfied, the surety
to the extent that he has contributed to this satisfaction is subrogated . . . (c)
to the rights of the creditor against persons other than the principal whose
negligence or wilful conduct has made them liable to the creditor for the
same default. . . .

W hether the surety company asserts a claim against the accountant by
way of subrogation or assignment, this gives the surety company no greater
rights than the client himself would have had, had he become the party
plaintiff. Accordingly, the defense of the contributory negligence of the
client may be asserted against the surety company.
Furthermore, the surety company cannot be neglectful in enforcing its
remedies against the primary obligor (the defaulting employee) to the
detriment of the accountant. Thus, in the fairly recent case of Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. Atherton,42 where the County Treasurer was primarily
responsible for the defalcations of his deputy, he had made substantial
payment to the surety company on account of the loss and had given his
note for the balance, secured by a mortgage on property valued in excess
of the amount due the surety company. The surety company had made no
attempt to collect on this note, though it was long past due. The court
held that the negligence of the surety to collect from the County Treasurer
(the man who was primarly liable for the loss) was a sufficiently equitable
ground for estopping the surety from attempting to collect the unpaid por
tion of its loss from the accountants.
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear to the business com
munity and to surety companies that while an audit offers a large meas
ure of protection as a preventive of loss resulting from defalcations, the
accountant does not undertake to uncover all such irregularities. Circum
stances may arise where such frauds are perpetrated and remain unde
tected despite the fact that the audit complied with generally accepted
42. 47 N.M. 443, 144 P.2d 157 (1943). R eprinted at p. 168 infra.
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auditing standards. In such circumstances, the accountant does not as
sume the responsibility of an insurer. This is the function of the surety
company and generally it is recognized as such by all parties involved.
This problem of the division of responsibility between the accounting
profession and the surety companies has been widely discussed over the
years. Such discussions culminated in December, 1945 in an agreement
between the American Institute of Accountants and some twenty-three
of the companies issuing fidelity bonds, by the terms of which, the surety
companies agreed that it was not their intention to assert claims against
accountants, except on the basis of affirmatively dishonest or criminal
acts or gross negligence on the part of the accountants.43 It was stipu
lated that prior to asserting such claim, the matter would be submitted
to an impartial committee of three persons who were not accountants,
who would consider the evidence relating to the audit performed. It
was agreed by the surety companies that unless the committee concluded
that the claim involved an affirmatively dishonest or criminal act or
gross negligence on the part of the auditor, the surety company would
not press any claim by way of subrogation against the accountant. Sub
sequent to 1945, an additional number of surety companies became
parties to this arrangement. It is encouraging to note that the use of
this quasi-arbitration machinery has not yet been invoked. However, it
has served to clear the atmosphere in defining the respective responsi
bilities of the accounting profession and of surety companies in these
situations. It does not relieve accountants from their responsibility to
comply with generally accepted auditing standards. It does, however,
recognize the fact that accountants are not insurers against loss by de
falcation and that an audit, as valuable as it may be, is not the legal
equivalent of a fidelity bond.
43. See Carey, Defalcation in R elation to A u d it, Internal Control, and Fidelity Bonds,
83 J ournal of Accountancy 353 (1947), also in 15 T he Controller 127 (1947). R e
printed at p. 172 infra.

CHAPTER 3

LIA BILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
AT COMMON LAW
T he legal responsibility of accountants and auditors to parties other
than their clients (herein referred to as third parties) has been dealt with
in a num ber of highly im portant American cases. These cases have
defined and limited the accountant’s responsibility for negligence, but
they have emphasized the accountant’s exposure to claims of third parties
on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit. These cases have also
influenced the enactment of legislation which has broadened the re
sponsibility for negligence where the claims of investors or securities
purchasers are involved. These statutory rules will be outlined at a later
point in this text.
T he landmark cases relating to accountant’s liability to third parties
now will be discussed.
The Landell C a se 44
This was an action brought against a firm of certified public account
ants by a plaintiff who claimed that he had suffered loss through the
purchase of shares of the Employers’ Indemnity Company, in reliance
upon their financial statement which had been audited and certified to
by the defendant-accountants. T he complaint further alleged that the
financial statement was false and untrue, that the stock purchased by
him turned out to be valueless, that the loss he sustained was due to the
negligence of the accountants in the conduct of their audit and that they
were consequently liable for the loss he had sustained. T he court below
entered judgment for the defendants on the ground that, as a m atter of
law, the complaint failed to state a cause of action. On appeal, this judg
ment for the defendants was affirmed, for the following stated reasons:
There were no contractual relations between the plaintiff and defendants,
and, if there is any liability from them to him, it must arise out of some
breach of duty, for there is no averment that they made the report with intent
to deceive him. The averment in the statement of claim is that the defendants
were careless and negligent in making their report; but the plaintiff was a
stranger to them and to it, and, as no duty rested upon them to him, they
44. Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919). R eprinted at p. 175 infra.
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cannot be guilty of any negligence of which he can complain: Schiffer v.
Sauer Co. et al., 238 Pa,. 550, 86 Atl. 479, This was the correct view of the
court below, and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.45

The Ultramares Case 46

The Ultramares case is undoubtedly the leading American case dealing
with the legal responsibility of accountants. Early in 1924, the defendants,
a firm of certified public accountants, had audited the books of account
of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., who were importers and dealers in rubber, and
had certified to their balance sheet as of December 31, 1923; the said
certificate of the accountants reading as follows:
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year
ending December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet
is in accordance therewith and with the information and explanations given
us. We further certify that, subject to provision for federal taxes on income,
the said statement, in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.47

The accountants supplied their clients with thirty-two copies of the
certified balance sheet, knowing in a general way that it would be ex
hibited by their client to banks and other creditors. The plaintiff in this
action was one of the creditors to whom the balance sheet was later sub
mitted, who claimed that he relied upon it in making substantial ad
vances to Fred Stern & Co., Inc. It was not known to the accountants
that the balance sheet would be submitted to this specific creditor.
T he balance sheet as certified, showed a net worth of approximately
$1,070,000, when, as a matter of fact, the corporation was at the time in
solvent and its liabilities exceeded its assets by approximately $200,000.
The assets had been overstated by the inclusion of over $950,000 of fic
titious and nonexisting accounts receivable. T he liabilities had been un
derstated by over $300,000 through failure to record accounts payable
covering merchandise which had been purchased, received, and dealt
with as assets of the business. The audit had failed to detect these fraudu
lent entries, and for the loss suffered by the plaintiff-creditor it brought
this action against the accountants.
The action was brought in November, 1926. It was not until April,
1929 that it was tried before a judge and jury in the Supreme Court of
New York County. In its inception the complaint alleged a single cause
45. Ibid.
46. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 229 App. Div. 581, 243 N.Y.Supp. 179 (1st Dep’t
1930), rev’d, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Both opinions reprinted at pp. 175 and
179.
47. See Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E. 808 (1934), where the certif
icate was specifically based upon statements received from abroad with respect to
foreign constitutent companies. The case was distinguished from the Ultramares case
on that ground. Reprinted at p. 192 infra.
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of action based upon the alleged negligence of the accountants. Upon
the trial the complaint was amended to add a second cause of action in
fraud. At the conclusion of the trial the complaint was dismissed as to
fraud. However, the trial judge reserved decision on the motion to dis
miss the negligence action and submitted the question of negligence to
the jury. T he jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount
of $187,576.32. The trial judge thereupon dismissed the complaint and
set aside the verdict based on negligence, stating that his decision was
based on the law and not on the facts. The case was taken to the Appel
late Division which unanimously affirmed the dismissal of the cause of
action for fraud, but, by a divided court of three to two, reversed the
dismissal of negligence and reinstated the verdict.
T he case was then taken on cross appeals to the Court of Appeals,
which handed down its unanimous decision in 1931, reversing the Appel
late Division on both causes of action. As to the cause of action for negli
gence, the judgment of the trial judge was affirmed, dismissing the cause
of action as a matter of law. As to the second cause of action, based on
fraud, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and a new trial granted.
The opinion for the unanimous court was written by Judge Cardozo.
The court expressed the view that the evidence supported a finding that
the audit was negligently made, but it reached the conclusion that even
if negligence existed, it did not create liability to the plaintiff in the
circumstances of this case. In this connection, the court stated:
The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to make
their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract to make
it with the care and caution proper to their calling. Fraud includes the
pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none. To creditors and in
vestors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate, the defendants owed
a like duty to make it without fraud, since there was notice in the circum
stances of its making that the employer did not intend to keep it to himself.
. . . A different question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty
to these to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath
the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an
The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class,
enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that
exposes to these consequences. (Emphasis added)48

In this connection the court distinguished the facts in this case from
those in Glanzer v. Shepard.49 In that case a public weigher, hired by
the seller of beans, issued a false certificate of weight which was re
lied upon by the purchaser. The purchaser sued the weigher on the
ground of negligence and was permitted to recover. This earlier case
was not reversed by the Court of Appeals. It was merely distinguished
48. 255 N.Y. at 179-180, 174 N.E. at 444.

49- 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). R eprinted at p. 194 infra.
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on its facts and not considered applicable to the Ultramares case. Ac
cordingly, it is thought by many that if a case should arise where the
third party who relies upon an accountant’s statement was specifically
identified and known to the accountant as one for whose primary benefit
the audit was made, then there might be liability even for negligence
to such a third party.80 In comparing the facts of the Ultramares case,
the court stated:
In Glanzer v. Shepard, the seller of beans requested the defendants, public
weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish the buyer with a copy.
This the defendants did. Their return, which was made out in duplicate,
one copy to the seller and the other to the buyer, recites that it was made by
order of the former for the use of the latter. The buyer paid the seller on
the faith of the certificate which turned out to be erroneous. We held that
the weighers were liable at the suit of the buyer for the moneys overpaid.
Here was something more than the rendition of a service in the expectation
that the one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter in the opera
tions of his business as occasion might require. Here was a case where the
transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one possibility among
many, but the “end and aim of the transaction,” as certain and immediate
and deliberately willed as if a husband were to order a gown to be delivered
to his wife, or a telegraph company, contracting with the sender of a mess
age, were to telegraph it wrongly to the damage of the person expected to
receive it. . . . The bond was so close as to approach that of privity, if not
completely one with it. Not so in the case at hand. No one would be likely
to urge that there was a contractual relation, or even one approaching it,
at the root of any duty that was owing from the defendants now before
us to the indeterminate class of persons who, presently or in the future, might
deal with the Stern Company in reliance on the audit. In a word, the service
rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the in
formation of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract,
and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand,
the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern Company, a convenient
instrumentality for use in the development, of the business, and only inci
dentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern and his associates
might exhibit it thereafter. Foresight of these possibilities may charge with
liability for fraud. The conclusion does not follow that it will charge with
liability for negligence. (Emphasis added)5051

In thus lim iting the liability of accountants to third parties for mere
negligence, the court indicated how negligence might of itself be evi
dence from which an inference of fraud could be drawn. In this connec
tion, the court stated:
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of
fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as to
justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this
again is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less than this is proved, if
there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession of an
50. See Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix N at’l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
T his case was distinguished from the situation in Ultramares and held to be inappli
cable thereto. R eprinted at p. 197 infra.
51. 255 N.Y. at 182-183, 174 N.E. at 445-446.
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opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for negligence is one
that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties
by whom the contract has been made. We doubt whether the average busi
ness man receiving a certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely
as one among a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything
more.62

In dealing with the question of the possible liability of the account
ants on the second cause of action, for fraud, the court concluded that
in this case the certificate of the accountants involved both the repre
sentation of fact and the expression of opinion. Thus it found that the
accountants “certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that the
balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account.” As to this,
it was held, as a matter of law, that if their statement of fact was false,
they were not to be exonerated because they believed it to be true. The
court further concluded that there was ample evidence from which the
jury might hold such a statement to be false. The court discussed this
point further, stating:
Correspondence between the balance sheet and the books imports some
thing more, or so the triers of the facts might say, than correspondence be
tween the balance sheet and the general ledger, unsupported or even con
tradicted by every other record. The correspondence to be of any moment
may not unreasonably be held to signify a correspondence between the state
ment and the books of original entry, the books taken as a whole. If that
is what the certificate means, a jury could find that the correspondence did
not exist, and that the defendants signed the certificates without knowing it
to exist and even without reasonable grounds for belief in its existence.63

In reviewing the facts in the record concerning the audit that was
made, the court dwelt upon the grounds for suspicion which existed, as
reflected in the working papers of the accountants, and felt that a jury
might have held that in the circumstances the limited testing and sam
pling employed was entirely inadequate. T he following quotation from
the court’s opinion indicates how neglect to follow through with the most
searching inquiry when suspicions are aroused may readily present a
question for the jury as to whether there was a sincere belief in the
opinion expressed:
How far books of account fair upon their face are to be probed by account
ants, in an effort to ascertain whether the transactions back of them are in
accordance with the entries, involves to some extent the exercise of judgment
and discretion. Not so, however, the inquiry whether the entries certified as
there, are there in very truth, there in the form and in the places where men
of business training would expect them to be. The defendants were put on
their guard by the circumstances touching the December accounts receivable
to scrutinize with special care. A jury might find that with suspicions thus
awakened, they closed their eyes to the obvious, and blindly gave assent.54525354
52. Id . a t 189, 174 N.E. a t 448.
53. Id. a t 189-190, 174 N.E. at 448.
54. Id. at 192, 174 N X a t 449.
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On the whole record the Court of Appeals concluded that a jury might
find that the accountants, in certifying to the correspondence between
the balance sheet and the accounts, made a statement of fact as true to
their own knowledge when they had no knowledge on the subject; also
that a jury might find that the accountants acted “without information
leading to a sincere or genuine belief when they certified to an opinion
that the balance sheet faithfully reflected the condition of the business.”
Accordingly the dismissal of the cause of action in fraud was reversed and
a new trial was granted.
The State Street Trust Company Case 55

The principles enunciated in the Ultramares case were soon to be
applied in two other cases now to be discussed. T he action in the State
Street Trust Company case was commented in December, 1932, subse
quent to Judge Cardozo’s opinion in the Ultramares case. Accordingly
the complaint was based on allegations of fraud although the evidence
from which the jury was asked to find fraud involved gross negligence
for the most part.
The audit covered the operations of Pelz-Greenstein Co. for the year
1928 and their financial position as at December 31, 1928. This company
was engaged in the factoring business, a form of commercial financing.
They loaned money to firms who were manufacturers and merchants
and made a profit from charging interest, commissions, deducting in
terest, discounts, et cetera, in connection with the loans which they made
to others and the collection of the accounts receivable assigned to them
by their customers. Pelz-Greenstein Co. in turn obtained most of their
own working capital from some seventeen banks to whom they were in
debted in the aggregate amount of $4,275,000 on December 31, 1928.
The plaintiff in this action was one of the said bank creditors who
claimed that they had made loans in reliance upon the financial state
ments certified to by the defendant-accountants, which were here at
tacked as fraudulent misrepresentations.
The basic factual issues were different from those in the Ultramares
case. Here it was claimed that the reserves set up for bad and doubtful
accounts were grossly inadequate. Furthermore, it was contended that,
in a long-form report which the accountants later submitted to their
client only, material facts were revealed which indicated that the ac
countants knew that the financial position was not fairly presented in
the condensed report which they had issued for distribution to the banks.
It was further claimed that the long-form report to the client was quali
fied by making it subject to comments which were omitted from the
55. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938). Reprinted
at p. 203 infra.
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condensed statement, whereas the condensed statement carried with it
the unqualified certificate of the accountants. T he certificate which was
attached to the short-form report (described as “condensed statement”)
read as follows:
We hereby certify that we examined the books of account and record (sic)
pertaining to the assets and liabilities of Pelz-Greenstein Co., Inc., New York
City, as of the close of business December 31, 1928, and, based on the records
examined, information submitted to us, and subject to the foregoing notes
[not here material], it is our opinion that the above condensed statement
shows the financial condition of the company at the date stated and that the
related income and surplus account is correct.

In comparison with the accountants’ certificate involved in the Ultra
mares case, it is interesting to note (a) there was no reference to the
statement being in accordance with the books, (b) the certificate em
braced the “related income and surplus account,” as well as the balance
sheet.
The case was tried in March, 1936 before a judge and jury in the
Supreme Court of New York County. At the close of plaintiff’s case,
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. T he trial judge reserved
decision. T he defendants thereupon rested without calling any wit
nesses, renewed their motion to dismiss and also moved for a directed
verdict. T he trial judge reserved decision again and submitted the case
to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of
$246,000. Thereupon the trial judge granted a motion to set aside the
verdict and directed a verdict for defendants on the ground that the
jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence. T he Appellate Division
unanimously affirmed (without opinion) 50 the directed verdict for de
fendants, making it necessary for the plaintiffs to obtain permission from
the Court of Appeals to carry the case to that court. T he Court of Ap
peals by a vote of four to two reversed the judgments below and granted
a new trial.
T he Court of Appeals reiterated the principles laid down in the Ultra
mares case, which it summarized as follows:
We have held that in the absence of a contractual relationship or its equiva
lent, accountants cannot be held liable for ordinary negligence in preparing
a certified balance sheet even though they are aware that the balance sheet
will be used to obtain credit. (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170).
Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties, even where there
is lacking deliberate or active fraud. A representation certified as true to the
knowledge of the accountants when knowledge there is none, a reckless mis
statement, or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the con
clusion that there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon
which to base liability. A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate
the doubtful, if sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an in
ference of fraud so as to impose liability for losses suffered by those who56
56. 251 App. Div. 717, 298 N.Y.Supp. 176 (1st Dep’t 1937).
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rely on the balance sheet. In other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard
of consequence may take the place of deliberate intention.
In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (255 N.Y. 170) we said with no uncertainty
that negligence, if gross, or blindness, even though not equivalent to fraud,
was sufficient to sustain an inference of fraud. Our exact words were: “In
this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already stated in the
course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even when not equivalent
to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an inference of fraud. At least
this is so if the negligence is gross.” (Emphasis added) 57

I t would seem that the apparent inconsistency between the long-form
report later submitted to the client and the short-form report upon which
the plaintiff had relied was of itself the crucial evidence which the Court
of Appeals felt supported the jury verdict of fraud. In the following
discussion the court refers to this long-form report as “a letter of ex
planation.” In the absence of an affirmative defense by the accountants
the court seemed to attach sinister significance to the fact that a certified
report should be supplemented by a more detailed document which
went only to the client and that the detailed report was not released
until after a delay of thirty days. This view is indicated in the following
quotation from the opinion:
The record is, indeed, replete with evidence, both oral and documentary,
to make a prima facie case against the defendants. In the first place, we have
these accountants guilty of an act which is the equivalent of active misrepre
sentation. On April 2, 1929, they sent to Pelz-Greenstein the certified balance
sheet, with ten additional copies, knowing that it was to be used to obtain
credit. "Nothing was said as to the persons to whom these counterparts would
be shown, or the extent or number of the transactions in which they would
be used. . . . The range of the transactions in which a certificate of audit
might be expected to play a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibili
ties of the business that was mirrored in the summary.” (Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174.) Not until thirty days later did the accountants
send to Pelz-Greenstein a letter of explanation of this balance sheet, and then
apparently only one copy. So important was this covering letter in the minds
of defendants that, although the balance sheet attached to the covering letter
was in other respects substantially identical with the original balance sheet, it
contained the following notation, which did not appear at all on the original
balance sheet released thirty days earlier: "This balance sheet is subject to the
comments contained in the letter attached to and made a part of this report.”
One of the copartners, testifying before trial, said: “We wanted to try to pre
vent anyone using this balance sheet, without knowing the scope of the exam
ination which we made, which is set forth in paragraph 2 of the full report.
. . . We have had cases where our entire covering letter had been deleted
from these reports and just the balance sheet used.” Yet, in effect, these
defendants themselves did just this. They held back this covering letter for
thirty days and issued the balance sheet alone to the world of possible lenders.
The loan by the plaintiff was made long before this important covering letter
was even sent.
The above act of the accountants, in placing in circulation a certified balance*57
57. 278 N.Y. at 111-112, 15 N.E.2d at 418-419.
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sheet which they practically conceded should not be used without knowing
the scope of the examination set forth in the covering letter, and then allow
ing a period of thirty days to elapse before sending the covering letter, and
then only one copy, whereas there had been ten copies of the certified balance
sheet issued, was itself gross negligence and an important piece of evidence
raising an inference of fraud.58

There was considerable additional evidence before the jury indicating
that the accountants accepted the assurances of their client concerning
the collectibility of accounts when the records before them should have
aroused their suspicion to a point where independent inquiry was manda
tory. From this evidence to support the allegation of gross negligence,
the jury might have inferred that the expression of opinion concerning
financial position (embracing the adequacy of reserves for bad and
doubtful accounts) was a mere fraudulent pretense and that the ac
countants did not entertain a sincere and honest belief in the opinion
which they expressed. On this phase of the case the court stated:
The defendants urge that these defendants were excused from investigation
because of a letter from Leon S. Pelz, treasurer of Pelz-Greenstein, in which
he stated that Pelz-Greenstein had in its possession “sufficient saleable mer
chandise to completely liquidate” these accounts. In other words, defendants
were content to certify a balance sheet knowing it would be used to secure
bank credit which contained an item of over $125,000 59 of apparently dead
accounts on the uninvestigated and unsupported statement of the party seek
ing the credit that these accounts were amply secured, although it appeared
on the face of the books that there had been no realization upon this security
for years. Where the books indicate the likelihood of a substantial loss, a
failure to indicate this on the balance sheet can be justified only by an actual
check-up. It does not suffice to rely instead upon the statement of an officer
of the firm the books of which are being examined. If an accountant may
disregard a situation which indicates substantial losses because he is informed
by the person whose books are being examined that there is adequate secur
ity, the balance sheet issued by the accountant, by its failure to point this
out, contains a misrepresentation. The very purpose of the bank in seeking
the balance sheet prepared by the accountant is to check any possible fraud
on the part of the person seeking the loan. Yet these accountants contend
that they may accept as true a statement by the party whose books are being
examined, make no check-up or investigation on their own part, and issue
a statement omitting entirely any mention of the reason why investigation of
the security was omitted.
We have explicit expert testimony, uncontradicted, that under these circum
stances it was improper accounting practice for defendants to accept a letter
from Pelz-Greenstein, and that they should have investigated these accounts
very fully to ascertain whether the companies were still in business and to
ascertain definitely and independently what security, if any, Pelz-Greenstein
held for the payment of these accounts.60

T he opinion of the Court of Appeals also indicates that they were un
58. Id. at 113-114, 15 N.E.2d at 419-420.
59. Sic, should clearly be $215,000.
60. 278 N.Y. at 118-119, 15 N.E.2d at 421-422.
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favorably impressed with the fact that the defendants rested without call
ing any witness, “although there would naturally be available the men
who made the audit, those who prepared or supervised the preparation
of the working papers or the certified balance sheet and experts to refute
the testimony offered by the experts called by plaintiff.” The conclusion
to reverse the judgments below and grant a new trial was thus expressed:
The foregoing presents abundant evidence from which a jury could find
that defendants knew facts which vitally affected the financial worth of PelzGreenstein, and which defendants totally suppressed on the certified balance
sheet but disclosed to Pelz-Greenstein alone in the one copy of the covering
letter sent thirty days later. The jury further could have found that the
computation of reserves on the certified balance sheet was a misrepresentation
which did not reflect the facts as known to defendants, and which they in
good faith should have revealed. Where the record shows acts on the part
of the accountants, as outlined above, we cannot say, as a matter of law,
that plaintiff has failed to make out a case for the jury.61

There was an interesting dissenting opinion representing the views of
two of the six judges who sat on this appeal. They stressed the fact
that the only representation of fact here involved was the statement by
the accountants that they had examined the books of account, which was
undisputed. It also pointed out that the defendants did not war
rant or certify the accuracy of the balance sheet; they represented only
that the balance sheet was “in their opinion” correct. W ith respect to
the expression of such an opinion, the minority of the court went on
to state:
The defendants are not liable for error of judgment; they are not liable
even for lack of care in arriving at their opinion. They are liable only if
the opinion expressed was not only erroneous, but was fraudulently expressed.
Actual bad faith and intent to deceive is not always, it is true, an essential
element in a cause of action for deceit. Such a cause of action may be estab
lished against the defendants without proof that they expressed an opinion
which they knew was incorrect; at least, however, there must be evidence of
a ruthless disregard of whether the opinion was correct or not — the ex
pression of an opinion where “the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to
lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it.” (Ultra
mares Corp. v. Touche . . .) 62

The discussion in this dissenting opinion of the inadequacy of reserves
particularly warrants quotation:
Judge FINCH [who wrote the majority opinion] has, in his opinion, re
ferred to the evidence upon which he bases his conclusion that it establishes
fraud. I shall try to avoid repetition of that evidence. The most important
of the alleged errors in the balance sheet is the failure to provide sufficient
reserves for the collection of “commission accounts receivable.” The amount
of reserves which should be set aside to take care of loss that may be suffered
by reason of inability to collect such accounts is a matter of judgment. The
61. Id. at 121, 15 N.E.2d at 423.
62. Id. at 125, 15 N.E.2d at 424-425.
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defendants knew of circumstances which it is said pointed clearly to the
conclusion that a reserve of $21,000 is insufficient to take care of these ac
counts of over $2,043,337.81. Perhaps the defendants here showed a lack of
caution. Their letter sent thirty days after the certified balance sheet was
sent, shows that they knew that the reserve might prove insufficient. None
the less, the amount of probable loss even with these circumstances known
remained uncertain; the estimate of one per cent loss was doubtless overoptimistic, yet the estimate was based on facts which were not “so flimsy as
to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it” . . .
The next error which, it is argued, shows negligence so gross as to indicate
a lack of honest belief based on substantial grounds is that no allowance was
made for “commission account advances.” Many of these accounts were old.
Again there are circumstances which perhaps should have acted as a warning
signal to a cautious accountant. The defendants saw the signal — that is
shown by the supplementary letter — but decided, nevertheless, to make no
allowance. Again it would, doubtless, have been better if the defendants had
given to those who might rely upon the balance sheet, the warning signal
they had seen. They did, however, give notice on the balance sheet that ac
counts were “inactive and in liquidation” and they removed them from the
current assets of the business and placed them “below the line.” The owners
of the business, men who at that time had a fine reputation, assured the
defendants that they had sufficient security to liquidate these dead accounts.
T can find here no justification for any argument that a balance sheet which
shows that no allowance or reserve has been made for inactive accounts in
liquidation may be held to be a fraudulent representation that no allowance
or reserve is necessary.63

The minority concluded:
The jury might find that the defendants’ judgment was bad, but the court
pointed out in the Ultramares case that liability cannot be predicated upon
error however great in the exercise of judgment. The error of judgment does
not indicate a willful expression of a false opinion, or an expression of
opinion based on grounds so flimsy that the jury might conclude that the
opinion was not based on genuine belief. To permit recovery in a case
where the evidence does not sustain such a conclusion is to wipe out the
distinction which this court has always drawn and which it reiterated in
the Ultramares case.64

When one considers the views expressed in the minority opinion to
gether with the fact that six judges in the courts below all felt the evi
dence did not support the jury’s verdict of fraud, it would seem that the
adverse decision in this litigation may have turned upon the existence of
a long-form report which made the condensed statement seem misleading
by comparison, coupled with the fact that the accountants chose not to
defend their own work. This thought emphasizes the inherent danger,
from an evidentiary standpoint, of the coexistence of a condensed and
a detailed report.
63. Id. at 126-127, 15 N.E.2d at 425.
64. Id. at 128, 15 N.E.2d at 426.
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The O'Connor Case 65

This case involved an action by a group of persons who had pur
chased shares of the preferred stock of G. L. Miller & Company, Inc.,
during 1925 and 1926, in alleged reliance upon a balance sheet dated
August 31, 1925, which was stated to present the financial position after
giving effect to proposed new financing, namely, the sale of thirty
thousand shares of preferred stock at par, an aggregate offering to the
public of $3,000,000. T he balance sheet was published on the letterhead
of defendant-accountants and was reprinted and incorporated in the
prospectus which was used in the sale of the stock. At the bottom of the
balance sheet, over the signature of the accountants, appeared the fol
lowing certificate:
Our audit of the books and accounts of the G. L. Miller & Company, In
corporated, discloses that the net earnings of the Company for the year ended
December 31, 1924, were in excess of 2½ times the dividend requirements of
the contemplated issue of 30,000 shares of 8% cumulative preferred stock, and
that the net earnings for the eight months ended August 31, 1925, were in
excess of 3 times the dividend requirements of said stock for the said eight
months.

T he corporation was adjudicated bankrupt in 1926. Its assets were in
sufficient to pay the allowed claims of creditors and therefore the
plaintiff-stockholders lost their entire investment. The action against the
accountants was begun in 1928; it did not come to trial until 1934. Dur
ing this period of time, the final decision in the Ultramares case was
handed down. Shortly thereafter, the complaint in this case was amended
so as to state a cause of action in fraud against the accountants, instead
of negligence. Owing to the diversity of citizenship of the plaintiffs, the
action was brought in the Federal District Court for the Southern Dis
trict of New York. After a 13-week trial before a judge and jury, the
jury brought in a verdict for the defendants, in May 1934. Several of the
plaintiffs carried the case on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals
where, in August 1937, by the unanimous decision of the court of three
judges, the judgment for the defendants entered upon the jury verdict
in the lower court was affirmed. Plaintiffs’ petition to the Supreme
Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, requesting that body
to review the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, was denied.
T he business of G. L. Miller & Company, Inc. consisted in under
writing mortgage bonds on real estate, usually on buildings to be con
structed, acting as trustees under the mortgage indentures, and selling
the bonds to the public. The criticism of the audit and the “certified”
balance sheet involved a great many very complicated transactions and
65. O ’Connor v. Ludlam , 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937).
R eprinted at p. 214 infra.
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technical legal relationships growing out of the manifold functions of
the client as underwriter, trustee, and disbursing agent in connection
with the business which it conducted.
T he main issues which emerged were the contentions of the plaintiffs
that:
1. The audit and balance sheet were claimed to be “intentionally fraudulent
in not adequately disclosing the amount of cash held in trust.”
2. Payments made by Miller & Company to complete the construction of mort
gaged buildings were falsely shown in the balance sheet to be “Secured.”
3. Miller & Company itself guaranteed to bondholders the completion of build
ings under construction, and the balance sheet made no mention of such con
tingent liabilities.
4. The defendants made a false certificate as to the net earnings of Miller &
Company.

T he defendants and members of their staff who worked on the audit
testified at great length as to the work done. Voluminous working papers
supplied further evidence of the audit procedures followed and the ac
counting evidence upon the basis of which their opinion was expressed.
T he testimony of experts was offered both on behalf of plaintiffs and
defendants. There was a sharp conflict on the basic issue as to whether
the audit was so conducted that a jury might infer that the accountants
did not entertain a sincere and honest belief in the opinion which they
expressed.
Accordingly, the judge carefully explained the applicable law and sub
mitted the entire case to the jury. T he circuit court commented as fol
lows upon the charge to the jury:
The charge which Judge Patterson delivered to the jury was an exceptionally
clear exposition of the applicable law. Since there was no contractual re
lationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, liability could be im
posed only for fraud: a mistake in the balance sheet, even if it were the result
of negligence, could not be the basis of a recovery. Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R. 1139. Fraud
presupposes not only an untrue statement but also a fraudulent intent. On
the question of falsity of the representations the jury was told that the issue
was whether the defendants’ representations, “in the sense to be taken by an
ordinary reasonable man,” were, in fact, true or untrue — whether a true or
a false impression was created. On the question of intent, the jury was
told that fraud may be established by showing that a false representation has
been made, either knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or in reckless
disregard of whether it be true or false; and that the issue was whether the
defendants had an honest belief that the statements made by them were true.
“If they did have that honest belief, whether reasonably or unreasonably,
they are not liable. If they did not have an honest belief in the truth of
their statements, then they are liable, so far as this third element [scienter]
is concerned.” The jury was also told that an intent to deceive may be inferred
from a lack of honest representation; and that, so far as alleged concealments
or omissions were concerned, the issue was whether the omission to state
certain matters was deliberate and intended to conceal. It was further
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charged that, if the audit made “was so superficial as to be only a pretended
audit and not a real audit, then the element of knowledge of falsity of their
representations is present, and they may be held liable.” Reading the charge
as a whole, it seems to be in strict conformity with the established law . . .66

Upon this appeal the issue relating to the item “Notes and Accounts
Receivable and Accrued Interest — Secured,” was particularly crucial.
The trial judge stated that these assets were not secured as a matter of
law. T he plaintiffs contended that the defendants knew they were not
secured. The defense maintained that they honestly, if erroneously, be
lieved them to be secured. W ith respect to this issue the trial judge
charged:
As matter of law it is my opinion, and I charge you, that these advances
to complete unfinished buildings are not the kind of advances that are
secured under the trust deeds. The point, however, is not so clear that per
sons reading such parts of the deed might not, in good faith, entertain differ
ent opinions; and the good faith of the defendants in representing these ad
vances as secured is one of the questions of fact for you to determine under
all the evidence applicable to these notes, and under the rules which I will
later explain to you.67

The plaintiffs requested the trial judge to charge the jury that if they
should find that the statement as to security was false and “that the de
fendants represented to the plaintiffs that this was true to their own
knowledge, as distinguished from belief or opinion, they were guilty of
making a false balance sheet, even if they believed it to be true.” This
request to charge was denied, and the denial became one of the important
grounds for appeal. T he circuit court supported the position of the
trial judge, dealing with the question in the following language:
Accountants profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an agree
ment between the audit and the entries in books audited, but there is no
suggestion in the cases relied upon that a statement by an auditor that notes
are secured by the provisions of a trust deed is an assertion of knowledge
rather than an expression of opinion. To suggest that a title examiner was
guilty of fraud if he erroneously certified a title because he had honestly
misconceived the legal significance of a provision in a deed would doubtless
horrify counsel for the appellants no less than other members of the legal
profession. There is no reason to hold accountants to a higher standard,
when they deal with legal documents. The issue of the defendants’ good
faith was rightly left to the jury.68

As to the alleged omission of contingent liabilities, it was stated:
T h e charge called attention to the conflicting testimony and instructed the

jury to weigh it. The refused requests were to the effect that omission of
the contingent liabilities made the balance sheet false. In view of the con
flicting testimony, such a charge was properly refused. Even if it were an abuse
of good accounting practice to omit them, such an abuse was not fraud unless
66. Id. at 53-54.
67. Quoted in circuit court opinion, id. at 55.
68. Id. at 56.
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accompanied by an intent to conceal. The issue of fraudulent concealment
was fairly put to the jury in the general charge. (Emphasis added) 69

T he circuit court concluded that a full and fair trial had been had;
that the instructions given to the jury as to the applicable law were cor
rect; that the factual issues had been properly submitted to the jury
and that the verdict of the jury for the accountants should not be
disturbed.
General Comments

A comparative study of the foregoing three leading cases dealing with
accountants’ legal responsibility to third parties supports the following
general conclusions.
In the absence of special statutory rules (such as the Federal Securities
Act soon to be discussed) there is no liability for mere negligence. How
ever, the Ultramares case did not reverse such authorities as Glanzer v.
Shepard and Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix National Bank, where it
had been held that there would be such liability if there was a suffi
ciently intimate relationship between the third party and the defendant.
Thus, we still have the possibility of liability for mere negligence if the
particular third party, or a limited group of which he was a member,
was known to the accountant with sufficient definiteness as a party for
whose primary benefit the certified statement of the accountant was
intended.70
T he Ultramares case held that a false representation of fact as of
knowledge creates liability even if believed to be true. This rule em
phasizes the vital distinction between representations of fact and ex
pressions of opinion. It was a major issue in the Ultramares case in
relation to the alleged representation that the balance sheet was in ac
cordance with the books, and it was one of the major issues resulting in
the reversal which sent the case back for a new trial. Plaintiffs in the
O’Connor case sought unsuccessfully to have the court submit to the
jury the question of whether or not the characterization “Secured” in
relation to assets in the balance sheet was a representation of fact as of
knowledge. However, it was there held that the use of this term involved
only the expression of opinion concerning what was essentially a legal
concept.
69. Ibid.
70. It should be noted, however, that the Court of Appeal in England, early in
1951, dealt with just such a situation and on the authority of a line of earlier English
cases held that the accountant was not liable for mere negligence to a plaintiff, other
than his client, even though the accountant know definitely that his report was in
tended for the use of and reliance upon by that specific plaintiff. The court divided
two to one on the result, but the majority felt that the English precedents dictated a
result in favor of the defendant accountant. The provisions of the English Companies
Act were not involved Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. [1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.). For a
full discussion of this case, see Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., Negligent
Misrepresentation by Accountants, 67 L.Q. R ev. 466 (1951). Reprinted at p. 221 infra
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T he principles that there is liability for fraud to persons outside the
privity of contract, that gross negligence may be evidence of fraud, that
even the expression of opinion may be a fraudulent representation if
there is not a sincere and honest belief in that opinion — are all long
established in the law.70a Only the application of such principles to the
accountants’ situation is novel. It has shifted the strategy of third party
plaintiffs from the battleground of negligence to that of fraud. How
ever, it has not eliminated the legal distinction between fraud and negli
gence, nor has it eliminated that distinction as a practical matter. But
for the ruling in the Ultramares case, the O’Connor case would have
been fought out on the issue of negligence and the jury would not have
had to rest its decision upon the basic issue of the good faith of the
accountants and their sincere belief in their opinion, even if erroneously
held.
These cases highlight the decisive role of the jury in determining the
legal responsibility of accountants. In Ultramares it was held that the
case on fraud should have gone to the jury. In the State Street Trust
case it was held that the verdict of the jury for plaintiff should not have
been set aside. In the O’Connor case it was held that the jury verdict for
defendants should prevail. Not only do the questions of negligence and
fraud present factual issues to be passed upon by the jury, but so does
the question of the reliance of plaintiff upon the work of the accountants,
as well as the question of damage to plaintiff, if any, resulting from the
fault of the accountants.
In the absence of a defense of his work, the jury is likely to assume
a consciousness of fault on the part of the accountant. This may have
been an im portant factor in the State Street Trust case. Similarly, if the
testimony of plaintiffs’ experts is uncontradicted, it carries maximum
weight with both court and jury.
Questions of auditing standards and accounting principles are matters
of fact and not of law. If there is conflicting expert testimony, it is for
the jury to decide which testimony it should follow. In this connection,
where the cause of action is in fraud, the jury, in order to render a
verdict for the accountants, does not have to do more than conclude that
the accountant had an honest belief in his expressed opinion on these
technical matters, even if such belief might have been erroneous. On
the other hand, in areas where standards and principles have not been
clearly defined, the lay jury may be misled and reach a conclusion
disastrous to the defendants. Hindsight wisdom 71 lends plausibility to
the arguments of plaintiff and is always a serious threat to the defense.
70a. For a recent application by a New York referee of the rules of the Ultramares
and State Street T ru st cases, see Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N. Y. L aw J ournal
7 (April 29, 1954). R eprinted at p. 247 supra.
71. As Justice Brewer observed in U nited States v. American Bell T elephone Co.,
167 U.S. 224, 261, “Anybody could have discovered America after 1492."

CHAPTER 4

LIA BILITY TO TH IRD PARTIES
BY STATUTE
T he common law liability of accountants to third parties has been
substantially affected by the enactment of the Federal Securities Act of
1933 72 and the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934.73 Insofar as the
work of the accountant falls within the jurisdiction of the 1933 Act there
can be liability for mere negligence as well as for fraud, to certain large
classes of third parties, namely, the purchasers and owners of securities.
As was said of the 1933 Act shortly after its enactment:
To say the least the Act goes as far in protection of purchasers of securities
as plaintiff in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche unsuccessfully urged the New York
Court of Appeals to go in the protection of a creditor. The change which that
court thought so “revolutionary” as to be “wrought by legislation” has been
made. And the duty placed on experts such as accountants has not been
measured by the expert’s relation to his employer but by his service to
investors.74

T he Federal Securities Act of 1933 regulates the offering of securities
for sale to the public through the use of the mails or in interstate com
merce. It provides for the prior filing of a so-called Registration State
ment with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in which there is
disclosure of all material facts concerning the securities to be offered. In
cluded in the Registration Statements are the relevant financial state
ments of the issuer of the securities. These statements are required to be
certified by independent public accountants who are usually certified
public accountants. Section 11 (a) of this statute in part provides:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became ef
fective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state
ments therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it
is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or
omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdic
tion, sue — . . .
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1946).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1946).
74. Douglas and Bates, T h e Federal Scurities A ct o f 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171,198 (1933).

45

46

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement,
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in
such registration statement report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him; 75

It is further provided that no person, other than the issuer, shall be
liable who shall sustain the burden of proof that:
as regards any part of the registration statement purporting to be made
upon his authority as an expert or purporting to be a copy of or extract from
a report or valuation of himself as an expert, (i) he had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such
part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
or (ii) such part of the registration statement did not fairly represent his
statement as an expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from his report or
valuation as an expert; 76

With respect to the amount of damages which the plaintiff may recover
under the statute, it is stated:
Provided, That if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such dam
ages represents other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting
from such part of the registration statement, with respect to which his liability
is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable.77

The effect of the statute, as indicated by the above quotations, insofar
as it relates to financial statements prepared or certified to by an inde
pendent public accountant and included with his consent in the Registra
tion Statement, may be summarized as follows:
1. Any person acquiring securities described in the Registration
Statement may sue the accountant, regardless of the fact that he is
not the client of the accountant.
2. His claim may be based upon an alleged false statement or
misleading omission in the financial statements, which constitutes
his prima facie case. The plaintiff does not have the further burden
of proving that the accountants were negligent or fraudulent in
certifying to the financial statements involved.
3. T he plaintiff does not have to prove that he relied upon the
statement or that the loss which he suffered was the proximate re
sult of the falsity or misleading character of the financial statement.
4. The accountant has thrust upon him the burden of establish
ing his freedom from negligence and fraud by proving that he had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and
did believe that the financial statements to which he certified, were
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1946).
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
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true not only as of the date of the financial statements, but beyond
that, as of the time when the Registration Statement became ef
fective.
5. The accountant has the burden of establishing by way of de
fense or in reduction of alleged damages, that the loss of the plaintiff
resulted in whole or in part from causes other than the false state
ments or the misleading omissions in the financial statements.
Under the common law it would have been part of the plaintiff’s
affirmative case to prove that the damages which he claims he sus
tained were proximately caused by the negligence or fraud of the
accountant.
It should be noted that Section 13 of the 1933 Act bars any action under
its provisions unless brought “within one year after the discovery of the
untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have
been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” 78 In no event can
such an action be brought “more than three years after the security was
bona fide offered to the public.”
No court cases against accountants have been reported under this Act
since 1933 based upon alleged falsity or misleading omission as of financial
statement dates. It would seem clear, however, that proof of compliance
with generally accepted auditing standards would be an adequate and
effective defense insofar as the statements speak as of their purported
dates. It is the vague extension of responsibility beyond the financial
dates and down to the “effective date” of the Registration Statement
(which may be months later) which poses a difficult and unresolved prob
lem. W hat constitutes the “reasonable investigation,” within the mean
ing of the statute, that the accountant should undertake, covering the
period from the completion of his audit down to the subsequent effective
date, is still relatively an open question. Whereas generally accepted
auditing standards have been promulgated with reasonable clarity, such
standards are not applicable to the “reasonable investigation” covering
this post-audit period. There is considerable difference of opinion as to
what work the accountant should perform after the completion of his
audit, to assure himself that the statements which are a fair presentation
upon the completion of his audit work are also a fair presentation upon
the subsequent effective date of the Registration Statement. It is generally
considered essential to take the following steps:
1. Inspect the minutes down to a date reasonably close to the effective date.
2. Address inquiries to the management as to whether there have been significant
events down to that date.
3. Inspect available unaudited financial statements dated subsequent to the
audited statement dates.
T h e “reasonable investigation” outlined above is far less than an audit,

falls far short of compliance with generally accepted auditing standards,
78. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1946).
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and is not intended to afford a basis for the expression of an opinion as
to any period or any transaction subsequent to the audited statement
dates. It does serve, however, as a reasonable inquiry by the accountant,
within the practical limits of the situation, to place him in a position
where he feels justified in relying upon a presumption of continuance as
to the fairness of presentation to which he certified as of the audited
statement dates. On the other hand, if the accountant does have actual
knowledge, however obtained, of material subsequent events, it is gen
erally considered to be his responsibility to insist that such facts of which
he has actual knowledge are adequately disclosed.
T he only recorded court case involving a claim against accountants
under the Federal Securities Acts dealt with the failure to disclose a con
tingent liability which had developed between the date of certification
and the effective date. The case 79 was dismissed against the accountants
as well as against the other defendants. T he case arose in 1939 and is
inconclusive for a number of reasons. The opinion of the court seemed
to ignore any responsibility on the part of the accountants for events
subsequent to the date when they certified the financial statements. T he
peculiar situation existed where the Registration Statement became ef
fective on a given date but as of a prior date, which prior date coincided
with the date on the accountants’ report. Furthermore, the action was
dismissed on the additional grounds of a failure by the plaintiff to prove
damages. T he statute of limitations was also invoked. T he decision was
criticized in law reviews 80 on varying grounds and contributed very little
toward the clarification of accountants’ responsibility under the statute.
This case was recently discussed at some length in The New York Certified
Public Accountant.81*
T he Securities Exchange Act of 1934 relates in general to the regula
tion of securities exchanges and the securities there traded in and listed.
I t provides, among other things, for the filing of annual reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, including financial statements cer
tified by independent public accountants. Section 18 of the 1934 Act
deals with the liability for misleading statements and is applicable to
accountants involved in the certification of such statements. T his Section
provides as follows:
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this title or any rule
or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration
statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which state
ment was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it
was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable
79. Shonts v. H irlim an, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939). R eprinted at p. 253 infra.
80. 38 Mich. L. R ev. 1103 (1940); 50 Yale L.J. 98 (1940)
81. R appaport, Accountants’ Liability Under the Securities A ct, 21 N.Y. Certified
P ublic Accountant 763 (1951).

LIABILITY T O T H IR D PARTIES—BY STA TU TE

49

to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading)
who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security
at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such
reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and
had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person
seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, re
quire an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, against either party
litigant.82

T he Statute of Limitations relating to actions under the 1934 A c t83
contains 1-year and 3-year provisions which are substantially similar to
those under the 1933 Act.
It will thus be seen that the provisions of Section 18 of the 1934 Act
differ in the following significant respects from the comparable provisions
of Section 11 of the 1933 Act:
1. There is no provision similar to the “effective date” require
ment of a Registration Statement. In contrast, it is provided in the
1934 Act that to be actionable, the statement must be false or mis
leading “at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made.” It would seem from this that the accountant is
not obligated to extend his examination or inquiry beyond the
completion of his audit work, even though the filing with the Secur
ities and Exchange Commission may take place at some subsequent
date. In the case of the 10-K report covering a calendar year, this
is required to be filed on or before April 30th following the close of
the year. It usually includes financial statements, the audit work on
which may have been completed two or three months earlier. T he
accountant’s report usually bears the date of the completion of his
audit and it would seem that his responsibility would be limited to
his compliance with generally accepted auditing standards applied
down to the date of the completion of the audit. However, if the
accountant has actual knowledge of the occurrence of subsequent
events which are of material significance, it would be incumbent
upon him to insist upon adequate disclosure in the report.
A similar view was expressed in a paper read at the 1951 annual
meeting of the American Institute of Accountants by the present
chairman of its committee on auditing procedure, from which the
following is quoted:
It should be recognized as entirely proper that there are situations in con
nection with which we may acquire no knowledge of what has occurred after
the date of our examination and, in the absence of any such knowledge, are
able to release a standard form certificate within a reasonable period after
the completion of our field work with no fear of responsibility for what might
have happened in the interim period concerning which we had no contact
with the client or his affairs. It would appear that this should apply in the
case of an annual report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
82. 15 U.S.C. §78r (1946).
83. Ibid.
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or any similar body. If, for instance, the field work for a printed annual
report is completed and the report is certified on February 14, and the work
ing papers then contained necessary data for checking the company’s report
to be rendered in April to the Commission, the independent accountant
should check such report in April and furnish his certificate to accompany
it with no responsibility for events which had occurred between February 15
and April unknown to him.84

2. The plaintiff must prove his reliance upon the financial state
ment and prove damages that were caused by such reliance.
3. While the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving negli
gence or fraud on the part of the accountant, the accountant is given
the statutory defense “that he acted in good faith and had no knowl
edge that such statement was false or misleading.” This quoted
language is consistent with freedom from fraud rather than freedom
from negligence. It would seem, therefore, that the rule of the
Ultramares case has been here enacted and that there would not be
liability to third parties for mere negligence where the good faith
of the accountant is established.
T he civil remedies under the Federal Securities Acts apply only to
purchasers and owners of securities and do not include claims of creditors
who are not bondholders or the owners of similar securities. Securities
transactions which are strictly intrastate matters would not be covered.
Most of the states have their own so-called Blue Sky laws which regulate
the issuance of securities and which do not contain specific provisions
modifying the legal responsibility of the accountant under the common
law. However, in the case of the State of Florida, the remedies of the
Federal Securities Acts have been incorporated into their own state law
by the following statutory enactment:
The same civil remedies provided by laws of the United States now or here
after in force, for the purchasers of securities under any such laws, in inter
state commerce, shall extend also to purchasers of securities under this
chapter.85
84. Hill, Auditor’s Responsibility for Events after Balance-Sheet Date, F ive N ew
G uides to the Auditor’s R esponsibility 9 (papers presented at 64th annual meeting
of the American Institute of Accountants 1951).
85. F la. Stat. A nn . § 517.23 (West 1943).
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Situations may occasionally arise where the work of the accountant
may be subjected to serious critical attack which nevertheless does not
involve legal responsibility or civil liability. Though the claim may be
made that an audit was performed or reported upon fraudulently or in
competently, the claimant may be unable to prove that he sustained
damages. Therefore he cannot m aintain any action, either at common
law or under the Federal Securities Acts. He may be a third party who
cannot even sue for the recovery of a fee. In such circumstances, he may
resort to the filing of a complaint seeking disciplinary action against the
accountant involved. Though such a complaint may not include the
threat of a judgment for money damages, it may place in jeopardy the
reputation of the accountant, or even the retention of his CPA certificate.
From this latter viewpoint it would seem relevant to include in this
chapter some mention of disciplinary proceedings.
Disciplinary powers over accounting practitioners are vested in:
1. Professional societies such as the American Institute of Ac
countants and the various state societies. These organizations have
established codes of professional conduct for the breach of which a
member may be expelled or suspended from membership, or cen
sured.
2. Under the authority of state statutes regulating certified public
accountants there is generally provision for the revocation or sus
pension of the CPA certificate or the censure of the CPA where,
after due notice and a proper hearing, the constituted authorities
find evidence of specified professional misconduct.
3. The Securities and Exchange Commission in Rule II (e) of
its Rules of Practice has provided:
(e) The Commission may disqualify, and deny, temporarily or permanently,
the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person
who is found by the Commission after hearing in the matter
(1) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or
(2) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in un
ethical or improper professional conduct.

It is significant to note that fraud and gross negligence in the practice
of public accountancy have been included in the broad concept of pro
fessional misconduct subject to disciplinary action. By way of illustration
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it is pertinent to quote Rule 5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the American Institute of Accountants:
In expressing an opinion on representations in financial statements which
he has examined, a member may be held guilty of an act discreditable to the
profession if
(a) he fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not disclosed
in the financial statements but disclosure of which is necessary to make
the financial statements not misleading; or
(b) he fails to report any material misstatement known to him to appear
in the financial statement; or
(c) he is materially negligent in the conduct of his examination or in
making his report thereon; or
(d) he fails to acquire sufficient information to warrant expression of an
opinion, or his exceptions are sufficiently material to negative the
expression of an opinion; or
(e) he fails to direct attention to any material departure from generally
accepted accounting principles or to disclose any material omission
of generally accepted auditing procedure applicable in the circum
stances.

CHAPTER 6

W ORKING

PAPERS

Relevancy From an Evidentiary Viewpoint

In any case brought against an accountant on the ground that negli
gence or fraud was involved in his work, it is altogether likely that the
working papers relating to the audit will be offered in evidence in whole
or in part. T he evidence may be offered by the plaintiff to support his
allegations of fraud or negligence. On the other hand, it may be the
accountant who will introduce his working papers to establish the
adequacy of his audit and the fairness of the opinion which he expressed
in his report thereon.
T o be more specific, the working papers may be relevant on one or
more of the following issues which may arise in the case:
1. The working papers will constitute a record of the audit work performed,

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

both from a qualitative and quantitative standpoint. That is to say, they
will constitute proof of what records were examined, what inquiries were
made, what confirmations were undertaken, etc. At the same time they may
constitute a record of the amount of testing and sampling that was performed,
which, in the judgment of the accountant, was adequate in the circumstances.
The extent to which the audit work was properly planned and supervised
may be evident from the working papers.
The nature and extent of the review of the client’s system of internal control
and its effective operation may appear in the working papers, and therefore
the extent to which the accountant relied upon his appraisal of internal con
trol in planning and carrying out his audit program.
The scope of his inquiries addressed to the client and the extent to which
the accountant relied upon the client’s representations may be recorded in
the working papers.
Working papers may contain information which the plaintiff claims should
have aroused the suspicion of the accountant and resulted in an extension of
his audit procedures beyond the work which was done.
The working papers in their entirety may be offered by the accountant as
evidence of his compliance with generally accepted auditing standards in
support of the opinion expressed in his report.
The working papers may contain information which the plaintiff claims
should have been disclosed and the omission of which, it is claimed, makes
the report of the accountant misleading.
Where the genuineness of the accountant’s belief in the opinion which he
has expressed is put in issue, the working papers may offer persuasive evi
dence of the thinking of the accountant in the development and formulation
of his opinion.
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Even where the working papers themselves are not put in evidence,
they may be used to refresh the recollection of the accountant as to sig
nificant occurrences during the course of the audit and as to the circum
stances existing in connection with his work which influenced his judg
ment in many im portant ways. On the other hand, an inspection of the
working papers by the plaintiff’s representatives may supply leads for
inquiry and material for the cross-examination of the accountant.
Ownership of Working Papers — The Ipswich Mills Case

In view of the potential importance of the accountant’s working papers,
many states have confirmed their ownership by the accountant through
specific statutory enactment.86 Even in the absence of such statutory pro
visions, however, the courts have recognized and upheld such ownership
by the accountant.
T he leading case on this point is Ipswich Mills v. Dillon,87 decided
in 1927 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. T hat was a case
brought by a corporation against certified public accountants, the cor
poration seeking to gain possession of certain documents held by the
accountants, who had theretofore been employed by the corporation to
make annual audits, prepare tax returns and statements for banks, and
to represent the corporation in a Federal tax matter before the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. There had been no special agreement between the
client and the accountants as to the ownership of the documents. The
papers were divided into the following categories for purposes of this
litigation:
Group A consisted of papers that originated in the client’s offices or in
the offices of its selling agents or of someone associated with them. The ac
countants conceded that the client was the owner of these papers.
Group B included a copy of the amended Federal tax returns of the plain
tiff for the year 1918 and certain papers (not work sheets) relating thereto.
Group C included copies of the client’s tentative and amended tax return
for 1919 with work sheets and correspondence in connection therewith.
86. The states of California, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington, and Puerto Rico, have included such a pro
vision in their statutes regulating the practice of public accountancy. In some instances
the provision relates only to certified public accountants. In other instances, it relates
to certified public accountants and public accountants. In all other respects, these
provisions are substantially identical. The Virginia statute is quoted by way of illustra
tion: “All statements, records, schedules and memoranda made by a certified public ac
countant or a public accountant, or by an employee or employees of a certified public
accountant, or public accountant, incident to or in the course of professional service to
clients by such certified public accountant, or public accountant, except reports sub
mitted by a certified public accountant, or public accountant, to a client shall be and
remain the property of such certified public accountant, or public accountant, in the
absence of a written agreement between the certified public accountant, or public ac
countant, and the client, to the contrary.” Va . Code Ann . §54-101 (1950).
87. 260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927). R eprinted at p. 263 infra.
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Group D consisted of papers and work sheets of revaluation of the client’s
plant assets.
Group E consisted of the accountants’ work sheets of their July, 1922 report.
Group F included papers, reports, returns, copies, work sheets, data, cor
respondence and memoranda respecting the tax case, together with some
letters originating in the client’s office.

The trial judge had ruled that the client was the owner of all of the
above enumerated papers, except those in Group F, and entitled to their
immediate possession. As to Group F, he ruled that the client and the
accountants were jointly interested in those papers, with the right in the
client to take them temporarily from the accountants.
On appeal, this decision was reversed and it was held that except for
group A (which the accountants conceded belonged to the client) all
enumerated papers and documents belonged to the accountants. The
appellate court stressed the fact that the accountants were not mere em
ployees of the client but were independent contractors functioning in a
professional capacity. The court also was impressed with the necessity
for the accountants retaining possession of all of these documents “if the
accuracy of their work was questioned.” The following quotations from
the court’s opinion further explain the decision reached:
The carbon copies of the defendants’ letters to the collector of internal
revenue did not belong to the plaintiff. Whatever right it may have to ex
amine these copies, or take copies of them, which point we are not called
upon to decide, the defendants’ copies did not belong to the plaintiff; they
were owned by the defendants. The fact that the copies of these letters con
cern the plaintiff is not a sufficient reason for depriving the defendants of
their property. In writing the letters the defendants were not the plaintiff’s
servants.
In group C there are copies of Federal tax returns. These, as we under
stand from the record, were the defendants’ office copies. The record shows
that copies of all returns and schedules prepared by the defendants for the
plaintiff were sent to the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff has a right to require
further copies, a question not involved in this suit, it has no right to demand
of the defendants the surrender of these office copies. They were the property
of the defendants.
The work sheets, as defined by the trial judge, were the defendants’ property.
They were made by them while engaged in their own business. The paper
on which the computations were made belonged to them. They were not
employed to make these sheets. The sheets were merely the means by which
the work for which the defendants were employed might be accomplished.
The title to the work sheets remained in the defendants after the computa
tions were made. In the absence of an agreement that these sheets were to
belong to the plaintiff, or were to be held for it, they were owned by the
defendants. It may be that these papers contained information confidential
in its nature and of importance to the plaintiff; but the defendants did not
receive this information as the plaintiff’s servants. . . . The interest of the
plaintiff in the information collected and copied by the defendants and the
confidential nature of this information do not give title to the plaintiff of
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the defendants’ working papers. They were made by the defendants solely
for their own assistance in preparing the tax returns.
With reference to group F, the letters addressed to the defendants, copies of
letters written by the defendants, copies of returns furnished to the plaintiff,
and work sheets relating to the tax case, are the sole property of the defend
ants, and this is true of the papers and reports collected by the defendants in
the preparation of the tax case. The plaintiff is not jointly interested with the
defendants in these documents. We do not understand that any of these
reports, papers and returns were property of the plaintiff which had been
placed in the defendants’ custody by the plaintiff or merely delivered to the
defendants. If there are any papers belonging to the plaintiff which were
lent to the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to them; but as we construe
the record, the papers referred to in group F were gathered and collected
by the defendants in the course of their business, and were not papers of the
plaintiff placed by it in the defendants’ possession.88

The New York Surrogate's Court Case 89
A case arising in the New York Surrogate’s Court in 1936 indicated
that the property rights of the accountant in his working papers may be
qualified or limited in certain circumstances. A certified public account
ant, who had been an individual practitioner for a number of years prior
to his death in 1933, in his will bequeathed to his secretary “all of my
office files and records.” Upon the proceeding to settle the accounts of
the executrix, the Surrogate’s Court was called upon to decide whether
the language in the will included working papers and if it did, whether
or not the testator had a legal right to dispose of them by will. The Sur
rogate held that no such right existed, but in so holding, it did not differ
with the Ipswich Mills case.
The Ipswich Mills case did not deprive the client of the right to prevent
the accountant from disclosing to other persons the confidential informa
tion in his working papers. In other words, the title of the accountant to
his working papers was always subject to his obligation to deal with
the information there contained in compliance with the confidential
relationship of client and accountant. This legal principle was not
abrogated by the Ipswich M ills case, nor could it have been, without
doing violence to the rights of the client implied in the client-accountant
relationship.
If the deceased accountant had been a member of a partnership and
had bequeathed his interest in the partnership papers to any one or all
of his surviving partners, the question presented in this case would not
have arisen. The confidential nature of the working papers would have
been safeguarded despite the transfer of ownership of the interest in them
88. Id. at 457-458, 157 N.E. at 606-607.
89. Estate of W illiam H. Dennis, 95 N.Y. L aw J ournal 827 (Surr. Ct. Feb. 15, 1936).
Excerpt reprinted a t p . 266 infra.
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possessed by the decedent. But this was the case of an individual practi
tioner who had no surviving partners. If the court had recognized an
unqualified right in the testator to deal with his working papers as he
would with other assets of his estate, then his legatee in turn could dispose
of them to anyone else, even to a competitor of the client. Similarly, if
the ownership of these working papers was to be regarded in the same
category as the ownership of other assets, it would have been necessary
to recognize the paramount right of creditors who might assert their
claims against the working papers and dispose of them by sale for the
satisfaction of the debts of the decedent.
The Surrogate wisely held that after the executrix had assured herself
that there was no basis for claims against the estate which would require
the retention and preservation of the working papers for the protection
of the accountant’s estate, she was to return to the respective clients all
working papers which had originated in their offices and to destroy all
working papers which the deceased accountant himself had prepared.
This important case, which bristles with undecided and unresolved
implications, is not recorded in the official reports. It has been rescued
from obscurity, so far as accountants are concerned, through the very
comprehensive discussion of it which appeared contemporaneously in The
Journal of Accountancy.9091The comments on the case in this chapter are
based upon that discussion.
The Frye Case 91
This case was decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio in May, 1951.
It is of special interest to practicing accountants for at least three reasons:
1. It is an illustration of the uncomfortable predicament of an
accountant who is not a party to a litigation brought against his
client, but who, nevertheless, is compelled by legal process to testify
against his client’s interests by divulging the contents of his working
papers.
2. While reaffirming the Ipswich Mills case, it holds that the mere
possession of legal title to his working papers does not give the ac
countant the legal right to refuse to disclose their contents to parties
other than his client, where such disclosure is ordered by the courts
incidental to litigation or for other reasons.
3. It clarifies the legal limitations affecting the confidential
nature of his working papers and the qualified obligation of the
accountant to refrain from disclosing the contents thereof.
The client in this case was being sued by a sales agent who had been
in its employ, who claimed commissions to be computed on a percentage
90. 61 J ournal of Accountancy 246 (1936).
91. In re Frye, 155 Ohio St. 345, 98 N.E.2d 798 (1951). R eprinted a t p. 267 infra.
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basis. The accountant, who had audited the books of the client, was
served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production by the ac
countant of “all records or copies of records in your possession relating to
the financial condition or operation of [the client] from the date of its
organization to the present day; including copies of all . . . tax returns,
state or federal . . .”
T he accountant appeared for examination, testified that she had been
the client’s auditor since its organization, and presented and identified
some thirty separate exhibits consisting of audit reports, financial state
ments, and commission statements. At a subsequent hearing the account
ant appeared with counsel who objected to the introduction in evidence
of the accountant’s working papers previously identified or of “photo
static replicas” thereof. T o lay a foundation for such objection, she
testified that she did work for the defendants as an independent con
tractor in the capacity of auditor; that she had no records which belonged
to the defendant; that the records which she had previously identified
were her own personal records; that when she made out the tax returns
for the client, she gave it the originals and copies for its files and that the
client did the filing of the tax returns. Upon her persistent refusal, she
was cited for contempt and put under technical arrest. T he legal issues
thus raised finally came before the Ohio Supreme Court on appeal.
T he court held against the accountant and ruled that she was lawfully
obligated to produce the documents for use in evidence. It was held
that the Ipswich Mills case did not apply to this situation, the court
stating:
In that case the papers were not under subpoena in the hands of the account
ants to produce them in court. Doubtless they were subject to subpoena
but this question was in no way before the court. The sole question deter
mined was the ownership of the papers. Doubtless in a proper case a court
will protect the owner of papers and documents so far as their custody is
concerned by requiring the party calling for them for evidential purposes
to make photostatic or other proper copies of the same so that the owner
may retain the originals. Such an offer was made to Frye by the plaintiff
in the instant case but the offer was rejected.92

T he accountant also contended that the documents sought in evidence
related to the income tax returns of the client and that their production
by the accountant would be in violation of the United States Internal
Revenue Code which provided:
It shall be unlawful . . . for any person to print or publish in any manner
whatever not provided by law any income return, or any part thereof or
source of income, profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income
return. . . .93
92. Id. at 351, 98 N.E.2d at 802.
93. 26 U.S.C. §55f (1946).
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T he court disposed of this contention in the following ruling:
Furthermore, there is no infraction of the statute involved in this proceeding.
The latter part of the statute above quoted prohibits any person from print
ing or publishing tax returns or sources of income, profit, losses or expendi
tures appearing in any income tax return, in any manner “not provided by
law.” This statute does not and could not legally inhibit the disclosure, as evi
dence in a proper judicial inquiry or where required by law, of the operative
financial data relating to the business of a taxpayer, even though such data
comprehends the elemental facts and information from which his income tax
return is necessarily made up. The law could never sanction such a sweeping
prohibition of disclosure of the essential facts of the business world. It must
be evident that the statute in question has no such purpose or intent.94

T he broad question of the duty of the accountant not to disclose the
information involved because of its confidential nature, was dealt with
by the court in the following terms:
In the absence of a privilege created by constitution or statute not to disclose
available information, a witness may not refuse to testify to pertinent facts
in a judicial proceeding merely because such testimony comprehends a com
munication or report from himself as agent to his principal or as independent
contractor to his employer, no matter how confidential may be the character
of the communication itself or the relationship between the parties thereto.
See 146 A.L.R. 966. And where one possesses knowledge of facts which are
pertinent to a judicial inquiry, he may be required to testify or to produce
papers and documents as to such facts. In discussing this subject, 58 American
Jurisprudence, 40, Section 32, states the rule as follows: “It is a general rule
that a witness possessing knowledge of facts material to the vindication of
the rights of another may be compelled by judicial process to appear and give
evidence in behalf of that other party, notwithstanding the evidence thus
coerced may uncover the witness’s private business. This rule is also gen
erally held applicable when the information sought is contained in books
and papers. Accordingly, it has been held that it is no ground for the refusal
of a witness to produce books and papers, when required by lawful author
ity, that they are private. The duty of witnesses to disclose the details of their
private business for the benefit of third persons when required in the adminis
tration of justice, is one devolving on them as members of a civilized com
munity.” . . .95

The above quoted language of the court defines and limits not only
the legal obligation but the ethical duty of the accountant concerning
the confidential relationship existing between himself and his client, a
relationship which has been set forth in the Institute’s Rule 16 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. T he legal position of the accountant
with respect to the question of privileged communication status (which
will be dealt with in the following pages) was only indirectly involved
in the Frye case.
94. 155 Ohio St. at 352, 98 N.E.2d at 802.
95. Id. at 354, 98 N.E.2d at 803.

CHAPTER 7

PR IV ILEG ED

COM M UNICATIONS

In the Frye case it was emphasized that neither the confidential nature
of an accountant’s working papers nor the personal ownership of them
by the accountant was sufficient legal reason for a refusal by the ac
countant to divulge their contents in a judicial proceeding to which they
were relevant. A different result might have been reached by the court
had the relationship of accountant and client conferred upon these docu
ments the status of privileged communications.
Such a status of privilege has been recognized under the common law
as to confidential communications between attorney and client, and be
tween husband and wife, and by statute generally as to confidential com
munications between physician and patient and between priest and
penitent. Statutes have also codified and to some extent limited the com
mon law privilege accorded to the attorney-client and the husband-wife
relationship. W ith special reference to the accountant-client relation
ship, however, it has been held that no such privilege ever existed under
the common law and that none will be recognized in the absence of a
statute specifically creating such a status.
The leading case which so held was that of In re Fisher?96 decided in
1931 in the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York
(a state which has no accountant privilege statute). The question arose
during the course of bankruptcy proceedings. T he witness involved was
both a certified public accountant and a lawyer. He had acted as the
bankrupt’s accountant for a num ber of years and, after his later admis
sion to the bar, also acted as the bankrupt’s attorney. He refused to an
swer questions relating to the bankrupt’s books of account or to produce
working papers prepared by members of his accounting staff in the course
of auditing the bankrupt’s books. It would appear that he relied upon
the privilege arising from the attorney-client relationship with the bank
rupt, but the court, in directing the witness to testify, gave consideration
as well to the fact that the evidence involved was obtained by the witness
in his capacity as accountant. In support of its conclusion, the court
stated:
There is no privilege with regard to communications made to accountants.
The information given to the witness and to the accountants in his employ
for the purpose of making financial statements and doing other work charac
teristically performed by accountants is not privileged, despite the fact that
96. 51 F.2d 424 (S.D. N.Y. 1931). R eprinted at p. 273 infra.
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the witness may also have rendered legal advice on the basis of such data. See
Matter of Robinson, 140 App. Div. 329, 125 N.Y.S. 193, where it was held
that an attorney for a corporation, who was one of its directors, could not
refuse to disclose information about corporate affairs by claiming his pro
fessional privilege.
Furthermore, the privilege accorded to an attorney is the privilege of the
client and not of the attorney. Baumann v. Steingester, 213 N.Y. 328, 107
N.E. 578, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1071. For this reason the attorney cannot claim
privilege where the client has already disclosed the substance of the commu
nication. Baumann v. Steingester supra. Nor can he claim privilege where
the communication was made with the understanding that it was to be im
parted to third parties. Rosseau v. Bleau, 131 N.Y. 177, 30 N.E. 52, 27 Am. St.
Rep. 578.
In the case at bar it appears that the bankrupt has already testified with re
spect to the matters contained in his books and records. And the income tax
returns and financial statements drawn up from the communications made
by bankrupt to the witness were obviously intended to be communicated
to others.
For these reasons, the witness should be directed to testify with regard to the
bankrupt’s books and to produce in evidence the monthly work sheets made
by the accountants.97

In the case of Himmelfarb v. United States,98 decided in 1949 in the
Federal courts of California (a state which has no accountant privilege
statute) it was again held that privileged communications are not recog
nized as between a client and his accountant. In that case the certified
public accountant had been employed by the client’s attorney during
the pendency of an investigation by the special agents of the Intelligence
Unit of the Treasury Department. The accountant attended numerous
conferences with the attorney and the client and also examined the client’s
records. In an effort to work out a settlement, the attorney and the ac
countant had supplied the Treasury agents with considerable docu
mentary material which the accountant had assembled from the books
and records. On the trial which followed, the accountant was subpoenaed
and identified the documents, which were then put in evidence over the
objection of the client’s attorney. T he court held that even if the ac
countant had obtained some of the information by being present at con
ferences between the client and the attorney, such communications were
not privileged. T he accountant’s “presence was not indispensable in
the sense that the presence of an attorney’s secretary may be. It was a
convenience which, unfortunately for the accused, served to remove the
privileged character of whatever communications were made. Of course,
communications made by the client to such a third party in the presence
of the attorney are not within the privilege.” 99
97. Id. at 425.
98. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949). Excerpt reprinted at
p. 274 infra.
99. Id. at 939.
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It was held that, from any viewpoint, the documents prepared by the
accountant were properly admissible. T o the extent that they were based
upon information given to the accountant directly by the client or ob
tained from the client’s records, there was no privilege growing out of
the accountant-client relationship. Insofar as the documents were based
upon information overheard by the accountant at conferences between
the client and the attorney, which would otherwise have been privileged,
the presence of the accountant destroyed the privilege.
It was similarly held in the later income tax evasion case of Gariepy v.
United States100 that under the common law there is no accountant-client
privilege. In this instance the Michigan statute creating an accountantclient privilege was expressly inapplicable in a criminal case.
T he Himmelfarb case was specifically cited and followed in 1951, in
the Federal courts in Pennsylvania, in the case of United States v.
Stoehr.101
Although all of these cases arose in the Federal courts in connection
with criminal or bankruptcy matters, they consistently support the propo
sition that, in the absence of statutory provision, there is no status of
privilege applicable to the confidential communications between client
and accountant similar to that which applies to the communications
between attorney and client.
Statutes which confer the status of privileged communications upon
information obtained by accountants during the course of their work
have now been enacted by twelve of our states and by Puerto Rico. These
statutes fall roughly into three groups:
1. Arizona,102 Iowa,103 Maryland,104 Michigan and Tennessee105
specifically provide that the privilege is not applicable in situations
involving criminal or bankruptcy laws. All of this group, except
Tennessee, apply to certified public accountants and public account
ants. T he Tennessee statute mentions only certified public ac
countants. These are other variations within this group, but the
Michigan statute may be quoted as a fair example:
Except by written permission of the client, or person, or firm, or corporation
employing him, or the heirs, successors or personal representatives of such
employer, a certified public accountant, or a public accountant, or a person
employed by a certified public accountant or by a public accountant shall not
be required to, and shall not voluntarily, disclose or divulge information of
which he or she may have become possessed relative to and in connection
with any examination of, audit of, or report on, any books, records, or ac100. 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951). Excerpt reprinted at p. 276 infra.
101. 100 F. Supp. 143 (M.D. Pa. 1951), aff’d, 196 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 826 (1952). Excerpts reprinted at p. 277 infra.
102. Ariz. Code Ann . § 67-609 (1939).
103. I owa Code Ann . §116.15 (West 1949).
104. Md. Ann . Code Art. 75A, § 11 (1951).
105. T enn , Code Ann . § 7097.12 (Williams Replacement Volume 1941).
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counts which he or she may be employed to make. The information derived
from or as the result of such professional service shall be deemed confidential
and privileged: Provided, however, That nothing in this paragraph shall be
taken or construed as modifying, changing or affecting the criminal or bank
ruptcy laws of this state or of the United States.106

2. Florida,107 Illinois,108 Kentucky,109 Louisiana, New M exico110
and Puerto R ico111 do not exclude criminal or bankruptcy matters
from the provisions of this statute. T he Louisiana statute is quoted
as an example of this group:
No certified public accountant, public accountant, or person employed by
certified public accountant or public accountant, shall be required to, or vol
untarily disclose or divulge, the contents of any communication made to him
by any person employing him to examine, audit, or report on any books,
records, or accounts, or divulge any information derived from such books,
records or accounts in rendering professional services except by express per
mission of the person employing him or his heirs, personal representatives
or successors.112

3. Colorado and Georgia may be considered a third group which,
like the second group, does not exclude criminal and bankruptcy
matters from the statutes, but mentions certified public accountants
only. As these statutes create a status not recognized under the
common law, they would be strictly construed and therefore would
exclude from their provisions accountants who were not certified
public accountants. However, there are very im portant differences
in wording between the Colorado and Georgia statutes, and for this
reason it is advisable to quote both.
T he Colorado statute provides:
Who may not testify without consent. There are particular relations in which
it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate;
therefore, a person shall not be examined as a witness in the following
cases: . . .
Sixth — A certified public accountant shall not, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him in
person or through the media of books of account and financial records, or
his advice, reports or working papers given or made thereon in the course
of professional employment, nor shall a secretary, stenographer, clerk or assist
ant of a certified public accountant be examined without the consent of the
client concerned concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired
in such capacity.113
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

M ich . Stat. Ann . § 18.23 (Callaghan 1937).
F la. Stat. Ann . § 473.15 (West 1952).
I I I . Ann . Stat. Ch. 110½, §22 (Sm ith-Hurd 1935).
K y . R ev. Stat. § 325.440 (1953).
N ew Mexico Stat. A nn . §51-1736 (Cum. Supp. 1941).
Laws of 1945, Act No. 293, § 19.
L a . R ev. Stat. Ann . §37.85 (West 1951).
Colo. Stat. Ann . Ch. 177, § 9 (Replacement Volume 1949).
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T he Georgia statute provides:
Any communications to any practicing certified public accountant trans
mitted to such accountant in anticipation of, or pending, the employment
of such accountant shall be treated as confidential and not disclosed nor
divulged by said accountant in any proceedings of any nature whatsoever.
This rule shall not exclude the accountant as a witness to any facts which
may transpire in connection with his employment.11415

It should be reiterated that there are other important variations in
wording in the statutes within the other groups. This should be kept in
mind in considering the legal problems which may arise in any particular
engagement.
There is frequently the question as to whether the federal or the state
rule will govern in any particular case. This question was raised in a
proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission, where the
Commission held that it was not inhibited by the Illinois statute from
admitting in evidence a confidential communication contained in the
accountant’s working papers. The following is quoted from the Com
mission’s release in that case:
Registrant also asserts that the Kuiper memorandum was erroneously ad
mitted in evidence because of an Illinois statute which provides that a pub
lic accountant is not required to testify as to information obtained by him in
his capacity as a public accountant (2 Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones) Sec. 1.19).
It is clear that the common law never recognized any privilege in the account
ant-client relationship (In re Fisher 51 F. (2d) 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931)). More
over, state legislation purporting to create such a privilege is given no effect
in federal courts outside the state (Doll v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 138 Fed.
705 (C.C.A. 3d, 1905)). While, in this case, the Kuiper memorandum was
introduced during a session held in Illinois, the hearing was originally ordered
to be held in Washington, D.C., and a large portion of the hearing was actu
ally conducted in that city. Since it is clear that such a statutory privilege is
not recognized outside the state and that no objection based on such a privi
lege could have been directed to the introduction of the Kuiper memorandum
during that portion of the hearing held in Washington, D.C., it would be
manifestly absurd to hold that the memorandum must be excluded because
of the fortuitous circumstance that it was introduced while the hearing was
being conducted in Illinois. Moreover, while the question need not be re
solved here, we have some doubt whether state limitations on the admissibility
of evidence which go beyond the common law rules of evidence can be bind
ing in any case in hearings of a tribunal having no fixed situs analogous to
that of the federal district courts. For the underlying basis for the conformity
statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. § 631, is to achieve a uniformity of evidentiary rules
in forums which are permanently fixed within a single state and has no appli
cability to the hearings of tribunals which have no fixed situs within that
state.115
114. G a. Code Ann . §84-216 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
115. In the m atter of Resources Corporation International, 7 S.E.C. 689 (1940)
(footnote 47 at p. 741).
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A more recent instance of an apparent conflict between the Illinois
statute and Federal court decisions was disposed of in Petition of Borden
Co.116 where the Federal court refused to give effect to the state statute
because it conflicted with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In
other words, the Federal court in effect attached to the Illinois statute a
proviso that it did not apply to a criminal proceeding in the Federal
court. T he following is quoted from the court’s opinion:
It is contended that the reports made by public accountants for The Borden
Company, called for by the subpoena duces tecum in question, are privileged.
Section 51, Chapter 110½, Illinois Revised Statutes 1947, provides: “A public
accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge information or evi
dence which has been obtained by him in his confidential capacity as a public
accountant.”
It is doubtful whether the privilege granted by this section to a public
accountant extends to his written report after he has released it, but it is
unnecessary for the court to decide whether the privilege created by the
section does extend to the report after its release for the reason that Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. following section
687, provides: “The admissibility of evidence and the compentency and privi
leges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these
rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.”
At common law the reports of public accountants are not privileged. No act
of Congress and no one of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
otherwise. Accordingly, the court concludes that the reports of public account
ants are not privileged.117

In another very recent case, Falsone v. United States,118 where an ac
countant was summoned to testify and bring records to an Internal
Revenue agent investigating the accountant’s client, the court held that
the accountant must produce the records even though the state (Florida)
statute119 made them privileged communications, and even though the
tax statute of limitations had run on some of the years for which the
records were demanded. In support of its holding the court quoted from
United States v. Murdock, “Investigations for Federal purposes may not
be prevented by matters depending upon state law.” 120
There is also the interesting question (raised by the dictum in the Bor 
den case) as to whether the client does not waive the privilege as to
accountant’s reports which he has released to third parties. It may well
be argued that such reports have lost their confidential character, which
is the foundation of the privilege. If the accountant’s report has lost its
116.
117.
118.
infra.
119.
120.

75 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill. 1948). Excerpt reprinted at p. 279 infra.
Id. at 859-860.
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 103 (1953). R eprinted at p. 280
F la. Stat. Ann. §473.15 (West 1952).
284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
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character as a privileged communication protected by statute, it would
then seem to follow that the working papers of the accountant, which
were compiled in connection with the preparation of that report, have
similarly been released from the prohibition of the statute.
It has been argued that even though the “accounting statements are
designed for exhibition to others generally and would not therefore con
stitute a communication in confidence . . ., the working papers generally
contain confidential matters never revealed in the financial statements.” 121
This is undoubtedly so, yet the relevancy of the working papers to the
financial statements which are published is so intimate and important
that it is highly doubtful that courts would draw the distinction urged
above. It would seem more likely that the courts would hold that the
client, by publishing his financial statement, waives his privilege not
only with respect to that statement but with respect to the underlying
working papers assembled by the accountant in the course of preparing
or examining the financial statement in question.
Furthermore, the accountant might have to resort to the working
papers to defend himself against critical attack. Certainly if the client
himself attacks the work of the accountant, it is inconceivable that the
client would not have waived any right he might have previously had to
prevent the accountant from putting the working papers in evidence. If
a waiver on the part of the client were not implied in such a situation,
the result obviously would be unconscionably unjust.
For the same reason, if a third party brings an action against the ac
countant, based on the accountant’s report published by the client, the
accountant should not be prevented from offering his working papers in
evidence in defense of his work merely because his client’s consent thereto
cannot be obtained. Under Section 22 of the Federal Securities Act of
1933,122 state courts and Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in all
actions brought to enforce any liability created under the statute. Such
an action might be brought against an accountant in the courts of the
state where there is a statutory accountant privilege. The plaintiff might
be a third party security owner who brings an action against the account
ant based upon prima facie proof of a false statement in the balance
sheet audited and certified to by the accountant. T he accountant would
have the burden of proof of showing that after reasonable investigation
he had reason to believe, and did believe, that the financial statement
was true. W ithout recourse to his working papers, the accountant might
not be able to sustain this burden of proof. I t is most unlikely that in
such a situation the state court would hold that the accountant could not
put his working papers in evidence or testify concerning their contents
without the consent of his client. T he only reasonable and just attitude
121. R ich , L egal R esponsibilities
122. 15 U.S.C. §77v (1946).

and

R ights of P ublic Accountants 180 (1935).
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which the courts could take in such a situation would be that when the
client caused the financial statement (based upon these very working
papers) to be made available to the public through its inclusion in the
Registration Statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis
sion, he waived the statutory privilege, and, by implication, consented to
the accountant’s use of his working papers to defend his work, if need be.
One other case should be noted which dealt with the accountant’s
privilege under the Colorado statute. This was the case on appeal in
Hopkins v. The People,123 which involved the conviction for embezzle
ment of the administrator of a decedent’s estate. On the trial a certified
public accountant, employed by the prosecution, testified to certain facts
obtained through an examination of the records of the estate. The de
fendant objected to the testimony because of the Colorado statute pro
viding that a certified public accountant, under certain circumstances,
should not be examined as a witness without the consent of his client.
The court held that the statute had no application to this situation since
the defendant who invoked the statute was not the client of the certified
public accountant who testified, and therefore the defendant’s consent
was not required.
123. 89 Colo. 296,1 P .2d 937 (1931). Excerpt reprinted at p. 288 infra.
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FUNDAM ENTAL

CO N SID ERA TIO N S

SMITH v. LONDON ASSURANCE CORP.*
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, 1905.
109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. Supp. 820

H ooker, J. T he action is to recover for services rendered to the
defendant by the plaintiffs in their capacity as public accountants. The
answer admits a small payment on account, as alleged in the complaint,
avers that such payment was in full of the plaintiffs’ claim, and includes
a counterclaim for a large sum of money embezzled by one of the de
fendant’s employees, which embezzlement the defendant claims would
not and could not have occurred except for a breach of plaintiffs’ contract
of employment. T he plaintiffs demurred to the counterclaim on the
ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action, the demurrer was overruled, and plaintiffs appeal.
T he plaintiffs do not challenge the proposition of law advanced by
the defendant that public accountants now constitute a skilled profes
sional class and are subject generally to the same rules of liability for
negligence in the practice of their profession as are members of other
skilled professions. And such is doubtless the law. Cooley states the rule
governing the measure of such liability in this language: “Every man who
offers his services to another and is employed, assumes the duty to
exercise in the employment such skill as he possesses with reasonable
care and diligence. In all those employments where peculiar skill is
requisite, if one offers his services he is understood as holding himself
out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly possessed
by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions are unfounded
he commits a species of fraud upon every man who employs him in
reliance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or
unskilled, undertakes that the task he assumes shall be performed suc
cessfully and without fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and
integrity but not for infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for
negligence, bad faith or dishonesty, but not for losses consequent upon
mere errors of judgment.” (Cooley Torts [2d ed.] 777. See, also.
Carpenter v. Blake, 50 N.Y. 696; S. C., 75 id. 12; Link v. Sheldon, 136
id. 1; Pike v. Honsinger, 155 id. 201.)
Although the counterclaim is inartistically drawn and deficient in
logical order, we believe that it does state sufficient facts to make out a
cause of action. In the 10th paragraph of the answer, near the final
statements of the counterclaim, is to be found an allegation that in the
* This case is cited at p. 4 supra.
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agreement between the parties it "was expressly stipulated that there
should be a frequent checking by the plaintiffs of the cash account of
the New York branch of the defendant, and a verification of the items
appearing thereon." Reverting to the first words of the 9th paragraph
an averment is found that the plaintiffs "have negligently and will
fully failed to examine and check in particular the cash account of the
New York fire office of the defendant and have failed to verify the said
cash and agency accounts.” Then follows the allegation that Scott, its
cashier, from time to time embezzled large amounts of money paid to him
as such cashier, the embezzlement being assisted by his falsifying entries
in defendant’s books and practically its cash books. In the 11th paragraph
it is alleged that the defendant’s losses from Scott’s embezzlements and
defalcations were due to the negligence of the plaintiffs to perform their
agreement with the defendant in the manner stipulated.
These allegations, with the facts that may be implied from them by
reasonable and fair intendment, sufficiently plead a valid contract, its
breach and the resultant damage, and require a reply from the plain
tiffs. H ad an examination and checking of the New York office cash
account, performed with that degree of skill and care demanded by the
rule which has been noticed, resulted in preventing defendant’s loss,
in whole or in part, the plaintiffs should respond in damages; for it must
have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the
time of making the contract, and so it is inferentially alleged in the
counterclaim that one of the objects of the frequent checking of the
defendant’s cash account of the New York branch and a verification of
the items thereof was to prevent, or at least arrest, just such practices
as it is claimed Scott indulged in, and the loss the defendant has sus
tained naturally flows from the breach of the contract it has plead.
T he interlocutory judgment should, therefore, be affirmed * * *.

ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY*
By Saul L evy, C.P.A. and Member of the New York Bar

T he subject of accountants’ liability is as broad as the scope of our
professional activity and the content of the opinions which we issue in
the course of our work. It involves our relations with the government,
the general public, our clients, and with each other. This paper will
attempt to deal with only one phase of the subject. It will discuss the
question of legal liability from the standpoint of its intimate relation
to the development by our profession of its own technical criteria.
During the past several years the American Institute of Accountants
through its committees and its members has been dealing aggressively
and effectively with accounting and auditing standards, procedures,
principles and terminology. Insofar as these matters are crystallized into
a form or formula which has the general approval or acceptance of the
* A paper presented at the 55th annual meeting of the American Institute of
Accountants, 1942. Published in wartime accounting 146 and n . y . certified public
ACCOUNTANT 10 (1942).
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profession, we succeed in establishing technical criteria “by which facts,
principles, opinions and conduct are tried in forming a correct judg
ment respecting them.” This paper is presented from the viewpoint of
those who believe it is the function of every profession worthy of the
name to establish its own technical criteria. T he desirability of doing
so in its relation to the question of legal liability will be here considered.
In recent years, considerable attention has been focused on the dual
responsibility of the client and the independent public accountant.
Responsibilities arise simultaneously through the publication or issuance
by the client of statements whereby the client makes certain repre
sentations concerning his financial position and operating results, to
which statements is attached the certificate or opinion of the independent
public accountant. In an effort to clarify the situation, members of our
profession have raised the question “Whose Balance Sheet is it?” Many
have strenuously insisted that it is the balance sheet of the client and
that it sets forth the primary representations of the client. Others have
pointed to instances where the public accountant himself prepared the
statements, where the public accountant was engaged to do so, and where
the credit grantor and others have regarded the resulting statement as the
accountant’s balance sheet.
A third viewpoint has been recently asserting itself which seems to
carry us along a little further toward a clearer understanding of the
respective responsibilities of client and public accountant. It is pointed
out that certified financial statements are the statements both of the
client and of the accountant.
Insofar as such statements set forth the financial position or the oper
ating results of the client, they are obviously the statements of the client.
The client assumes responsibility for the factual representations they
contain and for the accuracy of the accounting records upon which they
are based. He does not relieve himself of such responsibilities by engag
ing a public accountant to audit his records and to express an opinion
concerning his statements.
In a different sense, the statements are at the same time those of the
accountant. It is through the medium of these statements that the
accountant expresses a professional opinion concerning the financial
position and operating results of the client. T he statement becomes an
integral and inseparable part of the accountant’s opinion. T h at opinion
may serve to support and tend to corroborate the representations of the
client, but it does not involve the assumption by the accountant of re
sponsibility for the factual representations of the client. From this view
point, it would seem to be immaterial whether the client or the account
ant prepared the financial statements in the first instance. In either case,
the accountant, in expressing an opinion concerning the statements,
assumes responsibility for whatever opinion he expresses. The legal
liability of the accountant for the expression of a professional opinion
is governed by the nature of that opinion, and a finding (by whatever
trib u n a l has th e fu n c tio n of m a k in g such a finding) as to w h eth er or

not that professional opinion is reasonably well-founded in terms of
auditing standards and procedures and accounting principles and
terminology.
While the respective responsibilities of the client and the public
accountant may arise out of the same financial statements, they are sepa
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rate, distinct and different types of responsibility. If we speak of the
primary responsibility of the client, we are in danger of implying that
public accountants have a related secondary liability. This may put us
in the undesired position of assuming secondary liability for factual
representations, when we have done no more than express an opinion.
Since the Ultramares case, which was decided in 1931, we have given
a great deal of thought to the fundamental distinction in our work be
tween representations of fact and expressions of opinion. A representation
of fact by the accountant is virtually warranted to be true. As was stated
by the Court in the Ultramares case:
“T he defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge,
that the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account.
If their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because
they believed it to be true * * * accountants * * * by the very nature
of their calling profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to
an agreement between the audit and the entries.”
In certifying to the statements with respect to the client’s financial
position or operating results, accountants usually profess to do no more
than express an opinion. This is clearly indicated in the form of cer
tificate, report or opinion now in general use by the profession. Never
theless, an element of fact still remains in our certificates, though it
relates to the scope of review or examination made, upon which our
opinion is predicated. As Mr. Spencer Gordon stated at the 1939 annual
meeting of this Institute:
“If the form of report recommended by the special committee on
auditing procedure is to be used it would appear that the only state
ments of fact will be as to the scope of the examination made. Under
the doctrine promulgated by Judge Cardozo it would seem to follow
that if the accountant has not made the examination that he states
that he has made, he may be held in an action of deceit by any third
party who has relied on the report, but the proposed form of report
does not appear to involve any statement of fact as to the result of the
examination. T hat the balance-sheet and the related statements of
income and surplus fairly present the position of the company and
the result of its operations is to be stated as a m atter of opinion.” (1)
Any such factual representation concerning the scope of review or
examination which has been made, is likely to appear in very general
terms, leaving much to implication and exploration should controversy
arise. T he scope of the examination made is so essential a prerequisite
for the expression of the opinion which is founded upon it, that from
the standpoint of legal liability the examination and the opinion usually
merge into each other. This becomes apparent when we consider some
of the characteristics of the professional opinion of the independent
public accountant.
T he Ultramares case also drew a distinction between negligence and
(1) Spencer Gordon, Liability Arising from Accountant’s R eport (Papers on Auditing
Procedure, etc., presented at the Fifty-second Annual Meeting of the American Institute
of Accountants, 1939, page 53).
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fraud. It held that whereas the negligence of the accountant might
create liability to his client, it would not result in liability to a third
party relying upon the accountant’s opinion. At the same time, however,
the Court held that there would be liability to third parties for the fraud
of the accountant and that such fraud might grow out of the expression
of an opinion. In this connection the Court stated:
“Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be
found to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as
to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it.
Further than that this Court has never gone. Directors of corporations
have been acquitted of liability for deceit though they had been lax
in investigation and negligent in speech * * *. This has not meant, to
be sure, that negligence may not be evidence from which a trier of the
facts may draw an inference of fraud * * * but merely that if that
inference is rejected, or, in the light of ail the circumstances, is found
to be unreasonable, negligence alone is not a substitute for fraud.’’
*

*

*

*

“Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the conse
quence of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in
its adequacy, for this again is fraud.”
*
*
*
*
“In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already
stated in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even
when not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an
inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross.”
T he Ultramares opinion has been followed without modification in
subsequent cases both in the New York and Federal Courts. It remains
our leading authority on accountants’ liability. Although it drew a
distinction in principle between negligence and fraud, it also established
the rule that negligence may be offered as evidence of fraud. In con
sequence, a jury may hold that an accountant’s opinion is a fraudulent
pretense, merely because, in that jury’s judgment, the underlying audit
or examination was grossly negligent. W hether there was such negligence,
and whether such negligence was sufficient to sustain an inference of
fraud, are questions of fact for the jury to decide. In four of the leading
cases(2) relating to accountants’ liability, beginning with the Ultramares
case, our appellate courts have consistently recognized and upheld the
right of juries to pass upon these questions. Where trial courts have
ruled that there was not sufficient evidence from which a jury might find
fraud and where a jury verdict adverse to the accountant has been set
aside by a trial judge, the appellate courts have reversed the trial courts
and have sent these cases back for new trials. On the other hand, where
a jury, after listening to all of the evidence, has found the accountants
free from liability, the appellate court has been unwilling to disturb
(2) Ultramares Corporation v. T ouche (1931) 255 N. Y. 170; O ’Connor v. Ludlum
(1937) 92 F. (2d) 50; State Street T ru st Co. v. Ernst (1938) 278 N. Y. 104; National
Surety Corp. v. Lyndbrand (1939) 256 App. Div. 226.
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that finding. T he significance of this is that the question of liability
in any litigated case is likely to be a question of fact to be passed upon
by a jury of laymen. T he jury will examine the opinion of the account
ant, pass upon its meaning, determine whether the opinion was properly
based upon adequate examination or whether it was so negligently con
ceived that its expression amounted to fraud.
Some of the characteristics of the professional opinion of the public
accountant which may become issues of fact for a jury to pass upon are
the following. It will be seen that each of these characteristics involves
an evaluation of difficult technical matters concerning which most laymen
have had no previous knowledge or experience.
W ithout attempting a definitive description or analysis thereof, it
may be pointed out that the accountant’s opinion is (1) a technical
opinion, (2) an informed opinion, (3) an expert opinion, (4) a candid
opinion and (5) an independent opinion.
1. It is a technical opinion. T he conclusions of the accountant are
presented in the technical form of the balance sheet, income or operating
statement, surplus account and supporting schedules. T he opinion relates
to financial position in the accounting sense and does not purport to
appraise the enterprise in its entirety or evaluate any of the fixed assets.
It does not guaranty the accuracy of the client’s representations of fact.
This technical aspect of the accountant’s opinion is further indicated
in the following comments:
“Some important elements of financial position are altogether be
yond measurement and statement in terms of money values. Other
elements frequently involve judgments and approximations which
may be formulated or made within comparatively wide areas of reason
ableness. T his is particularly true, as the committee pointed out, of
income statements prepared to cover the short period of a single year
where, in a going concern, many items of unfinished business exist
at the close of the year and where the direction of long-term trends
is not fully apparent.
“As for the balance-sheet, the committee has a full realization of
the wide-spread misconception of the document as a measure of value
or present worth and has repeatedly pointed out that its basic function
is to measure investment rather than value. T he current studies on
the use of the term ‘surplus’ seem to indicate an unfortunate asso
ciation, in the minds of many, of surplus and value.”(3)*
2. It is an informed opinion. It is predicated upon an examination
of the books of account, supporting records, system of internal control,
tests of inventory, independent confirmation of facts recorded and such
other examinations or tests as the accepted and established practices of
the profession require. Such procedures and practices prescribe the
minimum of examination to be followed. In many im portant respects,
the amount of detail to be reviewed, as well as the choice of method, are
matters of expert judgment within the discretion of the accountant.
(3) James L. Dohr, Reflections on the Development of Accounting Procedures, Jo u r
nal of Accountancy, July, 1942, pages 43 and 44.
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3. It is an expert opinion. It is the work of one well-trained for the
particular task, who performs the prerequisite examination of accounts
and the interpretation thereof in a competent manner.
T he most frequently quoted statement of the general rule of law
applicable to the rendition of expert services is the following:
“Every man who offers his services to another and is employed
assumes the duty to exercise in the employment such skill as he
possesses with reasonable care and diligence. In all those employ
ments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services, he
is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the
degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment,
and, if his pretentions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud
upon every man who employs him in reliance on his public pro
fession. But no man, whether skilled or unskilled, undertakes that
the task he assumes shall be performed successfully, and without fault
or error. He undertakes for good faith and integrity, but not for
infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith,
or dishonesty, but not for losses consequent upon mere errors of
judgment.”(4)
T he Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission
recently discussed this m atter and stated:
“T he new rules ask for a positive representation as to whether
the audit made was in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards applicable in the circumstances. T he propriety of such
a requirement, as opposed to a requirement merely for a statement
of the accountant’s opinion on the point, was the subject of a good
deal of debate and was adopted only after full consideration of
opposing views. As I see it, an unqualified certificate contains an
implied representation that the accountant has lived up to the stand
ards which are generally approved by his colleagues. Such a repre
sentation, indeed, is implicit, I think, to all professions—that one
who holds himself out as a professional man represents that he has
and has exercised that skill and knowledge common to his calling.
T he new rule merely makes explicit what was before implicit.”(5)
4. It is a candid opinion. It sets forth its conclusions in such form
that material factors are not concealed or suppressed. If the opinion
is subject to any im portant mental reservation or if facts have come to
the notice of the accountant which have an adverse bearing upon the
conclusion reached, such negative factors are either set forth explicitly
as qualifications, reservations or exceptions, or (in the judgment of the
accountant) are so material that he refrains from expressing any opinion.
In this connection, the following is quoted from the bulletin of the
Institute on Extensions of Auditing Procedure (Statements on Auditing
Procedure—No. 1, issued October, 1939):
“In explanation of the general principles governing the auditor’s5
(4) Cooley on Torts, 2nd Edition, page 277.
(5) W illiam W . W em tz, Some Current Deficiencies in Financial Statements, Journal
o f Accountancy, January, 1942. page 27.
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opinion, with particular regard to explanations and exceptions, it is
pertinent to state that the auditor satisfies himself as to the fairness
of the statements ‘by methods and to the extent he deems appropriate’
in general conformity with the auditing procedures recommended in
the Institute’s bulletin Examination of F inancial Statements. Ordi
narily, if he has so satisfied himself, he is in a position to express an
unqualified opinion. However, if he considers it in the interest of
clear disclosure of material fact to include explanations of procedures
followed, he is free to do so. If, on the other hand, such disclosures
are made by reason of any reservation or desire to qualify the opinion,
they become exceptions and should be expressly stated as such in the
opinion paragraph of the auditor’s report. As previously stated, if
such exceptions are sufficiently material to negative the expression of
an opinion, the auditor should refrain from giving any opinion at all,
although he may render an informative report in which he states that
the limitations or exceptions relating to the examination are such as
to make it impossible for him to express an opinion as to the fairness
of the financial statements as a whole.
“It is desirable as a general rule that exceptions by the independent
certified public accountant be included in a paragraph separate from
all others in the report and be referred to specifically in the final para
graph in which the opinion is stated. Any exception should be
expressed clearly and unequivocally as to whether it affects the scope
of the work, any particular item of the financial statements, the
soundness of the company’s procedures (as regards either the books
or the financial statements), or the consistency of accounting practices
where lack of consistency calls for exception.’’

5. It is an independent opinion. It is an unbiased and disinterested
opinion. T he accountant impliedly represents that he has no conflicting
interest which may raise a doubt as to his independence of judgment.
This vital question of independence was recently discussed at some length
by a former president of the Institute, who stated, among other things:
“Evidently it has always been considered an attribute so indis
pensable to the public practice of accounting that it was taken for
granted, and it never occurred to anyone to attempt to define it or
to create rules requiring it.”

“Independence is the certified public accountant’s stock in trade.
He invites public criticism which may result in his professional dis
aster if he permits circumstances to arise which cast doubt on his
independence, even though he may be sure that his state of mind is
as independent as it could be. In this case the appearance of impro
priety is only slightly less dangerous than the impropriety itself.”(6)
Limitations of space and time prevent a more amplified discussion of
the foregoing elements and characteristics of accountant’s opinion. It
(6) Frederick H. H urdm an, Independence of Auditors, Journal of Accountancy.
January, 1942, page 55 and page 60.
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must be obvious, however, that any one of these elements may become
a crucial issue which cannot be resolved intelligently without passing
judgment upon one or more technical questions of accounting and audit
ing principles, procedures, practices, standards, conventions, precedents,
rules, forms, definitions and the like. T he conclusions and findings of
juries will be based upon the evidence presented of what the accountant
did and what he should have done. If our profession itself has failed
to agree upon these matters, there is most likely to be a confusing conflict
of expert testimony, raising controverted issues concerning which juries
will have the final word. On the other hand, to the extent that these
technical matters are sufficiently clarified and established by the profes
sion itself, it is likely that juries will accept the criteria of the profession
and not impose upon us their own inexpert conclusions as to the account
ant’s duty in any given case.
There has already been reference to the fact that in four leading cases
the appellate courts have indicated a consistent disinclination to disturb
the findings of juries in cases involving the alleged negligence and fraud
of accountants. Certainly that policy of the appellate courts will persist
in situations where the existence or the content of professional criteria
is seriously disputed. We have reason to expect, however, that if these
matters are sufficiently clarified and established by the profession itself,
courts of law will be placed in a position to set aside adverse jury
verdicts as contrary to the weight of evidence when such verdicts are in
conflict with recognized and accepted professional standards and criteria
as testified to by experienced and reputable members of the profession.
Such clear-cut professional standards may be exacting in the matter
of minimum requirements and in that way to some extent may restrict
the free use of judgment on the part of the accountant. This fear has
been picturesquely pointed up by one of our distinguished members
in warning us that “it is easier to get into a straitjacket than to get out
of it.” Others have taken what is urged in this paper to be the more
far-sighted view. An eminent expression of this latter viewpoint is the
following quotation from a recently published article on Accounting
Standards by Mr. Victor H. Stempf:
“It follows that objective standards narrow the sphere of individual
judgment and personal opinion as to what the standards are, but it
does not follow that they restrict reasonably free judgment and indi
vidual opinion as to the propriety of applications of such standards.
In respect of these the accountant’s work must still be judged by what
other competent accountants would have done under the same cir
cumstances in conformity with the standards set by the profession.
T he immediate need is for the accelerated formulation of these objec 
tive standards.”(7)
We owe it to our profession to guide and instruct its members in
the performance of their im portant functions. We also have a duty to
the public and to ourselves to enlighten all interested parties as to what
is the technical nature of the services we render and what is the scope
of the responsibility we assume in performing such services. These are
(7) Victor H . Stempf, Accounting Standards, Journal of Accountancy, January, 1942,
page 67.
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paramount considerations. Furthermore, any standards or criteria which
we establish are likely always to permit wide latitude for the exercise
of expert judgment. Even if such latitude is not to be unlimited, any
apparent disadvantage to us will be far outweighed by the sound pro
tection afforded accountants in the face of threatened liability. Only
through well-established professional standards and criteria can account
ants assure themselves of judgment by their peers. T he legal liability of
accountants should be confined within the framework of professional
standards and criteria. If that framework is not constructed by the
profession itself, it will be rudely fashioned for us by juries of laymen
out of the unfortunate material presented to them in the extreme situa
tions which are occasionally litigated.

SECTION 2

LIA BILITY

TO CLIENTS

THE LEGAL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS IN
ITS RELATION TO A STANDARD CLASSIFICATION
OF ACCOUNTING SERVICES *
By Saul L evy, C.P.A. and Member of the New York Bar

T he movement now well under way throughout the profession of
accountancy to adopt and establish a standard Classification of Account
ing Services and Appropriate Certificates may well be discussed from the
standpoint of the legal relationships and the legal hazards involved in
the practice of accountancy. T he general subject of the legal responsi
bility of accountants to clients and to others has received considerable
attention in recent months, particularly in connection with an attem pt to
interpret and apply the opinion of Judge Cardozo in the well-known
Ultramares case.
It would seem that a very close connection exists between the account
ant’s liability arising out of services rendered and the need for a Classi
fication of Accounting Services and Appropriate Certificates. Perhaps it
will serve to emphasize that close connection if the subject is presented
from the hybrid viewpoint of the accountant-lawyer.
Accountants, like practitioners in other skilled professions, undertake
to render personal services to members of the public. T he nature of the
services to be rendered as well as the terms and conditions under which
the accountant undertakes his retainer should be found in a contract or
agreement with the client. This agreement may be written or oral. Its
terms may be expressed in great detail or left largely to inference and
implication. Whatever be its form, however explicit or implicit its terms,
a contract must always exist in legal contemplation whenever an account
ant undertakes a professional engagement. Whatever questions may later
arise concerning the work performed by the accountant, the interested
parties and the court or jury to which their controversy ultimately may
be submitted, must look to that contract for a definition of the rights and
duties of the parties involved.
Curiously enough, the controversy relating to this accountant-client
agreement may involve complaining parties who are not parties to the
original agreement. T he accountant-client relationship has always been
a somewhat unique one from a legal standpoint and has never occupied
quite the same status as the client relationship in other professions.
Neither the common law of England nor that of the United States has seen
fit to confer upon the communications between accountant and client the
* Published in 12 Certified P ublic Accountant 695 (1932).
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protection of privilege accorded to similar communications between
lawyer and client, physician and patient, priest and penitent. An account
ant must regard information obtained by him during the course of the
professional engagement as a sacred trust of confidence, and it would be
a serious breach of professional duty for him on his own initiative and
of his own volition to violate that confidence. Nevertheless, when that
confidential information becomes relevant in a legal proceeding, the
accountant may be subpoenaed to court and, on penalty of contempt of
court, compelled to testify and divulge that information. Under similar
circumstances a lawyer, physician or priest may remain silent, claiming
that the information came to him as a confidential communication in his
professional capacity and that it is his privilege under the law to deem
himself incompetent to testify concerning it. Not so the accountant.
From this it becomes at once apparent that the accountant may become
involved in litigation to which he is not a party. T he work that he has
performed and the conditions surrounding its performance may be in
directly in issue. T he accountant, however reluctantly, may be drawn into
someone else’s controversy, yet find himself in the position of vindicating
his own work. His reputation may be as much at stake as it would be in
a litigation to which he is directly a party.
Accountants themselves have frequently pointed out a fundamental dis
tinction between their professional function and that of the attorney.
The attorney is an advocate, a partisan, a special pleader. By contrast, the
accountant (at least in the performance of audit work) is primarily con
cerned in ascertaining facts and in expressing an impartial opinion with
respect thereto. Our profession has always recognized its ethical responsi
bility to the general public. How far that ethical responsibility goes
beyond the limits of legal responsibility has been a much mooted question.
T he Ultramares case dealt directly with this very question of the legal
responsibility of accountants to others than clients. The decision in the
New York Court of Appeals has restricted liability for ordinary negligence.
It would seem, however, that in practical effect the court has broadened
the liability for fraud. It has held that where there is gross negligence a
jury may find such negligence so flagrant that a representation of fact
could not have been made in good faith because there was no knowledge
of the fact and that an expression of opinion under the circumstances was
a fraudulent pretense. As the court there stated:
“Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be found
to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead
to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it.”
Thus it would seem that while the court has held that for their negli
gence there is no liability on the part of accountants to the general public,
it has at the same time held that there is such liability for fraud. And
going further, it has held that there is a type of fraud which may be in
ferred from negligence. T o quote again from the opinion of Judge
Cardozo:
“O ur holding does not emancipate accountants from the conse
quences of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its
adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that if less
than this is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor
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insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing
liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is
to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been
made.”
Thus we must be brought to the realization that when we undertake
a professional engagement we may become answerable therefor not only
to our client, not only to the authorities who govern the practice of our
profession, but also to some member of the general public who claims to
have been injured because of the manner in which we have performed
our work. The very heart of the controversy is likely to be left for deci
sion to a jury of laymen involving findings of fact by them concerning
the following basic propositions:
1. W hat audit work did the accountant undertake to perform?
2. Did he perform that work adequately and competently, i.e. without
negligence?
3. If not, was he so grossly negligent that he could not have issued his
certificate in good faith? T h at is to say, did his gross negligence
amount to fraud within the meaning of the opinion in the Ultra
mares case?
T he jury system is a condition that confronts us and not a theory. W ith
all its imperfections and obvious limitations it has somehow withstood
the criticism of centuries and is still with us. As it operates in this day
and age with reference to the accountancy profession, it comes to this.
The professional standing and financial fate of the ablest and best quali
fied accountant in the land may hang in the balance while twelve men
in the jury box sit in judgment upon technical questions of accounting
procedure. T he likelihood is that not one of those twelve jurors is a
competent accountant. The lawyers on both sides of the litigation may
manage between them to excuse from service on the jury any individual
whose background suggests that he may be technically qualified. The
jurors who are impanelled will probably represent a cross section of the
commercial community and may include amongst its num ber salesmen
and sales executives, retired business men whose active experience dates
back a long time, shipping clerks, architects, real estate brokers, install
ment house bill collectors, theatrical press agents, insurance agents, ad
vertising experts, manufacturing executives and many other types, each
intelligent enough in his own restricted field, but most, if not all of them,
utterly uninformed with respect to accounting and auditing practice.
W hat this oddly assorted jury is likely to have in common is a firm con
viction that certified public accountants are a breed of infallible super
men whose work should not be judged by ordinary mortal standards.
The existence of error is almost sufficient of itself to create a presumption
of fault on the part of the accountant.
T he predicament in which we find ourselves is clearly unsatisfactory.
W hat is there to be done about it? One obvious line of attack would be to
attem pt to change the jury system so that accountants might be judged
by those understanding accountancy. Ultimately some such reform may
come to pass. But that avenue of solution seems to promise results far
too remote and far too uncertain to warrant our further consideration
at this time.
Another and more promising field of reform is equally obvious. Since
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all questions of fact to be found by the jury relate in a basic way to the
original contract giving rise to the work of the accountant and to the
certificate or report of the accountant covering his work, why not make
that contract so explicit in its terms and make the work of the accountant
and the certificate based thereon so obviously and strictly a compliance
with that contract that technical questions are removed, as far as possible,
from the consideration of the jury. The largest part of the difficulty has
been that most of the essential terms of the accountant’s contract have
been left to inference and implication. The accountant’s certificate has
likewise shed little light upon the scope of the underlying audit work.
In making a fetish of the short unqualified certificate accountants have
borrowed a great deal of trouble for themselves. As a consequence, it is
too often left for the jury to discover through the evidence just what it
was the accountant did and what his agreement and the standards of his
profession required him to do.
Accountants should be judged by the recognized and accepted stand
ards of their own profession and not by the purely adventitious standards
of a jury of laymen, whose mental processes are being manipulated by
adroit and persuasive trial counsel. In order to obtain adequate considera
tion for such authentic standards accountants must first put their own
professional house in order.
From the vantage point of legal liability, which has been my approach,
the problem may be outlined in the following terms:
1. To standardize accounting and auditing technique and terminology,
so far as such matters will submit to standardization without impairing
their essential usefulness.
2. To make the client contract as explicit as may be feasible in terms
of standardized procedure.
3. To express the accountant’s conclusions and/or findings, whether
of opinion or fact, in a certificate which clearly predicates such conclu
sions and findings upon the standardized procedure involved.
Important pioneer work along these specific lines has already been
accomplished by the technical committees of accountancy societies
throughout the country. Opinion may differ as to how far the classifica
tions and standard forms thus far promulgated serve the practical require
ments of the situation. Many difficult problems begin to emerge only as
the discussion proceeds. The desired progress in the right direction cannot
be made without the active interest and cooperation of the profession at
large. Perhaps when accountants better realize why they should be con
cerned with the subject of a standard classification of accounting services
and appropriate certificates, they will then more readily apply themselves
toward the solution of the many technical problems involved.

MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. v. COOK *
District Court of the U nited States, E. D. Michigan, 1940.
35 F. Supp. 160.

T uttle, District Judge. Dexter G. Conklin was appointed city treasurer
by the City of Flint, Michigan. This appointment was confirmed by the
* T his case is discussed at p. 9 ff. supra.
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City Commission. The period of employment was continuous, beginning
April 5, 1928, and ending October 24, 1935. The employment was dis
continued by resignation. The resignation was given by reason of and
immediately following the discovery of misappropriations and embezzle
ments by said Dexter G. Conklin.
In this suit the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company of Balti
more, Maryland, a Maryland Corporation, is designated as defendant.
While it is designated as defendant, actually it appears in these proceed
ings presenting a statement of a cause of action as against Jonathon Cook,
d /b /a Jonathon Cook & Company of Chicago, Illinois, and the Com
mercial Casualty Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, analogous
to the statement of the cause of action of the Maryland Casualty Company
of Baltimore, Maryland. Both the Maryland Casualty Company and
the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company present claims which are
identical, excepting as to amounts, and both are therefore plaintiffs.
The City of Flint carried fidelity bond insurance for its protection,
said fidelity bonds providing that if Dexter G. Conklin should embezzle,
misappropriate or misapply funds belonging to the City of Flint then
the surety on such fidelity contracts was to be chargeable for such loss.
During the period of time involved in this case the surety companies
protected the city of Flint against embezzlement by Dexter G. Conklin
as city treasurer. The dates of coverage and the amount of coverage were
as follows:
Maryland Casualty Company,
6/1/31 to 6/1/32
$200,000.00
“
“
“
6/1/32 to 6/1/33
200,000.00
“
"
“
6/1/33 to 7/30/34
200,000.00
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 7/30/34 to 8/19/35
200,000.00
Maryland Casualty Company,
8/19/35 to 10/24/35 200,000.00
By reason of its contracts of fidelity insurance, the Maryland Casualty
Company, a Maryland Corporation, was required to pay, and did pay, to
the City of Flint on account of losses incurred by the City of Flint by
reason of fraud, misappropriation and embezzlements of Dexter G.
Conklin, City Treasurer, the amount of $12,969.15.
By reason of its contract of fidelity insurance the United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Company, a Maryland Corporation, was required to pay,
and did pay, to the City of Flint on account of losses incurred by the City
of Flint by reason of fraud, misappropriation and embezzlements of
Dexter G. Conklin, City Treasurer, the amount of $3,148.21.
On effecting such payments, the Maryland Casualty Company and the
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company became subrogated to and
were assigned all of the rights of the City of Flint to the extent of the
payments as by them effected.
The City of Flint had prepared “specifications for audit” for the year
period beginning July 1, 1931, ending June 30, 1932. These specifica
tions for audit were submitted to any certified public accountant who
cared to make a bid for the doing of the work as required thereby. The
specifications provided in part as follows:
“The City of Flint, Michigan, is requesting bids for a complete audit of
the transactions of its various boards, departments and offices on a monthly
basis for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1931, and ending June 30, 1932,
subject to the following conditions which will become a part of any con
tract entered into;
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“ 1. The examination shall be a complete monthly audit. Cash bal
ances shall be verified at the beginning of the fiscal period. Cash counts
shall be made each month at irregular periods. All cash receipts shall be
verified by a deposit in one of the depositories of the City. Disbursements
shall be verified for the legality of same. Purchase orders shall be verified
for charter provision in regards thereto, as well as, ordinance governing
purchasing. Commission proceedings shall be checked for compliance
with the various authorizations, agreements, allowances, contracts or other
procedures contained therein. Cash balances shall be verified at the close
of the fiscal period. Any other duties or procedures which ordinarily be
come a part of a complete audit although not specifically stated herein,
shall be deemed a part of these specifications.
“2. It will not be considered the duty of the contracting auditors to
bring into balance any ledger or other book of record during this engage
ment. It shall be their privilege to request the Director of Finance to have
brought into balance any book of record which should have been in bal
ance for their convenience.
*
*
*
*
*
*
“5. * * * No payments will be made by the city before the completion
and acceptance of the work for the fiscal year unless a surety bond for
faithful performance of contract has been filed, and then only after the
approval by resolution of the City Commission.
“6. A letter of certification shall be filed with the City Clerk monthly
as a m atter of record that the monthly audit has been made. T he report
of the contracting auditors for the fiscal year shall be a certified report
stating briefly but clearly what their examination consisted of, with the
necessary exhibits and schedules in support thereof. It should show par
ticularly the exact financial condition of the various funds of the City, a
proper accounting for the cash receipts and disbursements for the year, a
verification of deposits, and a reconciliation of bank balances.
*
*
*
*
*
*
“8. The contracting auditor’s report for the fiscal year shall be made
for all departments, boards and offices of the City as of June 30, 1932. T he
report shall be made with bound imitation leather covers, and delivered
as follows: one copy containing a complete report of all departments,
boards and offices, to the City Clerk, one copy containing a complete report
of all departments, boards and offices, to the Director of Finance, one copy
containing the board report only, to the Recreation and Park Board, one
copy containing the board report only, to the Board of Hospital Managers,
two copies bound separately to contain departmental reports only, to the
Justice Courts and the W ater Department respectively. T he reports shall
be submitted not later than July 30, 1932.
*
*
*
*
*
*
“ 10. The following departments, offices and boards are to be included
in this audit engagement:
“ 1. Director of Finance
“2. City Treasurer.”
Defendant Jonathon Cook, of Chicago, Illinois, an individual, doing
business as Jonathon Cook & Company, submitted his bid to the City of
Flint in accordance with these specifications. This provided in part:
“We are submitting herewith our sealed bid on the audit of the books
and records of the various departments of the City of Flint, Michigan,
for the period from July 1, 1931 to June 30, 1932, in accordance with
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specifications issued by you, for a total sum not to exceed ($2,975.00) Two
Thousand Nine H undred Seventy-Five Dollars including all expenses.
*
*
*
*
*
*
“Jonathon Cook & Company have been bonded at numerous times in
similar cases and shall be pleased to furnish same as requested.”
*
*
*
*
*
*
Subsequently a contract was entered into by and between defendant;
Jonathon Cook and the City of Flint, which contract provided in part as
follows:
“This Agreement, made this 20th day of August, A. D., 1931, by and
between Jonathon Cook & Company of Muskegon, Michigan, hereinafter
called T he Company, and the City of Flint, a municipal corporation, in
the County of Genesee, State of Michigan, hereinafter called the City.
“* * * No payments will be made by the City before the completion
and acceptance of the work for the fiscal year unless a surety bond for
faithful performance of contract has been filed before any monies are paid,
and then only after the approval by resolution of the City Commission.
“Witnesseth: The Company hereby agrees to audit the books and
accounts of the various boards, departments and offices of the City of
Flint on the monthly basis for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1931 and
ending June 30, 1932 subject to the conditions and in accordance with the
specifications hereto attached, which specifications are made a part hereof
as fully as if written herein.”
In accordance with such specifications, the Commercial Casualty In
surance Company, a New Jersey corporation, a hired surety for profit,
executed bond on behalf of Jonathon Cook & Company to the benefit of
the City of Flint in the sum of $2,975, the condition of their said bond
being as follows:
“Whereas, said Principal has been awarded a contract under specifica
tions for audit of the official records of the City of Flint, Michigan, for a
period beginning July 1st, 1931 and ending June 30th, 1932.
“Now, Therefore, if the said Principal shall make audits of the official
records of the various departments of the City of Flint, Michigan, in ac
cordance with the specifications of audit for the period beginning July
1st, 1931, and ending June 30th, 1932, then this obligation to be void;
otherwise to remain in full force and effect.”
This bond was typed on the letterhead stationery of the Commercial
Casualty Insurance Company; was executed in Chicago by the agent of
the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, and was sent to the City of
Flint and countersigned by a Michigan agent of the Commercial Casualty
Insurance Company. It was approved by the City Attorney, and I find as
a fact that the bond and the language thereof were prepared by the Com
mercial Casualty Insurance Company.
I now proceed to discuss the various issues of fact and law as are pre
sented as to the obligations of the several defendants.
First, as to Dexter G. Conklin, defendant herein. He was dishonest and
embezzled moneys belonging to the City of Flint during each and all of
the years in question. He had different ways of embezzling and misap
propriating the money. Principally, such moneys collected by him and
misappropriated by him were delinquent personal property taxes owing
to the City of Flint. For one example, he collected delinquent taxes vol
untarily paid by the taxpayer and then issued what has been termed a
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temporary receipt and no record was made of the tax payment in his office
whatever. For another example, he issued the official receipt of the City
of Flint, but duplicate copies of such receipt supposed to be recorded in
his office were destroyed and no record of the taxpayer having paid such
item was made. For another example, he, as permitted by the statutes of
the State of Michigan, seized personal property of the taxpayers and by
authorization of law sold these assets of the taxpayers who were delinquent
for the purpose of satisfying the tax indebtedness. Having done this, he
issued the so-called temporary receipt and no record of payment of the
taxes appeared in his office.
For another example, he altered the delinquent tax rolls by increasing
the amount shown to be owing in an amount sufficient so that his books
balanced by reason of his collection of the tax money which he had
embezzled.
Dexter G. Conklin embezzled money for a large and substantial amount.
He undoubtedly embezzled money to an extent greater than the City of
Flint was able to prove. I say this because of the lapse of years and the
impossibility of locating certain of the taxpayers shown by the books as
delinquent, many of whom undoubtedly had paid their taxes.
T he embezzlements and misappropriations resulted in a loss to the
Maryland Casualty Company of $12,917.30. T h at is the amount of their
payment to the City of Flint. In addition thereto, expenses have been
incurred by the Maryland Casualty Company investigation of $51.85,
making a total loss to this company of $12,969.15.
T he embezzlements and misappropriations resulted in a loss to the
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company of $3,148.21. T h a t is the
amount of their payment to the City of Flint. In addition thereto, ex
penses have been incurred by the United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company in investigation of $11.35 making a total loss to this company
of $3,159.56.
These losses to the Maryland Casualty Company and to the United
States Fidelity 8c Guaranty Company resulted entirely by reason of the
fraud and embezzlements of Dexter G. Conklin, in an official capacity
and while acting as fiduciary for the City of Flint. Hence, although this a
chancery action it sounds in wilful, malicious and intentional tort and
not in assumpsit, and if the proceedings were on the law side of the court
the finding as against Dexter G. Conklin would be in wilful, malicious
and intentional tort to the amount and extent as before mentioned. This
fact is particularly mentioned and found as a fact for the benefit of the
Maryland Casualty Company and United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company, and in order to prevent a discharge of these debts in the event
that Dexter G. Conklin should attempt to secure a discharge of these ob
ligations in bankruptcy.
As to Jonathon Cook, d /b /a Jonathon Cook 8c Company.
Subrogation of the Sureties to the Right of Action of the City of
Flint as Against Public Accountants.
T he Maryland Casualty Company, and the United States Fidelity 8c
Guaranty Company, sureties on fidelity bonds on behalf of Dexter G.
Conklin, City Treasurer, on the making good of his defalcations, are subro
gated pro tanto to the City of Flint’s right of action as against Jonathon
Cook, d /b /a Jonathon Cook 8c Company, Public Accountants, for his
negligence in the auditing of the books of the City of Flint, in consequence
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of which negligence the earlier defalcations of Dexter G. Conklin as City
Treasurer were not discovered, and the City Treasurer, Dexter G. Conklin,
was left in a position to commit subsequent defalcations. Dantzler L u m 
ber fa Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116,
95 A.L.R. 258. Annotation 95 A.L.R. 269.
Construction of the Contract and Specifications.
I have quoted at length hereinbefore from the specifications for the
audit and the contract for the audit. The contract made the specifications
a part of the audit and required that the audit engagement be performed
in accordance with the specifications.
W hat is the meaning to be given to this contract and specifications?
Am I to interpret them by the usual literal meaning of the words, or am I
to place an interpretation upon this contract and the specifications as
requested by this defendant on the basis of accounting terms? These
technical accounting terms have been referred to as a cash audit, as a bal
ance sheet audit, and as a detailed audit. Some of the accountants here
testifying have said that this contract and specifications required a cash
audit. Some have said it required a balance sheet audit. Some have said
it required a combination of a cash and balance sheet audit, and some
others have said that it required a detailed audit.
In the first place, the Director of Finance for the City of Flint in draw
ing these specifications and drawing this contract had no knowledge of
technical auditing terms. Neither did the City Commission, which had
the authority to make the contract with the specifications, have any such
knowledge. They did not know what a cash audit meant or what a de
tailed audit meant or what a balance sheet audit meant. They did not
have these technical terms in mind. They knew they wanted a complete
audit. They knew of some things that they wanted done for the City by
these accountants, so they put those things down first. T hen when they
mentioned the specific details that they knew they wanted covered, they
went on and used general language to include everything else that was
ordinarily required to be done in the making of a complete audit.
Accordingly, I reach the determination, and it is my opinion, that this
contract and these specifications should be interpreted according to their
literal and usual meaning. There is nothing to indicate that a partial
or limited audit was intended. The language calls for a complete audit.
Why should I attem pt to call this audit engagement by some technical
term as the defendant accountant urges me to do? Neither the contract
nor the specifications use any such technical terms. There is nothing to
guide me in an effort to classify it as a cash audit, a balance sheet audit, or
a detailed audit. If I so classified this audit contract, I would necessarily
then have to reach a conclusion as to exactly what work that classification
called for. T he net result of such reasoning would lead me to an interpre
tation contrary to the plain, ordinary, everyday meaning which this con
tract and these specifications disclose for themselves.
Therefore, I reach the conclusion that this audit engagement is not
limited; that it should be interpreted according to its literal meaning, its
actual meaning, its plain everyday, common-sense meaning. Restatement,
Contracts, Secs. 230 to 235 (a).
I think that it is high time for accountants to know that if they want
a particular contract which they enter into to be measured in the technical
terms of a cash audit, or a balance sheet audit, or a detailed audit, they
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should insist that their contract and the specifications which they agree
to comply with in their contract should plainly state the facts.
So I interpret this contract with its specifications according to the
plain language used.
T he witnesses have all agreed that no technical terms or language has
been used in either the contract or the specifications. Ordinary, everyday
English has been used. It is easily understood and interpreted. If ac
countants wish a contract construed in accordance with their own tech
nical language, then they must see to it that their technical language is
used in their contracts.
T he defendant, Jonathon Cook, testified that on receiving these speci
fications and on reading the specifications, he did not know just what
work was required to be performed for the City of Flint and so he went to
the City of Flint and had a talk with the Director of Finance and thereafter
entered into the contract in reliance upon that conversation had prior to
the execution of the contract. T h at conversation with the Director of
Finance does not mean a thing. T he contract was with the City of Flint
and not with the Director of Finance. It is the contract which Jonathon
Cook made with the City of Flint which must be construed and not con
versations or oral agreements reached with independent officers of the
City prior to the execution of the contracts. Those prior conversations, in
order to become binding, should have been embodied in the written
contract and signed pursuant to proper authority. Therefore, the court
has no alternative but to hold this defendant to performance in accordance
with the terms of his written contract. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 237.
On this point there is an additional thing that should be mentioned.
Once that contract was executed and signed by the parties, no individual
officer, agent or employee of the City of Flint was authorized to alter or
vary the terms of that written instrument. T hat cannot be done by any
individual unless the City has lawfully delegated the authority to a partic
ular individual. In this case, the City Commission of the City of Flint, the
law-making body of the City of Flint, established the requirements of
this audit engagement, and unless they agreed to a change or an alteration
of the terms of that audit engagement and authorized an alteration, the
audit engagement is to be performed in accordance with the terms of the
contract. No such change was made or authorized. Restatements, Con
tracts, Sec. 408 (a).
Negligence of Accountants or Auditors.
While I have reached the conclusion and interpreted this contract for
the audit to require a complete audit within the broad aspects of the
meaning of that word, it does not make any difference in deciding as to
negligence or non-negligence whether I interpret it as a complete audit
within the broad aspects of this contract or whether I say it is a combina
tion cash and balance sheet audit. I say that because if I follow the testi
mony in this case of all of the certified public accountants who have
testified they all agree that reasonable care should be used in test check
ing or in some other way to see that the figures in the controls are in
balance with the detailed ledgers. There was not a reasonable careful
audit performed by the defendant auditor on either basis, whether it be
on the basis of the complete audit or on the basis of the combination cash
and balance sheet audit. I reach that conclusion for several reasons as
follows:
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1. The auditor made no attempt to circularize the delinquent accounts
outstanding. If there had been any attempt made, the probabilities are
that the discrepancies would have been discovered. Certainly there should
have been some attem pt made at circularization. It would not necessarily
have been a 100 per cent. circularization, but there should at least have
been a test circularization. T he delinquent accounts should have been
canvassed and selected persons contracted either by personal call, by tele
phone, or by a form letter.
2. Alteration of the tax rolls. There were many items of alterations
of the tax rolls. The alterations were very crude. He did not even use the
same kind of ink. There are many ways in which these alterations could
have been discovered by this defendant auditor. T he particular rolls
could have been totalled and then compared with the rolls in the assessor’s
office, which were not altered, and the discrepancies would have im
mediately come to light. This auditor paid no attention to the original
assessor’s rolls. Those rolls are a part of the books and records of the
City of Flint, and hence were required to be audited and examined.
3. W hen this defendant auditor or his representatives started to make
his monthly audits and his annual audits it was incumbent upon him to
audit various delinquent tax rolls including the current tax roll. He
should have carefully examined the 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929 and 1930 de
linquent tax rolls as well as the 1931 tax rolls. He should have determined
whether or not the delinquent balance outstanding on each and every
one of those tax rolls balanced with the controls. It is my belief and find
ing that this was not done. The auditor was unable to produce work
sheets. T he auditor said he thought that the delinquent tax rolls for
several years were totalled in their entirety, and that then the totals taken
from the controls for the corresponding years added and the two then
compared. Even if done, this, in my judgment, is not reasonably prudent
or careful auditing work.
4. This defendant auditor found the delinquent balances outstanding
from these tax rolls on the basis of the total obtained over the period of
years to be out of balance on the basis of the total obtained from the
controls over the period of years. He says that the only thing that he did
was to mention it verbally to the Director of Finance, and then he pro
ceeded in the annual report to certify the exact balance to be a stated
figure on the delinquent taxes, when actually it was not true, and he
had no knowledge whatsoever of what the delinquent balance outstand
ing was. T he auditor did not balance these books or require the City
to do so. He should have required the City of Flint to bring these books
into balance. It was not done.
5. W hen this auditor ran tapes, he used figures superimposed upon the
tax roll in lead pencil. By that I mean this City Treasurer’s office for
their convenience had placed out at the extreme edge of the page in lead
pencil what they claimed represented the delinquent balances outstanding,
and when this auditor ran his tapes he used those pencil figures without
checking those figures with the figures in ink to determine whether or not
the pencil figures were accurate. Many of them were not accurate and a
careful check would have so disclosed.
6. This auditor failed to audit the control as maintained in the City
Treasurer’s office, either with the control in the Director of Finance’s office
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or with the tax rolls themselves. Had he audited such book in comparison
with either the controls or the rolls, he would have found the records
decidedly out of balance. It is the failure to do these things that forces
me to the conclusion that this auditor failed to faithfully perform his
audit engagement. W ith a reasonable degree of care the many defalcations
would have been discovered. It is the failure upon the part of the auditor
to do these things which makes it clear that he did not make the audit he
had contracted to make, and he did not do what a reasonably prudent
auditor would and should have done under the circumstances. He was
negligent.
For the failure to perform this audit engagement in accordance with the
terms of this contract as a reasonably prudent and careful auditor would
and because of such negligence, this defendant auditor, Jonathan Cook,
must respond in damages, Fox & Sons v. Moorish Grant &Co., 1918, 35
Times Law Report, 126; Leeds Estate Building & Investment Co. v.
Shepherd, 36 L. R. Chancery Div. 787; Smith, et al. v. London Assurance
Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. S. 820; National Surety Corp. v.
Lybrand et al, 256 App. Div. 226, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 554; Dantzler Lum ber &
Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116, 95 A. L. R.
258; Ultramares Corp. v. George A. Touche et al., 225 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E.
441, 74 A .L .R . 1139.
Is the negligence of the defendant auditor the proximate cause of the
damage for which this suit against Jonathan Cook is brought?
T he evidence as to all of the shortages and peculations which appear
upon the books and records of the City of Flint during the yearly audit
engagement of the defendant auditor must be considered. Those marks of
irregularity were there in the record.
An auditor performing an audit on the basis of this contract and these
specifications and doing his work as a reasonably prudent, careful auditor
would have done his work, would have, and should have, discovered some
of these many, many irregularities; and, having discovered some of them,
all of the others would have been found.
One of the purposes of the audit was to determine whether or not any of
the employees of the City of Flint, including the City Treasurer, were
embezzling or misappropriating or defrauding the City of Flint of its
money. These irregular items were apparent from the books. If they had
been brought to the attention of the City of Flint by the auditor, the
Treasurer’s services would have been terminated and the City would then
not have been put to the further loss suffered by it by reason of the sub
sequent misappropriations and peculations by this City Treasurer occur
ring after the negligent performance of the contract by the auditor. Re
statement, Contracts, Sec. 330.
It was fairly within the contemplation of the parties to this contract that
this work should be properly done. It was negligently done and thus the
defaulting City Treasurer was permitted to continue on in his work. The
auditor is obligated to respond in damages for the amount of the shortages
accruing after the negligent performance of the audit engagement. Hadley
v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145; Fox & S o n v. Moorish Grant & Co.,supra;
Leeds Estate Building & Investment Co. v. Shepherd, supra; Smith, et al. v.
London Assurance Corp., supra; National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, supra;
Dantzler Lum ber &Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., supra; Ultra
mares Corp. v. George A. Touche et al., supra.
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T he Maryland Casualty Company and the United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company having reimbursed the City of Flint for such loss and
damage are subrogated to the rights of said City as against Jonathon Cook.
Of the particular loss as sustained by the Maryland Casualty Company
on its payment to the City of Flint, the amount of $11,169.09 occurred
subsequent to the negligent performance of the contract by the defendant
Jonathon Cook.
Of the particular loss as sustained by the United States Fidelity & Guar
anty Company on its payment to the City of Flint, the amount of $2,809.61
occurred subsequent to the negligent performance of the contract by the
defendant Jonathan Cook.
As to the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company.
W hat is the obligation of the bond of the defendant Commercial
Casualty Insurance Company? T he obligation clause of that bond
provides:
“Whereas, said Principal has been awarded a contract under specifica
tions for audit of the official records of the City of Flint, Michigan, for a
period beginning July 1st, 1931, and ending June 30th, 1932.
“Now, Therefore, if the said principal shall make audits of the official
records of the various departments of the City of Flint, Michigan, in
accordance with the specifications of audit for the period beginning July
1st 1931 and ending June 30th, 1932, then this obligation to be void;
otherwise to remain in full force and effect.”
Therefore, in determining the obligation of the Commercial Casualty
Insurance Company there must be determined the obligation of the de
fendant Jonathon Cook & Company as per the contract and the specifica
tions, and the requirements as set forth and enumerated by the contract
and the specifications as to the obligation of the surety bond.
The specifications say, in part: “No payments will be made by the
City before the completion and acceptance of the work for the fiscal year
unless a surety bond for faithful performance of contract has been filed.”
T he contract says, in part: “No payments will be made by the City
before the completion and acceptance of the work for the fiscal year unless
a surety bond for faithful performance of contract has been filed.”
This bond cannot be read by itself separately without reading and
construing the specifications and the contract, and there is no question
but that the specifications and the contract require the principal on the
bond to faithfully perform his audit engagement, and if he does not
faithfully perform the audit engagement then the bond has been breached.
In fact, the specifications and contract specifically and definitely define
the auditor’s bond to be given as a “bond for faithful performance.”
Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 238 (a).
T he defendant auditor, the principal on this bond, did not faithfully
perform his audit engagement. Therefore, the bond has been breached.
Therefore, the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company is holden on
their bond.
It is argued by the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company that its
bond is a completion bond only; that it was not required to be conditioned
upon anything other than that the principal, this defendant auditor,
should be there twelve times a year and make an audit, irrespective of
how made, and then give a report at the end of the year irrespective of
what was contained in the report.
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The position which the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company
would like this court to take in construing this bond cannot be taken
because it is apparent that if that were all that was required by the bond,
then the words “faithful performance of the contract” would not have
been written in the specifications and would not have been written in the
contract.
Further, both the specifications and the contract use the language,
“before the completion and acceptance of the work.” If this were merely
a completion bond, on the basis of the argument of the Commercial Casu
alty Insurance Company the words “and acceptance” would not have been
inserted in either contract or specifications.
There is nothing in the bond, there is nothing in the specifications,
and nothing in the contract which would justify the conclusion that this is
a completion bond without any regard for faithful performance of the
work which was to be completed. T he specifications and the contract
definitely describe the bond to be given as “a surety bond for faithful per
formance of contract.”
Counsel for the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company predicates
his argument upon verbal testimony given by a former Director of Finance
of the City of Flint and the City Clerk of the City of Flint. Obviously,
their testimony does not alter the terms or conditions of this bond or of
the contract or of the specifications, because no authority was ever con
ferred upon the Director of Finance or the City Clerk to decide what the
obligation of the bond should be. T he obligation of that bond was set
by the law-making body of the City of Flint, the City Commission. No
officer, agent, or employee had authority to alter or amend in any way or
manner the mandate of the City Commission as to the requirements of
this bond.
Further, we have the very definite proposition that, this defendant
surety being a hired surety for profit and having drawn its own form of
bond, any ambiguity in the bond would be construed as against it. I do
not think this bond, the contract, or the specifications are ambiguous.
They are as clear as the English language is capable of making them.
Therefore, there is nothing to construe; but if we were to take the
argument of this surety as to ambiguity, we must of necessity construe that
ambiguity against it. Restatement, Contracts, Sec. 236 (d).
Lastly, we have this fact for consideration, and it cannot be refuted.
If this is only a completion bond; if it only required the defendant auditor
to be there twelve times annually and to submit a report at the end of
the year without any regard for what work was to be done, or how the
work was to be done, or the accuracy of the report when given at the end
of the year, the bond would be worthless.
The Commercial Casualty Insurance Company is accordingly obligated
on its bond to the Maryland Casualty Company and United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Company.
Decree may enter finding for the Maryland Casualty Company and
against Dexter G. Conklin as follows:
Payment to the City of F lin t......................................................... $12,917.30
Cost of investigating c la im ............................................................
51.85
Cost of investigation—witness fees—payments to expert wit
nesses incidental to this suit......................................................
1,187.45
$14,156.60
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Interest may also be computed at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from
December 15, 1936, as to the first and second items only.
Decree may enter finding for the United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company and against Dexter G. Conklin as follows:
Payment to the City of Flint ........................................................
Cost of investigating claim ...........................................................

$3,148.21
11.35
$3,159.56

Interest may also be computed at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from
September 29, 1936.
Decree may enter finding for the Maryland Casualty Company as
against Jonathon Cook in the sum of $11,169.09. Interest may be com
puted on this sum at the rate of 5 per cent from December 15, 1936.
Decree may enter finding for the United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company as against Jonathon Cook in the sum of $2,809.61. Interest may
be computed on this sum at the rate of 5 per cent from December 15, 1936.
Decree may enter finding as against the Commercial Casualty Insurance
Company in the amount of $2,975.00 together with interest at the rate
of 5 per cent per annum from June 28, 1937, to date of entry of decree,
said decree to provide that the Maryland Casualty Company and the
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company recover from the Commercial
Casualty Insurance Company as follows: Maryland Casualty Company,
$2,377.76, together with interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per
annum from June 28, 1937; T he United States Fidelity & Guaranty Com
pany, $597.24, together with interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per
annum from June 28, 1937.
T he decree shall provide that on satisfaction by the Commercial Cas
ualty Insurance Company the obligation of Jonathon Cook to the Mary
land Casualty Company and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company shall be reduced in proportion. The decree shall further pro
vide that on satisfaction of decree by Jonathon Cook the obligation of
Dexter G. Conklin to the Maryland Casualty Company and United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company shall be reduced in proportion.
The decree shall further provide that the Maryland Casualty Company
and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company be permitted their costs
as against Dexter G. Conklin, Jonathon Cook and the Commercial Cas
ualty Insurance Company.
This opinion shall stand as findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Proposals for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law may be
filed at any time prior to final decree.

O’NEILL v. ATLAS AUTOMOBILE FINANCE CORP.*
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1940. 139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A.2d 782.

C unningham, Judge. The proceeding below was assumpsit by a firm
of certified public accountants against the defendant finance corporation
to recover $677.50, alleged to be due for professional services.
* T his case is discussed at p. 11 ff. supra.
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Plaintiffs’ statement of claim included three separate items, each
founded upon an alleged oral contract with defendant—$75 for an exami
nation of defendant’s transactions and a report thereon for the month of
June, 1936; $456.25 for a detailed examination to determine the extent
of certain embezzlements by a bookkeeper; and $146.25 for selecting and
training a new bookkeeper. These services were alleged to have been
rendered during July and August, 1936.
The defendant, in its pleadings, not only denied liability for any of the
items set out in plaintiffs’ statement, but also set up a counterclaim for
damages in the net amount of $927.30 alleged to have been suffered by it
by reason of the asserted negligence of plaintiffs in failing to discover
that defendant’s bookkeeper had been misappropriating various sums of
money over a period of three years prior to July, 1936. During the trial,
defendant conceded that plaintiffs were entitled to recover the first item
of $75. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of
$487.03; the court below denied defendant’s motions for judgment n. o. v.,
or a new trial, and entered judgment upon the verdict; this appeal by the
defendant followed.
The defendant having admitted liability for the first item sued upon,
and the second and third items being based upon contested oral contracts,
alleged to have been made subsequent to the discovery of the shortage,
these issues of fact arose: (a) Did defendant make these contracts, and if so
what were their terms? (b) Did plaintiffs perform the work called for by
them? (c) Were the charges for the services performed reasonable? Each
issue was necessarily one of fact to be determined by the jury.
As to the second item it was not disputed that the examination was
carefully and properly made, but it was contended plaintiffs volunteered
these services because of their failure to discover the shortages of the book
keeper while making prior examinations, hereinafter discussed. On behalf
of plaintiffs, O ’Neill testified defendant’s president employed them to
investigate the circumstances and amount of the shortage and agreed to
pay for the work, although no specific sum was mentioned.
W ith respect to the third item, it was denied by defendant that it had
ever agreed to pay plaintiffs for any services of that character.
An examination of the record discloses a num ber of conflicts in the evi
dence bearing upon these issues, but it also discloses that plaintiffs ad
duced sufficient competent evidence to take each issue to the jury. They
were submitted in a m anner concerning which no complaint is made in
the assignments. T he verdict was evidently a compromise over the inclu
sion or rejection of certain items claimed by plaintiffs and the reasonable
ness of some of their charges, bu t the matters at issue were exclusively for
determination by the jury. We find no error upon this record which would
justify the granting of a new trial with respect to these items.
We turn, therefore, to the consideration of defendant’s counterclaim. It
was not contended by defendant that plaintiffs had been guilty of any
negligence in the performance of the contracts upon which they sued; the
counterclaim was founded upon the charge that plaintiffs had negligently
failed, while rendering prior accounting services to defendant, to discover
that the totals upon the tapes submitted by the bookkeeper were false.
Except for a period from January to May, 1935, during which another
firm of accountants was employed by defendant, plaintiffs rendered ac
counting services from December of 1929 up to May 31, 1936. About the
middle of July, 1936, it was discovered the bookkeeper had been embez-
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zling funds of the defendant and had concealed her thefts in the following
manner; Defendant’s business involved the keeping of accounts with a
large num ber of lessees of automobiles who had obligated themselves to
pay it monthly rentals. The greater part of its “accounts receivable” con
sisted of such rentals. A card was prepared for each lessee and payments
entered thereon as made. T he total of these accounts appeared in the gen
eral ledger. On the occasion of each of defendant’s monthly audits, the
bookkeeper ostensibly totaled the accounts receivable from the cards on
the adding machine, so that the total might be compared by the plaintiffs
with the ledger entry. T he bookkeeper’s peculations began in 1933 and
her method of concealing them was by “plugging the tapes” of the adding
machine. W hen about to run a tape, she first tabulated the amount she
was short without making any figures on the tape and then proceeded to
run the tape in the usual way. T he result was that the totals on the tapes
included not only the sum of the figures appearing thereon but also the
amounts she had embezzled.
T he dispute between plaintiffs and defendant is with regard to the
extent of the undertaking on the part of plaintiffs, under the terms of
their employment, during the years they had been examining defendant’s
books and making reports thereon. Plaintiff’s contention is that their con
tract was for a limited examination, and a financial review of defendant’s
books, without verification. Defendant’s contention is that the terms of
plaintiffs’ employment contemplated the making of a complete and
detailed audit and the furnishing of certified reports which should have
uncovered the shortage.
One of the plaintiffs, O’Neill, testified his original employment was
under an oral contract (a fact conceded by defendant) and that “the
nature of the work was to review [defendant’s] transactions, guide the
bookkeeper, preparation of Federal and State T ax Returns, advise with
the management of the concern in financial affairs,” and that it was not
agreed or contemplated that “certified reports” would be issued. In
describing the services rendered he said: “Monthly we would visit the
office of the Atlas, make a revision of the transactions, not verifying the
data considered, we would instruct the bookkeeper in the handling of
technical transactions, we would prepare from the trial balance submitted
by the bookkeeper a statement of the condition and a profit and loss
statement. We would review that statement with the management, upon
the submission of the typewritten report.”
T he letters of transmittal of the reports used this phraseology: “We have
prepared from the records of Atlas Automobile Finance Corporation and
information submitted to us balance sheet as of (designated month and
year) and a comparative statement of profit and loss based on the month
of (name of month) together with relating schedules.” (Italics supplied.)
T he services shown by the testimony to have been rendered were accu
rately described by the learned trial judge, Brown, Jr., J., in his opinion
supporting the judgment, as having “consisted of making a review of
defendant’s transactions, guiding the bookkeeper in handling of tech
nical transactions, preparing a statement of condition and a profit and
loss statement from the trial balance submitted by defendant’s book
keeper, preparing Federal and State T ax Returns, and advising defendant
in financial matters. T he monthly reports submitted to defendant were
uncertified and unverified. * * * The accountants’ practice was to accept
the totals set forth in defendant’s general ledger, without checking the
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individual items that made up the totals. It was stated in letters accom
panying the accountants’ reports that they were ‘prepared from the rec
ords of Atlas Automobile Finance Corporation and information sub
mitted to us?'"
W hen plaintiffs were reengaged in July, 1935, the extent of their under
taking was set forth by them in a letter addressed to the president of the
defendant company and accepted by it as satisfactory. The letter read:
“Confirming our recent conversation we agree, with respect to the
Atlas Automobile Finance Corp, and the Universal Auto Loan Co., to
make a monthly examination of the transactions and submit monthly re
ports in substantially the same form as heretofore and to prepare annually
the Federal Income Tax Return, Pennsylvania State Income Tax Returns,
and the Pennsylvania Capital Stock and Corporate Loans Report. In
addition to the above, we will also prepare your personal Federal Income
Tax Return and your Pennsylvania State Income Tax Return. This work
is to commence with the transactions on June 1, 1935, and continue until
May 31, 1936, for the total sum of $1,050.00, payable in twelve equal
monthly amounts as reports are submitted. Please indicate your agree
ment to this arrangement by signing the duplicate of this letter in the
space provided below and return to us.” (Italics supplied.)
It was agreed that the share of the total compensation chargeable to the
defendant company would be $75 a month. This contract by its terms
expired May 31, 1936. The compensation therein provided for was paid
up to and including the report for May, 1936. The reference in the letter
to the submission of “monthly reports in substantially the same form as
heretofore,” is not without significance in view of the rejection by the
jury of the entire counterclaim. T he subsequent verbal contract made in
July, 1936, and involving the first item in plaintiffs’ claim of $75 for an
examination of defendant’s transactions and a report thereon for the
month of June, 1936, was, as plaintiffs contend, for an examination and
report similar to those theretofore rendered. T he report was made in the
usual form and defendant’s concession at the trial of liability for that
item may have been considered by the jury as some confirmation of plain
tiff’s contention relative to the extent of their duties.
In support of plaintiff’s version of their responsibilities under the con
tract, they called, as an expert witness, Henry S. McCaffrey; no objection
was made to his competency. His testimony corroborated that of O’Neill
with respect to the difference between an ordinary audit and report and
a certified one, verified from independent sources. Defendant offered no
expert testimony to contradict that introduced by plaintiffs.
It is apparent from what has been said that the services rendered up to
May 31, 1936, were rendered under a contract partly oral and partly
written. It is well settled that the terms and construction of such a con
tract are for the jury where, as here, its terms are disputed. Philadelphia
v. Stewart, 201 Pa. 526, 530, 51 A. 348; Bastian v. Marienville Glass Co.,
281 Pa. 313, 316, 126 A. 798; and Dougherty et al. v. Proctor & Schwartz,
Inc., 317 Pa. 363, 366, 176 A. 439. T he jury evidently accepted plaintiffs’
version of the terms of their contract and the nature of their duties under
it.
T he conflicting evidence relative to the counterclaim was necessarily
for the jury and the twelfth assignment, based upon the refusal of the
trial judge to give binding instructions for the defendant, is without
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merit. The court below, therefore, did not err in subsequently denying
defendant’s motion for judgment, n. o. v.
Defendant’s other assignments of error are directed to the refusal of a
new trial. The first five allege errors in the admission of the above men
tioned expert testimony and evidence of a similar nature.
We adopt the following excerpts from the opinion of the trial judge as
justifying the admission of that evidence:
“The qualifications of these witnesses (O’Neill and McCaffrey) were
not challenged. T he fact that O ’Neill was a party did not, of course, dis
qualify him as an expert witness in his own behalf. Beck v. Philadelphia
Automobile Trade Ass’n, 59 Pa. Super. 145, 147. Nor was any objection
made to the form of the questions put to them. It was contended, how
ever, that in testifying as they did they were interpreting the legal effect
of the contract and were thereby usurping the function of the court. W ith
this we were unable to agree. * * * T he witnesses, moreover, did not
testify as to the legal effect of the contract between the parties. They were
called to explain the significance of the type of reports which plaintiffs
submitted, over an extended period of time, in performance of the con
tract. It has frequently been decided that the construction placed upon
a disputed contract by the parties thereto, as shown by their acts or decla
rations, will ordinarily be adopted, and will certainly be referred to in
determining the true nature of the agreement. Philadelphia, Trustee v.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 87, 94, 138 A. 94; Armstrong v. Standard
Ice Co., 129 Pa. Super. 207, 213, 195 A. 171. Aside from this, however, in
explaining the nature of plaintiffs’ performance of their obligations under
the contract, the testimony aided the jury in determining whether such
performance complied with the terms of the contract. For this purpose
it was clearly admissible.”
Complaint is made in the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh assignments
of the disposition made by the trial judge of certain points for charge.
T he eighth and ninth alleged error in affirming plaintiffs’ second and
third points, reading:
“2. Magee, Liebman & O’Neill, as accountants, are not guarantors or
insurers of the correctness of their accounts.
“3. Magee, Liebman & O ’Neill, as accountants, do not say to the
public ‘Let us examine your books and vouchers, and we will with absolute
certainty discover any dishonesty, every mistake, that exists in those books,
and we will protect you against that.’ T h a t is not what they undertook
to do. They agreed to use such skill in the performance of their agree
ment as reasonably prudent, skillful accountants would use under the
circumstances.”
In our opinion, these points were properly affirmed. T he language of
the third was taken from Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N.Y.S.
259, affirmed, 242 N. Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431. Reference may also be made to
In re London and General Bank, 2 Ch.Div. (Eng) 673; Cooley, Law of
Torts (2d Ed.) 277.
The tenth and eleventh assignments complain of the refusal of defen
dant’s second and third points:
“2. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs were employed
to make a detailed monthly examination and audit of defendant’s busi
ness transactions and books, and by reason of the plaintiffs’ failure so to
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do a loss or losses resulted, which might otherwise have been prevented,
the plaintiffs are liable to the defendant for such losses.
“3. If the work for which the plaintiffs are suing was made necessary
because the plaintiffs failed to comply with their contract of employment,
then the plaintiffs cannot recover for those services in default of an agree
ment by defendant to pay.”
These points were refused, and we think properly, upon the ground
that they were too comprehensive and would require extensive qualifi
cation “to present the matters referred to adequately to the jury.” It must
also be noted that the trial judge affirmed the following points submitted
by the defendant:
“ 1. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs were employed
to make a detailed monthly examination and audit of defendant’s busi
ness transactions and books, then it was the duty of the plaintiffs to
ascertain the accuracy of the Accounts Receivable of the defendant and
to ascertain whether the books balanced and to make a true and accurate
statement of the same to the defendant.
“4. If you find that the plaintiffs broke their contract and if you
find that the loss could have been prevented by the plaintiffs’ careful and
efficient work under their contract, the defendant is entitled to a verdict
for the amount of the loss occurring after the date upon which a discovery
of embezzlements and thefts should have been made.”
T he substance of the points refused was covered in those affirmed.
Moreover, in the concluding portion of the charge the trial judge, after
instructing the jury to determine whether plaintiffs had been “careless,
negligent and inefficient,” added: “If they were, that is if they were so
neglectful in the performance of their work of examination and audit that
the embezzlements, which extended over a period of years, were not dis
covered, and the failure to discover them resulted in this loss which the
defendant company sustained, which has been reduced by payments to
$927.30, then it seems to me you would be justified in rendering a verdict
in the defendant’s favor against the plaintiffs for that amount, less of
course the $75 which defendant now concedes plaintiffs are entitled to
receive.”
We have examined the other assignments relative to the admission of
testimony objected to by counsel for defendant and are satisfied no re
versible error was committed by the trial judge in his rulings upon the
admission or rejection of evidence.
We think the counterclaim was submitted to the jury in a m anner as
favorable to the defendant as it had any right to expect. As the jury re
jected the entire counterclaim, nothing further need be said. T he assign
ments of error are severally overruled.
Judgment affirmed.

In re LONDON AND GENERAL BANK *
Court of Appeal, 1895. 2 Ch. 673.

Lord Justice L indley: This is an appeal by Mr. Theobald, one of
the auditors of the London and General Bank, which is being wound up,
* T his case is discussed a t p . 17 supra.
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against an order made by Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, under Section
10 of the Companies Act, 1890. By this order Mr. Theobald and the
directors of the bank are declared jointly and severally liable to pay to
the Official Receiver of the company two sums of £5,946 12s. 0d. and
£8,486 11s. 0d., being respectively the amounts of dividends declared and
paid by the bank for the years 1890 and 1891, with interest on those
sums. T he grounds on which this order was made on Mr. Theobald
are that these dividends were paid out of capital, and that such payment
was made pursuant to resolutions of the shareholders based upon recom
mendations of the directors of the bank and upon balance sheets pre
pared and certified by Mr. Theobald, and which did not truly repre
sent the financial position of the company.
Mr. Theobald’s appeal was supported by arguments to the effect: (1)
that Mr. Theobald was not an officer of the company within the meaning
of Section 10 of the Winding-up Act, 1890; (2) that the balance sheets
and certificates given by Mr. Theobald were in accordance with the books
of the bank, and that Mr. Theobald’s duty as auditor was confined to
framing the balance sheets, which showed the position of the bank as dis
closed by its books; (3) that the dividends in question were not really
paid out of capital and that, however im prudent and reckless it may have
been to pay them, Mr. Theobald, as auditor, is not legally responsible
for such payment; (4) that even if Mr. Theobald, as auditor, failed ade
quately to discharge his duty, and even if the dividends were paid out of
capital, his failure to discharge his duty was the remote and not the
proximate cause of the non-payment (sic) of the dividends, and that he,
consequently, is not legally liable to make good the amount so paid; (5)
that at any rate the order is wrong in declaring him liable jointly and sev
erally with the directors to repay the dividends in question.
The first of these contentions was argued and decided last April, and
the Court then held that an auditor of a banking company governed by
the Companies Act, 1879, and by such articles as regulated the present
company, was an officer of the company within the meaning of Section 10
of the Winding-up Act, 1890, and was liable to have proceedings taken
against him under that section. This point, having been thus decided,
was, of course, not again raised, and nothing further need be said about it.
It remains, however, to consider what the duties of an auditor are as
respects companies governed by the Companies Act, 1879, and by such
articles as regulate this particular company. It will be convenient to do
this before examining the facts relied upon by the liquidator as making
Mr. Theobald liable to make good the dividends which he has been
ordered to pay. Section 7 of the Companies Act of 1879, clauses 1, 5 and
6, are material. ‘7.— (1) Once at least in every year the accounts of every
banking company registered after the passing of this Act as a limited
company shall be examined by an auditor or auditors, who shall be elected
annually by the company in general meeting.’ T hen clause 5 is: ‘Every
auditor shall have a list delivered to him of all books kept by the com
pany, and shall at all reasonable times have access to the books and
accounts of the company; and any auditor may, in relation to such books
and accounts, examine the directors or any other officer of the company.’
Then there is a proviso, which one need not read, about banks beyond
the limits of Europe. Then 6 is: ‘The auditor or auditors shall make a
report to the members on the accounts examined by him or them, and
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on every balance sheet laid before the company in general meeting during
his or their tenure of office; and in every such report shall state whether,
in his or their opinion, the balance sheet referred to in the report is a
full and fair balance sheet properly drawn up, so as to exhibit a true
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs, as shown by the
books of the company, and such report shall be read before the com
pany in general meeting.’ Then ‘7. T he remuneration of the auditor or
auditors shall be fixed by the general meeting appointing such auditor
or auditors, and shall be paid by the company.’ It is necessary also to
read articles 106, 107 and 114. Article 106, which is under the head ‘Ac
counts,’ runs thus: ‘At every ordinary meeting the directors shall lay
before the meeting a balance sheet showing the financial state of the
company for the previous financial year, duly audited, and every such
balance sheet shall be accompanied by a report of the directors as to the
state and condition of the company, and as to the amount which they
recommend to be paid out of the profits by way of dividend or bonus to
the shareholders, after allowing for any interim dividend which the di
rectors may have declared, and any sum which they may have set aside
under article 116 hereof.’ Then article 107, which is under the head
‘Audit,’ runs thus: ‘The accounts of the company shall be from time to
time examined and the correctness of the statements shall be from time
to time ascertained, by two or more auditors, in accordance with these
presents.’ T hen article 114, which, I think, is the only further one I need
read at this moment, runs thus: ‘The auditors shall be supplied with
copies of the statement of accounts intended to be laid before the meeting,
and it shall be their duty to examine the same with the accounts and
vouchers relating thereto.’ These are the enactments and regulations
which bear directly on the duties of the auditors, and although articles
107 and 114 are in terms more explicit than Section 7 of the statute as
regards the duty of the auditors to examine and ascertain the correctness
of the statements laid before them, and of the accounts laid before the
shareholders, yet it is tolerably plain from the language of Section 7
of the Act, clause 5, that the articles add little, if anything, to the duties
imposed on the auditors by the statute alone.
In connection with these articles, and in order to save repetition, it
should be stated that by the articles of this bank it is the duty of the
directors, and not of the auditors, to recommend to the shareholders the
amounts to be appropriated for dividends; and it is the duty of the
directors to have proper accounts kept so as to show the true state and
position of the company. Lastly, it is for the shareholders, but only on
the recommendation of the directors, to declare a dividend.
It is impossible to read Section 7 of the Companies Act, 1879, without
being struck with the importance of the enactment that the auditors are
to be appointed by the shareholders, and are to report to them directly,
and not to, or through, the directors. T he object of this enactment is
obvious. It evidently is to secure to the shareholders independent and
reliable information respecting the true financial position of the com
pany at the time of the audit. T he articles of this particular company are
even more explicit on this point than the statute itself, and remove any
possible ambiguity to which the language of the statute, taken alone,
may be open if very narrowly criticised.
It is no part of an auditor’s duty to give advice either to directors or
shareholders as to what they ought to do. An auditor has nothing to do

LIABILITY T O CLIENTS

103

with the prudence or imprudence of making loans with or without secur
ity. It is nothing to him whether the business of a company is being
conducted prudently or imprudently, profitably or unprofitably; it is
nothing to him whether dividends are properly or improperly declared,
provided he discharges his own duty to the shareholders. His business
is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the company at the
time of the audit, and his duty is confined to that. But then comes the
question: How is he to ascertain such positions? T he answer is: By exam
ining the books of the company. But he does not discharge his duty by
doing this without inquiry and without taking any trouble to see that the
books of the company themselves show the company’s true position. He
must take reasonable care to ascertain that they do. Unless he does this,
his duty will be worse than a farce. Assuming the books to be so kept as
to show the true position of the company, the auditor has to frame a
balance sheet showing that position according to the books, and to certify
that the balance sheet presented is correct in that sense. But his first
duty is to examine the books, not merely for the purpose of ascertaining
what they do show, but also for the purpose of satisfying himself that
they show the true financial position of the company. This is quite in
accordance with the decision of Mr. Justice Stirling in The Leeds Estate
Company v. Shepherd in 36 Chancery Division, page 802. An auditor,
however, is not bound to do more than exercise reasonable care and skill
in making inquiries and investigations. He is not an insurer; he does not
guarantee that the books do correctly show the true position of the
company’s affairs; he does not guarantee that his balance sheet is accurate
according to the books of the company. If he did he would be responsible
for an error on his part, even if he were himself deceived, without any
want of reasonable care on his part—say, by the fraudulent concealment
of a book from him. His obligation is not so onerous as this.
Such I take to be the duty of the auditor; he must be honest—that is,
he must not certify what he does not believe to be true, and he must take
reasonable care and skill before he believes that what he certifies is true.
W hat is reasonable care in any particular case must depend upon the
circumstances of that case. Where there is nothing to excite suspicion,
very little inquiry will be reasonable and sufficient; and in practice, I
believe, business men select a few cases haphazard, see that they are
right, and assume that others like them are correct also. Where sus
picion is aroused more care is obviously necessary, but still an auditor
is not bound to exercise more than reasonable care and skill even in a
case of suspicion; and he is perfectly justified in acting on the opinion of
an expert where special knowledge is required.
Mr. Theobald’s evidence satisfies me that he took the same view as my
self of his duty in investigating the company’s books and preparing his
balance sheet. He did not content himself with making his balance sheet
from the books without troubling himself about the truth of what they
showed. He checked the cash, examined vouchers for payments, saw that
the bills and securities entered in the books were correct, took reasonable
care to ascertain their value, and in one case obtained a solicitor’s opinion
on the validity of an equitable charge. I see no trace whatever of any
failure by him in the performance of this part of his duty. It is satis
factory to find that the legal standard of duty is not too high for business
purposes, and is recognised as correct by business men.
The balance sheet and certificate of February, 1892, that is, for the year
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1891, was accompanied by a report to the directors of the bank. Taking
the balance sheet, the certificate, and report together, Mr. Theobald
stated to the directors the true financial position of the bank, and if this
report had been laid before the shareholders, Mr. Theobald would have
completely discharged his duty to them. Unfortunately, however, this
report was not laid before the shareholders, and it becomes necessary to
consider the legal consequences to Mr. Theobald of this circumstance.
A person whose duty it is to convey information to others does not
discharge that duty by simply giving them so much information as is
calculated to induce them, or some of them, to ask for more. Information
and means of information are by no means equivalent terms. Still, there
may be circumstances under which information given in the shape of a
printed document circulated amongst a large body of shareholders would
by its consequent publicity be very injurious to their interests, and in
such a case I am not prepared to say that an auditor would fail to dis
charge his duty if, instead of publishing his report in such a way as to
ensure publicity, he made a confidential report to the shareholders, and
invited their attention to it, and told them where they could see it. The
auditor is to make a report to the shareholders, but the mode of doing
so, and the form of the report, are not prescribed. If, therefore, Mr. Theo
bald had laid before the shareholders the balance sheet and the profit
and loss account accompanied by a certificate in the form in which he
had prepared it, he would perhaps have done enough, under the peculiar
circumstances of the case. I feel, however, the great danger of acting on
such a principle, and in order not to be misunderstood, I will add that
an auditor who gives shareholders means of information instead of in
information in respect of a company’s financial position does so at his
peril, and runs the very serious risk of being held, judicially, to have
failed to discharge his duty.
In this case I have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Theobald did fail
to discharge his duty to the shareholders in certifying and laying before
them the balance sheet of February, 1892, without any reference to the
report which he laid before the directors, and with no other warning
than is conveyed by the words ‘The value of the assets as shown on the
balance sheet is dependent upon realisation.’ T he most important asset
on that balance sheet is put down as ‘Loans to customers and other securi
ties, £346,975,’ and on those a full and detailed report was made to the
directors, showing the very unsatisfactory state of these loans and securi
ties, and it is impossible to read the oral evidence, the report of Mr.
Balfour and Mr. Brock, dated the 22nd December, 1891, and the report
of the auditor to the directors of the 3rd February, 1892, without coming
to the conclusion that the entry of that large sum as a good asset without
explanation was unjustifiable. It is a mere truism to say that the value of
loans and securities depends upon their realisation. We are told that a
statement to that effect is so unusual that the mere presence of those
words is enough to excite suspicion. But, as already stated, the duty of
an auditor is to convey information, not to arouse inquiry, and although
an auditor might infer from an unusual statement that something was
seriously wrong, it by no means follows that ordinary people would
have their suspicions aroused by a similar statement if, as in this case, its
language expresses no more than any ordinary person would infer with
out it.
But Mr. Theobald relies on the fact that he was induced to omit from
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his certificate all reference to the report which he made to the directors
because Mr. Balfour, the chairman, promised to mention such report in
his speech to the shareholders, and he did so. But although Mr. Balfour
twice alluded to the report, he did so in such a way as to avoid attracting
attention to it. The second time he mentioned it was after a dividend
had been declared, and when a motion to reappoint the auditors was
before the meeting. T he truth is that not a word was said to convey to
the shareholders the substance of the information contained in the report,
or to induce them to ask any question about it. T he balance sheet and
the profit and loss account were true and correct in this sense, that they
were in accordance with the books. But they were, nevertheless, entirely
misleading, and misrepresented the real position of the company. Under
these circumstances, I am compelled to hold that Mr. Theobald failed
to discharge his duty to the shareholders with respect to the balance sheet
and certificate of February, 1892. Possibly he did not realise the extent
of his duty to the shareholders as distinguished from the directors, and
he, unfortunately, consented to leave the chairman to explain the true
state of the company to the shareholders instead of doing so himself. T he
fact, however, remains, and cannot be got over, that the balance sheet
and certificate of February, 1892, did not show the true position of the
company at the end of 1891, and that this was owing to the omission by
the auditor to lay before the shareholders material information which he
had obtained in the course of his employment as auditor of the company,
and to which he called the attention of the directors.
But then it is contended that, even if this be so, there was, after all,
no payment of a dividend out of capital; and further that, even if there
was, still that such payment was not the natural or immediate result of
Mr. Theobald’s certificate, and of the accounts which he prepared.
W hether the payment was made out of capital or not is a question of
fact. It was professedly made out of profits made by the bank by charging
its customers with interest and commission on loans and discounts. The
books showed such profit, but the question is, where did the money come
from with which the dividends were paid? T he money came from cash
at the bankers or in hand, but this cash could not be properly treated as
profit, and the directors and auditors knew this perfectly well. This part
of the case has been most carefully investigated by the learned judge
whose decision we are reviewing, and after attending most attentively
to the observations of counsel on the reasonings and conclusions contained
in the judgment appealed from, I see no reason whatever for dissenting
from them. On the contrary, I entirely agree with him in saying that the
profits for the year 1891 never really existed except on paper—that, to
use his words, ‘W hatever may be the right line to draw as to when profit
not received may be carried to profit for the purpose of the annual revenue
account, it is plain that there was no justification for so doing in the pres
ent case’. T he real truth is that the assets of the bank were put down in
the balance sheet at far too high a figure, and this entry, though not
misleading if explained (as it was to the directors), was seriously mislead
ing in the absence of explanation. Mr. Theobald says that he regarded
the assets of the bank as only locked up, but his report and the schedule
to it go far beyond this. The value of the principal asset depended on
the probability of the Balfour group of companies and some of the other
large borrowers repaying their loans. They were financing each other,
their indebtedness to the bank increased largely during the year, the
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securities held by the bank for these loans were, to say the least, of very
doubtful character, and yet the total amount due to the bank in respect
of these loans is in serted in the balance sheet as a good asset without any
deduction, and without a word of explanation to the shareholders. We
now know that these assets have realised a comparatively small sum, and
we were very properly warned against the danger of doing injustice by
being wise after the event. But disregarding the result of realisation and
attending only to what was known to the auditors in February, 1892,
the entry in the balance sheet of the sum of £346,975 as a good asset was
wholly unjustifiable unless explained.
We are now in a position to understand the true meaning of a passage
contained in the auditors’ report to the directors of the 3rd February,
1892, and which runs thus: ‘We cannot conclude without expressing our
opinion unhesitatingly that no dividend should be paid this year’. I find
it impossible to treat this as a statement by the auditors that there are
profits divisible among the shareholders, but that the auditors cannot
recommend a dividend. I can only regard the passage as meaning that
there are no funds out of which the dividend can properly be paid, and,
therefore, no dividend ought to be paid this year. A dividend of 7 per
cent. was, nevertheless, recommended by the directors, and was resolved
upon by the shareholders at a meeting furnished with the balance sheet
and profit and loss account certified by the auditors, and at which meet
ing the auditors were present, but silent. Not a word was said to inform
the shareholders of the true state of affairs. It is idle to say that these
accounts are so remotely connected with the payment of the dividend as
to render the auditors legally irresponsible for such payment. T h e bal
ance sheet and account certified by the auditors as showing a profit avail
able for dividend were, in my judgment, not the remote, but the real
operating cause of the motion for the payment of the dividend which
the directors improperly recommended. T he auditors’ account and certifi
cate gave weight to such recommendation and rendered it acceptable to
the meeting. It was wholly unnecessary for the Official Receiver to call
a shareholder to say that he was induced by the auditors’ certificate to
concur in the resolution to pay a dividend. As to this part of the case
res ipsa loquitur.
The point was made that the form of the order was wrong. But there
was nothing in this. Mr. Theobald could obviously be sued alone in an
action at law for breach of his statutory duty as auditor, and the measure
of damages would be the sum which he has been ordered to pay. W hether
a similar action at law could be maintained against him and the directors
jointly is more open to question. I am by no means satisfied that it could
not, seeing that the wrongful payment of the dividend was caused by his
improper certificate and accounts, and by the use made of them by the
directors. But, be this as it may, there was a clear breach of trust by
the directors, facilitated, and, indeed, only rendered possible by the audi
tor, who failed in discharging his own duty to the shareholders; and I
have no doubt that in equity both he and they could be held jointly and
severally liable for the misapplication of the company’s moneys, which
constituted a breach of trust. In respect, therefore, to the sum of £8,486
11s. wrongfully paid as dividend in 1892 in respect of the alleged profits
made in 1891, the appeal in my opinion fails.
I pass now to the accounts and balance sheet prepared by the auditors
in February, 1891, and showing the state of affairs in 1890. A profit for

LIABILITY T O CLIENTS

107

that year was shown and a dividend of £5,946 12s. was declared and paid,
and Mr. Theobald has been held liable for this sum also. I agree with
Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams in holding that the dividend for 1890 was
in fact improperly declared and paid. But the evidence that Mr. Theo
bald was guilty of any breach of duty in certifying the accounts in Febru
ary, 1891, is far less cogent than that which presses so heavily against him
with reference to the accounts of February, 1892. T he truth is that the
conviction that the bank’s affairs were every year getting worse and worse
grew upon him year by year. This state of things was shown by the
decrease of its reserve capital and the increase of its loans to customers.
But the loans to customers were, speaking roughly, £100,000 less at the
end of the year 1890 than at the end of 1891, and seeing that the accounts
prepared by the auditors did accurately represent the position of the
company as shown by the books, and that it is not proved that Mr. Theo
bald really knew, or ought then to have known, that the position of the
bank was not correctly shown by the books, I think Mr. Justice Vaughan
Williams has gone too far in holding Mr. Theobald liable for this sum.
The reasons which induced the learned judge to decide that Mr. Theobald
was not liable for the dividends paid in 1889 and 1890 appear to me to
apply also to the dividends paid in 1891 in respect of the profits of 1890.
No doubt the change made by the auditors in 1886 in the form of the
certificate that they gave is really significant, and, unexplained, leads to
the inference that the auditors did not believe that the books of the
company and the balance sheet prepared from them correctly showed
the position of the bank. But Mr. Theobald’s evidence does, in my opin
ion, show that in February, 1891, matters were not known or believed to
be so bad as to lead him to the conclusion that there were then no
profits out of which a dividend could properly be paid. It is true that
the position of the bank was very unsatisfactory in 1890, and the auditors
knew it to be so. This, however, appeared from the balance sheet and
accounts which they laid before the shareholders. It is known now that
the assets were put dow n at too high a figure; but it is not proved that
the auditors knew it or ought to have known it. T he Balfour group of
companies, though dependent upon each other, were by no means in so
tottering a state as they were a year later. Mr. Wilkinson’s debt was still
treated by the directors as bearing interest and as a good, or at all events
not a bad, debt. Mr. Benham’s debt was unsatisfactory, but the auditors
can hardly be blamed for treating it as good, having regard to the solici
tor’s statement as to the security held for it. This part of the case is very
near the line, but having carefully considered it, I do not think that the
evidence is sufficiently strong to establish a case of misfeasance on the part
of Mr. Theobald in February, 1891. I am not satisfied that he was then
guilty of more than an excusable error of judgment; although now that
all the facts are known the error is seen to have been very serious in its
consequences. As to the sum of £5,946 12s. 0d., therefore, the appeal
must be allowed. As regards costs, Mr. Theobald’s appeal has resulted
in reducing the sum for which he has been held liable; but, in other
respects, and as regards his main contention, it has failed. Under these
circum stances he o u g h t n o t to receive or pay any costs of the appeal, and
the only order as to costs will be that the Official Receiver be paid his
costs out of the assets of the company.
Lord Justice L opes has read and considered this judgment and concurs
in it.
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Lord Justice R igby: I have had the advantage of reading and consider
ing the judgment just delivered by Lord Justice Lindley, and I might
have confined myself to saying I concur in it, but as I have gone carefully
into the evidence as against the appellant, I think that I shall do well to
show how I have come to the conclusion on which my judgment is
founded. I shall not attem pt to repeat all that is contained in Lord
Justice Lindley’s judgment. Where no reference is made to a particular
topic it must be taken that I have nothing to add, though I do not wish to
detract from anything said. T he appeal is against that part of the order
of the 20th December, 1894, of Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams, which finds
Mr. Theobald liable as one of the auditors of the London and General
Bank Ltd. to make good to the assets of the company, jointly with other
persons, and severally the amount with interest from the date of the order
of two sums, £6,768 6s. 9d. and £9,328 17s. 4d., being the dividends with
interest thereon down to the date of the order recommended by the
directors and declared by meetings of the company in the years 1891 and
1892 for the years 1890 and 1891. I have not taken the same figures as
Lord Justice Lindley did, because there has been added to the dividends
the amount of interest down to the date of the order. I think it will be
the exact figure.
T he order was made on a summons taken out by the liquidator of the
company in the m atter of the Companies Acts and in the m atter of the
bank, asking, so far as is material for the present appeal, for a declaration
of the joint and several liability of the directors and auditors of the com
pany on the ground that the dividends before mentioned were not paid
out of profits but out of capital, and so far as the auditors were concerned
on the ground that they certified and reported that the balance sheets
which were laid before the company at the said meetings purported to
show profits in excess of the sum paid as dividends. I understand the
application to have been in substance an application against the auditors
as officers of the company under the 10th Section of the Act of 1890 to
compel them to contribute to the assets of the company by way of
compensation for their misfeasance, such sums as the Court may think just.
T he main issues, therefore, seem to be whether the auditors have been
guilty of any misfeasance in relation to the company; whether the mis
feasance has occasioned loss to the company for which compensation
ought to be directed to be made. This will involve the question whether
the dividends were, in fact, paid not out of profits, but out of capital, and
whether such payment was the fault of the auditor. Then there will be
the question of the amount of compensation which ought to be directed.
To determine the first question, I think it will be necessary to consider in
some detail the position and duties of the auditors, what they ought to
have done, and what they have done. Then I refer to subsection 6 of
Section 7 of the Companies Act of 1879, and to those articles of association
which have been referred to by Lord Justice Lindley. I do not think it
necessary here to read them out. The articles of association cannot absolve
the auditors from any obligation imposed upon them by the statute, and
it may be that they do not in this case impose any greater obligations as
to the balance sheet, though they make it clear that similar obligations
extend to all accounts placed before the company, including profit and
loss account as well as the balance sheet. Under the statute, the members
of the company are entitled to have the safeguard of an expression of
opinion of the auditors to the effect, first, that the balance sheet is a full
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and fair balance sheet; and, secondly, that it, the balance sheet, is properly
drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the
company’s affairs. T he words ‘as shown by the books of the company’
seem to me to be introduced to relieve the auditors from any responsibility
as to affairs of the company kept out of the books and concealed from
them, but not to confine it to a mere statement of the correspondence of
the balance sheet with the entries in the books. Now, a full and fair
balance sheet must be such a balance sheet as to convey a truthful state
ment as to the company’s position. It must not conceal any known cause
of weakness in the financial position, or suggest anything which cannot
be supported as fairly correct in a business point of view. T he provision
as to the balance sheet being properly drawn up so as to exhibit a correct
view of the state of the company’s affairs is taken from, though it does
not go quite so far as, article 94, Table A, of the schedule to the Com
panies Act of 1862. Treated as an addition to the requisition of a full and
fair balance sheet, it may not be easy to define the full extent of the
obligation which it imposes, nor is it necessary to do so in this case, for
it certainly requires, as will hereafter appear, a more detailed statement
of facts, or a more detailed explanation of the affairs of the bank, than is
contained in any of the balance sheets of this company.
It will be im portant to see what information the auditors actually
acquired as to the business of the company, and the way in which they
reported upon the successive balance sheets. Mr. Theobald and Mr.
Timms were auditors of the bank from its incorporation in 1882, and
they made the audit for successive years down to and including the audit
for 1891.
T he reports of the auditors to the members always took the form of a
certificate or memorandum written on the balance sheet for the year.
T heir reports on the accounts for the years 1882 and 1883 contained a
statement to the effect that in their opinion the balance sheet exhibited a
true and correct view of the position of the bank. In their report on the
accounts of 1885 a somewhat less emphatic statement to the same effect
appears, but in the subsequent report no such statement is to be found.
In a report to the directors dated the 11th February, 1886, which refers
to the accounts for 1885, Mr. Theobald, after noticing that the first-class
investments, kept by bankers for quick realisation in case of need, stood
at a considerably reduced sum, and that more than the whole capital of
the company was invested in four accounts, viz. the accounts of the
Liberator, the Lands Allotment Co., the House and Land Co., and the
Building Estates Co., and that these investments could not be easily
realised in critical times, proceeds to say: ‘You are doubtless aware that
it is a rule with bankers to have at hand in cash or easily realisable
securities an amount equal to at least one-third of the customers’ current
accounts. Considering the whole amount of uncalled capital, I consider
that in this case the proportion is scarcely sufficient.’ There can be no
doubt that even at this time Mr. Theobald was aware that the state of
affairs of the bank was unsatisfactory in the im portant points of lock-up
of capital and consequent deficiency of realisable securities. At this date
the cash in hand appeared to be £28,000—I only give the round figures—
and the easily realisable securities were worth £12,600, making together
£41,000 odd, while the current accounts and deposit accounts of customers
together reached £107,000. I have not been able to distinguish the
separate amounts of current and deposit accounts at that time. In the
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balance sheet for 1891, more particularly dealt with hereafter, the cash
had fallen to £25,000, and the easily realisable securities to £7,820, making
together £32,000 odd; hardly more than one-sixth of the sum due to
customers on current accounts alone, which had increased to £189,000 odd,
the amount due on current and deposit accounts taken together being
£282,000. No other report of the auditors to the directors is put in
evidence until that of 1892 as to the accounts of 1891. T he report of the
auditors to the members on the accounts for 1886 to 1890, both inclusive,
are simply to the effect that the cash and bills receivable are correct, that
securities had been produced for the investments and loans (no informa
tion being given as to the securities so produced) and that the balance
sheet is a correct summary of the accounts recorded in the books. In the
last-mentioned report is contained for the first time a statement, ‘The
value of the assets as shown on the balance sheet is dependent on
realisation.’
Great stress has been laid on this by counsel for the appellants. They
argue that it was sufficient to put members upon inquiry, and that from
the course taken at the trial they were debarred from giving the evidence
of experts as to the importance and signification of this. I may at once
say that it was the duty of the auditors to convey in direct and express
terms to the members any information which they thought proper to be
communicated, that the words of the statement are perfectly clear in their
meaning, but also entirely unim portant, amounting to a mere truism, and
that no evidence of experts would have been of the slightest use for the
purpose of giving them a greater importance or signification than they
possessed in themselves, even if such evidence were admissible. To me it
appears that all the reports from 1886 onwards were imperfect, and that
the auditors in giving reports in such form failed entirely to fulfil the
statutory duties imposed upon them. Counsel for the appellants argued
that such a failure would not amount to misfeasance but only to
negligence, and that the appellant is not charged by the summons with
negligence, but I cannot admit the cogency of this argument. T he reports
were made in order to fulfil the statutory obligation, and to be read to the
meetings in accordance with the statute. Mr. Theobald, with reference to
this matter, says at page 74 of the evidence, ‘My evidence means the same
as the Act’. Then he is asked, ‘Do you say you could have given the
certificate required by the Act of 1891?’ (I think that question must have
been meant and understood to mean, ‘Could you have given the certificate
for 1891 required by the Act?’) ‘ (A), Yes, certainly. (Q) T hen why did you
not do so? (A) Because I was not aware that it was considered necessary
for me to give the certificate either in the words of the Act or not at all.’
Mr. Theobald’s interpretation of his own certificate cannot be received
either in his favour or against him, and we should not unduly press against
him apparent admissions made in the course of a very trying crossexamination. But this evidence of his does, I think, go so far as to show
that the certificates were in fact given as reports under the Act, and
independent of that evidence I think there can be no doubt that they were
intended to be and were received and acted upon as reports under the Act.
I consider the giving of the certificates (assuming them to be to the
knowledge of the auditors misleading certificates, a question which I shall
deal with separately) to be a misfeasance within the meaning of Section 10
of the Act of 1890, and not a mere act of negligence; and that this was a
fair meaning of the charge contained in the summons I can have no doubt,
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having regard to the terms of the certificates given and the explanations
of Mr. Theobald himself, that there was a strong and growing feeling of
dissatisfaction in the mind of Mr. Theobald at the state of the affairs of
the bank as shown by the books, and I find no sufficient communication
of the facts causing this dissatisfaction in the reports. T he balance sheets
when examined do not in my opinion fulfil the statutory requirements of
being full and fair balance sheets, and they are not properly drawn up so
as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs
as shown by the books of the company. T o establish this, I think it is
necessary to give a short summary of the evidence, as to the years 1889,
1890 and 1891, the only years as to which we have sufficient evidence to
be able to arrive at definite conclusions. From the tables set out at page 7
of the Official Receiver’s report it appears that during the years 1889,
1890 and 1891, the greater part of the business of the bank consisted in
making loans to and discounting bills for a group of companies, nine in
number, conveniently referred to as the Balfour group, or the Balfour
companies. Loans were also made or discounting facilities afforded to
other companies allied to the Balfour companies, to certain directors of
the bank, and customers, including Wilkinson and Benham, who are
named in the table, by reason of special considerations affecting their
accounts. These accounts of allied companies and the persons last men
tioned are for convenience hereinafter referred to as ‘the special accounts.’
T he balances due from the Balfour companies at the end of the years
1889, 1890 and 1891 were, for 1889 £119,000, for 1890 £218,000, and for
1891 £308,000. Corresponding balances in the ‘special accounts’ were,
for 1889 £77,000, for 1890 £112,000, for 1891 £121,000, the aggregate
balances from the Balfour companies and on the special accounts being
for 1889 £196,000, for 1890 £321,000, for 1891 £429,000. T he correspond
ing balances due from all other customers and persons were, for 1889
£135,000, for 1890 £103,000, for 1891 £100,000. Roughly speaking, the
proportion of what may be called the outside business that with the
Balfour companies and on the special accounts was, at the end of 1889
two-thirds, at the end of 1890 one-third, and at the end of 1891 one-fourth.
T he paid-up capital increased in 1890 by about £67,000, and in 1891 by
about £43,000, or altogether £120,000, but the whole of this, and con
siderably more than £100,000 in addition, had been absorbed into the
accounts of the Balfour companies and the special accounts.
It has already been pointed out that the amount of cash and easily
realisable securities at the end of 1891 was hardly more than one-sixth
of the amount due to customers on current accounts, or about one-half
of what Mr. Theobald had in 1886 pointed out to be required according
to the usual practice of bankers.
These figures show an alarming absorption during the three years of
the available assets of the company in advances to the Balfour companies
and on the special accounts, and a perilous diminution of easily realisable
assets. As is usual with banking companies, profits alleged to have been
earned by the bank consisted, with unsubstantial exceptions, of interest
on loans, discounting of bills, and commissions.
The gross profits entered in the books as having been earned from
the Balfour companies, between the incorporation of the bank and the
end of 1891, amounted to upwards of £84,000. The amount distributed in
dividends during the same period was upwards of £58,000 and the amount
carried to reserve fund £13,000. I include there £3,000 carried to reserve
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fund in accordance with the report on the accounts of 1891, making
together £71,000.
T he reserve fund, however, was not required by the articles of associa
tion to be kept separate, and was not kept separate from the general funds
of the bank. It was employed in the bank’s business, quite rightly, no
doubt.
Subject to an argument as to appropriation of payments dealt with
hereafter, the profits supposed to have been earned from the Balfour
companies were not actually paid, but they were only debited in the
accounts current of the different companies, and, speaking generally, the
moneys owing by the different companies went on increasing from year
to year. It is evident that, unless these profits could be fairly treated as
not only earned but payable within a reasonable time, there would at the
end of 1891 be no profits out of which a dividend could be paid, but, on
the contrary, a large deficiency.
T he learned judge, after a careful consideration and investigation of
the evidence before him, has found, as a fact, that the credits of these
companies at the end of each year were generally credits created
temporarily for the purpose of audit, and that such credits, in the majority
of cases, were created either by the discounting of bills of companies like
Hobbs & Co., which bills constituted a mere paper asset, or by loans
direct or indirect from the bank itself, the bulk of which were illsecured.
I see no reason to differ from this conclusion, but it is a conclusion
arrived at to an im portant extent from comparing the books of the bank
with the books of other companies of the Balfour group to which the
auditors had no access, and it is only to the extent to which it is founded
on entries in the books of the bank itself that it can be used for the
purpose of charging the appellant with knowledge of the facts, though it
is very im portant on the question whether the dividends were really paid
out of capital or not. T he books themselves show that in many instances
the accounts were put in credit in the manner described by the learned
judge, but in other cases, and especially with reference to the indirect
loans, that is to say, loans made by the bank to one of the companies out
of which that company made an advance to another of the group for the
purpose of putting the accounts of the latter in credit at the end of
the year, the auditors would have no sufficient means of tracing the
transactions.
Having made these general observations I will go on to examine more
completely the im portant case of the accounts for the year 1891. For that
purpose, as being more fair to the auditors, I will assume without at all
deciding that, down to the end of 1890, no knowledge that the former
balance sheets were misleading has been brought home to the auditors,
and will endeavour to ascertain what additional information the auditors
acquired during the audit for 1891. In the year 1891 the indebtedness
of the Balfour companies to the bank as appearing by the bank books
was increased by the sum of between £89,000 and £90,000 without any
additional securities of importance being given, though, no doubt, to a
considerable but unascertained extent money was expended on buildings
already charged to the bank, which would make the property charged,
though not necessarily the charges in favour of the bank, more valuable.
The securities consisted in the main of charges on buildings being con
structed under building agreements, on which large sums had already
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been charged in priority to the bank. T he buildings were unfinished, and
required further expenditure of very large sums before they could
advantageously be disposed of, and in my judgment there was abundant
evidence to show that these securities of the bank were very insufficient,
and not realisable at all without the expenditure of further money, which
the bank was unable to advance. T he sums due on the special accounts
had increased from £102,000 to £121,000, that is to say, between £18,000
and £19,000. W ith regard to these special accounts, I do not think it
necessary to go in detail through the list, but I find that the auditors
comment very unfavourably on the security for the following debts: T hat
of William Blewitt for £7,849; that of Blewitt and Balfour for £2,148;
and that of Balfour for £12,000. I think, however, that they may have
considered the personal security in these cases sufficient, and I do not
found anything on those cases. Wilkinson, at the end of 1890, was
indebted to the bank in the sum of £24,000 practically unsecured. Mr.
Theobald complained about interest being debited on the ground that
the directors had then more definite information as to the security. This
was going through the audit for 1890. T he fact is that the security con
sisted of debentures of a tramway company whose tramway was never
built. Interest accordingly ceased to be debited to this account in March,
1891. W hen Mr. Theobald was pressed to explain why the full sum was
returned as an asset, he replied that it would have to be provided for out
of the reserve fund. He further explained that he thought the account
wanted watching, but that it was likely to turn out all right. In examina
tion before the judge with reference to this debt, he said that he had
conferred with the manager, who knew all about the circumstances.
‘First of all,’ says he, ‘I suggested the whole should be written off, but
afterwards, Mr. Brock, I think it was, sent for Mr. Blewitt. We had a very
serious conference about it, and they convinced me that the time had not
come to do that (write off the whole), and they might yet get the whole of
the amount back, but I thought it was not wise to charge interest.’
This, I think, falls very far indeed short of showing that the auditor
believed, or could have believed, that the debt was a good debt, though
it might have justified the carrying of it to a suspense account, instead
of writing it off as bad. T he importance of the case depends upon the
fact that if the debt had not been entered in the balance sheet as a good
debt, there would have been no profit at all to show for the year 1891.
At the end of 1891, Mr. Wilkinson’s debt, which had risen from discount
ing bills, all of which would appear by the dates to have been dishonoured,
was reduced to £16,000 on account of discount by a loan of £10,000,
but the indebtedness remained unaffected. W ith regard to Benham’s debt
which increased in the year 1891 from £31,635 to £47,745, it was proved
that in 1891 Mr. Theobald refused to pass the security for another year,
and, to satisfy him, a letter purporting to come from Benham’s solicitor,
Mr. Waring, containing an undertaking to pay off £15,000 within a week,
was produced. He had also been told, during the audit for 1890, that
there was a security under a supposed will which had not been proved,
and that they expected to get the will proved very soon. During the audit
for 1891 he ascertained that the debt had increased from £31,000 to
£47,000, that the £15,000 promised to be repaid had not been repaid, and
that the alleged will had not been proved—indeed, it turned out after
wards that such a will never existed. T he explanation of Mr. Theobald,
that he trusted to the solicitor seeing that the security was all right, is not,
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under circumstances, altogether satisfactory, but I think it is safer to
allow Mr. Theobald the benefit of the defence, though his own report
sufficiently shows that he was not himself thoroughly satisfied. I wish to
make it plain, so far as I can, that I am only relying on matters which Mr.
Theobald ought to have known and must be presumed to have known.
T he debt of £7,300 from the Medway Portland Cement Co. had, like
Wilkinson’s, ceased to be charged with interest, and could not properly
have been treated as a fund for the payment of dividend. W ith reference
to that of the Public Works Co. Ltd., amounting to £8,105, the auditors,
in their schedule to their report to the directors, say this: ‘T he realisation
of this is very doubtful.’ There could, therefore, be no justification for
treating this as a fund for payment of dividend. Whilst Mr. Theobald
was engaged upon the audit of the accounts for 1891, or previously, a
report of Messrs. Balfour & Brock, dated 22nd of December, 1891, was
produced to him as to the way of putting into credit current accounts of
Hobbs & Co. Ltd., George Newman & Co. Ltd., the London, Edinburgh &
Glasgow Insurance Co., and C. H. Wilkinson, by loans from the bank.
W ith reference to Mr. Wilkinson’s account, the proposal ‘that the over
draft should be made in part by a loan and in part by fresh acceptances
of both secured as may be arranged, we think the further loan should be
£10,000 on loan and £15,000 on bills’. T he loan was made, and, appar
ently, £16,000 was left on security of acceptances, but it does not appear
that any security was then arranged for or given, or that Mr. Theobald
investigated this matter. Attention was, therefore, called in this particular
case to the mode in which the accounts were put in credit as found by
the learned judge. Several facts which appear to me to be most material
with reference to the debt of 1891 are to be gathered from the text of
the report. I have dealt, to a certain extent, with the schedule in the
remarks I have previously made, but as to the text of the report of the
auditors of February, 1892, almost every sentence is full of serious mean
ing. In it they state ‘that they are unable to give a more satisfactory
certificate than the one set forth,’ which is a mere statement that the
balance sheet is a correct summary of the accounts as recorded in the
books, followed by a statement that the value of the assets as shown on
the balance sheet is dependent upon realisation, which I have already
commented upon, an im portant sentence: ‘O n this subject we have
reported specifically to the board.’ This may mean they have reported
as to the value of the assets, or as to their realisation, or (as I think is the
true construction) as to both. T he auditors were induced to withdraw
this sentence, which, though it would have given no information of the
slightest value to the members, yet would have been calculated to put
them upon inquiry. They go on: ‘We are not qualified, nor is it the
province of the auditors, to estimate with exactitude the value of the
securities.’ T he words ‘with exactitude’ seem to me to be emphatic, and
to point out that they had, as appears by the report, made a general
estim ate of the securities, which was very unfavourable. They say, ‘Never
theless, we feel it our duty to send you herewith a schedule of the
securities amounting to £487,000, which we desire should have the special
and very serious consideration of the directors.’
In the £487,000 are included every one of the sums owing by the
Balfour companies and on the special accounts, and nearly £60,000 more
out of the £100,000 owing by other customers of the bank. Auditors who
feel it their duty to call the special and very serious consideration of their
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directors to £487,000 out of a total of£530,000 of the debts due to the
bank must indeed have arrived at the opinion that the state of affairs of
the company was critical and dangerous, but, as will appear, Mr. Theo
bald does not deny this, though he attempts, unsuccessfully, I think, to
explain it away by saying that all his anxiety arose from the fact of the
assets being locked up. Further on in the report the auditors say, ‘The
gravity of the situation is enhanced by the fact, as we believe it to be,
that the board is in many cases powerless to decline further help because
they are powerless to realise.’ This appears to me to be a very just but
a very serious statement. The Balfour companies were indeed so much
bound up with one another by a system of inter-financing, and some of
them had committed themselves so deeply in the building schemes of
Hobbs & Co., Newman & Co. and others, that they would only be kept
going in the future, as they had been in the past, by continued advances
from the funds of the bank. T he last quoted extract from the report
seems to me to show that the auditors fully appreciated this view of the
state of affairs of the company. They continue as follows: ‘We beg also
respectfully to point out that the quarters from which the bank obtains
by far the larger proportion of its business’—meaning, I conclude, the
Balfour companies, and some of the special accounts—‘are such that the
constitution of the board must make it difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain a sufficiently independent judgment upon many vital questions
which have to be decided in its management.’ No doubt this refers to the
fact that some members of the board of the bank, the financing company,
were members also of the board of different Balfour companies requiring
advances, and the difficulty arising from this is obvious and serious. Then
follows a sentence which forms an appropriate ending to such a report:
‘We cannot conclude without expressing the opinion unhesitatingly that
no dividend should be paid this year.’ The auditors were, unfortunately,
persuaded by Mr. Balfour, assisted by Mr. Brock, to strike out this clause,
I believe, before the report reached the hands of the other directors of the
bank. Mr. Theobald explains this by saying that he came to the con
clusion that it was beyond the province of the auditors to express an
opinion as to the policy of declaring a dividend, and if that were all, I
should be disposed to agree with him. It is no part of the auditors' duty
to consider what is good or what is bad policy. They have only to
examine into facts and see that the members have their opinion as to the
balance sheet showing the state of affairs of the company. But the context
seems to oblige me to read the excised sentence as meaning not that it was
impolitic, but that it would be improper, having regard to the state of
affairs of the company, to declare a dividend. Having regard to the
explanations given by Mr. Theobald in his evidence, I think the post
script to this report very significant. It runs thus: ‘We do not wish it to
be understood that we consider all the accounts in the schedule are
unsecured, but as a whole the capital therein represented is locked up.’
T hat is the defence, that all their alarm arose from the capital being
locked up. This is not, I think, the language that would have been used
if the auditors had thought that the only mischief was in the locking-up,
and an examination of the schedule to my mind confirms this conclusion.
To a great extent the memoranda in the schedule explain themselves, and
I have already dealt with many of the items. The accounts of each one
of the Balfour companies is referred to in such a way as to show the
unsatisfactory state of the securities Mr. Theobald now says that he had
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no doubt as to the solvency of any of the Balfour companies, and in a
certain sense I am ready to believe this; that is to say, he thought that
if they continued to be financed in the future as they had been in the
past, and so were enabled to complete the buildings which had been
commenced, they might ultimately be able to repay the advances to them
with interest and commission. But this is not the meaning of solvency
in a legal or business sense, and it is quite plain that Mr. Theobald knew
perfectly well that some at least of these companies were, and were likely
to remain for an indefinite period, unable to meet their liabilities as they
became due. In no other way can the memoranda as to the want of
security, or the defective nature of the securities, of the several Balfour
companies be explained. Similar observations apply to the memoranda
as to the special accounts. Notwithstanding this report, every item of the
£487,000 was entered as a good debt in the balance sheet for 1891. No
valuation was made of any one of the debts, or of the securities for them.
If any such valuation had, in fact, been made, I think it plain that there
could have been no profit shown for the year. Mr. Theobald gave
evidence several times over to the effect that whilst he was engaged in
the audit for 1891 he felt that it was a very im portant crisis in the bank’s
affairs, and that if they could only get over the next month or so they
would save it. His explanation of his withdrawal of the words in the
proposed report to the members is that on this point he had reported
specifically to the board. In explanation he gave, among other carefully
prepared and considered reasons, the following: T h at ‘Mr. Balfour was
so thoroughly aroused to the necessity for taking the affairs of the bank
resolutely in hand as to lead me to believe that he would do so, and being
a man of great financial resource, he would be able to save the bank’;
and that Mr. Balfour also spoke of an amalgamation. ‘Mr. Balfour said
that, while doing this, he would confer with me continuously, and that
no interim dividend should be paid without consultation with me.’ The
first intimation received of payment of the interim dividend was an
announcement in the Press of an interim dividend for 1892, for which
it is not suggested Mr. Theobald was in any way liable. This would have
given twelve months to work, during which time it would have been
quite possible for Mr. Balfour to obtain very large repayments from the
borrowing companies with which he was connected, and thus for the bank
to be saved. T h a t is a very im portant point to make.
In another place he says, ‘My main point is this, that the bank could
be saved if many of these accounts were collected. Mr. Balfour had
absolute power over most of these companies, and he was so thoroughly
alarmed that I quite believed that if we could only tide over that period
he would use his influence over other companies to bring the money into
the bank. I quite imagined he would do that, even if it meant that some
of the other companies would have to go to the wall. W hat becomes of
his statement that he thought the companies were solvent? He says it is
a critical time; if you can tide over the next month or two—as to which
he never expresses an opinion—if you can do that, then the resources of
Mr. Balfour are so great, his influence with the other companies so great,
that it is quite possible he may collect a num ber of the accounts, even if
the other companies have got to go to the wall. I think it is impossible
to avoid the conclusion that Mr. Theobald, when about to make his
report on the accounts of 1891, was thoroughly alarmed at the critical
position of the bank, as he thought it more than likely the bank would
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not tide over another month or two, but that if it did, it could only be
saved by extraordinary exertions on Mr. Balfour’s part, and that in the
process some of the other Balfour companies might have to go to the
wall. He represents Mr. Balfour as fully sharing his alarm. If we turn
to the balance sheet to see whether the state of the company’s affairs, as
apprehended by Mr. Theobald, was in any way indicated therein, we
shall, I think, be obliged to answer the question in the negative.
T he liabilities appear to be sufficiently set forth. It is the statement of
the assets which most calls for criticism. T he cash at the bank was cor
rectly stated and so are the bills receivable, though the amount of £180,000
there appears only to have been arrived at by transferring £58,000, on
31st December, 1891, from bills receivable to a loan account for unpaid
expenses. Disregarding the small item for stamps, the only other items
on the credit side are as follows: ‘Investments including reserve fund’—
the reserve fund at that time was £10,000—‘2¾ per cent. Consols and
Prescott and Arizona Railway bonds, £7,820.’ T h at could not be the
investments which included the reserve fund of £10,000. ‘Loans to
customers and other securities, £346,000.’ In the two items, ‘bills receiv
able’ and ‘loans to customers and other securities,’ are, as above pointed
out, included the whole of the sums, amounting to £487,000, the subject
of the report of the auditors to the directors, at their full value. This
item, ‘loans to customers and other securities,’ is, of course, altogether
inaccurate and may be very misleading. W hat the £346,000 really con
sists of is ‘loans to customers partly secured,’ which is a very different
matter. It would be open to any ordinary reader of the balance sheet to
suppose that there were securities to an indefinite amount apart from
loans to customers, and available to meet moneys due on the current
accounts of customers. I am at a loss to understand for what purpose this
item could have been so entered. It was not through inadvertence, for it
was a correction of a still more misleading entry occurring in former
balance sheets. It was suggested that such an item frequently appears
in balance sheets. It may be so for anything I know, but it is none
the less improper in the particular balance sheet which we have to
consider. In short, the balance sheet, as it stands, would have given
no hint to any ordinary reader of the critical position arising either
from the locking-up of capital or from the doubtful nature of many
of the debts entered at their full value. In reporting this balance sheet
without explanation the auditors were, in my judgment, guilty of a
misfeasance within the meaning of the 10th Section of the Act of 1890,
as charged in the summons, and were in this case, at any rate thoroughly
alive to the unsatisfactory state of the affairs of the bank as shown by the
books. T he next question is whether the misfeasance was the cause of
loss to the company. On examination of the evidence there set forth,
I should be led to the conclusion that the auditors did not know that
a dividend could not properly be paid out of profits.
See how the figures stand from another point of view. T he profit and
loss account shows a gross profit of £24,000. After making provision for
bad and doubtful debts, and after deduction of £6,600 for expenses of
management and other charges, there is carried over to the balance sheet
a net profit of £18,000 odd, out of which there had already been applied
£6,000 and more in payment of an interim dividend, leaving a balance of
between £11,000 and £12,000 and nothing more. £3,000 of that was to
be carried to reserve; so you have only about between £8,000 and £9,000,

118

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

according to the books, for dividends. But of the gross profits for the year
1891 shown by the books £16,788 were book entries debited to the
Balfour companies, £2,462 a book entry debited to Benham’s account, and
£275 a book entry debited to Wilkinson’s account. That, of course, was
in the early part of the year, W ilkinson’s account being treated as a debit.
Assuming all the Balfour companies, and Benham and Wilkinson, to have
been able to pay the whole sums due from them, except the amount
debited in 1891 for interest and commission, not only the profits available
for dividend would be swept away, but of the reserve fund itself little or
nothing would be left. Such an assumption however, in my judgment,
would have been extravagantly favourable to the auditors, and it only
required that one of the debts owing by Mr. Wilkinson (I leave out
Benham because I do not want to found on Benham any charge against
Mr. Theobald), or almost any one of the Balfour companies should turn
out to be bad, it would exhaust everything belonging to the bank which
was not capital. It turned out that each of the Balfour companies as
well as Wilkinson and Benham, as well as other debtors of the bank, were
insolvent. In my judgment it is established that the bank had no funds
out of which the dividends could in any point of view be properly paid.
I think the auditors might well be held to have known, but I do not rely
upon that conclusion in my judgment; what I do rely upon is that the
auditors must have known and did know that the balance sheet was not
properly drawn up so as to show the state of affairs, and that was a
misfeasance. If they were guilty of misfeasance in relation to the com
pany, they must be responsible for the consequences of such misfeasance,
whether they had arrived at the conclusion that the dividend if paid at
all would be payable out of capital or not. T hat dividends were, in fact,
paid out of capital cannot, I think, be doubted. It was argued that before
the stoppage of the bank the profits entered in the 1891 balance sheet
were, in fact, paid by appropriation of moneys paid into current accounts.
This would not apply to a case like Wilkinson’s, where there was no
current account, but in my judgment the rule in Clayton’s case has no
sort of application under the circumstances. If it had, a bank might
always pay profits by mere book entries, though the customers against
whom interest and commission were charged might all be hopelessly in
solvent. Was, then, the loss occasioned by the misfeasance of the auditors?
It had been argued that the payment of the dividend was not the proxi
mate result of the auditors’ report, as the recommendation of the directors
and the vote of the meeting had to intervene. This appears to me to
misrepresent the true state of things. T he report of the auditors was a
continuing representation, made indeed before, but in law and in good
sense to be treated as repeated after, the recommendation of the directors.
It was perfectly well known to Mr. Theobald (at any rate at the meeting
where he was present and heard the reading of the report recommending
a dividend, and the speech of Mr. Balfour) that this report was intended
to be relied upon as justifying the recommendation and as an invitation
to vote the dividend. How far the judgment should go against the
appellant has given me considerable difficulty. A great deal of the reason
ing which has led me to hold that their reporting on the accounts of 1891
is a misfeasance in relation to the company applies only to the case of
that report. The learned judge has held Mr. Theobald liable not only
for the 1891, but also for the 1890, dividend. I am far from saying that
he is clearly wrong, but I cannot satisfy myself that he is clearly right.
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In the case of the 1890 dividend it cannot, on the evidence, be made out
to my full satisfaction that the auditors knew the balance sheet to be
substantially misleading, and I think it safer to confine the order to the
dividend in respect of 1891.
Lord Justice L indley: T he order will stand as to one dividend with
interest but not as to the other.

In re KINGSTON COTTON MILL CO.*
Court of Appeal, 1896. 2 Ch. 279.

Lord Justice L indley said: This is an appeal from an order made by
Mr. Justice Vaughan Williams under Section 10 the Companies (Windingup) Act, 1890, on Mr. Pickering and Mr. Peasegood, the auditors of the
company, ordering them to pay the liquidator certain sums of money,
being the amounts of dividends improperly declared and paid out of the
assets of the company on the faith of certain balance sheets prepared and
signed by the auditors. The appeal is made upon two grounds: (1) that
the auditors have not failed to discharge their duty to the company and
are under no liability to make good the money misapplied; (2) that even
if they have, the proper remedy is by action and not by the summary
process to which the liquidator has had recourse. It will be convenient to
dispose of the second point first. It has already been decided that the
auditors of this company are ‘officers’ within the meaning of Section 10 of
the Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890 (see [1896] 1 Ch. 6; The Times
Law Reports, Vol. XII, p. 60). The object of that section is the same as
that of Section 165 of the Companies Act, 1862, which it has replaced.
T h at object was to facilitate the recovery by the liquidator of assets of a
company improperly dealt with by its promoters, directors, or other
officers. T he section applies to breaches of trust and misfeasance by such
persons. I agree that the section does not apply to all cases in which
actions by the company will lie for the recovery of damages against the
persons named; it is easy to imagine cases of breach of contract, trespasses,
negligences, or other wrongs to which the section is inapplicable, and
some such have been the subject of judicial decision; but I am not aware
of any authority to the effect that the section does not apply to the case
of an officer who has committed a breach of his duty to the company, the
direct consequence of which has been a misapplication of its assets, for
which he could be made responsible by an action at law or in equity. Such
a breach of duty, if established, is a ‘misfeasance’ within the meaning of
the section, or, to adopt the language used in Cavendish-Bentinck v.
Fenn (12 A. C. 652), such a breach of duty is a misfeasance in the nature
of a breach of trust. This view of the section was adopted by this Court in
In re The London &General Bank ([1895] 2 Ch. 166, 673; The Times
Law Reports, Vol. XI, pp. 374-573), and is, in my opinion, correct. On
this preliminary point, therefore, which, however, does not touch the
merits of the case, the appellants are not entitled to succeed. I come now
to the real question in this controversy, and that is, whether the appellants
have been guilty of any breach of duty to the company. T o decide this
question it is necessary to consider: (1) W hat their duty was; (2) How
*T his case is discussed at p. 18 supra.
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they performed it, and in what respects (if any) they failed to perform it.
The duty of an auditor generally was very carefully considered by this
Court in In re T he London and General Bank ([1895] 2 Ch. 673), and I
cannot usefully add anything to what will be found on pages 682-684. It
was there pointed out that an auditor’s duty is to examine the books,
ascertain that they are right, and to prepare a balance sheet showing the
true financial position of the company at the time to which the balance
sheet refers. But it was also pointed out that an auditor is not an insurer,
and that in the discharge of his duty he is only bound to exercise a reason
able amount of care and skill. It was further pointed out that what in any
particular case is a reasonable amount of care and skill depends on the
circumstances of that case; that if there is nothing which ought to excite
suspicion, less care may properly be considered reasonable than could be
so considered if suspicion was or ought to have been aroused. These are
the general principles which have to be applied to cases of this description.
I protest, however, against the notion that an auditor is bound to be
suspicious, as distinguished from being reasonably careful. To substitute
the one expression for the other may easily lead to serious error. I pass
now to consider the complaint made against the auditors in this particular
case. The complaint is that they failed to detect certain frauds. There is
no charge of dishonesty on the part of the auditors. They did not certify
or pass anything which they did not honestly believe to be true. It is
said, however, that they were culpably careless. The circumstances are
as follows: For several years frauds were committed by the manager, who,
in order to bolster up the company and make it appear flourishing when
it was the reverse, deliberately exaggerated both the quantities and values
of the cotton and yam in the company’s mills. He did this at the end of
the years 1890, 1891, 1892 and 1893. There was no book or account (ex
cept the stock journal, to which I will refer presently) showing the quan
tity or value of the cotton or yarn in the mill at any one time. It would not
be easy to keep such a book. Nor is it wanted for ordinary purposes.
There is considerable waste (20 or 25 per cent, on the average) in the
manufacture of yarn from cotton, and the market prices of both cotton and
yarn are subject to great fluctuations. The balance sheets of each year
contained on the asset side entries of the values of the stock-in-trade at the
end of the year, and those entries were stated to be ‘as per manager’s cer
tificate.’ There were also in the balance sheets entries on the opposite side
of the values of the stock-in-trade at the beginning of the year. The quan
tities did not appear in either case. The auditors took the entry of the
stock-in-trade at the beginning of the year from the last preceding balance
sheet, and they took the values of the stock-in-trade at the end of the
year from the stock journal. The book contained a series of accounts
under various heads purporting to show the quantities and values of the
company’s stock-in-trade at the end of each year, and a summary of all the
accounts showing the total value of such stock-in-trade. The summary
was signed by the manager, and the value as shown by it was adopted by
the auditors and was inserted as an asset in the balance sheet, but ‘as per
manager’s certificate.’ The summary always corresponded with the ac
counts summarised, and the auditors ascertained that this was the case.
But they did not examine further into the accuracy of the accounts sum
marised. The auditors did not profess to guarantee the correctness of this
item. They assumed no responsibility for it. They took the item from
the manager, and the entry in the balance sheet showed that they did so. I
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confess I cannot see that their omission to check his returns was a breach
of their duty to the company. It is no part of an auditor’s duty to take
stock. No one contends that it is. He must rely on other people for details
of the stock-in-trade in hand. In the case of a cotton mill he must rely on
some skilled person for the materials necessary to enable him to enter the
stock-in-trade at its proper value in the balance sheet. In this case the
auditors relied on the manager. He was a man of high character and of
unquestioned competence. He was trusted by everyone who knew him.
The learned judge has held that the directors are not to be blamed for
trusting him. T he auditors had no suspicion that he was not to be trusted
to give accurate information as to the stock-in-trade in hand, and they
trusted him accordingly in that matter. But it is said they ought not to
have done so, and for this reason. The stock journal showed the quantities
—that is, the weight in pounds—of the cotton and yarn at the end of each
year. Other books showed the quantities of cotton bought during the
year and the quantities of yarn sold during the year. If these books had
been compared by the auditors they would have found that the quantity of
cotton and yarn in hand at the end of the year ought to be much less than
the quantity shown in the stock journal, and so much less that the value
of the cotton and yarn entered in the stock journal could not be right, or,
at all events, was so abnormally large as to excite suspicion and demand
further inquiry. This is the view taken by the learned judge. But, al
though it is no doubt true that such a process might have been gone
through, and that, if gone through, the fraud would have been discovered,
can it be truly said that the auditors were wanting in reasonable care in
not thinking it necessary to test the managing director’s returns? I cannot
bring myself to think they were, nor do I think any jury of business men
would take a different view. It is not sufficient to say that the frauds
must have been detected if the entries in the books had been put together
in a way which never occurred to anyone before suspicion was aroused.
The question is whether, no suspicion of anything wrong being enter
tained, there was a want of reasonable care on the part of the auditors in
relying on the returns made by a competent and trusted expert relating to
matters on which information from such a person was essential. I cannot
think there was. T he manager had no apparent conflict between his
interest and his duty. His position was not similar to that of a cashier who
has to account for the cash which he receives, and whose own account of
his receipts and payments could not reasonably be taken by an auditor
without further inquiry. The auditor’s duty is not so onerous as the
learned judge has held it to be. T he order appealed from must be dis
charged with costs.
L opes, L. J., in the course of his judgment, made the following observa
tions upon the duties of auditors: It is the duty of an auditor to bring
to bear on the work he has to perform that skill, care, and caution which a
reasonably competent, careful and cautious auditor would use. W hat is
reasonable skill, care and caution must depend on the particular circum
stances of each case. An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or as was
said, to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion
that there is something wrong. He is a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound.
He is justified in believing tried servants of the company in whom con
fidence is placed by the company. He is entitled to assume that they are
honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided he takes reason
able care. If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should

122

ACCOUNTANTS' legal responsibility

probe it to the bottom, but, in the absence of anything of that kind, he is
only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful. His lordship then
referred to the circumstances which led to the auditors being deceived, and
came to the conclusion that they were not wanting in skill, care or caution,
in accepting the figures of the manager, and he concluded as follows: The
duties of auditors must not be rendered too onerous. T heir work is respon
sible and laborious, and the remuneration moderate. I should be sorry
to see the liability of auditors extended any further than in In re The
London and General Bank. Indeed, I only assented to that decision on
account of the inconsistency of the statement made to the directors with
the balance sheet certified by the auditors and presented to the share
holders. This satisfied my mind that the auditors deliberately concealed
that from the shareholders which they had communicated to the directors.
It would be difficult to say this was not a breach of duty. Auditors must
not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully-laid
schemes of fraud, when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion and
when those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and
are undetected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the
position of an auditor intolerable.
* * * *

T H E IRISH WOOLLEN CO. v. TYSON *
Irish Court of Appeal, 1900. 26 The Accountant L. R. 13.

[The question before the court was whether Mr. Kevans, the account
ant, was, or was not, responsible for the non-detection of the frauds.]
* * * *
Lord Justice H olmes, in delivering his judgment, referred to the
career of the company which, he said, was formed in June, 1887, for the
purpose of promoting the woollen industry in Ireland, the original capital
being £6,000. For some time at the commencement the business was
almost entirely confined to the purchase of woollen goods from Irish
manufacturers. In the year 1889 the directors resolved to develop their
undertaking by seeking to establish their home trade, and for this pur
pose they increased their capital. The prospectus announcing this resolu
tion alluded to the success that had attended the operations of the com
pany up to that time, and held out more brilliant prospects for the future.
T he whole of the additional capital, however, was required to pay off
debts previously incurred, and could hardly be used for the purpose of
opening up new business. Between the years 1888 to 1895 nine balance
sheets were presented to the shareholders, each showing considerable net
profit; and during all this period dividends were paid which never once
fell as low as 5 per cent., amounting to £4,649. There is not the slightest
evidence of the soundness of the financial position of the company until
its operations were suspended, when Mr. Carnegie—the auditor’s repre
sentative, who was examining the accounts—noticed a double entry. The
mistake was a trifling one, and he was satisfied with the explanation given
by Mr. Crawford, who had been for some time the accountant of the
This case is discussed at p. 18 supra.
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company. Crawford and Johnson abandoned their positions, and the
balance sheet for the last period (1895) showed a deficiency of £11,107.
T he company, by order of the Court, was directed to be wound up com
pulsorily, and Mr. Garde—who was himself formerly in the employment of
the defendant auditor—found that, although the company was just solvent
as regards its creditors, its capital had entirely disappeared, and I presume
it was his report that led to the bringing of the present action. It appears
that Crawford, acting either by himself or with Johnston, the warehouse
man, was a defaulter to a very large extent. Mr. Kevans says, in his letters
of the 22nd and 24th January, 1896, ‘that although the whole of the items
that made up Crawford’s definciency were apparently received within the
three months ending 31st December, 1895, it is highly improbable that
he could have abstracted all that money in so short a period of time, but
that it was impossible to say how far back exactly the defalcations ex
tended.’ T he defendant was held guilty in connection with Crawford’s
fraud, and I therefore pass away from this portion of the case, which
relates to only a small part of the losses sustained by the company. T o
account for the rest it is necessary to go more fully into the way the busi
ness was carried on. T he directors, who were paid no fees for the first
two or three years, were originally selected by lot; and Mr. Peter W hite
was appointed managing director; Mr. Tyson was appointed secretary at
£250 per annum; and the rest of the staff—examiner and packer—at
£150 and £75 per annum respectively. Mr. Tyson did not long remain
secretary, and was succeeded by Mr. McDonough, and subsequently by
Crawford. Mr. White, in one of his letters, referred in a somewhat gloomy
manner to the large annual amount of money paid to the officers in the
shape of salaries, and recommended such a change being made as would
reduce the annual expenses to £600. W hite’s recommendation was ac
cepted, and from that date Crawford was appointed secretary. He only
received 35s. per week, and his income from the company never seemed
to come up to £150 a year. I presume that Johnston did not receive more.
Mr. Kevans was the first auditor of the company, and he provided the
books which, in his judgment, were necessary for keeping the accounts.
They consisted of: (1) cash book; (2) customers’ ledger; (3) creditors’
ledger; (4) day book; (5) invoice guard book; (6) petty cash book. It
cannot be denied that these were sufficient to show the true financial
position of the business of the company, if they had been honestly kept.
Mr. MacDermot commented upon the absence of one book, but I attach
no importance to this. T he multiplication of books, if written up by
different parties, may be a check upon fraud, but in this case all the book
keeping was done by a single officer who, if dishonest, would take care to
make the books appear perfectly straight. There was another book, re
ferred to in the evidence, kept for the private use of the directors, but
whatever its significance may be it could not affect Mr. Kevans. In Feb
ruary, 1891, there occurred a circumstance materially bearing upon the
case. After that time the auditor’s fee was increased to £40, the considera
tion being a ‘monthly audit.’ It was not understood by this that a balance
sheet or profit and loss account was to be prepared for each month, or
that a monthly statement was to be submitted to the directors. I t was a
monthly investigation for the purpose of checking fraud or error. It was,
as Mr. Kevans himself says, ‘a system of monthly checking with a view to
the half-yearly audit.’ Mr. Kevans seems to have done little of the actual
work himself, and the evidence varies as to the nature of the supervision

124

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

which he gave to it; the investigation of the books he deputed to his
assistants—namely Mr. Roche, Mr. Garde and Mr. Carnegie, and it must
be on the faith of their representations that he certified the balance sheets.
I presume this course is not unusual, and that an accountant with a large
business is not supposed to do everything himself. T he auditor is bound
to give reasonable care and skill but this can also be exercised by his
deputy. I do not think there is anything to be gained by considering in
the abstract the duties of an auditor of a joint stock company. He is
entitled to see the company’s books and the materials for their books,
and also to ask for explanations. But he is not called on to seek for knowl
edge outside the company, or to communicate with customers or creditors.
He is not an insurer against fraud or error; and if fraud is alleged it must
be shown with precision the acts of negligence for which he is said to
be responsible. Nine balance sheets were prepared, and the figures on
some represent the aggregate amount of many items, but I propose to
deal only with matters that have been referred to during the hearing.
There are three sets of figures with which I will deal: (1) stock-in-trade;
(2) sundry debtors; (3) sundry creditors on the liability side of the bal
ance sheet. Taking these in order, I find that Mr. Garde, in his evidence,
drew a distinction between the home stock and the stock in America,
which was never mentioned in this Court. I do not fully understand this,
as Mr. Kevans can only be held responsible from the 4th January, 1892,
and at that date the American trade had been abandoned. T he Master of
the Rolls expressed a doubt, with which I agree, as to whether it was
the duty of the directors to take stock with their own hands. It was taken
by Mr. O’Callaghan, and I agree with the Master of the Rolls that he (Mr.
O ’Callaghan) did quite as much as he could be expected to do. There was
certainly no duty cast on the auditor to take stock. W hat he did was to
have the calculations checked in his office, and this was done with proper
care. Mr. Kevans said he was particularly careful as to the deduction
for discount, and, as far as I could gather, the universal rate of 10 per
cent. seems reasonable. Moreover, an auditor has nothing to do with the
terms upon which the company or a trader buys or sells. As to No. 2,
the charge in this is that the allowance made for the trade discount of
2½ per cent. was omitted. This is a purely technical question. Mr.
Kevans says that the proper method of dealing with these debts was to
return them as they stood in the books, and to bring the discount, when
it was allowed, to the profit and loss account. Mr. Pixley said it would not
be scientifically correct to deduct these discounts. This seems to be in
accordance with common sense, and it is to be noted that although Mr.
Garde, as liquidator, corrected the balance sheets by marking off these
discounts, he never thought of doing so when conducting the audit. As
to the provision for the ‘bad debts,’ if there is any one thing upon which
an auditor is dependent upon the officers it is the writing-off or the mak
ing of a prospective allowance for, bad debts. He has no personal knowl
edge of the customers, and Mr. Kevans seems to have taken particular
attention in reference to this. (See questions 2,125 to 2,127 in the evi
dence.) He said ‘he had some special knowledge on the subject, that he
saw all ascertained bad debts duly written off, and that there was a fund
amounting to £500 as a provision therefor.’ For the foregoing reasons
there is no ground for alleging negligence against Mr. Kevans on the ‘assets
side’ of the balance sheet. As far as this portion is concerned, I think the
balance sheets were properly and carefully prepared, and there was noth
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ing dishonest or negligent on the part of anyone; but if there was, it was
not on the part of Mr. Kevans or of his representative. Now dealing with
‘sundry creditors’; here evidently there is a fraud, and a curious thing is
that no one seemed to have derived any benefit from the fraud. Dealing
with the invoices, the learned judge detailed the practice in connection
with the statements of accounts being laid before the meeting, and said
the ledger was used for the purchases made and for the payments on
account thereof. If, then, all this were rightly done it would be easy for
the auditor to ascertain the amounts due to the creditors, but unfortun
ately the books were not properly kept. The creditors’ accounts in the
ledger did not show all the goods purchased up to the time of the audit,
nor could the auditor discover the omissions on account of many of the
invoices being either ‘suppressed’ or not put into the book until a later
date—a process described as ‘carrying over.’ There is some doubt as to
whether the deficiency arose from the suppression or the carrying over,
but my impression is that the whole of it comes within the last mentioned
class, for at the end of 1894 we find they amounted to £4,095. Mr. Peter
W hite is now dead, and he should not be condemned unheard, but it is
difficult to believe that this system was not within his own knowledge.
As chief promoter he was no doubt anxious to see that the company was
successful; Crawford, who was the secretary, appears to have continued
the process. It seems strange that a system of fraud so long continued, and
for so extensive a period, was never detected by the auditor. Once or
twice he noticed something, and the explanation that was given was ‘that
the goods were not taken into stock.’ T he question is, was it negligent
not to have seen this? There is no doubt that both the suppression and
carrying over of invoices would have been detected if the auditor had
called for the creditors’ statements of accounts upon which payment was
ordered, and compared them with the ledger. I should have thought this
was part of the auditor’s duty for many reasons; but all the accountants
examined, except Mr. Southworth, stated that this course is never taken
unless there is something to arouse suspicion. Mr. Pixley, the eminent
London accountant, says it could not well be done except in the case of
a very small concern. In the face of such evidence I should not leave myself
at liberty to hold that Mr. Kevan’s assistants were guilty of negligence
in not looking at these statements of account if they were engaged in an
ordinary audit. Little time is allowed for doing so; but in this case there
was this system of monthly checking. From the time that Crawford was
accountant in 1890 the accounts of the company were completely in his
hands. Now White, for the two years following, may have given general
directions, but he was often away in America for months at a time, and
it is clear that the monthly audit was instituted for the purpose of seeing
that he (Crawford) would do his work regularly and honestly. I am
unable to conceive how, if there was nothing wrong about this monthly
checking, it did not lead at an early period to the detection of the frauds
in this ledger. Mr. Kevans ought to have found out, by the accounts, the
payments that were made—and no better means could be adopted than
that of a comparison with the statements of accounts. It ought to have
been done in some way, and, if it had, detection would have been certain.
I do not base my decision on this alone; apart altogether from the state
ments of account and the monthly check, I do not understand how the
carrying over of the invocies could have escaped detection by the account
ant, who should have used due care and skill and who was not a mere
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machine. The invoices carried over were ultimately posted to the ledger.
If they were posted to their true dates it would be at once apparent that
they were not entered in at the proper time. If they were posted under
false dates, why was this not detected when the ledger accounts were
checked with the invoices? And when no invoices came into the books, it
is admitted that this ought to have excited suspicion. For these reasons I
am of opinion that if due care and skill had been exercised, the carrying
over and the suppression of invoices would have been discovered, and the
auditor is liable for any damage the company has sustained from the un
derstatement of liabilities in the balance sheet due to this cause since
4th January, 1892. I consider that not only are Mr. Kevans and his assist
ants not free from blame for this, but also for the mechanical way the
audit was carried out. I desire to say that, although I have carefully read
the evidence, I have not attempted to examine the books of the company
out of Court. I, at one time, thought of doing so, but, on consideration,
feared that they might lead me into error. T h at some damage has been
sustained by the company is clear; and it will be observed that I have said
nothing about the measure of the damages. Theoretically, damages re
sulting from negligence has been assessed in money, but it would be
premature to consider it now.
Lord Justice F itzgibbon: I entirely concur with the judgment that
Lord Justice Holmes has delivered, and there are a few matters on which
I desire to offer some independent observations:
First.— W hat is the measure of the defendant auditor’s duty in a case
such as this?
Second.— W hat is the evidence of the particular case of the breach of
that duty?
Third.— A few words upon the question of damages.
As regards the measure of the duty of a gentleman employed, as Mr.
Kevans was in this case, the result is the same, as it occurs to me, in all
cases in which professional skill is employed, except one, the peculiar
instance of a barrister. T he measure of duty is the bringing of reasonable
care and skill to the performance of the business directed to be done,
having regard, first to the contract of employment, then to the character
of the business itself, to the remuneration of the defendant, and to all
the other circumstances of the case. In strict rule, however, the measure
of the duty is to be ascertained by applying to all the circumstances of the
case the best consideration, so as to ascertain what ought to have been
done under the circumstances. Now, in all the three English cases, and
also in this case, the auditor was bound by the articles of association of
the company. In one English case it was put forward for the auditor that
he had never seen the articles of association, and it was admitted that he
had never read them, but, nevertheless, it was held that if he did not see
them, he was at least bound to do all that was required just as if he had
seen them. In this case Rules 150 and 157 of the articles of association
prescribe the duties of the auditor, and it is not suggested that Mr.
Kevans did not see them. ‘Once at least in every year the accounts of the
company shall be examined, and the correctness of the statement and
balance sheet ascertained by one or more auditor or auditors.’ Now, it
appears that half-yearly statements were submitted to the directors, and
I gather that Mr. Kevans discharged his duties half-yearly, but I shall deal
with the case entirely on the assumption that he did it only once a year,
because his half-yearly examination probably would not be as complete
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as the one completed at the end of the year. The 157th rule of the article
provides: ‘T h at the auditor shall be supplied with copies of the statements
of accounts seven days before the intended meeting, and it shall be his
duty to examine the same with the accounts and vouchers relating thereto,
and to report to the company in general meeting thereon.’ These are the
two rules that define his duty. Rule 158 is, however, important, as showing
the materials that were to be placed at his disposal. ‘T he auditor shall
have a list delivered to him by the directors of all the books kept by the
company, and shall have reasonable access to the books and accounts of
the company, and may in relation thereto examine the directors, or other
officers of the company.’ Now, there are two specific things that Mr.
Kevans was charged with. In the first place, it was practically left to him
to say what books the company ought to keep, and therefore he, in the
position of a skilled accountant, was really made an adviser as to what
the set of books were that he was to examine, and I take it for granted
that the books recommended were sufficient. Another m atter was, that in
the course of the business they had to some extent ascertained by actual
experience what was necessary for their protection. They (the directors)
made an arrangement with the auditor that there should be a monthly
checking ,and therefore he was bound, dealing with the set of books that
he himself provided, to check these books once a month and to audit them
once a year. Now, I am not going to minimise the distinction between
checking and auditing. I do not agree at all with a great deal of what has
been presented to us that Mr. Kevans was to have done in the monthly
checking, but the monthly checking was a ‘checking at the time,’ a prepara
tion for the future, and a security that the books were carried forward
from month to month in the state in which they should be audited. His
remuneration was not very large, but it must not be taken to have been
inadequate. He also must be taken to have had a knowledge of the busi
ness. It was not a business to which any of the directors could have been
expected to devote anything like their whole time; and it was a business
where, to Mr. Kevans’ own knowledge, the clerical staff was cut down to
a very low point. Therefore, he must have known that there was more re
liance placed upon him, upon his checking, and upon the audit, than
might be expected in the case of an ordinary company. T h a t being the
measure of his duty—it is the same rule that applies to all, with the ex
ception I have mentioned—what is the nature of the breach of that duty?
It is curious that in one English case the breach of duty for which the
auditor was said to be held liable was exactly as here—a breach of duty
in not detecting the case of misfeasance on the part of others, which was
not for the purpose of putting money into their own pockets, but for
the purpose of giving a fictitious appearance of prosperity to a company
that really was not prosperous. I shall have to say more about that when
I come to the question of damages. I think the fairest way to deal with
Mr. Kevans in this case is to treat him as being charged with having failed
to find just cause of suspicion on the face of these books which, if found,
would have imposed on him the duty of pursuing his suspicion until he
found whether it was or was not well founded; and in that I am only
following the example of Lord Justice Keane, who in his judgment, took
as an example one particular instance of one particular year, and applied
all the rest of the case to that. I am fortunate in the present case to have
an instance which was discussed as a fair example of the mode in which
the fraud in question was carried out; as an example of the grounds of sus
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picion—that there were grounds of suspicion—appearing on the face of
the books themselves; and also the means that these books would have sup
plied (had the suspicion been entertained), in order to detect the frauds.
Now, I must entirely disclaim from myself the intention of going to do
anything more than what any ordinary intelligent juror would be bound
to do if he was trying Mr. Kevans on his indictment for having failed to
discover what appears on the face of the books themselves. This is not
a question of technical knowledge, nor a question in which it could be
capable of misleading anyone. T he English cases have established that
the auditor is entitled, in the absence of the elements of suspicion, to
assume that the books are honestly kept, and that, therefore, unless on
the face of a presumably honest book something appears to excite his
suspicion, he is not guilty of negligence, whatever other people might be
in their departments, if he does not discover that something was wrong.
Now, the one example is the case of Hill & Sons, for the period where
the balance was struck as of the 31st December, 1892, and the 31st Decem
ber, 1893. In that year there was an increase, as now appears, in the sup
pressed invoices and in the carried over invoices, and this account is one
of those in which that increase took place, and it has been taken and dis
cussed as an instance and as an example of others in the book (creditors’
ledger), presumably dealt with in the same way. At page 108 of the ledger
the account of Hill & Sons—if I use a technical word wrongly I hope I
may be forgiven—is ruled on the 31st December, 1892. T he figures imme
diately below the ruling indicate to my mind that, when it was ruled, all
the items for that year were then written up. From the 12th August to
the 20th December, 1892, there were, altogether, items that amount only
to £57 3s. 9d., and all of these items are on the one date, 20th December.
There were no transactions with Hill & Sons between the 12th August and
the 31st December, except whatever is covered by the entries of the 20th
December. Therefore, if there was anything written in it could only be
the £57 3s. 9d.; but I think it is admitted that these were not written
afterwards, because after that, and the very last item above the ruling,
is the correction of an error of £500, which is taken from the contra side
of the account; and there is a ruling on the top of £736 4s. 9d., and there
the account ends for the year 1892. On the face of the book there is no
subsequent entry in Hill & Sons’ account at all going back into 1892. It
is a perfectly legible account for 1892, closed on the 31st December, bal
anced by the correction of an error, and, as I call it, closed in every sense.
I will assume that all the transactions of 1892 were included in the ac
counts of 1892, and that there was nothing carried forward. Now, there is
also a ruling on the 31st December, 1893—there is on the face of the book,
as it stands, an undoubted ruling as of the 31st December, 1893. But what
is the case? It is conceded that in striking a trial balance for the purpose
of statements of account for the year 1893, three items that only appear
on the right side of page 150 were in the book at the time. In the book
now, before we come to the ruling, there were inserted below these and
after them half a column of items totting to no less than £698 19s. 11d.,
and the whole of that is included in the amount of these ‘kept-back in
voices’ for the year 1893. Well, I will admit that it is not the business of
an auditor, when he comes to strike his trial balance, on the 31st December
for the purpose of a meeting, to have every account closed and balanced,
but he must strike a trial balance, and he did so; but at a figure, 15th De
cember. I do not agree with the monthly check that was taken. Some of
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these items now introduced must have been there, and therefore within
a month of the 31st December, 1893, if the monthly check had been
carried out, the representative of Mr. Kevans would have found that after
the figure which he had taken for ascertaining the financial position of
this company, a string of figures had been put in, all in December, and
all within a day or two of the 15th, the day at which the financial position
of the company had been ascertained. I think that was something; but
it is nothing to what follows, because between that time and whatever
time this book was ruled there then follows a further string of items—
nearly £600 in amount—that go up to the 3rd November and go down
as far as the 14th December. I cannot conceive any more clear or glaring
grounds of suspicion than to discover in the account of a single customer
items amounting to such a sum having got into the books after the trial
balance is struck under dates going back two months prior to the period
of the ascertaining of the trial balance. There appears to be a further
thing—a monthly check was to be adopted, and that would have put an
auditor on inquiry. It appears to me that the moment I come to the con
clusion that that was on the face of it a suspicious mode of dealing with
Hill & Sons’ figures, I am bound to show how it would be corrected. I can
add nothing to the judgment of Lord Justice Holmes—viz. that it would
then have been necessary to call for the creditors’ statements of account,
and at that moment they would have disclosed on the face of them not
merely those post-dated items, but the suppressed invoices also; and at
the instant that this discovery was made there is an absolute conviction
of something wrong forced upon the mind of the auditor. It, therefore,
occurs to me that, upon those two branches, all that is required, both to
show the negligence, to arouse suspicion and to supply the means of put
ting a stop to the frauds is to be found on the face of the book, and for all
I have said I have no foundation except what is upon the face of that book
(creditors’ ledger). I now take the three English cases, in order to make a
few observations on each. In 36 Ch.D., in the Leeds Estate Building In
vestment Co., Mr. Justice Stirling held that the manager and auditor
were liable. It is right to say that the procedure in the other cases was
different from this Leeds case; and it is im portant to bear in mind that
the other two were under the 10th Section of the Winding-up Act. In
this case the auditor was held liable, and Mr. Justice Stirling held him
liable, saying that it was his duty to see that no part of the capital
was applied to any other than the proper purpose, and, in particular,
that no part of the capital was returned to the creditors—that is, in divi
dends—except in the cases in which a reduction of capital was permitted
by various Acts of Parliament. T he next case, and the most im portant one,
is the London and General Bank ([1895] 2 Ch.D. 681). T h at was a
procedure under this 10th Section Mr. Justice Lindley says, ‘An auditor
has nothing to do with the prudence or imprudence of the way in which
the business has been carried on; nothing to say as to whether it was
properly, improprely, profitably or unprofitably carried on, provided he
discharges his own duties to the shareholders. His business is to ascertain
and state the true financial position of the company at the time of the
audit, and his duty is confined to that.’ But then comes the question, ‘How
is he to ascertain that?’ T he answer is by examining the books of the com
pany. But he does not discharge his duty by doing this without inquiry
and without taking the common trouble to see that the books show the
company’s true position. He must take reasonable care to see that this
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is done (page 682), otherwise the audit reduces itself to an ‘idle farce.’
I have endeavoured to keep myself within that, and think that the prin
ciple is the very lowest upon which we can define the duties of an auditor.
In the Kingston Cotton Mills case (1 Ch.D. 96, 279), Mr. Justice Vaughan
Williams held, ‘that it was the duty of the auditor to have made a cal
culation outside the books which, if made, would have shown that the
amount of the stock was overstated on the books.’ In this case of the stock
taking and the over-valuing, 8cc., Mr. Kevans is exonerated. Now, time
after time, this passage about the ‘watch-dog and the bloodhound’ has
been made use of, and I would wish to say a word regarding it too. His
lordship then read from Lord Justice Lindley’s judgment the passages
dealing with the duties of auditors, in one of which it was laid down that
‘an auditor was a watch-dog, but not a bloodhound.’ This, Lord Justice
Fitzgibbon remarked, was very unfair to the bloodhound, who was just
as little likely to have his sense of suspicion aroused as the watch-dog.
Applying this instance of the dogs to the present case, was not the watch
dog bound to bark? And if, when sniffing round, you h it upon a trail of
something wrong, surely you must follow it up, and there is just as much
obligation on the auditor, who is bound to keep his eyes open, and his
nose, too. As in the case of the hound, the auditor will follow up this
trail to the end, and the first things he will ‘root up’ are those statements
of account, and then the fraud is discovered. On the question of dam
ages—the damage here—and I guard myself against expressing any in
dividual opinion upon anything more than is necessary—is sufficiently
supplied for the purpose of showing the existence of pecuniary losses. In
the first place, there has been a paying away of a large amount of money
in dividends to the shareholders that had not been earned, and therefore
at the time that that was stopped the company ought to have been in pos
session of a money capital, which they had parted with by paying it away
to their shareholders. It would be premature to discuss the pecuniary
damage until the financial position of the company is finally ascertained.
Then, again, had this system of the suppression—the carrying forward—
of invoices been detected sooner, it would have been open to the directors
to have done something to stop it. They had several ways, either to in
crease their percentages or diminish their dealings—in the latter case
thereby producing a less loss; or they could have stopped the business
and wound it up. On the question of the amount of the damages, that
depends on the amount of the losses the plaintiff has suffered, taking all
the circumstances of the case into consideration. We have not all these
circumstances before us, and it is, I say, premature to discuss damages
at all beyond the point I have discussed them. I have come with much
reluctance to the conclusion that a professional m an has failed in his duty,
and I am glad to be able to think that the worst that could be said of
the case is this: T hat, in what is so small a company, Mr. Kevans and his
representative, w ho went there to do this audit (for which Mr. Kevans
received a very small fee), were deceived not by any glaring or probable
fraud such as they would be on the watch against, but by a thing that was
done more for the purpose of giving an appearance of fictitious prosperity
to a company which did not exist than that of putting money into the
pockets of shareholders. That, however, cannot alter the legal liability
if it is based, as I am satisfied it is, upon the failure to have suspicion
aroused.
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T he L ord Chancellor also concurred, and the appeal was accordingly
dismissed.

CRAIG v. ANYON *
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department, 1925.
212 App. Div. 55, 208 N. Y. Supp. 259, aff’d, 242
N. Y. 569, 152 N. E. 431 (1926).

M artin, J. The plaintiffs during the years 1913 to 1917, inclusive, were
engaged in business in New York city as brokers in stocks and commodities
such as cotton, wheat and coffee. T heir transactions on behalf of cus
tomers were conducted on the New York Stock Exchange, the Cotton
Exchanges in New York and New Orleans, the Chicago Board of Trade
and similar exchanges in which they had membership. The business was
apparently prosperous and the partners had enjoyed a large income there
from. On May 26, 1917, through the confession of Robert Moore, an
employee of their commodities department, following an office investiga
tion, they learned that their prosperity had been an illusion, and that their
books had been falsified by Moore throughout a period of nearly five years,
during which they had been defrauded of over $1,250,000.
During the entire five years’ period, the defendants, composing an
accounting firm well known both in the United States and England, were
under retainer from the plaintiffs. Each three months throughout this
period the books were audited by them and a report submitted, by which
reports the plaintiffs say they were assured the books were properly kept,
no reference being made to any irregularity.
T he action is founded upon the charge that these audits were negli
gently made; that, had any audit been made with reasonable care, the
falsification of the books would have been discovered, Moore would
have been discharged and no further loss would have occurred.
T he complaint alleges a contract whereby the defendants undertook
periodically to audit the plaintiffs’ books and accounts a n d to report any
errors or omissions therein, and negligence by the defendants in the per
formance of the contract and damage to the plaintiffs amounting to the
sum of $1,280,233.61. This is made up of sums paid to customers to whom,
it is alleged, nothing would have been paid except for the defendants’
negligent failure to report that similar unauthorized payments had pre
viously been made, and of other sums paid to brokers, and not charged
to any customer, upon transactions which, as it is alleged, would not
have been permitted were it not for the defendants’ negligence in failing
to report irregularities consisting of similar transactions previously made.
T he answer admits the employment of the defendants to audit the
plaintiffs’ books “subject to certain instructions and limitations imposed”
by the plaintiffs and their predecessor firms; denies the allegation of
negligent performance of the contract; and sets up as a defense negligence
on the part of the plaintiffs and both negligence and “larceny, embezzle
ment and criminal acts and practices” on the part of employees of the
plaintiffs.
T he action was tried in May, 1922. At the end of plaintiffs’ case a
* T his case is discussed at p.

19 ff. supra.
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motion to dismiss was denied except as to six defendants who had become
members of the firm after 1917.
The defense rested without offering evidence and the motion to dismiss
was renewed. T he court reserved decision in accordance with the prac
tice set forth in section 1187 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civ. Prac.
Act, § § 459, 585), and submitted two specific questions to the jury, as
follows:
“Were the defendants negligent in the performance of their agreement
with Craig & Co.?”
“If so, what damages to the plaintiffs resulted directly and proximately
from such negligence?”
The court charged that if the defendants were found liable the verdict
must be either for $2,000, the amount paid as compensation for the de
fendants’ services; or for $1,177,805.26, the amount of plaintiffs’ actual
loss as proved. T o the first question the jury answered, “Yes;” to the
second question, “$1,177,805.26.”
Upon the rendition of the verdict the defendants’ motion to set aside
the answer to the second question was granted; the defendants’ motion to
set aside the answer to the first question was denied; and a general verdict
was directed in favor of the plaintiffs for $2,000, appropriate exceptions
being noted by the plaintiffs. The order recites that the court proceeded
“on the ground that as a m atter of law the only loss which resulted directly
and proximately from the negligence of the defendants was the sum of
$2,000.”
The three main questions litigated were (1) the degree of care actually
used by the defendants; (2) the understanding or agreement of the parties
with respect to the scope of the audits to be made; (3) the degree of care
used by the plaintiffs. The three questions are closely interlocked and are
to be answered by the inferences to be drawn from practically undisputed
evidence.
It is apparent from an examination of the record that the jury found
the defendants were negligent and the court agreed with the jury on that
question, but disagreed with it as to the damages resulting from such
negligence. .
Three questions are before us on this appeal: (1) Were the defendants
negligent; (2) did the plaintiffs’ negligence contribute to the loss, and
(3) assuming defendants were negligent, what damages resulted there
from? The first question has been resolved in favor the plaintiffs both
by the jury and the court. W ith reference to that question, therefore, it
is necessary only to inquire whether the evidence warranted a finding of
negligence.
T he plaintiffs contend that defendants are chargeable wit h negligence
by reason of the carelessly conducted audit of the plaintiffs’ books. It is
asserted that one or more books were in the custody of the plaintiffs when
each audit was made, an examination of which would have disclosed the
account of one Zabriskie as reflecting an indebtedness to the plaintiffs of
many thousands of dollars.
The defendants offered no evidence and no defense, except the crossexamination which developed the fact that an inspection of all the books
in the office would have disclosed irregularities; whereas the auditors, in
making investigations and reports, relied on books, papers and carbon
copies of statements to customers furnished by one Moore, who apparently
had charge of a division of the business,
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There can be very little doubt as to carelessness by the auditors.
Whether it caused the loss is a more difficult question. Although a proper
audit would have disclosed facts leading to the discovery of Moore’s
wrongdoing, there are a number of other elements entering into this case
which show that the plaintiffs are not without blame and might have
avoided the loss.
They now seek to make Moore a mere clerk. He was much more. He
was in charge of plaintiffs’ commodities department. He was permitted
to absolutely control that department; and the real cause of the loss is to
be found in the fact that he was given a free hand, without any super
vision, to deal with the accounts of Zabriskie and others at will. He de
cided what entries were to be made by the bookkeepers and how they
were to be made, so far as transactions in his division of the business were
concerned. He was perm itted to give directions for the firm to outside
brokers as to whether transactions should be closed or carried as “open.”
This appears to have been of great assistance in enabling him to keep
the actual condition of the Zabriskie account concealed. To this customer
large sums of money were paid time to time, the payment of which was
unwarranted, for the accounts with him would have shown the absence
of a sufficient balance to meet margins. Money was paid to him at a time
when he must have been heavily indebted to plaintiffs.
Should the plaintiffs have relied on Moore who was dealing with the
Zabriskie account for Zabriskie and at the same time taking care of the
account for the plaintiffs? Certainly they were called upon to exercise
some supervision in the matter. Having left a branch of their business
to an employee, it does not seem reasonable that although there was no
supervision they should now be permitted to charge the loss to the auditors
who, apparently on account of the dishonesty of such employee, failed
to uncover defalcations.
In his charge to the jury the court said: “These defendants rendered
such reports every three months. These reports undoubtedly contained
mistakes and inaccuracies. They were based on what Moore wanted them
to believe was the position of the firm and not on the true position of the
firm.”
T he auditors relied on Moore. They were deceived by him. So were
the plaintiffs. T he auditors could have performed their work inde
pendently of what they were told by Moore. But Moore was the employee
who dealt with them and who gave them the books and papers upon
which they were to work. They did not suspect any wrongdoing and
believed they were justified in taking the information given them by
the firm’s representative, who exercised without interference, power to
deal with them in reference to their work in the commodities department.
Defendants relied on Moore’s honesty, but no more than did plaintiffs.
In Matter of Kingston Cotton M ill Company (No. 2) (L. R. [1896]
2 Ch. Div. 279) Lord Justice L indley said: “In this case the auditors
relied on the manager. He was a man of high character and of unques
tioned competence. He was trusted by everyone who knew him. The
learned judge has held that the directors are not to be blamed for trusting
him. T he auditors had no suspicion that he was not to be trusted to
give accurate information as to the stock-in-trade in hand, and they trusted
him accordingly in that matter. But it is said they ought not to have done
so, and for this reason. The stock journal shewed the quantities—that is,
the weight in pounds—of the cotton and yarn at the end of each year.
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Other books shewed the quantities of cotton bought during the year and
the quantities of yarn sold during the year. If these books had been com
pared by the auditors they would have found that the quantity of cotton
and yarn in hand at the end of the year ought to be much less than the
quantity shewn in the stock journal, and so much less that the value of
the cotton and yarn entered in the stock journal could not be right, or
at all events was so abnormally large as to excite suspicion and demand
further inquiry. This is the view taken by the learned judge. But ,al
though it is no doubt true that such a process might have been gone
through, and that, if gone through, the fraud would have been discovered,
can it be truly said that the auditors were wanting in reasonable care in
not thinking it necessary to test the managing director’s return? I cannot
bring myself to think they were, nor do I think that any jury of business
men would take a different view. It is not sufficient to say that the frauds
must have been detected if the entries in the books had been put together
in a way which never occurred to any one before suspicion was aroused.
T he question is whether, no suspicion of anything wrong being enter
tained, there was a want of reasonable care on the part of the auditors
in relying on the returns made by a competent and trusted expert relating
to matters on which information from such a person was essential. I
cannot think there was. T he manager had no apparent conflict between
his interest and his duty. His position was not similar to that of a cashier
who has to account for the cash which he receives, and whose own account
of his receipts and payments could not reasonably be taken by an auditor
without further inquiry. T he auditor’s duty is not so onerous as the
learned judge has held it to be.”
Lord Justice L opes said (at p. 290): “T he duties of auditors must not
be rendered too onerous. T heir work is responsible and laborious, and the
remuneration moderate. I should be sorry to see the liability of auditors
extended any further than in In re London and General Bank (L. R.
[1895] 2 Ch. 673). Indeed, I only assented to that decision on account
of the inconsistency of the statement made to the directors with the
balance-sheet certified by the auditors and presented to the shareholders.
This satisfied my mind that the auditors deliberately concealed that from
the shareholders which they had communicated to the directors. It would
be difficult to say this was not a breach of duty. Auditors must not be
made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of
fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion, and when those
frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and are unde
tected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the position of
an auditor intolerable.”
Lord Justice Kay said (at p. 293): “It is said that it is easy to be wise
after the event. In former years when the stock journal was correctly
entered the alterations in value in a year were frequently very consider
able. T he increase in the years now in question did not excite any sus
picion in the directors. Why should it in the auditors? They had no
reason to distrust the manager. Moreover, he had, or was supposed to
have, taken the stock which was actually on the premises at the date to
which the balance-sheets referred. The auditors could not do this. The
only book from which they could obtain information as to the quantities
received in the year other than the stock journal was a book called the
‘invoice guard book,’ in which were pasted the invoices received with
goods supplied. But this was not necessarily accurate. Invoices received
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might have been omitted. Goods might in some cases have been received
without invoices. Were the auditors bound to enter upon an investigation
which could not bring out an accurate result in order to test the truth of
a statement by the manager which no one had any reason to discredit?”
T he court instructed the jury that these auditors did not guarantee the
correctness of their accounts. “They do not say to the public, ‘Let us
examine your books and vouchers and we will with absolute certainty
discover every dishonesty, every mistake that exists in those books, and
we will protect you against that.’ ” T h at is not what they undertook to
do. They agreed to use such skill in the performance of their agreement as
reasonably prudent, skillful accountants would use under the circum
stances.
One of the plaintiffs, Mr. Craig, said that when defendants originally
began their duties for a predecessor firm they agreed to supervise, super
intend and send out certain statements to customers. Mr. Craig knew that
was never done. Plaintiffs refused to allow statements to be sent to cus
tomers. It is further asserted that the defendants agreed to take the open
contracts and to calculate the actual liability of the customers thereon at
the time of each audit. It was known that defendants never made such
calculations.
The plaintiff Craig says that they told him, “We have to make that
calculation both for straddles and open accounts before we can tell you
what is the actual standing of this firm.” Craig’s statements with reference
to the contract were made to a man who has since died, leaving no way
of directly meeting his testimony in this respect. Craig was aware that
there had been for several years a failure to strictly live up to arrangements
and agreements as to what was to be accomplished.
Zabriskie started his account in 1909, writing the brokers a letter that
he was sending them $200 for margin, and that Moore, the plaintiffs’ em
ployee, should have the right to give directions to buy and sell for his
account. In other words, it became what is known as a discretionary
account. He directed that as soon as the $200 margin was exhausted, the
account should be closed. Moore thereafter gave orders to buy and sell
for Zabriskie’s account. The relationship between Moore and Zabriskie
does not appear, but it does appear that the loss could not have occurred
if Zabriskie’s account had been closed out when his margin had become
exhausted.
When Moore gave an order to a broker in Chicago to sell wheat, he
would sometimes charge that order to the account of Zabriskie but at other
times he would not. He always entered the transactions or had them
entered in the blotter. He told the clerks what entries they were to make
in the charge ledger. At times he gave an order to enter such contracts
against Zabriskie in this ledger and at other times he did not. If these
books were all examined at the end of the three months, any accountant,
skilled or unskilled, would have discovered something was wrong, or that
some entry remained to be made. Items not entered in the proper place
were entered in the back of the book on pages beyond the charge account
in the customers’ open contract ledger. They were made against Zabriskie
b u t with instructions that they were not to be entered as actual charges
against him. This was feasible because Moore was allowed to deal to the
extent of very great sums in Zabriskie’s account for Zabriskie and at the
same time had charge of the branch office to the extent of deciding what
bookkeeping entries should be made. Though Moore was directing these
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very extensive dealings from both sides, nothing was ever done to check
up and see whether the transactions were in order. Moore arranged for
payments to Zabriskie from time to time. These payments should never
have been made; for with the true condition of his account known it would
have been apparent that margins on hand did not warrant them. Had the
“opens” been properly checked it could have been seen whether Zabriskie
had balances due him and whether they warranted the payments made to
him. Craig made large payments to him without attempting to ascertain
how his accounts stood. Moore had the sole control in a department of
plaintiffs’ activities and therein plaintiffs allowed him to represent their
interests as well as the interests of some of those dealing with them. He
was permitted to represent conflicting interests. This was true when the
accountants were there and when they were not. During the whole of the
three months’ period between audits, being a major part of the time, the
plaintiffs paid out large sums of money without any investigation or
examination of the books, though an examination would have disclosed
the irregularities for which they now attempt to hold the defendants.
The actual liability of Mr. Zabriskie on open transactions and the
amount to be paid out should have been ascertainable from the customers’
ledger. The evidence shows that between February 28, 1917, and May
26, 1917, there was an actual change of position of something like $500,000.
Were plaintiffs justified in relying, as reasonably prudent business men,
on Moore’s honesty, though he was allowed to exercise discretionary
powers on behalf of customers? Moore was trusted with supervision over
the department where the loss occurred and, at the same time, was per
mitted to deal at will for Zabriskie. He was left in the same position as
to at least one other account. He was also margin clerk. As such it was for
him to decide what margins should be maintained.
His various and diverse duties and powers put him in a position to keep
records and papers or cause them to be kept so as to deceive the account
ants who relied on him. If it be assumed that they should not have done
so, it is nevertheless true that the plaintiffs also relied upon them to an
extent beyond all reason in view of all the circumstances. They were
guilty of the same kind of negligence of which they now complain. It
may be true that a proper accounting would have put the plaintiffs on
guard with reference to Moore’s wrongdoing, but it is also true that, if the
plaintiffs had attended to their business and, in view of the large trans
actions involved, had looked up Zabriskie’s account when payments were
being made to him, the dishonesty of Moore would have been discovered.
T he plaintiffs admit that they never inquired into the “opens” of
Zabriskie when he asked for money, nor when he placed orders to be
executed. Had they done so, nothing would have been paid to him other
than as his margins warranted, and losing trades would have resulted in
his account being closed. Instead they left these matters to an employee,
who, though not a partner or principal, had full authority in his depart
ment.
It also appears that the accountants notified the plaintiffs in writing
that a certain ledger should not be taken out of the control of one Hodge
and that, if it took up too much of his time, an assistant should be engaged
under his control. T he accountants wrote the plaintiffs, “as this ledger
is now operated, it is practically a check on the subsidiary departments
and we see no advantage in establishing a separate ledger.” Notwithstand
ing this advice, one of the partners put that ledger under Moore’s direc
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tion, leaving him with control of every book in the office necessary to work
his schemes and, at the same time, conceal his misdeeds.
Craig had knowledge that Moore was to have discretion as to Zabriskie’s
account. This is shown by a letter: “I enclosed herewith check for $200
which please place to the credit of my account. I am not fully acquainted
with the method of trading in cotton and wish to leave the operation of
my account entirely in Mr. Moore’s hands—with instructions to close out
if the margin becomes exhausted.”
It seems to us, therefore, that the loss was due to the failure of Moore
to close out the account when the margin became insufficient. No m atter
what the accountants had reported, if Zabriskie’s account had been closed
there would have been no loss. True, it was not closed out because of
the wrongdoing of Moore; but slight supervision would have disclosed
Moore’s wrongdoing.
Counsel for plaintiffs in his opening stated: “Moore got a man by the
name of Zabriskie—we do not know Zabriskie except as a name on the
books and as a witness in litigation that grew out of those transactions—
that is our total acquaintance with Zabriskie—since Zabriskie wrote a
letter to the plaintiff firm as then constituted—and you will understand
me, of course, when I say the plaintiff firm I mean Craig’s firm, in which
he enclosed a check for $200 which he said he wanted to trade in commod
ities, $200 will constitute a margin, that Moore was to do the trading for
him, and that if the margin of $200 was exhausted, that was the end of the
transaction.”
Zabriskie was in fact better known to the plaintiffs than they would
admit. Craig knew Zabriskie for about ten years, having spoken to him
a number of times. In 1910 he took Zabriskie to a dinner of the Stock
Exchange members, to which he invited all of his best customers. Craig
raised Moore’s salary because Zabriskie, a valuable customer, desired it
and said he could obtain for Moore better compensation elsewhere.
Moreover, the Zabriskie account was the most active the plaintiffs car
ried. He did from seventy-five per cent to eighty-five per cent of their
Chicago commodities business. Notwithstanding the tremendous loss
which such an active account might bring to the plaintiffs, they never
investigated the financial standing of Zabriskie; they never received a
mercantile report on him; they never asked him for references in the face
of the fact that his initial margin was about $200. During this period the
plaintiffs paid Zabriskie $123,689.04 without once making an examination
of the books to see whether anything was due him.
We are of the opinion that the loss was not entirely the result of the
negligence of the defendants, but also resulted from the careless and neg
ligent m anner in which the plaintiffs conducted their business.
The verdict embraces two items: Money paid to Zabriskie and subse
quent losses to his account which he failed to meet. These losses were paid
to other brokers by Moore. They would not have been incurred if Zabris
kie’s account had been investigated. T he purchases to which they relate
would not have been made for there was no margin in Zabriskie’s account
to make them.
Before a payment was made to Zabriskie or an order given by or for
him was executed, the “opens” and the sufficiency of his margin should
have been investigated. This should have been done from day to day, at
times from hour to hour, even though plaintiffs had audits from the
accountants.
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In Deyo v. Hudson (225 N. Y. 602, 615) the court said: “If they had no
right to rely exclusively upon the assurance of Mitchell when they might
have prevented the loss themselves thev cannot recover.”
There is no doubt in this case that plaintiffs could have prevented the
loss by the exercise of reasonable care, and that they should not have
relied exclusively on the accountants.
We think the damages cannot be said to flow naturally and directly
from defendants’ negligence or breach of contract. Plaintiffs should not
be allowed to recover for losses which they could have avoided by the
exercise of reasonable care.
In City of East Grand Forks v. Steele (121 Minn. 296) the court
said (at pp. 298-300): “This is not an action in tort, but an action to
recover damages for breach of contract. As said by Justice M itchell
in W hittaker v. Collins, 34 Minn. 299, 25 N. W. 632, 57 Am. Ren. 55
(an action brought to recover for the negligence of a physician): ‘Where
the action is not maintainable without pleading and proving the contract,
where the gist of the action is the breach of the contract, either by mal
feasance or nonfeasance, it is in substance, whatever may be the form
of the pleading, an action on the contract. * * * T he foundation of the
action is the contract, and the gravamen of it its breach.’
“T he rule governing liability for breach of contract is given in the
syllabus to Sargent v. Mason, 101 Minn. 319, 112 N. W. 255, as follows:
‘In an action for damages for breach of contract, the defaulting party is
liable only for the direct consequences of the breach, such as usually occur
from the infraction of like contracts, and within the contemplation of the
parties when the contract was entered into as likely to result from its
non-performance.’ * * *
“The damages claimed on account of the losses resulting from the
defalcations of the clerk and the insolvency of his surety are too remote
to be recovered, without showing the existence of special circumstances,
known to defendants, from which they ought to have known that such
losses were likely to result from a failure to disclose the true condition
of affairs. Such losses are neither the natural nor the proximate conse
quences of the failure of defendants to make a proper audit. Neither are
any facts shown from which it may be inferred that a loss from either of
these causes was or ought to have been contemplated, when the contract
was made, as likely to result from a breach of duty on the part of
defendants.”
In Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co. (236 N. Y. 425, 430)
the court said: “As I say this criminal act made it possible to use them;
without it they could not have been used and the defendant’s omission
would have resulted in no harm.
“Under these circumstances I fail to see how it can be said that its
omission was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. In the first place
it has been found as matter of fact that it was not such proximate cause
and ordinarily it is to be determined as a question of fact whether there
has been such a connection between cause and effect as to make the
former proximate. (Milwaukee &St. Paul Ry. Co. v . Kellogg, 94 U. S.
469, 475.) But if we disregard this particular finding of fact we then have
it on other findings that between defendant’s omission and plaintiff’s in
jury there has intervened the criminal act of a third party without which
the injury could not have occurred. There has been produced a great
amount of legal literature and numberless opinions on this subject of
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proximate cause which it is impossible and undesirable to attem pt to
review. But I think that there is one fundamental rule which has been
clearly established in the discussion of the subject which is decisive of this
case, and that is the one that the act of a party sought to be charged is
not to be regarded as a proximate cause unless it is in clear sequence with
the result and unless it could have been reasonably anticipated that the
consequences complained of would result from the alleged wrongful act;
that it the consequences were only made possible by the intervening act
of a third party which could not have reasonably been anticipated then
the sequential relation between act and results would not be regarded
as so established as to come within the rule of proximate cause.”
In Sutherland on Damages (Vol. 1 [4th ed.], p. 158, §41) it is said:
“If there intervenes between the defendant’s act or omission a wilful,
malicious and criminal act committed by a third person, which act de
fendant had no reason to apprehend, the connection between the original
wrong and the result is broken.”
The plaintiffs, in effect, contend that defendants are chargeable with
negligence because of failure to detect Moore’s wrongdoing, wholly over
looking the fact that although they were closely affiliated with Moore, who
was constantly under their supervision, they were negligent in failing
properly to supervise his acts or to learn the true condition of their own
business and to detect his wrongdoing.
We have reached the conclusion that the judgment is right and should
be affirmed.
M errell and F inch, JJ., concur; C larke, P. J., dissents.
Clarke, P. J. (dissenting):
I dissent from the affirmance of so much of the judgment as sets aside
the verdict of the jury assessing the damages at $1,177,805.26. T he con
tract of audit was not one merely to discover if inadvertent clerical errors
had been made in the bookkeeping, but was one of protection of the
plaintiff’s firm from their own failure to find any error in their books
of account. This contract the defendants failed to perform. Admitting
the neglect of the plaintiffs to discover the embezzlement and falsification
of the accounts through an examination of the books on their own part,
the defendants’ work in pursuance of the contract, owing to the manner
in which it was performed, failed to save plaintiffs from the consequences
of such failure and neglect, which was the very subject of the contract.
Judgment and order affirmed, without costs to either party as against
the other.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS v. BAKER*
Supreme Court of Kansas. 152 Kan. 164, 102 P.2d 1006.

H och, Justice. This was an action to recover damages for breach of
contract. The trial court made certain findings favorable to the plaintiff
but awarded only nominal damages, holding that no actual damage had
been show n. P lain tiff appeals, co n ten d in g th a t a d d itio n a l findings of

fact should have been made and that the judgment for nominal dam
ages only was inconsistent with findings of fact and conclusions of law
theretofore made.
See footnote 32 supra.
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The appellant, the Board of County Commissioners of Allen County,
Kansas, entered into a contract on August 8, 1936, with appellees, Baker
& Miller, licensed municipal accountants, for an audit of the accounts
and records of the various county offices. The audit was to be made in
compliance with the statutory requirement of an annual county audit.
G. S. 1935, 75-1122. T he appellees agreed to make the audit in accord
ance with the “Minimum Standard Audit Program” approved by the
State Municipal Accounting Board as required by the statute. The cost
of the audit was not to exceed $850.
T he appellees proceeded to make the audit. The audit of the county
treasurer’s office covered the period from October 8, 1935, to October 12,
1936, and that of the other county offices from January 1, 1936, to Janu
ary 11, 1937. The appellees were paid the full amount of $850 in three
payments, the last one of which was made on March 1, 1937. Certain
inaccuracies and irregularities were discovered in the report of the audi
tors, further audit being made of three county offices. Following these
disclosures, this action was brought.
After preliminary recitals, it was alleged in the petition that the defend
ants failed to discover or report shortages later found to have then existed
in the “emergency fund” maintained in the office of the county engineer;
that as a result of carelessness, negligence and wantonness in making the
audit, the defendants had erroneously reported that the county treasurer
had collected about $15,000 in taxes in excess of what should have been
collected, and that the county clerk had about $500 in cash on hand,
whereas nearly all of the amount reported as cash consisted of checks.
Other allegations not material to the present discussion need not be nar
rated, except to add that the plaintiffs alleged that by reason of the care
less, negligent and wanton manner in which the audit had been made
and of the incorrect audit report, the audit was “worthless to and of no
value” to the county, and that plaintiffs had been damaged in the amount
paid for the audit for which amount judgment was asked.
Defendant Miller was not served with summons being out of the
jurisdiction of the state. T he answer of defendant Baker admitted the
execution of the written contract and the making of the audit. It alleged
that the “emergency fund” in the office of the county engineer was created
without authority of law and that the defendants were under no obliga
tion to examine or audit it, but that in their report they did call atten
tion to the fact that such fund was in existence, and alleged that the
reimbursement vouchers of this fund were sworn to by the county engi
neer and approved by the county attorney; that the audit was made in
good faith and “that the purpose of said contract and audit report was
to enable plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the General Statutes
of Kansas of 1935, which require the governing body of each county in
the State of Kansas to have the accounts of such county examined and
audited by a licensed municipal accountant or accountants, or certified
public accountant or acountants; that said audit report was filed with the
county clerk of Allen county, Kansas, and in the State Accountant’s office,
Capitol Building, Topeka, Kansas, as alleged in said third amended
petition, and thereby said contract and said audit report completely and
fully fulfilled the purpose for which they were intended, as provided by
the 1935 General Statutes of the State of Kansas pertaining thereto; that
plaintiff has received and retained all the benefits of said contract and
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audit report and plaintiff therefore has no cause of action for damages
against the defendant for breach of said audit contract.”
T he case was heard by the court, after which sixteen findings of fact
and certain conclusions of law were made. It will be sufficient for this
review to refer to the findings of fact only to the extent necessary in
connection with the “conclusions of law.” T he conclusions of law were
as follows:
“I. T h at in making the audit in question the defendants were guilty
of negligence in the preparation of their report,—
“ (a) In not reconciling, within a reasonable degree of accuracy in the
first instance, the total taxes collected and uncollected, charged to the
treasurer, with the abstract of taxes furnished by the county clerk;
“ (b) In not setting out the items of cash on hand in the county clerk’s
office, as required by the Minimum Standard Audit program;
“ (c) In wholly failing to check the A. W. Young emergency fund and
include same in their audit.
“II. T h at Allen county, Kansas, had the benefit of the audit of the
offices concerning which no question has been raised; that said audit
is not entirely worthless, but was of some value to said county.
“III. T h at plaintiff has failed to prove any substantial damage that
it has suffered by reason of the negligence of the defendants; but that
because of the negligence of defendants the plaintiff is entitled to recover
nominal damages of one dollar.
“IV. T h at plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs herein.”
This opinion will be simplified if we state at the outset the principal
conclusions to which we have arrived after examination of the record,
and particularly after analysis of the findings of the trial court. Those
conclusions are that the trial court failed in its final determination, to
evaluate one of the primary purposes for which the audit was made; that
it proceeded upon the erroneous theory that unless the plaintiff estab
lished a money loss, apart from the payments made to the defendants, it
had shown no substantial damage. T he purpose of a county audit is not
merely to “comply with the statute” as the defendants rather indicate in
their answer. Its primary purpose—the purpose of the statute itself—is
to determine whether the accounts and records of the county are being
accurately and honestly kept. W hen the county commissioners, who are
charged with responsibility in the matter, employ accountants to make
the audit, they contract for skill, accuracy and fidelity on the part of
those who represent themselves as experts in this line of work. If service
which measures up to that high standard is not furnished, the breach
of the contract is fundamental—it goes to the very heart of the contract.
If gross inaccuracies are discovered in the report; if disclosure is made
that the accountants have failed to report material facts of serious import,
bearing upon questions of efficiency and honesty, the report becomes of
little if any value. If those employing the accountants cannot rely upon
an assumption that the audit and the report have been made with reason
able accuracy and with complete fidelity they have failed to receive the
principal thing they were to get under the contract. W hen confidence
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in the report is gone, very little is left. In the light of these elementary
and fundamental propositions, let us examine the record.
We first note the court’s findings (a) (b) (c) under its “conclusions of
law.” Finding (a) was that the defendants were “guilty of negligence in
not reconciling, within a reasonable degree of accuracy in the first in
stance, the total taxes collected and uncollected, charged to the treasurer,
with the abstract of taxes furnished by the county clerk.” This conclu
sion was based upon the court’s findings of fact numbered 10 and 12,
which we need only summarize. T he court there found that the defend
ants erroneously reported that the county treasurer’s books showed the
tax roll to be in excess of the tax abstract in the sum of $14,995.30; that
subsequently Mr. Bartlett, a bookkeeper in the county clerks office, exam
ined the county treasurer’s records and discovered that the correct amount
of the difference between the tax roll and the tax abstract was only $44.62;
that the attention of the defendants was called to the finding by Mr.
Bartlett, after which they wrote to the county clerk and submitted pages
to be substituted in their report, showing the difference to be $44.62 as
found by Mr. Bartlett, and on this m atter the court found that “the evi
dence does not disclose that the defendants ever checked their records
to determine their accuracy.”
T he court’s finding (b) was that the defendants were “guilty of negli
gence in not setting out the items of cash on hand in the county clerk’s
office, as required by the Minimum Standard Audit Program.” This is
based upon the court’s finding of fact No. 14, the substance of which is
that the auditors reported the “cash count, January 11, 1937 (noon),”
to be $494.38, whereas the defendant’s work sheets which were placed
into the record as an exhibit by the plaintiff, showed the following:
“Cash on hand, January 11, 1937, (noon)
Coin .................................. $ 7.75
Bills ..............................
12.00
Checks ............................... 416.88
Cash items(express) .........
2.00
I. O. U.(Elarton) .............
55.75
$494.38”
(The item of $416.88, on the same page of their work sheets, is made
up as follows)
“A. W. Young Emergency
Fund No. 517, 1-11-37 ... $ .25
Elarton, Ralph, 1-2-37 .... 391.63
Palace Ready to Wear,
9-4-36 .............................
25.00
$416.88”
In this connection we note the testimony of W. L. Warnica. Mr. W ar
nica was employed by the defendants to help make the audit. He iden
tified an exhibit by the plaintiff as sheets made in his handwriting, signed
and turned over by him to his employer Miller. One of these sheets reads
as follows: “Allen county, county clerk. County clerk claims the 47 cigar
ette licenses issued and covered by his personal check on January 2, 1937,
have now been collected on except for ten for which he secured a bank

LIABILITY TO CLIENTS

143

loan. The balance of the check represents funds diverted to his own use.
The balance of $109.63 is supposed to be covered by another check.”
It is also pertinent to note the following testimony of Barton Avery:
‘‘I am now and was in September 1937, a Senior Accountant in the State
Accountant’s Office. I made an investigation of the accounts of Ralph
Elarton, County Clerk, from the period January 3, 1936, to January 8,
1937, which showed a difference of $381.95, which had not been reported.
I also made a check on the discrepancy as to the cash on hand in the
county clerk’s office between the Cornell Audit and the Baker-Miller
Audit. We asked Mr. Miller about the difference and he said that he
omitted the $258.00; that Mr. Elarton stated that it was for an item to be
remitted direct to the Department of Inspection and Registration. Mr.
Austin Logan was in Iola with me also, and we made a check to see if the
personal check of $394.00 of Ralph Elarton, which was in the cash drawer,
was ever cashed and cleared the bank, and we learned that Mr. Elarton did
not even maintain a bank account at that time.”
While the trial court made no specific findings relative to the testimony
of witnesses Warnica and Avery, their testimony was not disputed.
It thus appears that the item reported as “cash, $494.38” in the county
clerk’s office was not cash. Most of it consisted of checks, and the principal
check was the personal check of the county clerk, Elarton, whose resigna
tion subsequently followed after disclosures of irregularities. It is hardly
necessary to say that of course the county commissioners were entitled to
know that checks were being carried as cash. A pertinent provision of the
Minimum Standard Audit Program which appellees contracted to observe
reads as follows: “Count all cash and cash items on hand. List checks and
note date of making. Note checks signed by officers, deputies or employees.
Insist upon all checks being deposited in the bank not later than the next
business day and see that there is no off-setting withdrawal. Request de
pository to make direct report of any items not cleared for any reason.”
(Audit Procedure 1-12a.)
But no recourse to the audit program is required. H ad it contained no
such specific provision it would none the less h ave been the plain duty of
appellees to report the facts. The county commissioners were certainly
entitled to know that a county officer was substituting his own check for
cash in the cash drawer. W hat confidence in the report could remain after
disclosure of such a serious failure to do their work carefully and faith
fully?
We next note the trial court’s “conclusion of law” (c), which was that
“the defendants were guilty of negligence in wholly failing to check the
A. W. Young emergency fund and include same in their audit.” This is
based upon the evidence covered by the court’s findings of fact numbered
15 and 16. The substance of those findings is that no audit was made of
the “emergency fund” in the county engineer’s office, the defendants doing
little more than report the existence of the fund; but that the work sheets,
submitted as an exhibit by the plaintiff, showed, “no funds on hand
January 11, 1937. An emergency account has been set up under the name
of A. W. Young emergency fund. T he amount, $389.49”; that as a result
of an audit subsequently made of this emergency fund by an accountant
from the State Accountant’s office, and covering the same period, unex
plained expenditures were disclosed in the amount of $196.77. In other
words, it is the plain implication of the court’s findings that if the appel
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lees had not been guilty of negligence in failing to audit this fund, they
would have discovered a shortage of about $200.
T he appellees made no objection at the time, and make none now, to
any of the findings heretofore narrated.
We now come to the court’s “conclusion of law’’ No. 2, to which the
appellant objected at the time and now objects, which reads as follows:
“Allen county, Kansas, had the benefit of the audit of the offices con
cerning which no question has been raised; that said audit is not entirely
worthless, but was of some value to said county.”
T he theory of the trial court seems to have been that since the audit
as to the other county offices had not been attacked, the disclosure and
proof of inaccuracies and irregularities in the report as to only three
county offices do not seriously injure the value of the report. The un
soundness of such a theory is sufficiently indicated, we think, by the gen
eral comments made at the start of this opinion. When reliance can
no longer be placed in an auditor’s report, the coin of the audit’s value
has become counterfeit. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the con
tract was for a county audit, and this was in harmony with the emphasis
placed upon the proposition in the audit program, that county audits
are based upon the county as a unit. T he “Introductory Comment”
therein reads as follows: “The audit contemplated herein comprehends
the financial position and financial management of the county. The finan
cial position and management of a county is based on the county as a
unit. It may seem trite to indicate as a basic principle that an audit pro
gram must consider the county as a composite unit made up of various
offices.”
T he only way the county commissioners could have discovered in
accuracies and irregularities, if any existed, in the other county offices,
would have been to have other auditors make another audit. Faults of
the audit made by defendants were not discovered until September 1937.
Another year, subsequent to the period covered by appellee’s audit, had
almost expired. In view of the fact that the statute requires that a county
audit be made annually, the time for another regular audit would soon
arrive. In the meantime, the county commissioners had secured the serv
ices of an accountant from the State Accountant’s office. Under such
circumstances, it would be unreasonable to say that the appellant was
under obligation, immediately upon the disclosures in September 1937, to
have another audit made of all county offices for 1936, and having failed
to do so it cannot recover.
T he only remaining question is whether the amount paid for the audit
is a proper measure of damages. W hat other measure could be used? On
what scales may some hypothetical residue of reliance be weighed when
confidence in an auditor’s report has been largely destroyed? We do not
say that minor inaccuracies in an audit and slight errors in an auditor’s
report may not be overlooked, nor that under some circumstances sub
stantial value from an audit may not remain in spite of its errors. But in
view of the negligence, the inaccuracies, the inexcusable failure to report
facts of serious character, found by the trial court in the instant case,
on a record which amply supports such findings, we must conclude that
the appellees failed, in a fundamental and essential particular, to furnish
the expert and faithful service which they contracted to furnish. W hether
this was due to personal fault of the appellees themselves or to that of
employees working for them is not material. As in other like situations,
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public accountants are liable for the failure of their subordinates to make
a proper audit. Ultramares Corporation v. George A. Touche, 255 N. Y.
170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139.
The general rule is that the measure of damages for defective per
formance of a contract is the difference in the value between what is
tendered as performance and what is due as performance under the
contract; and that if what is tendered is unsuitable for the purpose con
templated, the measure of damages may be the amount required to rem
edy the defect. 17 C. J. 853; Sutherland Damages, Vol. 1., p. 48. In the
instant case what was called for as performance was an audit and report
in which reliance could be placed. W hat was furnished was an audit
and report in which reliance could not be placed. In the case of City of
East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141 N. W. 181, 182, 45 L. R. A.,
N. S., 205, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 720, which involved a faulty audit and report
by public accountants, it was said;
“5. Defendants represented themselves as expert accountants, which
implied that they were skilled in that class of work. In accepting em
ployment as expert accountants, they undertook, and the plaintiff had
the right to expect, that in the performance of their duties they would
exercise the average ability and skill of those engaged in that branch
of skilled labor. They were employed to ascertain, among other things,
whether any irregularities had occurred in the financial transactions of
the city clerk, and, if so, the nature and extent of such irregularities.
If, from want of proper skill, or from negligence, they did not disclose
the true situation, they failed to perform the duty which they had as
sumed, and failed to earn the compensation which plaintiff had agreed
to pay them for the proper performance of such duty.
"6. T he work of an expert accountant is of such technical character
and requires such peculiar skill that the ordinary person cannot be ex
pected to know whether he performs his duties properly or otherwise,
but must rely upon his report as to the thoroughness and accuracy of his
work. The full contract price having been paid in the belief, induced by
defendants’ report, that such report disclosed fully and accurately the
condition of the city’s accounts, the city is entitled to recover back the
amounts so paid, upon proving that, through the incompetence or the
negligence of defendants, the report was in substance misleading and
false.”
In substantial particulars, both in what the appellees reported and in
what they failed to report, the instant audit and report were “misleading
and false,” and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount paid under
the contract.
The judgment for nominal damages only is set aside, and the case
remanded with direction to render judgment for the plaintiff in the sum
of $850 together with interest from the dates the installment payments
were made.

146

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

NATIONAL SURETY CORP. v. LYBRAND *
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1939. 256 App. Div. 226,
9 N.Y.S.2d 554

U ntermyer, J. T he plaintiff surety company maintains this action
against three firms of certified public accountants for their failure to
discover and report substantial cash shortages after auditing and examin
ing the books and accounts of Halle & Stieglitz, members of the New York
Stock Exchange. One Wallach, cashier in the main office of Halle & Stieg
litz, confessed on May 2, 1934, to defalcations over a period of years
aggregating $329,300. T he plaintiff, surety on a fidelity bond, paid the
loss to Halle & Stieglitz and now sues as its assignee.
During the period involved Halle & Stieglitz maintained about
twenty-seven bank accounts, nine of which were in New York city.
It had over 2,500 customers’ accounts, a large volume of daily transactions
and substantial bank loans. Many of the firm’s records were kept in the
“cage” of which Wallach, the cashier, had complete charge. Wallach
determined when and in what amounts to transfer funds from one bank
to another.
His system of embezzlements from about 1925 to May, 1934, consisted of
a series of abstractions from petty cash. The ever-accumulating shortage
of cash in banks was concealed by delaying and substituting bank de
posits from day to day, and, when outside audits were made, by “kiting”
checks from one bank to another on the audit date. T he effect was that
the sums covered thereby appeared in two banks at the same time. This
“lapping” or “kiting” practice resulted in a credit at the payee bank
on the same day that the check was deposited, making up a shortage
previously existing there, while the amount would not be debited at
the drawee bank until at least a day thereafter. Wallach knew when
audits were to be made and, by the use of this system, effectually con
cealed his steadily-increasing thefts for several years.
Defendant George R. Bowden & Company (referred to as Bowden)
examined the books of Halle & Stieglitz as of January 31, 1928, at which
time the cash shortage amounted to $28,350. Wallach’s subsequent thefts
amounted to $300,950.
Defendants Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery (referred to as Lybrand) made examinations as of September 30, 1929, September 30, 1930,
October 31, 1931, and September 30, 1932. The shortages existing at and
arising after those various audit dates were as follows:
Date
Sept. 30, 1929 ...........................................
Sept. 30, 1930............................................
Oct. 31, 1931............................................
Sept. 30, 1932..........................................

Shortage
$123,328.50
197,000.00
245,000.00
273,000.00

Subsequent thefts
$205,971.50
132,300.00
84,300.00
56,300.00

Defendant McHeffey & McDonough made an examination as of
November 30, 1933. The shortage then amounted to $315,000. Wallach’s
thefts between that date and the date of his confession in the first week
of May, 1934, amounted to $14,300. In all, his peculations aggregated
$329,300.
* This case is discussed at p. 22 ff. supra,
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Lybrand had made an earlier examination in 1926, as had Bowden
in 1927, but causes of action thereon were withdrawn as within the
Statute of Limitations.
The defendants are charged with failure properly to perform their
contracts to audit, with breach of warranty in their reports, with negli
gence in their work, and with fraudulently misrepresenting material
facts in their reports as to the financial condition of Halle & Stieglitz.
It is claimed that if the defendants had discovered and reported Wallach’s
misappropriations, Halle & Stieglitz would not have continued him in
their employ or sustained the subsequent losses. It is also claimed that
they might then have recovered previous losses from Wallach.
T he defendants Lybrand deny the material allegations of the com
plaint and assert that Halle & Stieglitz knew or should have known of
Wallach’s dishonesty but failed to advise the defendants of it; that the
proximate cause of the loss was the contributory negligence of Halle &
Stieglitz; that the damage was not attributable to any reasonable reliance
on the acts or omissions of these defendants; and that the defalcations
and damages were not within the contemplation of the parties to the
contracts. Bowden’s answer contains the same defenses, while that of
McHeffey & McDonough interposes only denials.
The trial course concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a case
for submission to the jury. T he first question is whether there were cir
cumstances which should have put the defendants on their guard so that
they, as professional accountants, might have ascertained the true situa
tion in the course of their investigations.
It was W allach’s practice usually to take the “kiting” checks from the
check books of the firm, but out of numerical order, so that the stubs
pertaining to the checks would appear beyond the last stub regularly
dated for the month. Then, when the check stubs for the previous months
were totaled in the check books the “kited” checks would not be in
cluded in the footings for that month.
T he circumstances surrounding “late” deposits are significant in that
the deposit was often constituted differently than reflected in the books
of the firm. For example, the deposit book would disclose the deposit of
several individual items, and although the total sum would be deposited
in the bank it would consist of a different num ber of checks in different
amounts and usually drawn by different makers. This practice developed
because it was a part of W allach’s system to place a customer’s check in
the petty cash box, instead of immediately depositing it, then extract from
the petty cash the amount of that check in cash, and deposit the check
in the bank one or more days later. The accumulating shortage in that
bank would then be covered by the deposit of a check or checks drawn
on another of the firm’s banks for the amount necessary to conceal the
shortage. At times Wallach would make up the aggregate of the shortage
by depositing his own check along with the checks of others.
The difference between the items on deposit slips and the entries in
the deposit books was never observed. T he bookkeeping department of
Halle & Stieglitz is blamed by the defendants for allowing this to remain
unnoticed and unchallenged. Yet these accountants themselves appar
ently never undertook to examine the deposit slips, which were retained
by the several banks, nor to obtain duplicates thereof.
Another office custom of Halle & Stieglitz is criticized by the defend
ants. Memoranda were prepared in pencil by the bookkeeping depart
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ment intended to show daily bank balances or the cash totals which the
firm was supposed to have in banks. These memoranda would be given
to Wallach, who would change the amounts so as to reflect approximately
the actual amount of cash in banks. However, these slips were not per
manent records. They were information memoranda used solely for the
consideration of bank loans. As they were immediately destroyed they
could not have been the basis for a check-up of cash shortages. The de
fendants otherwise charge Halle & Stieglitz with carelessness in the con
duct of their bookkeeping department, but there is no evidence that this
firm differed in its office practice from that of other Wall Street brokers
or that the defendants ever made any suggestions relating thereto.
During the years of Wallach’s pilferings one or the other of the de
fendant firms of certified public accountants was employed by Halle &
Stieglitz to make audits which included the verification of cash. For
the audit of January 31, 1928, Bowen received fees of $2,800. He specifi
cally reported to Halle & Stieglitz that they had on that date a balance
in Guaranty T rust Company of $73,109.20 and in Hanover National
Bank of $185,708.17, when in fact the balances were $72,829.20 and $157,
638.17, respectively. The shortages in those two bank accounts, aggre
gating $28,350, were concealed by delayed deposits recorded January 31,
1928, but actually made February first with substituted items.
Djorup, plaintiff’s expert, testified that comparison of the bank state
ments and the deposit books showed a number of delayed deposits be
tween January 14, 1928, and February 4, 1928. T he late deposits, before
and after the audit date, range as high as $33,684.70, with delays varying
from one to three business days. W ith respect to late deposits, this wit
ness testified that he would have checked the larger items among them by
obtaining the deposit slips. It is apparent that inquiries at the time of
audit might have revealed the shortages.
Bowden, who rested his case without proof, contends that he did not
undertake to verify the bank accounts. His report indicates no such
limitation. On the contrary, his balance sheet clearly separates cash in
banks and on hand and cash borrowed from customers’ accounts. It con
tains the various bank balances, and cash in banks is listed among assets
as amounting to $522,719.69. Even if the words “verify” and “verifica
tion” are not used, the fact of verification follows from the specific state
ment of the balances and total cash.
T he Lybrand firm, in contrast to Bowden, concedes that their engage
ments for the 1929, 1930, 1931 and 1932 audits included the verification
of cash. The arrangements for the 1929 and 1930 examinations were in
writing, it being stated that the examination was to be “along the lines
followed by us in prior audits of your accounts” and would embrace “the
verification of cash, securities, customers’ accounts, etc., without verifica
tion of income and expense accounts or the preparation of the question
n a ire of the N ew Y ork Stock E x change.” T h e arrangem ents for the 1931
and 1932 examinations were oral and followed the scope of the two
previous years. For the four years involved, 1929 to 1932, inclusive,
Lybrand received fees of $11,000, $5,000, $2,850 and $2,400 respectively.
The cash shortage on September 30, 1929, amounting to $123,328.50,
was concealed by four checks in the amounts of $13,000, $10,000, $100,000
and $328.50. The first three of these checks were taken from the stubs
of October first. All were deposited October 1, 1929, to take the place
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of a deposit of same amount, though of different items, recorded in the
books on September thirtieth.
The shortage on September 30, 1930, of $197,000 was concealed by
two checks for $102,000 and $95,000, which were drawn from stubs of
October first, but deposited in the Guaranty T rust Company on Septem
ber thirtieth.
On October 31, 1931, the shortage amounted to $245,000. The method
of concealment was a deposit of $245,023.11 recorded October thirtieth
and actually made October thirty-first with substituted items, including
two checks for $120,000 and $125,000, respectively, which were drawn
from stubs of November 2, 1931.
On September 30, 1932, with intervening defalcations of $28,000, the
shortage had increased to $273,000. It was concealed by two checks of
Halle & Stieglitz for $138,000 and $135,000 drawn on National City Bank
and Commercial National Bank, respectively, representing the exact
amount of the shortage. They had been taken out of numerical order
from check stubs which were later dated October 3, 1932, and were
deposited in Guaranty T rust Company on September 30, 1932.
Throughout these years there were continual lapped and delayed
deposits, and instances of substitution of deposited items. These, plaintiff
insists, are well-known danger signals to skilled auditors, but were dis
regarded or not recognized by the defendants, who never requested dupli
cate deposit slips, never pointed out late deposits or bank transfers, nor
made any suggestion to Halle & Stieglitz as to their methods relative to
cash, yet charge Halle & Stieglitz with negligence in the failure to make
investigations which are within the ordinary realm of professional ac
countants. The defendants say Halle & Stieglitz were negligent in failing
to observe the differences between the details of the deposits actually
made and those recorded in the books during the periods when Halle &
Stieglitz made their reconciliations of bank accounts. T he employees of
Halle & Stieglitz who made such reconciliations were not auditors skilled
in their profession, and their methods were purely mechanical checking
to arrive at an arithmetical balance. T he defendants’ employment, how
ever, was the verification of the sums then actually on deposit in the banks.
Aside from accepting the engagement and reviewing the report, the
Lybrand partners did not participate in the audits. T heir employees
were supervised by a senior accountant who made assignments and gave
instructions. T he only Lybrand employee who “verified” the cash in
banks was the witness Brushaber, who was called by the plaintiff. Bru
shaber had not listed “Transfers between banks” on previous audits, but
he made such a list during the period covered by his reconciliation in
1932 and was examined in connection therewith. However, even after
compiling such a list, Lybrand’s employee either disregarded the very
items which had become Wallach’s expedient in concealing his defalca
tions or did not understand their significance. T he plaintiff asserts that
the procedure followed was mere mechanical routine, with no attempt
to guard against the use of checks drawn from the check book out of
numerical order and beyond the last check of the current month; that no
notice was taken of delayed deposits nor effort made to guard against
“lapped” deposits or “kited” checks; that Brushaber did nothing on
the audit dates to ascertain the last checks drawn by Halle & Stieglitz
for the previous month.
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For the audit of November 30, 1933, McHeffey & McDonough received
fees of $2,000. T he shortage had then reached the sum of $315,000 and
was concealed by two checks for $150,000 and $165,000 drawn on National
City Bank and Commercial National Bank, respectively, the total cover
ing the exact amount of cash defalcations to that date. These two checks
were taken from the stubs of December first, but were deposited in the
Guaranty T rust Company on November twenty-ninth, the deposits being
recorded as made on December first.
On May 3, 1934, after Wallach had confessed his thefts, McHeffey
& McDonough were employed to verify the defalcations and later sub
mitted a detailed report showing the accumulation of the loss over a
period of years. T he account with Guaranty T rust Company was then
short a total of $329,300.
In a letter written by defendant McHeffey & McDonough on November
8, 1933, they stated that “the details of our audit will include: * * * 6.
Verification of Bank Balances.” They contend that their report is dis
tinguished from the report of the other defendants in that there was no
delayed deposit on the audit date. T he plaintiff concedes that there was
no delayed deposit between November 29 and December 1, 1933, but
there was a deposit of the two “kited” checks of $150,000 and $165,000,
above referred to, for which no entry appeared in the deposit book. The
only items corresponding in amount were entered on December first.
Furthermore, there are instances of substantial delayed deposits in the
latter part of November, 1933, and later, investigation of any of which
would have disclosed that the shortage was then being concealed by
“lapping.”
McHeffey & McDonough also contend that they are exonerated because,
notwithstanding the shortage, Halle & Stieglitz retained them to verify
the amount of defalcations and to prepare a claim against the surety.
T he subsequent employment, however, did not condone any prior negli
gence of these defendants. T he purpose was solely to verify the shortage
and fix the dates of its occurrence. Except for the expert, Klein, who
was called by Lybrand, the defendants “rested without calling any wit
nesses, although there would naturally be available the men who made
the audit, those who prepared or supervised the preparation of the work
ing papers or the certified balance sheet and experts to refute the testi
mony offered by the experts called by plaintiff.” (State Street Trust Co. v.
Ernst. 278 N. Y. 104, 111.)
It is contended that the defendants’ engagements called for only partial
examinations, of limited scope and nature, and that the fees were fixed
accordingly. Conceding that the audits and examinations were limited
in scope, the loss here did not involve bank loans, customers’ accounts,
partners’ accounts, expense accounts or other liabilities. It resulted from
a shortage of cash in banks due to pilferings of petty cash. T he question,
then, is whether the defendants’ duty was performed by a mere book
reconciliation of cash or whether it did not require the ascertainment
of the actual cash in bank.
It is undisputed that cash in bank can be verified absolutely. T he con
tracts for the services of the defendants were plain and their engagements
required the exercise of reasonable skill and diligence in making an actual
determination of the cash position of Halle & Stieglitz and not a mere
arithmetical bookkeeping computation. W hen they accepted the employ
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ment, though it may be at a low rate of compensation, they assumed the
risk of non-performance of contracts contemplating actual verification of
cash in banks.
T o “verify” as defined in Corpus Juris, volume 67, page 230, is to “as
certain to be correct; * * * to confirm or establish the truth of.” In
Dicksee’s Manual on Auditing (Am. ed. 1909), edited by Robert H.
Montgomery, one of the defendants herein, it is said (p. 40): “A list of
cheques outstanding should be retained, and it should be ascertained
afterwards, either by a second writing up of the pass book or by inquiry
of the bank, whether the amounts agree. If the time of the proposed
audit is known, fraud may easily be committed and the cash inflated by
drawing a cheque at the last moment which will be ‘outstanding.’ ”
In Montgomery’s own treatise on “Auditing—Theory and Practice”
(1912), he says (p. 94): “When the cash balance consists of several bank
accounts or funds, care must be taken to see that the entire balance is
verified simultaneously. Instances are known where auditors have been
deceived through one balance, after being inspected, having been trans
ferred and used on a later day in connection with another balance.”
Safeguards against fraud are discussed in Bell and Powelson on Audit
ing (1932), at page 71:
“T he reason for thus testing individual deposits, and especially the
composition thereof, is to detect any evidence of temporary misappropria
tions of cash which have been restored, or of the somewhat similar form
of fraud known as ‘kiting,’ which involves a series of unauthorized ‘bor
rowings,’ one being used to repay the other. * * *
“W hen there is more than one bank account, a test should always be
made of deposits during the last days of the audit period. The particular
purpose of this is to detect a deposit in one bank of an unrecorded check
on another bank to conceal a shortage in the first bank, which check
cannot reach the second bank in time to be charged by it in the audit
period and will not appear as outstanding.”
And (at p. 73) it is said: “For the same reason that all checks supposed
to have been issued should be accounted for, it is necessary, so tar as
practicable, to determine that none have been issued which were not
supposed to have been. Knowing that all current numbers of checks
would be accounted for by the auditor, the person desiring to issue a
fraudulent check would be likely to use one that was not current. For
that reason, the auditor should see that no checks have been abstracted
from the back of the check book, if they are in book form.”
The extent of an accountant’s duty is well defined in M atter of London
& General Bank (L. R. [1895] 2 Ch. 673, 682). Not only must he examine
the books but, if that be his contract, he must satisfy himself with reason
able diligence that the books “show the true financial position of the
company.”
T he evidence in this case discloses similar conditions at the time
of all the audits in question. It was for the jury to say whether the
practice of “lapping” and “kiting” of checks should have put the defend
ants upon inquiry which would have led to discovery of the defalcations,
and whether, if defendants had exercised ordinary care and used proper
methods of accounting as established by the expert testimony, they would
have observed checks drawn out of numerical order. If they had checked
“outstandings” they would have noted that the check or checks used by
Wallach at the audit dates were returned with the canceled vouchers
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accompanying the next bank statement. Again, if there had been any
substantial compliance with the requirements for verifying cash in
banks the cash shortages would have been detected, as the jury might
have found. T heir representations that there had been a verification of
cash was a pretense of knowledge when they did not know the condition
of the bank accounts and had no reasonable basis to assume that they did.
This, the jury could have found, amounted at least to a constructive
fraud. (UItramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 190, 191; State Street
Trust Co. v. Ernst, supra, p. 112.)
The defendants assert that they are not liable, no m atter how negli
gent they may have been, because Halle & Stieglitz were guilty of con
tributory negligence. If it be true that Halle & Stieglitz so conducted
their business as to make possible W allach’s defalcations, it did not nec
essarily excuse the defendants from the consequences of their negligence
in failing to discover and report the facts. T he action here, it must be
remembered, is not to recover for the thefts committed by Wallach as it
would be if it were against Wallach or against the surety. The action
is for errors of the accountants in failing to discover Wallach’s defalca
tions, thereby making further defalcations possible and rendering more
difficult recovery for defalcations of the past. T he measure of damages in
two such classes of actions is not the same.
We are, therefore, not prepared to admit that accountants are immune
from the consequences of their negligence because those who employ them
have conducted their own business negligently. T he situation in this
respect is not unlike that of a workman injured by a dangerous condition
which he has been employed to rectify. (Kowalsky v. Conreco Company,
264 N. Y. 125.) Accountants, as we know, are commonly employed for
the very purpose of detecting defalcations which the employer’s negligence
has made possible. Accordingly, we see no reason to hold that the ac
countant is not liable to his employer in such cases. Negligence of the
employer is a defense only when it has contributed to the accountant’s
failure to perform his contract and to report the truth. Thus, by way
of illustration, if it were found that the members of the firm of Halle &
Stieglitz had been negligent in connection with the transfer of funds
which occurred at about the time of each audit and that such negligence
contributed to the defendants’ false reports, it would be a defense to the
action, for it could then be said that the defendants’ failure to perform
their contracts was attributable, in part, at least, to the negligent con
duct of the firm. T h at was the principle applied in Craig v. Anyon (212
App. Div. 55; affd., 242 N. Y. 569) where the embezzler had been negli
gently represented to the accountants as a person to be trusted. In the
present case the loss consisted of thefts by a cashier not so represented
“whose own account of his receipts and payments could not reasonably
be taken by an auditor without further inquiry.” (Matter of Kingston
Cotton M ill Co. [No. 2], L. R. [1896] 2 Ch. Div. 279.)
We are, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiff established a prima
facie case. T he question of the defendants’ liability on the various theo
ries set forth in the complaint should have been submitted to the jury.
It was also for the jury to say whether the defendants were liable for
defalcations subsequent to their audits, depending upon whether such
losses could reasonably have been anticipated at the time they were en
gaged in the performance of the work. (Critten n. Chemical National
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Bank, 171 N. Y. 219; Smith n. London Assurance Corp., 109 App. Div.
882.)
It may be prudent, though perhaps unnecessary, to say that we have
stated the facts as they might have been found if the case had been sub
mitted to the jury. We do this because, the complaint having been dis
missed, the plaintiff is entitled to the most favorable inferences fairly
to be drawn from the evidence. We do not intend to suggest that the facts,
as we have stated them, would have been accepted by the jury or that
upon a new trial other facts may not appear. We merely hold that on
the present record the issues of fact, including negligence and contribu
tory negligence, were for the jury.
[Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.]

DANTZLER LUMBER & EXPORT CO. v.
COLUMBIA CASUALTY CO.*
Supreme Court of Florida, 1934. 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116.

B uford, Justice. We adopt the statement of the case as presented by
counsel for respective parties.
The appellee, Columbia Casualty Company, filed bill of complaint
against the appellants, Dantzler Lumber & Export Company, a Florida
Corporation, L. N. Dantzler, Jr., and Alvin C. Ernst, Lester W. Blyth,
Harry C. Royal, and Forrest H. Figsby, copartners doing business under
the firm name of Ernst & Ernst.
Summarized, the bill of complaint alleged:
(a) T h at the Columbia Casualty Company is a corporation organized
under the laws of the state of New York, and authorized to do business in
the state of Florida, as a surety company for compensation.
(b) T h a t Dantzler Lumber & Export Company is a corporation organ
ized under the laws of Florida, engaged in the lumber export business at
Tampa, Hillsborough county, Fla.
(c) T h at L. N. Dantzler, Jr., is vice president and treasurer of Dantz
ler Lumber & Export Company, and resides at Tam pa, Hillsborough
county, Fla.
(d) T h a t Ernst 8c Ernst is a copartnership composed of the persons
named in the bill, all of the members of the copartnership being non
residents of the state of Florida; said copartnership being engaged in
business as public accountants and maintaining an office in the state of
Florida.
(e) T h at Ernst 8c Ernst contracted with Dantzler Lumber 8c Export
Company to make annual audits of books and accounts of said company,
and did make audits of said books and accounts for the period from
September 20, 1926, to August 7, 1931, and reported said audits of the
books and accounts to said Dantzler Lumber 8c Export Company, said
audits being made at or near the end of each calendar year, and that said
audits were made by auditors or accountants in the employ of said Ernst
8c Ernst, and that said auditors were unrestricted in making and reporting
said annual audits, and were required to make complete and detailed
* See footnote 36 supra.
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audits and reports, and were under agreement with said Dantzler Lumber
& Export Company to make examination of all cash transactions for the
period covered by each audit, including inspection of vouchers and other
supporting data.
(f) T h at one W. Frank Alderman was employed as bookkeeper by
Dantzler Lumber & Export Company during the period above mentioned,
and that said Alderman, by means of issuing certain checks against the
bank accounts of said Dantzler Lumber & Export Company fraudulently
obtained possession of and embezzled moneys of said Dantzler Lumber &
Export Company to the aggregate amount of $39,425.61; that of said sum
$1,670.09 was embezzled during the year 1927, $4,716.62 in the year 1928,
$15,670.70 in the year 1929, $8,693.20 in the year 1930, and $8,675 in the
year 1931.
(g) T h at said Ernst & Ernst was negligent and careless in making its
audits of the books and accounts of said Dantzler Lumber & Export
Company, and that by the exercise of due care, caution, and vigilance, as
they were in duty bound to do, they would have discovered the embezzle
ment, that it was the duty of said auditors, pursuant to their contract of
employment, to examine every cash transaction and to investigate sup
porting data, and that, had said auditors, in making said audits, examined
the cash transactions wherein the cash above mentioned as withdrawn
by said Alderman by the checks above mentioned, with due care and
accuracy required of auditors, and pursuant to their contract of employ
ment, the embezzlement committed by Alderman would have been dis
covered at the time of the audit in 1927, which would have terminated the
said embezzlements and resulted in a loss of only $1,670.09, which was
the amount of the embezzlement committed by said Alderman prior to the
1927 audit, but that, through the failure of said Ernst & Ernst to use due
care and vigilance, and to properly perform their contract to examine all
cash transactions and supporting data and report the same in their annual
audits, the said embezzlements committed by the said Alderman were not
discovered and were permitted to continue until August, 1931, during
which time the amount of the embezzlements so committed by the said
Alderman aggregated the sum of $39,425.61.
(h) It is further alleged in the bill that in each report of the audit of
the books and accounts of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company by Ernst
& Ernst, commencing the year 1927 and continuing through succeeding
years including 1930, it was certified by the auditors that “all record cash
receipts for the year under review were traced directly into the bank
deposits and disbursements through the bank account were verified by an
examination of said checks, invoices or other supporting data on file.”
It is alleged that, had the auditors compared the checks with the invoices
and other supporting data, it would have been found that Alderman was
wrongfully and fraudulently withdrawing the money from his employer,
Dantzler Lumber & Export Company, from the bank account on checks
made payable to “Yourselves,” and that said checks were cashed by the
paying teller of the bank; that a careful, reasonable, and intelligent audit
of said accounts and the tracing of said checks would have disclosed that
there was no supporting data for them and that they were not connected
with any business transactions of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company;
that Dantzler Lumber & Export Company relied upon the accuracy of
said auditors’ reports and believed them to have been made in good faith
as stated therein; that, had the auditors, Ernst & Ernst, made the examina
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tion it reported to Dantzler Lumber & Export Company it had made, the
defalcation of Alderman would have been discovered, Alderman would
have been discharged and further loss obviated. And it is alleged that
by and through the fraud of Ernst & Ernst the Dantzler Lumber & Export
Company sustained losses in the approximate sum of $37,755.52 in excess
of that occurring prior to the time of the first audit in 1927 when the
defalcation should have been discovered and disclosed.
(i) T h at the Columbia Casualty Company had executed a surety bond
in the sum of $10,000, payable to said Dantzler Lumber & Export Com
pany, protecting said Dantzler Lumber & Export Company against loss
through embezzlements by certain of its employees, including the said
Alderman, and that, in accordance with the terms of its bond, for the
making of which it received an annual premium of $75 from Dantzler
Lumber & Export Company, it responded to its said liability and paid
the full penalty of said bond, to wit, the sum of $10,000, to said Dantzler
Lumber & Export Company, whereas, if the said embezzlements had been
discovered by said auditors at the end of the year 1927, as the bill charges
should have been done if said auditors had exercised due diligence and
had not been careless in the performance of their contract, the liability
of said Columbia Casualty Company on its bond would have been limited
to said sum of $1,670.09, being the total of the embezzlements committed
by the said Alderman up to that time.
(j) That, at the time of making payment of the amount of its bond
to Dantzler Lumber & Export Company, it notified said Dantzler Lumber
& Export Company and said Ernst & Ernst that it made claim against said
Ernst & Ernst for reimbursement to it of the loss so sustained by it, and
that it would claim to be subrogated to the rights of Dantzler Lumber &
Export Company to the extent of the payment so made by it against said
Ernst & Ernst, and warned said Dantzler Lumber & Export Company and
said Ernst & Ernst against making any settlement between themselves
without taking into consideration and providing for reimbursement to
said Columbia Casualty Company for its said loss.
(k) T he bill further alleges that, disregarding the notices so given,
said Dantzler Lumber & Export Company and Ernst & Ernst settled and
adjusted the claim which Dantzler Lumber & Export Company made
against Ernst 8c Ernst for a sum of money unknown to Columbia Casualty
Company, but that said settlement was made by way of compromise for
less than the total claim, and that Dantzler Lumber & Export Company
and Ernst & Ernst have refused to disclose to Columbia Casualty Com
pany the nature and terms of said settlement and the amount of money
paid in settlement of said claim.
T he bill prays that Dantzler Lumber & Export Company and N. L.
Dantzler, Jr., be required to make answer to certain interrogatories pro
pounded by the bill, and disclose whether or not settlement of the claim
of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company against Ernst & Ernst was made,
and, if so, the amount of the settlement. Certain other interrogatories
are propounded by the bill which are not of material importance on this
appeal.
T he bill prayed that Columbia Casualty Company be decreed to be
subrogated to the rights and claims of Dantzler Lumber & Export Com
pany against Ernst & Ernst as to all liability of Ernst & Ernst to Dantzler
Lumber & Export Company on account of the loss sustained by reason
of the alleged neglect of Ernst & Ernst as set forth in the bill to the extent
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of the loss sustained by Columbia Casualty Company and that the persons
constituting the copartnership of Ernst & Ernst be decreed to pay to
Columbia Casualty Company such sums as might be found to be due upon
an accounting.
T he defendants in the court below filed motion to dismiss. T he motion
was overruled, and appeal was entered.
Appellants have filed their assignments in error, being four in number.
T he assignments of error present for our determination two questions:
First, Did the bill of complaint set forth a statement of facts showing
liability of the appellant copartnership Ernst & Ernst to the appellant
Dantzler Lumber & Export Company? If that question is answered in
the affirmative, the second question is: “Did the bill show a right in the
appellee Columbia Casualty Company to subrogate pro tanto to the rights
of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company against Ernst & Ernst?” If this
question is also answered in the affirmative, then order appealed from
should be affirmed.
T he allegations of the bill are sufficient to show that the firm of Ernst
& Ernst carried on a business in the state of Florida of accounting and
auditing; that as such accountants and auditors they undertook to make
annual audits of the books and accounts of Dantzler Lumber & Export
Company, and in pursuance of such undertaking they made an audit of
the books and accounts of that corporation from 1927 until 1930, inclu
sive. It alleges that a careful and proper audit of the books and accounts
would have shown that Alderman embezzled $1,670.09 in 1927, $4,716.62
in 1928, $15,670.70 in 1929, $8,693.20 in 1930, and $8,675 in 1931.
T he allegations are sufficient to show that Ernst & Ernst negligently
and fraudulently misrepresented the financial condition of the business
and the status of the accoqnts of Dantzler Lumber & Export Company in
each and every of the reports of audits made. Public accountants and
auditors hold themselves out to be skilled and competent to perform the
duties and services which they undertake to perform as accountants and
auditors, and they are bound in law to perform such services in an accurate
and skillful manner. W hen auditors and accountants are employed for
the purpose of auditing books and accounts they occupy a relation of
trust and confidence to their employer based up on the superior knowledge
of the business of accounting and auditing possessed by the auditors and
accountants.
T he bill of complaint presents a case of gross negligence if not of legal
fraud on the part of the accountants in the performance of their services.
It alleges a loss by reason of such negligence and therefore the right of
action ex delicto, notwithstanding the injury complained of might also
be ground for action ex contractu. T he action here is not for mere non
performance, but it is based upon an alleged breach of duty to skillfully
perform and truly report the condition of accounts, in reporting a condi
tion which did not in truth and in fact exist and the true status of which
could and would have been discovered and disclosed by a careful, skillful,
and proper audit of the books of account.
In 26 R. C. L. 758, it is said:
“Whenever a negligent breach of a contract is also a violation of a com
mon law duty, an action ex delicto will lie. Accompanying every contract
is a common law duty to perform the thing agreed to be done with care,
skill, reasonable expediency, and faithfulness, and a negligent failure to
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observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract.
If the transaction complained of had its origin in a contract which placed
the parties in such a relation that in attempting to perform the promised
service the tort was committed, then the breach of the contract is not the
gravamen of the suit. The contract in such case is mere inducement,
creating the state of things which furnishes the occasion of the tort. And
in all such cases the remedy is an action on the case. Based on the prin
ciple above indicated, the firmly established rule is that for injuries re
sulting from the unskilful or otherwise negligent performance of a thing
agreed to be done, an action ex delicto will lie, notwithstanding the act
complained of would also be ground for an action ex contractu.”
In 45 C. J. 1093, it is said:
“In an action ex delicto for negligence in the performance of a con
tract, the fact of negligence must be alleged as in other cases of negligence,
and an allegation only of a breach of a contractual duty is not sufficient,
although it describes such breach as negligence. As an element of such
allegation facts should be averred to show the contractual relation be
tween the parties and the consequent duty owing by defendant to plaintiff;
and, when necessary for this purpose the contract out of which such duty
and the consequent negligence arose should be stated, although it is not
necessary to allege the terms of the contract in detail.”
In Smith et al. v. London Assurance Corporation, 109 App. Div. 882,
96 N. Y. S. 820, the court held:
“Where public accountants were employed on the express agreement
that they should frequently check the defendant’s cash account in one
branch of its business and verify the items thereon, and they negligently
and willfully failed to do so, and on account of such failure its cashier
was enabled to embezzle large amounts of money, they were liable for
the sums embezzled.”
In Banfield et ux. v. Addington et ux., 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893, 895,
we quoted with approval from Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Randall, 74 Ala.
170, saying:
“Wherever there is carelessness, recklessness, want of reasonable skill,
or the violation or disregard of a duty which the law implies from the
conditions or attendant circumstances, and individual injury results there
from, an action on the case lies in favor of the party injured; and if the
transaction had its origin in a contract, which places the parties in such
relation as that, in performing or attempting to perform the service
promised, the tort or wrong is committed, then the breach of the contract
is not the gravamen of the suit. There may be no technical breach of the
letter of the contract. The contract, in such case, is mere inducement, and
should be so stated in pleading. It induces, causes, creates the conditions
or state of things, which furnishes the occasion of the tort. T he wrongful
act, outside of the letter of the contract, is the gravamen of the complaint;
and in all such cases, the remedy is an action on the case.”
I n th a t same o p in io n , we also said:

“The reason for this is the firmly established rule that for injuries re
sulting from the unskilled or otherwise negligent performance of a thing
agreed to be done, an action ex delicto will lie, notwithstanding the injury
complained of would also be ground for an action ex contractu. In such
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cases the distinction made is that the action ex delicto can be maintained
where the action is founded on something more than mere nonfeasance
in the performance of an alleged contract.”
Numerous cases are there cited to support this enunciation which is
known as the American Rule, as distinguished from the English Rule
which prevails in some jurisdictions.
We therefore answer the first question in the affirmative.
As to the nature and doctrine of subrogation, in 25 R. C. L. 1313, it
is said:
“T he doctrine of subrogation is generally considered to have been
derived, and the term itself borrowed, from the civil law, though some
authorities regard the Roman Law as its source. However this may be,
it has long been an established branch of equity jurisprudence. It does
not owe its origin to statute or custom, but it is a creature of courts of
equity, having for its basis the doing of complete and perfect justice
between the parties without regard to form. It is a doctrine, therefore,
which will be applied or not according to the dictates of equity and good
conscience, and considerations of public policy, and will be allowed in
all cases where the equities of the case demand it. It rests upon the
maxim that no one shall be enriched by another’s loss, and may be in
voked wherever justice demands its application, in opposition to the
technical rules of law which liberate, securities with the extinguishment
of the original debt. T he right to it depends upon the facts and circum
stances of each particular case, and to which must be applied the prin
ciples of justice. In the administration of relief by subrogation, it will be
found that the jurisdiction of equity rests largely on the prevention of
frauds and on relief against mistakes; and the expression of the rule has
so nearly covered the field that it may now be said that, wherever a court
of equity will relieve against a transaction, it will do so by the remedy of
subrogation, if that be the most efficient and complete that can be
afforded.”
O ur court is committed to a liberal application of the rule of equit
able subrogation. See Federal Land Bank n. Dekle, 108 Fla. 555, 148 So.
756, and cases there cited.
In 25 R. C. L. 1316, it is said:
“Subrogation is a consequence which equity jurisprudence attaches to
certain conditions. The parties may not have contracted for it either
expressly or by legal implication; but if, in the performance of that con
tract which they did make, certain conditions have resulted which make
it necessary for equity to interpose its authority in this respect, it will do
so, provided that in so doing it will violate no law and not alter the
contract. It is accordingly the universal rule that the right of legal subro
gation need not rest upon any formal contract or written agreement, nor
does it follow from any fixed law; but it exists on principles of mere equity
and benevolence, and is founded on the relationship of the parties.”
In the same volume (page 1372), it is said:
“One who has indemnified another in pursuance of his obligations
so to do succeeds to, and is entitled to, a cession of all the means of redress
held by the party indemnified against the party who has occasioned the
loss. Thus the rule is well settled in fire insurance as well as in marine in
surance, that the insurer, upon paying to the assured the amount of a
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loss on the property insured, is subrogated in a corresponding amount to
the assured’s right of action against any other person responsible for the
loss; this right of the insurer against such other person not resting upon
any relation of contract or of privity between them, but arising out of the
nature of the contract of insurance as a contract of indemnity, derived
from the assured alone, and enforceable in his right only.”
T o like effect is 33 C. J. 43.
In Chickasaw County Farmers’ M utual Fire Insurance Co. v. Weller,
98 Iowa, 731, 68 N. W. 443, it was held:
“Payment by a fire insurance company of a claim for property destroyed
by the negligence of a railroad company, is not voluntary, and may be
recovered back, where the insured had previously made a settlement with
the railroad company, receiving payment in full, which fact he concealed
from the insurance company, although the latter knew that he was making
a claim against the railroad company.
“One who has ben paid by a railroad company, the full value of prop
erty destroyed by its negligence, cannot recover insurance on such prop
erty, as the insurance company would be entitled to be subrogated to the
rights of the insured to recover from the railroad company.”
In Joyce on Insurance (2d Ed.) vol. 5, p. 5888, § 3544, the writer says:
“If third parties who may be liable to the insured for the loss effect a
settlement with the latter and obtain a release from all liability, and this
is done with knowledge of the fact that the insurers have already paid
to the insured the amount of their liability to him, such settlement and
release will in no way affect the insurer’s right of subrogation as against
such third parties, since the settlement and release will be in fraud of the
insurer’s rights, and consequently void.”
In 14 R. C. L. 1404, it is said:
“On payment of a loss the insurer acquires the right to be subrogated
pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against any
third person whose wrongful act or neglect caused the loss. This right in
cludes the subrogation of the insurer to any cause of action which the
insured has against a carrier whose failure of duty caused the loss, as the
carrier is primarily and the insurer only secondly liable, and the insurer
also is subrogated to the property owner’s statutory right of recovery
against a railroad company for setting out fire by the operation of its road.
Likewise an insurer of internal revenue stamps may recover, in the name
of the owner, from the government for their loss. T he insurer is sub
rogated only to such rights as the insured possessed, and the right of the
insurer against the wrongdoer may be defeated by the act of the insured,
prior to the loss, or even after the loss, in releasing the wrongdoer from
any liability or giving him the benefit of any insurance, or by a recovery
of the amount of the loss by the insured, unless, in the case of a release
after loss, the wrongdoer settles with the insured with full knowledge of
the insurer’s right of subrogation.”
T o like effect in C ooley’s Briefs on In su ran ce (2d Ed.) vol. 7, p. 6713.

It therefore appears that the allegations of the bill of complaint are
sufficient to constitute the basis for a suit to enforce subrogation.
We have examined and considered the argument and authorities cited
in brief for plaintiff in error, but we hold that the authorities herein cited
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enunciate the law as it is in this jurisdiction, and therefore, we answer
the second question also in the affirmative.
T he contention is made that the appellants have the right to trial
by jury as to the rights of parties. T he contention is not tenable for the
reason that subrogation is a m atter of equitable cognizance, and, aside
from this, the bill of complaint seeks discovery of the terms, amount, and
condition of the settlement had between the appellants. It was therefore
necessary for the appellee to seek its relief in a court of equity. T he court
of equity, having acquired jurisdiction to determine rights cognizable
in equity between the parties, it will reach out and draw unto its considera
tion and determination the entire subject-matter bringing before it all the
parties interested therein and will retain such jurisdiction until all mat
ters involved in litigation between the parties or growing out of and
connected with the subject-matter of the suit are fully disposed of. See
Hitchcolk v. Mortgage Securities Corporation, 95 Fla. 147, 116 So. 244,
and cases there cited.
In Norris et ux. v. Eikenberry, 103 Fla. 104, 137 So. 128, 130, we said:
“W hile a court of equity, having once obtained jurisdiction of a cause,
will retain it for all purposes and administer complete relief, yet, in order
to authorize relief which can be obtained in a suit at law, there must be
some substantial ground of equitable jurisdiction both alleged and
proven; otherwise, a court of equity will not retain jurisdiction and grant
a purely legal remedy.”
As we have heretofore indicated, “Subrogation is a consequence which
equity jurisprudence attaches to certain conditions. T he parties may not
have contracted for it either expressly or by legal implication, but if in
the performance of that contract which they did make, certain conditions
have resulted which make it necessary for equity to interpose its authority
in this respect it will do so.” It may be said to be the universal rule “that
the right to legal subrogation need not rest upon any formal contract or
written agreement, nor does it follow from any fixed law, but it exists
on principles of mere equity and benevolence and is founded on relation
ship of the parties.” It therefore appears that it was not necessary that
there should have been any privity between Columbia Casualty Company
and Ernst & Ernst to create the liability of Ernst & Ernst under the prin
ciple of equitable subrogation to Columbia Casualty Company. It appears
to be also well settled that “the insurer upon paying to the insured the
amount of loss, is subrogated in a corresponding amount to the assured’s
right of action against any other person responsible for the loss.” This
right of insured against such other person does not rest upon any relation
of contract or privity between the insurer and such other person, but it
arises out of the nature of the contract of insurance as a contract of in
demnity, and, being derived from the contract with the insured alone, it
is enforceable in his right only. See 25 R. C. L. p. 1372, and cases there
cited. See, also, 33 C. J. 43; also Chickasaw County Farmers’ M utual Fire
Ins. Co. v. Weller, supra; 14 R. C. L. 1404.
Columbia Casualty Company’s right to recover rests upon principles
of subrogation, and only by the enforcement of its right to subrogation
may it recover. T he m atter of enforcing subrogation is of equitable cog
nizance.
It therefore appears that, inasmuch as the bill of complaint contains
sufficient allegations to show that the complainant in the court below was
entitled to an accounting because of funds having been received by
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Dantzler Lumber & Export Company from Ernst & Ernst and that the
bill of complaint also contains sufficient allegations to show that the
insurer has the right to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action
which the insured may have had against Ernst & Ernst, whose alleged
wrongful act or negligence caused the loss, the bill is not without equity.
For the reasons stated, the order appealed from should be affirmed. It
is so ordered.
Affirmed.
E llis and T errell, JJ., concur.
Davis, C. J., and W hitfield, J., concur in part and dissent in part.
Brown, J., dissents.
D avis, Chief Justice (concurring in part; dissenting in part).
There was a general motion to dismiss for want of equity in the bill,
which was overruled. Since that motion is the equivalent of a general
demurrer and there is equity in the bill, in my opinion, at least to the
extent of the discovery sought against Dantzler Lumber & Export Com
pany, I concur in the result which is an affirmance of the order from which
this appeal is taken.
But there is no justification in law, as I see it, for holding that, in a
case of this kind, the alleged tort-feasor’s right to a jury trial of a tort
action can be defeated by the fact that the right sought to be enforced
by plaintiff is a subrogated right and not the original right. O ur own
cases so hold. See Atlantic Coast Line R . Co. n. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274,
139 So. 886. Compare Royal Indem nity Co. v. Knott, 101 Fla. 1495, 1502,
136 So. 474.
If a tort was committed by the negligent audit of the Dantzler Lumber
& Export Company’s books by Ernst & Ernst as alleged, it gave rise to a
legal right to a tort action by Dantzler Lumber & Export Company against
Ernst & Ernst. On that tort action Ernst & Ernst are constitutionally en
titled to a jury trial. T heir right to a trial by jury ought not to be, on
principle, defeated by the fact that Columbia Casualty Company has
acquired a right to subrogation under its contract of suretyship entered
into with Dantzler Lumber & Export Company, to which contract Ernst
& Ernst is not a party. As I see it, Columbia Casualty Company, as the
new plaintiff by reason of subrogation, must step into the shoes of Dantzler
Lumber & Export Company and must submit its claim to a jury trial just
as Dantzler Lumber & Export Company would have had to do had no sub
rogation taken place.
Can it be said that, where A has a claim against B for damages by reason
of tort committed by A against B, B loses his right to a jury trial because
C, by reason of the doctrine of subrogation as applied between A and C,
has acquired A’s claim against B?
My view is that, under the principles stated in Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 139 So. 886, Columbia Casualty Company
is, as a m atter of law, a subrogated plaintiff and is entitled to m aintain a
suit at law against Ernst & Ernst as tort-feasors, to the same extent that
Dantzler Lumber & Export Company could have done had no subrogation
taken place, b u t that subrogation in favor of Columbia Casualty Com
pany against Dantzler Lumber & Export Company cannot operate so
as to destroy the right to a jury trial which was at all times possessed by
Ernst & Ernst as against the subrogated claim.
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I concur as to the finding of some equity in the bill, to wit, the right to
subrogation and to a discovery by the surety as to material facts relating
to its suretyship. I dissent from all other portions of the opinion prepared
by Mr. Justice B uford.
T he rule that a court of equity once having assumed jurisdiction of a
cause on any equitable ground will reach out and draw into its considera
tion and determination the entire subject-matter, bringing before it all
the parties interested therein, means no more than that, where there is a
distinct equitable controversy and a substantial ground of equitable
jurisdiction, a court of equity will render complainant full relief even
to the extent of passing upon strictly legal questions and granting strictly
legal remedies. It does not mean a bill in equity can bring into a court of
equity, as incident to the right to discovery, separate cause of action cog
nizable in a court of law. Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69, 3 L. Ed. 271;
Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347, 7 S. Ct. 249, 30 L. Ed. 451.
In this case there is no equitable controversy between Columbia
Casualty Company and Ernst & Ernst, no privity of contract between them,
and no right of discovery from them. T he equitable controversy is wholly
between Columbia Casualty Company, on the one hand, and Dantzler
Lumber & Export Company, on the other. T o join in Ernst & Ernst for the
purpose of settling an alleged action at law against them to which Colum
bia Casualty Company has by operation of law become subrogated is not
sustained by any authority other than the general rule above cited in the
preceding paragraph, and, as will be seen, the general rule does not mean
that third parties not in privity to an equitable right can be brought in
as an incident to it, and thereby deprived of the right to a trial by jury.
Hitchcolk v. Mortgage Securities Corp., 95 Fla. 147, 116 So. 244, cited
in the majority opinion, in so far as it held to the contrary, has been by
this court expressly overruled in a recent decision of this court. See Norris
v. Eikenberry, 103 Fla. 104, 137 So. 128, text page 134, column 1.
I therefore concur in part and dissent in part to the extent indicated.
W hitfield, J., concurs.
Brown, Justice (dissenting).
Although the bill may show a right of action on the part of the Dantzler
Company against Ernst & Ernst, either ex contractu for breach of contract
or ex delicto for breach of duty arising out of the contract between those
parties, I cannot see how the doctrine of subrogation can be resorted to
in support of a right of action, either legal or equitable, on behalf of the
Columbia Casualty Company against Ernst & Ernst. T he contract between
Ernst 8c Ernst and the Dantzler Company was not made for the benefit
of the casualty company. Of course, upon payment to the Dantzler Com
pany of the loss occasioned by the embezzlement of its funds by one of its
employees, for whose fidelity to his trust the casualty company had exe
cuted a surety bond to the Dantzler Company to the extent of the amount
named in the policy, the casualty company became subrogated to the
extent of such payment to any right of action which the Dantzler Com
pany may have had against the defaulting employee whose faithfulness
the casualty company had in effect guaranteed, but this right of subro
gation did not extend to any cause of action the Dantzler Company may
have had against the firm of accountants whom they had employed for
some years to make an annual audit of the company’s books. T he Dantzler
Company was under no obligation to the Columbia Casualty Company to
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employ Ernst & Ernst or any one else to audit their books. They ap
parently made this contract for annual auditing for their own benefit.
T he Columbia Casualty Company was in no way a party to the contract
between the Dantzler Company and Ernst & Ernst, nor does it appear that,
in writing the surety contract with the Dantzler Company, the casualty
company were relying upon or had any knowledge of the fact that the
Dantzler Company were employing Ernst & Ernst to make an annual audit
of their books. See Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 225 N. Y. 170,
174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139. Nor is there any question of conventional
subrogation involved in this case.
Cases involving the right of insurance companies to subrogation to the
rights of the insured party against tort-feasors causing loss to the insured
subject-matter are not in point here, as in those cases the liability of the
insurance company is based on the destruction or damage to the subjectmatter of the contract, and there is a direct relationship between the
subject-matter of the contract and the tort of the third party. But here
there is no direct relationship between the contract of suretyship entered
into between the casualty company and the Dantzler Company and the
contract for auditing services entered into between Dantzler Company
and Ernst & Ernst. So far as the casualty company is concerned, its lia
bility and its loss would have been the same if the Dantzler Company had
never made a contract with Ernst & Ernst and had never had its books
audited. There being no privity of contract nor any duty owed by the
auditors to the casualty company, the latter certainly had no right of di
rect action against such auditors.
Nor is there any showing of a right to equitable or legal subrogation;
nor does the writer know of any rule of law under which the casualty
company could have compelled the Dantzler Company to prosecute an
action for damages against Ernst & Ernst, and so, if the Dantzler Company
saw fit to compromise or waive any claim they may have had against the
auditors, the casualty company had no right to complain.
See, in this general connection, 25 R. C. L. 1831; Marianna National
Farm Loan Association v. Braswell, 95 Fla. 510, 116, So. 639.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice D avis in his opinion
herein, the procedure here attempted to be put in motion, even if there
was a right of subrogation, would deprive Ernst & Ernst of their right to
a trial by jury.
I think, therefore, the order overruling the motion to dismiss the bill
should be reversed.
FLAGG v. SENG *
California District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 1936. 16 Cal. App.
2d 545, 60 P.2d 1004.

Barnard, Presiding Justice. T he California Land Buyers Syndicate
was organized in June, 1926, for the purpose of buying real property in
San Diego county with the intention of later selling the same at a
profit. W ith the permission of the state corporation department one R.
L. Stewart was appointed as the corporation’s agent for the sale of stock
at a commission of 20 per cent. A large amount of stock was sold, and the
This case is discussed at p. 25 supra.

164

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

corporation acquired some thirty-one separate properties. Stewart opened
an office for the sale of stock, and the syndicate sublet from him a portion
of that space, in which it conducted its business under an arrangement
by which it allowed Stewart a certain sum each month to cover certain
expenses. T he syndicate had its own bookkeepers and other employees,
some of whom also worked for Stewart. T he directors of the corporation
held regular meetings and kept careful minutes. Any purchase of prop
erty was made only on the unanimous approval of the directors and after
the property had been examined and appraised by each director. All
papers in connection with each transaction were kept together, and the
directors were familiar with these and with the manner in which the
books of account were kept.
T he defendants, who were accountants, were employed to open up a
set of books and thereafter from time to time to audit the books and re
port to the directors. Four such audits were made, the first on September
8, 1927, and the last on January 21, 1930. In addition, the defendants
took a trial balance at the end of each three months and reported to the
directors. These audits and reports all indicated the amount of the sur
plus at the respective dates as shown by books of the corporation. A num 
ber of sales and exchanges of lands were made, all of which were entered
on the books in accordance with values fixed by the board of directors.
W hen a parcel was traded in on another property at a figure higher than
its cost, the difference was carried on the books as surplus, with the knowl
edge and approval of the directors. Dividends at 2 per cent, were paid
quarterly on the preferred stock from April 19, 1927, to and including
June 30, 1929. On November 12, 1929, the syndicate closed its office and
ceased operations. An auditor sent by the state corporation department
made an examination early in 1930 and found no irregularities in the
books and records of the corporation.
As stated by the appellant, he ‘‘seeks to recover on behalf of his bank
rupt the funds withdrawn from its treasury through the frauds of Stewart;
respondents having participated in these frauds are equally liable with
Stewart in answering for the loss sustained.”
T he complaint alleges that the respondents were employed by the syn
dicate to audit the corporation’s books and accounts and submit to the
directors annual reports as to the corporation’s financial condition and
such other reports as might be requested; that the respondents did audit
the books of accounts of the corporation and made reports of its financial
condition as disclosed by those books and accounts from December, 1926,
until November, 1929; that the respondents well knew that Stewart was
the manager of said corporation, that he had control of the entire busi
ness of said corporation, that all books and records were in his ex
clusive charge, that all financial transactions were handled by him, and
that all audits and reports were required for the purpose of informing the
board of directors of the actual condition of the corporation as disclosed
by its books and accounts; that the respondents well knew that Stewart
was engaged in a stock-selling campaign and that the continued payment
of regular quarterly dividends of 2 per cent. was essential to the continu
ance of this campaign; that the respondents submitted to the directors
various audits and reports purporting to show that the corporation then
had a surplus available for the payment of dividends; that these audits
and reports were false and did not set forth the true condition of the
corporation as disclosed by its books and accounts; that the respondents
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knew that these audits and reports were false and did not set forth the
true condition of the corporation; that the board of directors, believing
said audits and reports to contain a true and correct statement of the
condition of the corporation as disclosed by its books and records, de
clared and paid various specified dividends; that at no time since its in
corporation did the syndicate have any surplus for the payment of divi
dends; that the respondents knew that the books of the corporation dis
closed this fact; that the respondents knew that these reports and audits
were submitted to the directors for the purpose of inducing them to de
clare and pay dividends so that Stewart might continue his stock sales;
that the board of directors relied and acted upon the information furn
ished by the defendants as to the condition of said corporation; and that
all payments of dividends were illegal and constituted an impairment of
the capital of the corporation.
T he defendants answered, denying all of the plaintiff’s charges, and
setting up several special defenses. After a trial the court found in all
respects in favor of the defendants, and this appeal is from the judgment
which followed.
T he appellant states that his right to recover a judgment herein "de
pends upon whether or not he has, by a preponderance of the evidence,
established that approximately $68,000.00 of his bankrupt’s assets have
been unlawfully distributed among the Syndicate’s preferred stock
holders to its prejudice and the prejudice of its creditors, by the frauds
and deceptions practiced upon the corporation by its fiscal agent and
manager, R. L. Stewart, and those associated with him and that re
spondents, with guilty knowledge, aided and participated in such frauds
and deceptions by suppressing all information in relation thereto while
employed by the Syndicate as its auditors and by certifying in their audit
reports and statements submitted to Syndicate to the truth and reality
of transaction set up by false and fictitious entries in Syndicate’s books
and records made to conceal and cover the illegal and wrongful acts and
conducts of Stewart and his associates.” The case was tried on the issue
as to whether the defendants knowingly submitted false reports which
deceived the directors and which caused them to declare dividends which
could not be legally declared.
T he court found, among other things, that it was not true that the
sole source from which the corporation produced funds for the operation
of its business was from the sale of shares of its capital stock; that Stew
art had the exclusive right to sell stock for which he was paid a com
mission of 20 per cent.; that with that exception it was not true that he
had control of any of the business affairs of the corporation or that any
of the records of the corporation were kept or maintained by him; that
the stenographers and bookkeepers when engaged on the business and
books of the corporation were the employees of its directors and said
books, records, and accounts were at all times kept and maintained by
and under the control of the directors; that the directors hired Stewart
to see that these accounts and records correctly reflected the transactions
had or entered into by the company; that said books, records, and accounts
correctly reflected these transactions; that the directors were familiar with
these books and knew how the same were being kept and maintained; that
the respondents from time to time were employed by the directors to
make, and did make, to them audit reports, trial balances, and state
ments reflecting the financial condition of the corporation as shown by
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its books and records; that the various audits and reports made by the
respondents were neither false nor fraudulently prepared, and that each
of the same correctly set forth the true condition of said Corporation at
the time the same was made; that it was not true that the corporation did
not have a surplus at any time but that the corporation did have a surplus
as shown by its books of account on the dates and in the amounts set
forth in the various audits and reports; that the directors were familial
with the books and with the condition of the corporation and in order
ing the various dividends to be paid did not rely upon the reports and
audits submitted by the respondents; that it was not true that the re
spondents or any of them knew that any of the reports or audits was made
or submitted for the purpose of inducing the directors to declare or to
pay dividends so that Stewart might proceed with his stock sale, or for the
purpose of inducing any one to do anything whatsoever for any pur
pose; that it was not true that any of the dividends paid were illegally
declared, or that by reason of any such payments the corporation has had
its capital investment impaired, or that by reason thereof it became, or
now is, insolvent; that none of the letters, audits, reports, or statements
prepared by the respondents or submitted to the directors was false or
fraudulent, and that none thereof was made, prepared or submitted for
any purpose except in good faith to furnish the directors, in compliance
with the terms of their employment, with true and correct reports of the
financial condition of the corporation for the period covered therein as
shown by the books, accounts, and records of the corporation; and that
all of said audits and reports were faithfully and diligently made.
T he transcript and the briefs are voluminous, and it is a little difficult
to follow the appellant’s contentions. Disregarding immaterial matters,
the gist of appellant’s case is that Stewart, rather than the directors, was
in actual control and direction of the business of the corporation; that
Stewart sold stock in an illegal manner, claimed a fictitious profit on un
sold real estate, and deceived the directors by manipulating the books;
that the respondents assisted Stewart in this deception by suppressing
information and by falsely reporting the condition of the corporation;
that this was intentionally and knowingly done; that the directors, rely
ing on these reports and being deceived thereby, declared dividends which
were not warranted by the condition of the corporation; that the corpora
tion was damaged; and that the respondents are liable therefor. The
court found that Stewart was not in charge of the business of the cor
poration or of its books; that its transactions and business were conducted
by the directors; that the directors were familiar with the books and the
manner in which they were kept and with the facts in connection with
each of the transactions; that the audits and reports were correctly made;
and that the directors were not deceived by any of these reports and
audits. These findings are fully sustained by the evidence, and the ap
pellant has failed to establish the facts which he admitted throughout
the trial were essential to his recovery. Most of these findings and other
material findings are not directly attacked, and the contention seems to
be that the court should have drawn different conclusions. It is argued,
however, that some of the findings are not supported by the evidence
because, while the audits and reports correctly reflected the condition
of the corporation as shown by its books, the respondents could have
discovered through further investigation that the books did not show
the actual situation, that stock was being sold in an illegal manner, and
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that profits supposedly accruing from the sales of real property were in
fact nonexistent.
Several of these contentions relate to the theory of bookkeeping and
accounting, and involve the question as to whether certain items were
properly carried on the books as assets. All of the expert witnesses called
by the respondents testified against the appellant’s contentions in this
regard, and this testimony was confirmed, at least in part, by the ap
pellant’s own experts. Conceding that any conflict here appears, the
court’s findings are sustained by a part, and apparently by a preponder
ance, of the evidence.
Appellant’s main contention seems to be that stock in the corporation
was exchanged for real estate in violation of the permit issued by the
state corporation department, and that, when a parcel of real estate was
exchanged for other property at a price in excess of its original cost, the
difference was entered on the books as a profit before the second piece
was sold. T he m atter last referred to represents an established policy
on the part of the directors, the books were thus kept on their order, and
they were in no way deceived by anything done by the respondents in
this connection. W ith respect to the other m atter it appears that stock
was, in effect, exchanged for real property. This was done by putting
through escrows whereby the corporation's check was given in payment
for the land and the other party’s check was given in payment for the
stock. W hile there is some evidence that certain papers in the files of the
corporation indicated the true situation, although the same was not in
dicated by the books of the corporation, there is other evidence to the
effect that this could not be learned from an examination of the books
and records of the corporation, that it was unknown to the respondents
except in one instance, and that in that case the respondents took the
matter up with the attorney for the corporation who assured them that
the m atter was perfectly legal. It further appears that whatever illegality
existed and whatever harm arose therefrom was caused directly by the
action of the board of directors, and that all such exchanges were made
with their full knowledge and consent and in accordance with their fixed
policy, and no inference could be drawn that anything done by the
respondents had anv casual relation to any part of this situation.
Not only are the findings sustained by the evidence, but we are unable
to see how the matters particularly relied upon by the appellant can
justify or compel any other conclusions than those drawn by the court.
Conceding that certain sales of stock were illegally made, this was not
only well known to the directors, but was intentionally done by them.
They were not only not deceived by the audits and reports, but they had
intentionally handled the transactions in such a m anner as to make
them appear on the books as a cash transaction. W hile the court found
upon sufficient evidence that the respondents had no knowledge of those
parts of those transactions which had been thus covered up, and conced
ing, for the sake of argument, that the respondents might have found out
the true situation by a more extensive investigation, it in no way appears
that any discovery they might have made would have affected the result.
The method pursued by the directors was followed on the advice of their
attorneys, and, although the same has since been declared illegal, no such
blame can be attached to the respondents, under the circumstances here
appearing, as would justify a reversal of the judgm ent.
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Some contention is made that the trial court committed prejudicial
error in limiting the appellant’s cross-examination of a certain witness.
The cross-examination of this witness takes up more than a thousand
pages of the transcript, and it abundantly appears therefrom that the
court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.
The judgment is affirmed.

FIDELITY & DEPOSIT CO. OF MARYLAND
v. ATHERTON *
Supreme Court of New Mexico. 47 N. M. 443, 144 P.2d 157.

Brice, Justice. T he questions are: (1) W hether the appellant (plain
tiff below), who as surety upon the official bond of the treasurer of Berna
lillo County, paid the shortage of a defaulting deputy county treasurer,
is subrogated to the county’s rights and remedies (if any) against the
appellees Horton & Bixler (hereafter referred to as appellees), whose
negligence as public accountants (it is charged) was the proximate
cause of the loss: and (2) should appellees be required to pay appellant,
whose loss has been partially paid and the balance well secured, by the
county treasurer who is the principal debtor?
The appellees demurred to appellant’s complaint, asserting that it
did not state a cause of action. T he demurrer was overruled and there
after appellee answered. This action of the court is assigned as error,
but we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in overruling
the demurrer. Our reasons therefor will sufficiently appear from a deter
mination of the merits of the case.
T he facts as found by the trial court, material to a decision, are as
follows:
T he appellees, a co-partnership, are certified public accountants.
They entered into a written contract with Bernalillo County, wherein
they agreed for considerations named, to conduct a continuous audit of
the books and records of account of Bernalillo Countv and to act as con
sulting accountants for the period from July 1, 1936, to and including
June 30, 1937; to furnish to the appellee Board of County Commissioners
(hereafter called the Board), upon demand, a certified statement of cash
receipts and disbursements of the county treasurer from July 1, 1936 to
and including June 30, 1937; to prepare typewritten reports of a final
audit for the period ending June 30, 1937; to meet with the Board at least
once a month and furnish it the balances to the credit of the various
funds over which the Board had control and against which it could draw
warrants; to place accountants on the assignment who were skilled and
experienced in municipal accounting; to make audits in conformity with
existing laws, and render reports as required by the Board, and—“Party
of the Second Part agrees to furnish evidence to the Board of County
Commissioners and to file evidence with the County Clerk, indicating
that the County will be protected for the faithful performance of the
terms of this agreement, and also protected against defalcations or other
misdeeds of employees of Party of the Second Part, such evidence being a
blanket accountant’s Liability Policy of $60,000.00—34682-K American
* T his case is discussed at p. 27 supra.
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Surety Company of New York, protecting all clients of Party of the
Second Part. This above Policy expires June 1, 1937.”
This contract was extended by agreement of the parties to June 30,
1938. During the existence of this contract David J. Armijo was the
county treasurer of Bernalillo County and the appellant surety on his
official bond, payable to the State of New Mexico and conditioned that
he would well and faithfully perform his duties as county treasurer; that
he would render true accounts of his office and pay over all monies that
might come into his hands by virtue of his office to the persons authorized
to receive the same by law, and carefully keep and preserve all books and
papers and other property pertaining to his office and deliver them to
his successor.
Virgil G. Webster was deputy county treasurer, and he as principal,
and the appellant as his surety, executed a bond for $10,000 payable to
the State of New Mexico, conditioned substantially as that of the treasur
er’s bond. This bond was not required by law, and was executed for the
protection of the county treasurer as against his deputy.
From the period of July 1, 1937, to January 22, 1938, deputy county
treasurer Webster embezzled from the treasurer’s office funds aggrega
ting $21,611.57. T he appellant paid to county treasurer Armijo $10,000
as surety on his deputy’s bond, which sum of money was delivered back
to it, and appellant thereupon paid to the county of Bernalillo the total
amount of the defalcation.
After endorsing to appellant the $10,000 check received from it, treas
urer Armijo executed and delivered to appellant his promissory note in
the principal sum of $11,611.57 (the balance due the County by treas
urer Armijo) secured by a mortgage on certain real estate, the value of
which is ample security for the payment of the note, and much in excess
of the principal sum thereof. Thereafter treasurer Armijo paid to appel
lant on that note sums aggregating $3,393.43. No effort has been made
by appellant to enforce collection of this indebtedness, although long
past due.
T he duties of the treasurer of Bernalillo County required him to and
he did collect monies for payment of taxes upon real and personal prop
erty in said county as well as to collect and receive other monies due said
county.
In the collection of tax monies by the county treasurer of Bernalillo
County, at all times material, the method and procedure used was as
follow: Upon receipt of the tax rolls from the county assessor, the county
treasurer prepared a form of tax receipt in triplicate, in white, blue and
pink, for each taxpayer shown on the tax rolls. These receipts were num 
bered consecutively and bound in books each containing one hundred
receipts, not dated or signed by the treasurer at the time of their prepara
tion. The blue and pink sheets were carbon impressions of the white
sheet made at the same time as the white sheet was typed. T he white and
blue receipts were perforated, permitting them to be torn out of the tax
receipt book. W hen taxes were paid the receipts were signed in triplicate
by the treasurer or his employee and the date of payment was inserted.
T he white receipt was then delivered to the taxpayer, the blue receipt
was removed from the receipt book and retained by the treasurer. The
pink receipt was not perforated for tearing out of the bound book, and
it remained in the receipt book after the taxes were paid. It was a per
manent record of the cash received.
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Appellees each month sent their employee to the County Treasurer’s
office to audit the books and records of account of the treasurer, and to
prepare data for quarterly and annual audit reports, required to be made
under the auditing contract. They compared the blue receipts and the
adding machine tapes which then remained in the treasurer’s office with
the entries in the tax cash record and the tax cash journal; totaled the
amounts in the tax cash record and the tax cash journal and checked
the distributions to the various funds in the tax cash journal.
The pink receipts were permanently bound records of the treasurer’s
office containing a record of the actual cash received by the treasurer
from taxes.
The tax cash record book and the tax cash journal kept during 1937
did not contain any details showing the name of the taxpayer who paid
taxes, the num ber of the receipt issued to the taxpayer, or the amount
of money for which each receipt was issued, but only the total sum re
ceived daily as shown by the entries purporting to have been made by
the bookkeeper from the blue receipts which ostensibly remained avail
able in the treasurer’s office. T he books did not contain entries showing
any money received upon blue receipts which had been lost or destroyed.
Appellees did not test check any of the pink receipts by comparing
them with the available blue receipts or the tax cash record or the tax
cash journal, or the tax roll at any time prior to January 1, 1938, to de
termine whether or not all cash received by the country treasurer for
which tax receipts were issued and for which pink receipts remained had
been accounted for in the tax cash record and the tax cash journal, and
did not at any time during 1937 check the pink receipts in the bound vol
ume against the blue receipts available in the treasurer’s office or against
the tax rolls, or against the tax cash record or against the tax cash journal.
Between January 1, 1937, and January 22, 1938, during which time the
audit contract was in force, deputy treasurer Webster embezzled from
monies collected for taxes $21,176.20, and $435.28 from other monies re
ceived in the treasurer’s office. T o cover this defalcation Webster des
troyed the blue receipts equal in amount to the funds embezzled, and
made new adding machine tapes to correspond with the amount received
less the amount embezzled. As the amounts evidenced by the blue re
ceipts destroyed were not entered in the cash record or the tax cash
journal, the amounts of the retained receipts corresponded with those
evidenced by these records and the adding machine tape.
Appellees did not check the pink receipts nor begin the special in
vestigation agreed upon, in September, 1937, at any time during 1937,
but commenced work thereunder on January 1, 1938, to ascertain if
there was any shortage in the treasurer’s office.
T he trial court concluded that appellees were not negligent in the
performance of their contract with the County of Bernalillo; and they
“did not cause, or contribute to the cause of, any loss sustained by the
plaintiff.”
T he appellees assert that the complaint does not state a cause of action;
that as the State of New Mexico is the obligee named in the bond, it is an
indispensable party to the action; that as there was no privity of contract
between appellees and appellant it could not be subrogated to the rights
and remedies (if any) of the county of Bernalillo; that mere actionable
negligence resulting from the breach of a contract creates no right to
subrogation in favor of one who is neither a party nor a privy to the
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contract. These questions for the purpose of this suit only will be re
solved in favor of the appellant. T he writer is of the opinion that these
assumptions are legally correct, but this is not necessarily the view of any
other members of the court, and the questions are not decided.
Subrogation is not necessarily founded upon contract. Crippen v.
Chappel, 35 Kan. 495, 11 P. 453 Am. Rep. 187; Fourth Nat. Bank v.
Board of Com’rs of Craig County, 186 Okl. 102, 95 P.2d 878. It is an
equitable remedy of civil law origin whereby through a supposed suc
cession to the legal rights of another, a loss is put ultimately on that one
who in equity and good conscience should pay. American Surety Co.
of New York v. Robinson, 5 Cir., 53 F.2d 22, 23; Northern Trust Co. v.
Consolidated Elevator Co., 142 Minn. 132, 171 N.W. 265, 4 A.L.R. 510.
It is a remedy for the benefit of one secondarily liable, who has paid the
debt of another and to whom in equity and good conscience should be
assigned the rights and remedies of the original creditor, Andrew v.
Bevington Sav. Bank, 206 Iowa 869, 221 N.W. 668.
Treasurer Armijo was primarily liable to the county for his deputy’s
defalcation. He paid $10,000 which was paid to him by appellant as
surety on his unfaithful deputy’s official bond. True, the appellant’s
check to Armijo was endorsed by him, returned to appellant and de
livered to the county; but it was Armijo’s money and he, not appellant,
paid the county the $10,000. T he balance of $11,611.57 was paid to the
county by appellant, of which amount Armijo has repaid $3,393.43, and
appellant has accepted Armijo’s note secured by a mortgage on property
the value of which is much in excess of the debt, which, though long
past due, appellant has made no effort to collect.
If, in equity and good conscience, the appellees, under any circum
stances, should pay this debt (a question we do not decide), they should
not be required to do so under the facts stated. T he appellant has refused
to enforce collection of the amount due it from the treasurer Armijo,
who is primarily liable therefor, and the collection of which could be en
forced if not paid upon demand.
We do not hold that a surety who has paid his principal’s obligation
is not ordinarily entitled to be subrogated to all rights and remedies of
the insured, including those based upon ordinary negligence; we do not
decide the question; but see United States F. & G. Co. v. Citizens’ Nat.
Bank, D.C., N.M., 13 F.2d 213; Dantzler Lum ber & Export Co. v. Co
lumbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116, 95 A. L. R. 258; Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Cook, D. C., Mich., 35 F.Supp. 160; Fourth Nat. Bank
v. Board of Com’rs, 186 Okl. 102, 95 P.2d 878; Martin v. Federal Surety
Co., 8 Cir., 58 F.2d 79. We do hold that where, as in this case, the surety
has been paid approximately two-thirds of its outlay by the principal
debtor, and has accepted for the balance its principal’s note, so well se
cured that there can be no question of ultimate payment, which it re
fuses to enforce, it would be inequitable to require a third person to pay it.
No general rule can be laid down which will afford a test in every
case in which subrogation is sought. The underlying principle is that
the right flows from principles of justice and equity. Every case depends
upon its particular facts, and we can see no reason in equity or justice to
require a third person to pay this particular debt with such a back
ground of facts. Richardson v. American Surety Co., 97 Okl. 264, 223 P.
389; American Surety Co. v. Citizens’ Nat. Bank of Roswell, D.C., N.M.,
294 F. 609.
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T he appellees owed to the board of county commissioners a legal duty
to make their reports without fraud, and a contractual duty to make
them, under the terms of their contract, with the care and caution re
quired of experts. They likewise owed a duty to third persons, if any, to
whom they knew, or reasonably should have known, their employer
intended to exhibit their reports, and upon which they might act to their
injury, to make such reports without fraud. But there is no finding that
appellees made a fraudulent report, or of a reliance upon appellees’ re
port by either the appellant or Armijo, nor, of course, that they, or
either of them, was injured by such reliance, so as to bring the case with
in the doctrine of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441, 74 A.L.R. 1139.
We are entirely satisfied that appellant could have collected from
Armijo the balance due it, without the necessity of a suit, and certainly
with much less trouble and expense than it has incurred in this proceed
ing against appellees. Its negligence in failing or refusing to collect from
Armijo does not appeal to this court as a reason for requiring third per
sons to pay the debt.
It should be stated in behalf of the appellees that the trial court found
that they performed their contract; that they were not negligent, and that
no act or default of theirs caused or contributed to the loss of the county’s
funds.
T he decree of the district court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

DEFALCATION IN RELATION TO AUDIT,
INTERNAL CONTROL AND FIDELITY BONDS *
By J ohn L. Carey, Executive Director of the American Institute of Accountants

Losses running into millions of dollars are suffered each year by Amer
ican business through defalcation by employees, of which only a small
percentage are covered by fidelity bonds. Every businessman naturally
trusts his own employees or he would not continue to employ them. He
often enjoys an unwarranted sense of security, which is shattered when a
theft occurs. T hen he locks the stable door after the horse has been stolen
by taking precautionary measures that should have been taken long before.
Studies have shown that most defaulters are not habitual criminals,
or even fundamentally dishonest. They often begin by “borrowing” com
pany money to meet financial emergencies. Then if they find it easy to
continue without discovery, they cannot resist the temptation.
Employers are sometimes to blame for perm itting strong temptation
to dishonesty to confront their employees.
There are three m ajor preventives of losses through defalcation. They
are internal control, audits, and fidelity bonds. A book could be written
about each of them. The purpose of this discussion is only to emphasize
the fact that the most economical and effective defense against defalca
tions requires an integration of the three major preventives.
Internal Control: T he best defense against defalcation is an adequate
* Published in 83 J ournal of Accountancy 353 (1947) and 15 T he Controller

127 (1947).
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system of internal control, which basically is simply a division of duties
among employees in such a m anner that no one person alone should be
able to defraud the company without early detection. Independent audi
tors review their clients’ systems of internal control in the course of their
audits, and they often make recommendations to a client as to how his
system could be strengthened. These recommendations are often placed
in the file for future reference and then forgotten. T he busy executive
has many other things to do. But it would be good business in every in
stance to carry out the recommendations of the accountants for strength
ening the system. It is the cheapest and most effective way of minimizing
losses.
Audits: Audits by independent public accountants are sometimes as
sumed to be a satisfactory defense against defalcations. This is not a
wholly valid assumption. Today the primary purpose of most audits
of business of any size is to provide an expert, independent opinion on the
financial position and results of operations of the company concerned.
T he usual audit is based on testing and sampling procedures which may
incidentally, but will not necessarily, disclose defalcations. Unless there
has been collusion between several of the principal executives, an inde
pendent audit should disclose theft of amounts having a material effect
on the reported financial position or earnings. T he accounting profes
sion has stated publicly again and again that the customary type of audit
(financial examination) cannot be expected to catch m inor irregularities,
and that the auditor cannot take responsibility for detecting them, al
though the deterrent effect of audits may minimize frauds.
It is possible to make detailed audits that would give reasonable as
surance of the detection of even minor irregularities (though it would
not necessarily prevent them, unless such audits were made at frequent
intervals throughout the year), but such detailed audits would be so ex
pensive that the game would not be worth the candle. T he cost of such
detailed auditing in companies of any size might be greater than probable
losses through defalcation.
Fidelity Bonds: Even a good system of internal control, however, does
not always prevent collusive fraud. If two or more employees conspire
to defraud the employer they may be successful for some time without dis
covery. Again, many companies are too small to be able to afford an
internal accounting staff of a size which would permit the installation
of a satisfactory system of internal control. Accountants generally recom
mend, as a m atter of broad policy, that fidelity bonds be taken out on all
employees who have positions of any importance from the viewpoint of
fraud prevention. At the present time most accountants believe that
fidelity bond coverage in many companies is inadequate in relation to
risks involved, and recommend extension of such coverage. Adequate
coverage not only assures recovery of losses from discovered defalcations,
but it has a preventive effect, in that the underwriters usually investigate
the past records of bonded employees, and employees may sometimes be
deterred from theft by the thought that they might be prosecuted by the
surety company, no m atter how merciful their boss might be.
One complication has occurred in recent years that the accounting pro
fession has been attempting, with some success, to resolve. Some surety
companies, under their rights of subrogation, have asserted claims against
independent public accountants on the ground that all or a part of the
loss insured by the company under a fidelity bond would not have oc
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curred if the independent public accountant had not failed to make early
discovery of the defalcation.
A uditor’s R esponsibility
If an independent public accountant should be guilty of an affirmatively
dishonest act or wilful failure to follow accepted audit procedures, he
should be held responsible. This, however, is quite a different thing from
holding him financially responsible for not discovering defalcations which
generally accepted auditing procedures are not expected to disclose.
Unless an independent auditor has reasonable confidence that he will
not be held responsible by the surety company concerned for failure to
detect defalcations (except in case of gross negligence or dishonesty) he
may feel it necessary to protect himself by extending the scope of detailed
auditing. This would substantially increase the audit fee. T he client
might decide that he was paying twice for the same protection. He might
dispense with the audit, or drop fidelity coverage, or transfer the bond
to a surety company which will provide the auditor with the reasonable
assurance that will permit him to confine his work to the scope necessary
for certification of the financial statements.
Surety companies generally have recognized the position of the account
ing profession. In December, 1945, twenty-three of the companies issuing
fidelity bonds signed a form of letter to the American Institute of Account
ants under which they have agreed that they will not assert claims against
accountants in any cases not involving affirmatively dishonest or criminal
acts or gross negligence on the part of accountants, and that claims shall
in no case be asserted except after a hearing of the m atter by an impartial
committee of three persons who are not accountants. If this committee
concludes that such a case does not involve affirmatively dishonest or
criminal acts or gross negligence, then the companies have agreed that they
will not assert claims against the accountants. If the committee reaches a
contrary conclusion, then the surety company quite properly may assert
its claim. In the past year, eleven additional surety companies have signed
similar letters, bringing the total number to thirty-four.
It is hoped that other surety companies will participate in this general
agreement which, it is believed, will help greatly to avoid unnecessary
increase in the cost of audits, to encourage adequate fidelity bond coverage,
and to bring about better integration of audit, internal control, and
fidelity bonds as a defense against defalcation.

SECTION 3

LIA BILITY TO TH IRD PARTIES
AT COMMON LAW
LANDELL v. LYBRAND *
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1919. 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783.

P er C uriam. Appellees, defendants below, are certified public account
ants, and, as such, audited the books and accounts of the Employers’ In
demnity Company for the year 1911. T he appellant, plaintiff below,
averred in his statement of claim that he had been induced to buy 11
shares of the capital stock of that company, at the price of $200 per share,
on the strength of the report made by the appellees as to its assets and
liabilities at the close of the year 1911; the report having been shown to
him by some one who suggested that he purchase the stock. A further
averment was that the report was false and untrue, that the stock pur
chased by him on the strength of it is valueless, and for the loss he sus
tained he averred the defendants were liable. T o enforce this liability an
action in trespass was brought against them. In their affidavit of defense
they averred that the statement of claim disclose no cause of action, and
asked that this be disposed of by the court below as a m atter of law, under
the provisions of section 20 of the Practice Act of May 14, 1915 (P. L.
483). It was so disposed of by the court below in entering judgment for
the defendants.
There were no contractual relations between the plaintiff and de
fendants, and, if there is any liability from them to him, it must arise out
of some breach of duty, for there is no averment that they made the re
port with intent to deceive him. T he averment in the statement of claim
is that the defendants were careless and negligent in making their report;
but the plaintiff was a stranger to them and to it, and, as no duty rested
upon them to him, they cannot be guilty of any negligence of which he
can complain. Schiffer v. Sauer Co. et al., 238 Pa. 550, 86 Atl. 479. This
was the correct view of the court below, and the judgment is accordingly
affirmed.
ULTRAMARES CORP. v. TOUCHE **
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department, 1930.
229 App. Div. 681, 243 N. Y. Supp. 179, rev’d, 255 N. Y.
170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).

M cAvoy, J. The defendants, public accountants, have been held liable
to the plaintiff, to whom they owed no contractual duty through any con
* T his case is discussed at p. 29 supra.
** T his case is discussed at p. 30 ff. supra.
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tract of employment which the plaintiff intrusted to them. W hether a
duty arises here, in the absence of direct contractual relation, out of the
situation shown by the evidence, is the problem for solution.
T he general principle involved, and upon which plaintiff relies for
imposition of liability, is that if one undertakes to discharge any duty by
which the conduct of others may be governed, he is bound to perform it
in such a m anner that those who are thus led to action in the faith that
such duty will be properly performed shall not suffer loss through im
proper performance of the duty or neglect in its execution. Thus in
Glanzer v. Shepard (233 N. Y. 236) we have the buyers of merchandise
given recovery against public weighers who were to make return of the
weight and to furnish buyers with a copy. T he public weighers certified
the weight and the buyers paid the sellers on that basis. Discovery that
the weight had been incorrectly certified as a result of defendants’ negli
gence was found to give the plaintiffs the right to the resulting damage.
I t was decided there that the use of the certificates was not an indirect
or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers; and “it was a
consequence which, to the weighers’ knowledge, was the end and aim
of the transaction.” T he sellers ordered, but the buyers were to use the
certificates. Public weighers hold themselves out to the public as “skilled
and careful in their calling.” (Glanzer v. Shepard, supra, 238.)
T he duty there was held not be found in terms of contract, nor of
privity; although arising from contract, its origin is not exclusive from
that realm. If the contract and the relation are found, the duty follows
by rule of law. Diligence—it was pointed out—was owing not only to
the person who ordered the employment, but also to those who relied
thereon.
Plaintiff here is in the business of factoring. T he defendants were en
gaged by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to audit its books and accounts and certify
a balance sheet as of the end of the year 1923. They prepared a balance
sheet and attached it to a certificate signed by them, which they dated
February 26, 1924. This balance sheet stated that Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
had a net worth amounting to $1,070, 715.26, when the fact (as thereafter
found) was that at the very time of this certification the firm was in
solvent, with impairment of thousands of dollars in its assets and credit
and much enhancement of its reported liabilities.
T he finding of the jury would justify a conclusion that defendants were
guilty of a gross degree of negligence in their audit, and it is even urged
that the evidence also warranted the finding that the balance sheet was
made up in fraud of the rights and obligations which accountants, en
gaged in public calling, would owe to those to whom they had reason to
believe such balance sheets would be exhibited for purposes of obtaining
loans, extending credit, or to induce the sale of merchandise.
T he evidence showed that these accountants knew for four years that
their client (Fred Stern & Co., Inc.) was a borrower from banks in large
sums; that these banks required certified balance sheets as a basis for mak
ing loans; and that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., would require these certified
balance sheets for continuing existing loans and securing new loans. So
that this might be done, some thirty-two original counterparts of the certi
fied balance sheet were requested by the client, Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
and furnished by the accountants (defendants).
The jury’s verdict thus imports that defendants knew that the certified
balance sheets would be used by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the purpose
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of procuring loans, and that the very purpose of employment in the trans
action between Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and Touche, Niven & Co., the
accountants, was to allow Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to bring it about through
these balance sheets, the result that loans on the faith thereof would be
made by persons who would be governed by its declarations. Financial
statements in the course of trade have come to be used customarily for
the purpose of securing credit, and accountants indicate in their public
advertisements that makers of loans should require the safeguard of an
independent audit prepared by public accountants, so a corelative obliga
tion is placed upon them. It is their duty—if they do not wish their audit
to be so used—to qualify the statement of their balance sheet and the
certificate which accompanies it in such a way as to prevent its use. One
cannot issue an unqualified statement which will be so used, and then
disclaim responsibility for his work.
Banks and merchants, to the knowledge of these defendants, require
certified balance sheets from independent accountants, and upon these
audits they make their loans. Thus, the duty arises to these banks and
merchants of an exercise of reasonable care in the making and uttering
of certified balance sheets.
The facts here are brought within the rule in the case of International
Products Co. v. Erie R . R . Co. (244 N. Y. 331) that “there must be knowl
edge, or its equivalent, that the information is desired for a serious pur
pose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon it; that if
false or erroneous he will, because of it, be injured in person or property.
* * * T he relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or other
wise, must be such that in morals and good conscience the one has the
right to rely upon the other for information, and the other giving the
information owes a duty to give it with care.”
The certificate which these accountants attached to the balance sheet
reads:
“T ouche, N iven & Co.,
“Public Accountants,
“Eighty Maiden Lane,
“New York
February 26, 1924.
“C ertificate

of

Auditors.

“We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the
year ended December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and with the information and
explanations given us. We further certify that, subject to provision for
Federal taxes on income, the said statement in our opinion, presents a
true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
as at December 31, 1923.
“T ouche, N iven & Co.,
“Public Accountants.”
From the certificate and the findings made by the jury which are en
titled to be held conclusive in behalf of the plaintiff there is established:
T h at the defendants knew that the result of the audit would be used by
Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to represent its financial condition to persons from
whom Fred Stern & Co., Inc., might seek to borrow money, and that the
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balance sheet would be relied upon by such persons as indicating the true
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.; that defendants, in exercising
their public calling as auditors, did not exercise that care and skill re
quired of them, but acted in a negligent and careless manner, as a con
sequence of which the balance sheet made by them was incorrect, and
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the loss sustained by
plaintiff, i. e., that there was a causal relation between the neglect and
the loss sustained which could reasonably have been anticipated, and
that the presentation of the balance sheets, as certified by defendants,
was the inducing cause for making these loans to Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
which plaintiff made, and that the loss was not caused by reason of any
change in the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., from the time
of the presentation of the audit to the plaintiff, or because of any reliance
of plaintiff on other intervening causes; and that plaintiff’s conduct was
free from contributory negligence, and we, therefore, conclude that a
liability was properly found, arising out of a duty owed by the defendants
to plaintiff not to misrepresent, willfully or negligently, the financial con
dition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and that the judgment for the plaintiff
was correct and should not have been set aside.
T h at the particular person who was to be influenced by defendants’
act was unknown to the defendants is not material to a right to recovery,
for it is not necessary that there should be an intent to defraud any par
ticular person. In this case there was no mere casual representation made
as a m atter of courtesy; there was a certificate intended to sway conduct.
There was “the careless performance of a service * * * which happens
to have found in the words of a certificate its culmination and its sum
mary.’’ (Glanzer v. Shepard, supra, 241.) Here is an act performed care
lessly, intended to influence the actions of third parties, and one that
reasonably might be expected, when carelessly performed, to cause sub
stantial loss.
A duty exists towards those whom the accountants know will act on
the faith of their certificates. T he loss occurring here was the very result
which reasonably was to be anticipated if the balance sheet was carelessly
prepared.
W hile negligence was established and was the proximate cause of the
loss, and, as we have seen, the duty arose out of this situation which, while
not contractual, was, nevertheless, a ground of liability, yet we do not
think that there was sufficient proof upon which to found a liability in
fraud. We think that there was no error at the close of the entire case,
in the court’s decision to dismiss the second cause of action based upon
that ground. Misjudgment, however gross, or want of caution, however
marked, is not fraud. T he mere breach of duty, or the omission to use
due care is not fraud. Intentional fraud, as distinguished from a mere
breach of duty or the omission to use due care, is an essential factor in an
action for deceit. (Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124.)
We think that there was a proper conclusion with respect to damages.
T he amount of cash loans made to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., with interest
thereon, credited with all moneys repaid or collected by plaintiff, whether
through voluntary action or suit, without deduction of costs of collection,
was the approximate damage, and while other proof of damage was ex
cluded by the trial court, no appeal has been taken by plaintiff which
raises a construction of that rule.
T he judgment and order appealed from should, therefore, be modified
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by reversing so much thereof as sets aside the verdict and dismisses the
amended complaint as to the first cause of action, and by directing that
the verdict be reinstated and judgment entered thereon, with costs to the
plaintiff, and as so modified affirmed without costs.
D owling, P. J., and O ’Malley, J., concur; F inch and M artin, JJ.,
dissent.
F inch, J. (dissenting). Assuming that the defendants may be held
liable for the negligence of their employees where they undertake a duty
to a definite plaintiff (Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236), or to a definite
class (Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369), yet, for the
following reasons the defendants are not liable to this plaintiff: First,
because they undertook to make only a “balance sheet audit” at the re
quest of their client; second, because in their certificate the defendants
purported only to furnish their opinion based upon an examination in
connection with “ the information and explanations given us.” But even
more important, the defendants furnished such a report and certificate
without reference to any particular person or class of persons.
T he plaintiff seeks to liken the facts in the case at bar to a case where
the defendants were to make an audit which to their knowledge was for a
definite plaintiff, to induce such plaintiff to make loans thereon. (Glanzer
v. Shepard, supra.) This record does not sustain such a contention. The
courts have not gone to the length of holding that defendants in a case
like the case at bar can be held liable in negligence to the whole world, or,
as has been aptly said, liable for “negligence in the air.”
In other words, not only the purpose for which the statement is to be
used, but the person or class of persons who is to rely thereon, must be
definite to the knowledge of the defendants. The plaintiff relies upon the
stipulation in the record that the defendants “knew generally that these
reports would be used as financial statements to banks or to creditors or to
stockholders or to purchasers or sellers.” In accordance with the author
ities, this general knowledge is not sufficient.
As Judge A ndrews said in International Products Co. v. Erie R . R. Co.
(244 N. Y. 331), speaking of the information given, “that he to whom it is
given intends to rely and act upon it; that if false or erroneous he will
because of it be injured in person or property.” In Courteen Seed Co. v.
Hong Kong & S. B. Corp. (245 N. Y. 377) Judge P ound writes: “It [the
defendant] did not deal with appellant, had no relations with it and was
under no duty of care to it.” (See, also, Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S.
195.)
The professional man, be he accountant or otherwise, certifies for his
client and not for all the world. If the client makes it clear to such a man
that the statement is to be used in a particular transaction in which a
third party is involved, such circumstance should create a duty from the
professional man to such third party. If the accountant is to be held to
an unlim ited liability to all persons who may act on the faith of the
certificate, the accountant would be obliged to protect himself by a verifi
fication so rigid that its cost might well be prohibitive and a limited but
useful field of service thus closed to him. T he smallness of the compen
sation paid to the defendants for the services requested is in striking con
trast to the enormity of the liability now sought to be imposed upon them.
If in the case at bar the plaintiff had inquired of the accountants whether
they might rely upon the certificate in making a loan, then the accountants
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would have had the opportunity to gauge their responsibility and risk,
and determine with knowledge how thorough their verification of the
account should be before assuming the responsibility of making the cer
tificate run to the plaintiff.
It also appears in the case at bar that the loss of the plaintiff resulted
because of its own contributory negligence in failing to check the col
lateral. (Craig n. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55: aff’d., 242 N. Y. 569.)
In so far as the claim of actual fraud is concerned, there is no proof in
this record sufficient to support such a finding by a jury. The court, there
fore, properly dismissed this cause of action. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 457-a.) This
is so, even assuming that personal connivance and fraud on the part of the
employees of defendants could be held within the scope of the authority
given to these employees by the defendants, which at least is doubtful.
(Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1; Credit Alliance Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre
Co., 241 id. 216; Martin v. Gotham Nat. Bank, 248 id. 313.)
It follows that the judgment and order should be affirmed.
Martin, J., concurs.
Judgment and order modified by reversing so much thereof as sets aside
the verdict and dismisses the amended complaint as to the first cause of
action, and by directing that the verdict be reinstated and judgment
entered thereon, with costs to the plaintiff, and as so modified affirmed,
without costs.

ULTRAMARES CORP. v. TOUCHE *
Court of Appeals of New York, 1931. 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441.

[Cross-appeals from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Su
preme Court in the first judicial department, entered June 18, 1930, which
modified and affirmed as modified a judgment in favor of defendants,
entered upon an order of the court at a T rial Term setting aside a ver
dict in favor of plaintiff and dismissing the complaint. T he defendants
appeal from so much of the judgment as reversed the judgment dismissing
the complaint as to the first cause of action and directed reinstatement of
the verdict; and the plaintiff appeals from so much of said judgment as
affirmed the judgment of the T rial Term dismissing the complaint as to
the second cause of action.]
Cardozo, Ch. J. T he action is in tort for damages suffered through
the misrepresentations of accountants, the first cause of action being
for misrepresentations that were merely negligent and the second for
misrepresentations charged to have been fraudulent.
In January, 1924, the defendants, a firm of public accountants, were
employed by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to prepare and certify a balance
sheet exhibiting the condition of its business as of December 31, 1923.
They had been employed at the end of each of the three years preced
ing to render a like service. Fred Stern 8c Co., Inc., which was in sub
stance Stern himself, was engaged in the importation and sale of rubber.
T o finance its operations, it required extensive credit and borrowed
large sums of money from banks and other lenders. All this was known
* T his decision reverses the Appellate Division decision reprinted at p. 175 supra.
It is discussed at p. 30 ff. supra.

LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES — AT COMMON LAW

181

to the defendants. T he defendants knew also that in the usual course of
business the balance sheet when certified would be exhibited by the Stern
company to banks, creditors, stockholders, purchasers or sellers, accord
ing to the needs of the occasion, as the basis of financial dealings. Ac
cordingly, when the balance sheet was made up, the defendants supplied
the Stern company with thirty-two copies certified with serial numbers
as counterpart originals. Nothing was said as to the persons to whom
these counterparts would be shown or the extent or num ber of the trans
actions in which they would be used. In particular there was no mention
of the plaintiff, a corporation doing business chiefly as a factor, which
till then had never made advances to the Stern company, though it had
sold merchandise in small amounts. The range of the transactions in
which a certificate of audit might be expected to play a part was as in
definite and wide as the possibilities of the business that was mirrored in
the summary.
By February 26, 1924, the audit was finished and the balance sheet
made up. It stated assets in the sum of $2,550,671.88 and liabilities other
than capital and surplus in the sum of $1,479,956.62, thus showing a net
worth of $1,070,715.26. Attached to the balance sheet was a certificate
as follows:
“Touche, Niven & Co.
“Public Accountants
“Eighty Maiden Lane
“New York
“February 26, 1924.
“Certificate of Auditors
“We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the
year ending December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and with the information and
explanations given us. We further certify that, subject to provision for
federal taxes on income, the said statement, in our opinion, presents a
true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
as at December 31, 1923.
“T ouche, N iven & Co.
“Public Accountants.”
Capital and surplus were intact if the balance sheet was accurate. In
reality both had been wiped out, and the corporation was insolvent. The
books had been falsified by those in charge of the business so as to set
forth accounts receivable and other assets which turned out to be ficti
tious. T he plaintiff maintains that the certificate of audit was erroneous
in both its branches. The first branch, the asserted correspondence be
tween the accounts and the balance sheet, is one purporting to be made
as of the knowledge of the auditors. The second branch, which certifies
to a belief that the condition reflected in the balance sheet presents a
true and correct picture of the resources of the business, is stated as a
m a tte r of o p in io n . In th e view of th e plaintiff, b o th branches of the
certificate are either fraudulent or negligent. As to one class of assets,
the item of accounts receivable, if not also as to others, there was no real
correspondence, we are told, between balance sheet and books, or so the
triers of the facts might find. If correspondence, however, be assumed,
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a closer examination of supporting invoices and records, or a fuller in
quiry directed to the persons appearing on the books as creditors or
debtors, would have exhibited the truth.
T he plaintiff, a corporation engaged in business as a factor, was ap
proached by Stern in March, 1924, with a request for loans of money to
finance the sales of rubber. Up to that time the dealings between the two
houses were on a cash basis and trifling in amount. As a condition of any
loans the plaintiff insisted that it receive a balance sheet certified by public
accountants, and in response to that demand it was given one of the cer
tificates signed by the defendants and then in Stern’s possession. On the
faith of that certificate the plaintiff made a loan which was followed by
many others. The course of business was for Stern to deliver to the plain
tiff documents described as trust receipts which in effect were executory
assignments of the moneys payable by purchasers for goods thereafter to
be sold. When the purchase price was due, the plaintiff received the
payment, reimbursing itself therefrom for its advances and commissions.
Some of these transactions were effected without loss. Nearly a year later,
in December, 1924, the house of cards collapsed. In that month, plaintiff
made three loans to the Stern company, one of $100,000, a second of $25,
000, and a third of $40,000. For some of these loans no security was re
ceived. For some of the earlier loans the security was inadequate. On
January 2, 1925, the Stern company was declared a bankrupt.
This action, brought against the accountants in November, 1926. to
recover the loss suffered by the plaintiff in reliance upon the audit, was
in its inception one for negligence. On the trial there was added a second
cause of action asserting fraud also. T he trial judge dismissed the second
cause of action without submitting it to the jury. As to the first cause of
action, he reserved his decision on the defendants’ motion to dismiss
and took the jury’s verdict. They were told that the defendants might
be held liable if with knowledge that the results of the audit would be
communicated to creditors they did the work negligently, and that negli
gence was the omission to use reasonable and ordinary care. T he verdict
was in favor of the plaintiff for $187,576.32. On the coming in of the
verdict, the judge granted the reserved motion. T he Appellate Division
affirmed the dismissal of the cause of action for fraud, but reversed the
dismissal of the cause of action for negligence, and reinstated the verdict.
T he case is here on cross-appeals.
T he two causes of action will be considered in succession, first the
one for negligence and second that for fraud.
(1) We think the evidence supports a finding that the audit was
negligently made, though in so saying we put aside for the moment the
question whether negligence, even if it existed, was a wrong to the plain
tiff. T o explain fully or adequately how the defendants were at fault
would carry this opinion beyond reasonable bounds. A sketch, however,
there must be, at least in respect of some features of the audit, for the
nature of the fault, when understood, is helpful in defining the ambit
of the duty.
We begin with the item of accounts receivable. At the start of the
defendants’ audit, there had been no posting of the general ledger since
April, 1923. Siess, a junior accountant, was assigned by the defendants
to the performance of that work. On Sunday, February 3, 1924, he had
finished the task of posting, and was ready the next day to begin with
his associates the preparation of the balance sheet and the audit of its
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items. The total of the accounts receivable for December, 1923, as thus
posted by Siess from the entries in the journal, was $644,758.17. At some
time on February 3, Romberg, an employee of the Stern company, who
had general charge of its accounts, placed below that total another item
to represent additional accounts receivable growing out of the transactions
of the month. This new item, $706,843.07, Romberg entered in his own
handwriting. The sales that it represented were, each and all, fictitious.
Opposite the entry were placed other figures (12-29), indicating or sup
posed to indicate a reference to the journal. Siess when he resumed his
work saw the entries thus added, and included the new item in making
up his footings, with the result of an apparent increase of over $700,000
in the assets of the business. He says that in doing this he supposed the
entries to be correct, and that his task at the moment being merely to
post the books, he thought the work of audit or verification might come
later, and put it off accordingly. T he time sheets, which are in evidence,
show very clearly that this was the order of time in which the parts of the
work were done. Verification, however, there never was either by Siess
or by his superiors, or so the triers of the facts might say. If any had
been attempted, or any that was adequate, an examiner would have found
that the entry in the ledger was not supported by any entry in the jour
nal. If from the journal he had gone to the book from which the journal
was made up, described as “the debit memo book,” support would still
have failed. Going farther, he would have found invoices, seventeen in
number, which amounted in the aggregate to the interpolated item, but
scrutiny of these invoices would have disclosed suspicious features in
that they had no shipping num ber nor a customer’s order number and
varied in terms of credit and in other respects from those usual in the
business. A mere glance reveals the difference.
T he December entry of accounts receivable was not the only item that
a careful and skillful auditor would have desired to investigate. There
was ground for suspicion as to an item of $113,199.60, included in the
accounts payable as due from the Baltic Corporation. As to this the de
fendants received an explanation, not very convincing, from Stern and
Romberg. A cautious auditor might have been dissatisfied and have un
covered what was wrong. There was ground for suspicion also because
of the inflation of the inventory. The inventory as it was given to the
auditors, was totaled at $347,219.08. T he defendants discovered errors in
the sum of $303,863.20, and adjusted the balance sheet accordingly. Both
the extent of the discrepancy and its causes might have been found to
cast discredit upon the business and the books. There was ground for
suspicion again in the record of assigned accounts. Inquiry of the creditors
gave notice to the defendants that the same accounts had been pledged to
two, three and four banks at the same time. The pledges did not diminish
the value of the assets, but made in such circumstances they might well
evoke a doubt as to the solvency of a business where such conduct was
permitted. There was an explanation by Romberg which the defendants
accepted as sufficient. Caution and diligence might have pressed investi
gation farther.
If the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff to act with the same care
that would have been due under a contract of employment, a jury was
at liberty to find a verdict of negligence upon a showing of a scrutiny so
imperfect and perfunctory. No doubt the extent to which inquiry must
be pressed beyond appearances is a question of judgment, as to which

184

Accountants ’ legal responsibility

opinions will often differ. No doubt the wisdom that is born after the
event will engender suspicion and distrust when old acquaintance and
good repute may have silenced doubt at the beginning. All this is to be
weighed by a jury in applying its standard of behavior, the state of mind
and conduct of the reasonable man. Even so, the adverse verdict, when
rendered, imports an alignment of the weights in their proper places in
the balance and a reckoning thereafter. T he reckoning was not wrong
upon the evidence before us, if duty be assumed.
We are brought to the question of duty, its origin and measure.
T he defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to
make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract
to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling. Fraud in
cludes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none. To
creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate,
the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there
was notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer did not
intend to keep it to himself (Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery, 83
N. Y. 31; Tindie n. Birkett, 171 N. Y. 520). A different question develops
when we ask whether they owed a duty to these to make it without
negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a
business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt
whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to
these consequences. We put aside for the moment any statement in the
certificate which involves the representation of a fact as true to the
knowledge of the auditors. If such a statement was made, whether
believed to be true or not, the defendants are liable for deceit in the
event that it was false. T he plaintiff does not need the invention of
novel doctrine to help it out in such conditions. T he case was submitted
to the jury and the verdict was returned upon the theory that even in the
absence of a misstatement of a fact there is a liability also for erroneous
opinion. T he expression of an opinion is to be subject to a warranty
implied by law. What, then, is the warranty, as yet unformulated, to be?
Is it merely that the opinion is honestly conceived and that the pre
liminary inquiry has been honestly pursued, that a halt has not been
made without a genuine belief that the search has been reasonably
adequate to bring disclosure of the truth? Or does it go farther and
involve the assumption of a liability for any blunder or inattention that
could fairly be spoken of as negligence if the controversy were one
between accountant and employer for breach of a contract to render
services for pay?
T he assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of
juridical discussion (Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation,
24 Harv. L. Rev. 415, 433; Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts, pp. 150,
151; Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or W arranty, 42
Harv. L. Rev. 733; Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 Harv. L.
Rev. 184; Green, Judge and Jury, chapter Deceit, p. 280; 16 Va. Law
Rev. 749). In the field of the law of contract there has been a gradual
widening of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y. 268), until today
the beneficiary of a promise, clearly designated as such, is seldom left
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without a remedy (Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 238). Even in that
field, however, the remedy is narrower where the beneficiaries of the
promise are indeterminate or general. Something more must then appear
than an intention that the promise shall redound to the benefit of the
public or to that of a class of indefinite extension. T he promise must
be such as to “bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation
directly to the individual members of the public if the benefit is lost”
(Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 164; American Law
Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 145). In the field of the
law of torts a manufacturer who is negligent in the manufacture of a
chattel in circumstances pointing to an unreasonable risk of serious
bodily harm to those using it thereafter may be liable for negligence
though privity is lacking between manufacturer and user (MacPherson
v. Buick M otor Co., 217 N. Y. 382; American Law Institute, Restatement
of the Law of Torts, § 262). A force or instrument of harm having been
launched with potentialities of danger manifest to the eye of prudence,
the one who launches it is under a duty to keep it within bounds (Moch
Co. n. Rensselaer Water Co., supra, at p. 168). Even so, the question is
still open whether the potentialities of danger that will charge with
liability are confined to harm to the person, or include injury to property
(Pine Grove Poultry Farm v. Newton B.-P. Mfg. Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 296;
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303; American Law
Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, supra). In either view, how
ever, what is released or set in motion is a physical force. We are now
asked to say that a like liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or
a release of the explosive power resident in words.
Three cases in this court are said by the plaintiff to have committed
us to the doctrine that words, written or oral, if negligently published
with the expectation that the reader or listener will transmit them to
another, will lay a basis for liability though privity be lacking. These
are Glanzer v. Shepard (233 N. Y. 236); International Products Co. v.
Erie R . R . Co. (244 N. Y. 331), and Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat.
Bank (253 N. Y. 369).
In Glanzer v. Shepard the seller of beans requested the defendants,
public weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish the buyer
with a copy. This the defendants did. T heir return, which was made out
in duplicate, one copy to the seller and the other to the buyer, recites that
it was made by order of the former for the use of the latter. T he buyer
paid the seller on the faith of the certificate which turned out to be
erroneous. We held that the weighers were liable at the suit of the buyer
for the moneys overpaid. Here was something more than the rendition
of a service in the expectation that the one who ordered the certificate
would use it thereafter in the operations of his business as occasion might
require. Here was a case where the transmission of the certificate to
another was not merely one possibility among many, but the “end and
aim of the transaction,” as certain and immediate and deliberately willed
as if a husband were to order a gown to be delivered to his wife, or a
telegraph company, contracting with the sender of a message, were to
telegraph it wrongly to the damage of the person expected to receive it
(Wolfskehl v. Western Union Tel. Co., 46 Hun, 542; D eRuth v. New
York, etc., Tel. Co., 1 Daly, 547; M illiken v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
110 N. Y. 403, 410). T he intimacy of the resulting nexus is attested by the
fact that after stating the case in terms of legal duty, we went on to point
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that viewing it as a phase or extension of Lawrence n. F ox (supra), or
Seaver v. Ransom (supra), we could reach the same result by stating it in
terms of contract (cf. Economy Building & Loan Assn. v. West Jersey
Title Co., 64 N. J.L . 27; Young v. Lohr, 118 Iowa, 624; M urphy v.
Fidelity, Abstract & Title Co., 114 Wash. 77). T he bond was so close as to
approach that of privity, if not completely one with it. Not so in the
case at hand. No one would be likely to urge that there was a contractual
relation, or even one approaching it, at the root of any duty that was
owing from the defendants now before us to the indeterminate class of
persons who, presently or in the future, might deal with the Stern com
pany in reliance on the audit. In a word, the service rendered by the de
fendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the information of a
third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract, and only
incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand, the
service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern company, a convenient
instrumentality for use in the development of the business, and only in
cidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern and his
associates might exhibit it thereafter. Foresight of these possibilities may
charge with liability for fraud. T he conclusion does not follow that it
will charge with liability for negligence.
In the next of the three cases (International Products Co. v. Erie
R. R . Co., supra) the plaintiff, an importer, had an agreement with the
defendant, a railroad company, that the latter would act as bailee of
goods arriving from abroad. T he importer, to protect the goods by
suitable insurance, made inquiry of the bailee as to the location of the
storage. T he warehouse was incorrectly named, and the policy did not
attach. Here was a determinate relation, that of bailor and bailee, either
present or prospective, with peculiar opportunity for knowledge on the
part of the bailee as to the subject-matter of the statement and with a
continuing duty to correct it if erroneous. Even the narrowest holdings
as to liability for unintentional misstatement concede that a representa
tion in such circumstances may be equivalent to a warranty. There is a
class of cases “where a person within whose special province it lay to
know a particular fact, has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry made
with regard to it by a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for the
purpose of determining his course accordingly, and has been held bound
to make good the assurance he has given” (H erschell, L. C., in Derry v.
Peek, [L. R.] 14 A. C. 337, 360). So in Burrowes v. Lock (10 Ves. 470),
a trustee was asked by one who expected to make a loan upon the security
of a trust fund whether notice of any prior incumbrance upon the fund
had been given to him. An action for damages was upheld though the
false answer was made honestly in the belief that it was true (cf. Brownlie
v. Campbell, [L. R.] 5 A. C. 925, 935; Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat.
Bank, supra, at p. 379).
In one respect the decision in International Products Co. v. Erie R . R .
Co. is in advance of anything decided in Glanzer v. Shepard. T he latter
case suggests that the liability there enforced was not one for the mere
utterance of words without due consideration, but for a negligent service,
the act of weighing, which happened to find in the words of the certificate
its culmination and its summary. This was said in the endeavor to
emphasize the character of the certificate as a business transaction, an
act in the law, and not a mere casual response to a request for informa
tion. The ruling in the case of the Erie Railroad shows that the rendition
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of a service is at most a mere circumstance and not an indispensable
condition. The Erie was not held for negligence in the rendition of a
service. It was held for words and nothing more. So in the case at
hand. If liability for the consequences of a negligent certificate may be
enforced by any member of an indeterminate class of creditors, present
and prospective, known and unknown, the existence or non-existence
of a preliminary act of service will not affect the cause of action. The
service may have been rendered as carefully as you please, and its quality
will count for nothing if there was negligence thereafter in distributing
the summary.
Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank (supra), the third of the cases
cited, is even more plainly indecisive. A trust company was a trustee
under a deed of trust to secure an issue of bonds. It was held liable to a
subscriber for the bonds when it certified them falsely. A representation
by a trustee intended to sway action had been addressed to a person who
by the act of subscription was to become a party to the deed and a cestui
que trust.
The antidote to these decisions and to the over-use of the doctrine of
liability for negligent misstatement may be found in Jaillet v. Cashman
(235 N. Y. 511) and Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking
P. Corp. (245 N. Y. 377). In the first of these cases the defendant supply
ing ticker service to brokers was held not liable in damages to one of the
broker’s customers for the consequences of reliance upon a report negli
gently published on the ticker. If liability had been upheld, the step
would have been a short one to the declaration of a like liability on the
part of proprietors of newspapers. In the second the principle was clearly
stated by P ound, J., that “negligent words are not actionable unless they
are uttered directly, with knowledge or notice that they will be acted on,
to one to whom the speaker is bound by some relation of duty, arising out
of public calling, contract or otherwise, to act with care if he acts at all.”
From the foregoing analysis the conclusion is, we think, inevitable that
nothing in our previous decisions commits us to a holding of liability for
negligence in the circumstances of the case at hand, and that such
liability, if recognized, will be an extension of the principle of those
decisions to different conditions, even if more or less analogous. The
question then is whether such an extension shall be made.
The extension, if made, will so expand the field of liability for
negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite, coterminous with that
of liability for fraud. Again and again, in decisions of this court, the
bounds of this latter liability have been set up, with futility the fate of
every endeavor to dislodge them. Scienter has been declared to be an in
dispensable element except where the representation has been put for
ward as true of one’s own knowledge (Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604),
or in circumstances where the expression of opinion was a dishonorable
pretense (3 Williston, Contracts, § 1494; Smith v. Land & House Prop.
Corp., [L. R .] 28 Ch. Div. 7, 15; Sleeper v. Smith, 77 N. H. 337; Andrews
v. Jackson, 168 Mass. 266; People ex rel. Gellis v. Sheriff, 251 N. Y. 33, 37;
Hickey v. Morrell, 102 N. Y. 454, 463; Merry Realty Co. v. Martin, 103
Misc. Rep. 9, 14; 186 App. Div. 538). Even an opinion especially an opinion
by an expert, may be found to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting
it are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief
back of it. Further than that this court has never gone. Directors of
corporations have been acquitted of liability for deceit though they
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have been lax in investigation and negligent in speech (Reno v. Bull,
226 N. Y. 546, and cases there cited; Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124).
This has not meant, to be sure, that negligence may not be evidence from
which a trier of the facts may draw an inference of fraud (Derry v. Peek,
[L. R.] 14 A. C. 337, 369, 375, 376), but merely that if that inference is
rejected, or, in the light of all the circumstances, is found to be unreason
able, negligence alone is not a substitute for fraud. Many also are the
cases that have distinguished between the willful or reckless representa
tion essential to the maintenance at law of an action for deceit, and the
misrepresentation, negligent or innocent, that will lay a sufficient basis
for rescission in equity (Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N. Y. 375; Seneca Wire
& Mfg. Co. v. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1). If this action is well conceived,
all these principles and distinctions, so nicely wrought and formulated,
have been a waste of time and effort. They have even been a snare, en
trapping litigants and lawyers into an abandonment of the true remedy
lying ready to the call. T he suitors thrown out of court because they
proved negligence, and nothing else, in an action for deceit, might have
ridden to trium phant victory if they had proved the self-same facts,
but had given the wrong another label, and all this in a State where forms
of action have been abolished. So to hold is near to saying that we have
been paltering with justice. A word of caution or suggestion would have
set the erring suitor right. Many pages of opinion were written by judges
the most eminent, yet the word was never spoken. We may not speak it
now. A change so revolutionary, if expedient, must be wrought by legisla
tion (Landell v. L y brand, 264 Penn. St. 406).
We have said that the duty to refrain from negligent representation
would become coincident or nearly so with the duty to refrain from fraud
if this action could be maintained. A representation even though know
ingly false does not constitute ground for an action of deceit unless made
with the intent to be communicated to the persons or class of persons who
act upon it to their prejudice (Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery,
supra). Affirmance of this judgment would require us to hold that all or
nearly all the persons so situated would suffer an impairment of an in
terest legally protected if the representation had been negligent. We
speak of all “or nearly all,” for cases can be imagined where a casual
response, made in circumstances insufficient to indicate that care should
be expected, would permit recovery for fraud if willfully deceitful. Cases
of fraud between persons so circumstanced are, however, too infrequent
and exceptional to make the radii greatly different if the fields of liability
for negligence and deceit be figured as concentric circles. T he like may
be said of the possibility that the negligence of the injured party, con
tributing to the result, may avail to overcome the one remedy, though un
availing to defeat the other.
Neither of these possibilities is noted by the plaintiff in its answer to
the suggestion that the two fields would be coincident. Its answer has
been merely this, first, that the duty to speak with care does not arise
unless the words are the culmination of a service, and second, that it does
not arise unless the service is rendered in the pursuit of an independent
calling, characterized as public. As to the first of these suggestions, we
have already had occasion to observe that given a relation making
diligence a duty, speech as well as conduct must conform to that exacting
standard (International Products Co. v. Erie R . R . Co., supra). As to
the second of the two suggestions, public accountants are public only in

LIABILITY TO T H IR D PARTIES — A T COMMON LAW

189

the sense that their services are offered to any one who chooses to employ
them. This is far from saying that those who do not employ them are in
the same position as those who do.
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many
callings other than an auditor’s. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to
the validity of municipal or corporate bonds with knowledge that the
opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to
the investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same
extent as if the controversy were one between client and adviser. T itle
companies insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge that at an
approaching auction the fact that they have insured will be stated to the
bidders, will become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a
policy without payment of a premium. These illustrations may seem to
be extreme, but they go little, if any, farther than we are invited to go now.
Negligence, moreover, will have one standard when viewed in relation to
the employer, and another and at times a stricter standard when viewed
in relation to the public. Explanations that might seem plausible,
omissions that might be reasonable, if the duty is confined to the em
ployer, conducting a business that presumably at least is not a fraud upon
his creditors, might wear another aspect if an independent duty to be
suspicious even of one’s principal is owing to investors. “Every one
making a promise having the quality of a contract will be under a duty
to the promisee by virtue of the promise, but under another duty, apart
from contract, to an indefinite number of potential beneficiaries when
performance has begun. The assumption of one relation will mean the
involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, inescapably hooked
together’’ (Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., supra, at p. 168). “The
law does not spread its protection so far’’ (Robins Dry Dock & Repair
Co. v. Flint, supra, at p. 309).
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences
of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as
to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for
this again is fraud. It does no more than say that if less than this is
proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere pro
fession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for
negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced
between the parties by whom the contract has been made. We doubt
whether the average business man receiving a certificate without paying
for it and receiving it merely as one among a m ultitude of possible in
vestors, would look for anything more.
(2) The second cause of action is yet to be considered.
The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that
the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account. If their
statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because they believed
it to be true (Hadcock v. Osmer, supra; Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v. Bam
ford, 150 U. S. 665, 673; Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403;
Arnold v. Richardson, 74 App. Div. 581). We think the triers of the facts
might hold it to be false.
C orrespondence betw een th e balan ce sheet a n d the books im ports

something more, or so the triers of the facts might say, than correspond
ence between the balance sheet and the general ledger, unsupported or
even contradicted by every other record. T he correspondence to be of
any moment may not unreasonably be held to signify a correspondence
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between the statement and the books of original entry, the books taken
as a whole. If that is what the certificate means, a jury could find that
the correspondence did not exist and that the defendants signed the
certificates without knowing it to exist and even without reasonable
grounds for belief in its existence. T he item of $706,000, representing
fictitious accounts receivable, was entered in the ledger after defendant’s
employee Siess had posted the December sales. He knew of the interpola
tion, and knew that there was need to verify the entry by reference to
books other than the ledger before the books could be found to be in
agreement with the balance sheet. The evidence would sustain a finding
that this was never done. By concession the interpolated item had no
support in the journal, or in any journal voucher, or in the debit memo
book, which was a summary of the invoices, or in any thing except the
invoices themselves. T he defendants do not say that they ever looked at
the invoices, seventeen in number, representing these accounts. They
profess to be unable to recall whether they did so or not. They admit,
however, that if they had looked, they would have found omissions and
irregularities so many and unusual as to have called for further in
vestigation. W hen we couple the refusal to say that they did look with
the admission that if they had looked, they would or could have seen,
the situation is revealed as one in which a jury might reasonably find
that in truth they did not look, but certified the correspondence without
testing its existence.
In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already stated
in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even when not
equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an inference of
fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross. Not a little confusion
has at times resulted from an undiscriminating quotation of statements
in Kountze v. Kennedy (supra), statements proper enough in their
setting, but capable of misleading when extracted and considered by
themselves. “Misjudgment, however gross,” it was there observed, “or
want of caution, however marked, is not fraud.” This was said in a case
where the trier of the facts had held the defendants guiltless. The judg
ment in this court amounted merely to a holding that a finding of fraud
did not follow as an inference of law. There was no holding that the
evidence would have required a reversal of the judgment if the finding as
to guilt had been the other way. Even Derry v. Peek, as we have seen,
asserts the probative effect of negligence as an evidentiary fact. We
had no thought in Kountze v. Kennedy of upholding a doctrine more
favorable to wrongdoers, though there was a reservation suggesting the
approval of a rule more rigorous. The opinion of this court cites Derry
v. Peek, and states the holding there made that an action would not lie
if the defendant believed the representation made by him to be true,
although without reasonable cause for such belief. “It is not necessary,”
we said, “to go to this extent to uphold the present judgment, for the
referee, as has been stated, found that the belief of Kennedy * * * was
based upon reasonable grounds.” The setting of the occasion justified the
inference that the representations did not involve a profession of knowl
edge as distinguished from belief (147 N. Y. at p. 133). No such charity
of construction exonerates accountants, who by the very nature of their
calling profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an agreement
between the audit and the entries.
T he defendants attempt to excuse the omission of an inspection of the
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invoices proved to be fictitious by invoking a practice known as that
of testing and sampling. A random choice of accounts is made from the
total number on the books, and these, if found to be regular when in
spected and investigated, are taken as a fair indication of the quality of
the mass. The defendants say that about 200 invoices were examined
in accordance with this practice, but they do not assert that any of the
seventeen invoices supporting the fictitious sales were among the number
so selected. Verification by test and sample was very likely a sufficient
audit as to accounts regularly entered upon the books in the usual course
of business. It was plainly insufficient, however, as to accounts not entered
upon the books where inspection of the invoices was necessary, not as a
check upon accounts fair upon their face, but in order to ascertain
whether there were any accounts at all. If the only invoices inspected
were invoices unrelated to the interpolated entry, the result was to certify a
correspondence between the books and the balance sheet without any
effort by the auditors, as to $706,000 of accounts, to ascertain whether the
certified agreement was in accordance with the truth. How far books of
account fair upon their face are to be probed by accountants in an
effort to ascertain whether the transactions back of them are in accord
ance with the entries, involves to some extent the exercise of judgment
and discretion. Not so, however, the inquiry whether the entries certified
as there, are there in very truth, there in the form and in the places where
men of business training would expect them to be. T he defendants were
put on their guard by the circumstances touching the December accounts
receivable to scrutinize with special care. A jury might find that with
suspicions thus awakened, they closed their eyes to the obvious, and
blindly gave assent.
We conclude, to sum up the situation, that in certifying to the cor
respondence between balance sheet and accounts the defendants made a
statement as true to their own knowledge, when they had, as a jury
might find, no knowledge on the subject. If that is so, they may also be
found to have acted without information leading to a sincere or genuine
belief when they certified to an opinion that the balance sheet faithfully
reflected the condition of the business.
Whatever wrong was committed by the defendants was not their per
sonal act or omission, but that of their subordinates. This does not
relieve them, however, of liability to answer in damages for the con
sequences of the wrong, if wrong there shall be found to be. It is not a
Question of constructive notice, as where facts are brought home to the
knowledge of subordinates whose interests are adverse to those of the
employer (Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1; see, however, American Law In
stitute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 506, subd. 2-a). These sub
ordinates, so far as the record shows, had no interests adverse to the de
fendants’, nor any thought in what they did to be unfaithful to their trust.
The question is merely this, whether the defendants, having delegated
the performance of this work to agents of their own selection, are respon
sible for the manner in which the business of the agency was done. As to
that the answer is not doubtful (Fifth Ave. Bank v. 42d St., etc., R. R . Co.,
137 N. Y. 231; Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U. S. 349, 356;
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, §481).
Upon the defendants’ appeal as to the first cause of action, the judg
ment of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and that of the T rial
Term affirmed, with costs in the Appellate Division and in this court.
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Upon the plaintiff’s appeal as to the second cause of action, the judg
ment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be
reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
P ound, Crane, L ehman, Kellogg, O ’Brien and H ubbs, JJ., concur.
Judgm ent accordingly.

BEARDSLEY v. ERNST *
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, 1934. 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N. E. 808.

Syllabus by the Court.
In an action for damages for fraudulent misrepresentations of account
ants, brought by one purchasing stocks and bonds, relying on such ac
counts’ certified balance sheet, fraud is not established, where it is shown
by the accountants’ certificate that the statements “were based upon
statments from abroad with respect to the foreign constituent companies.”
Such statement gives rise to the indisputable inference that the account
ants had not examined the records of the foreign constituent companies.
M cG ill, Judge. This is a proceeding in error to reverse a judgment of
the court of common pleas wherein Martha R. Beardsley was plaintiff and
Alwin C. Ernst and others were defendants.
T he petition in substance alleged that the defendants were copartners
doing business as Ernst & Ernst, who were certified public accountants. It
further alleged that the plaintiff in 1931 purchased at different times two
bonds and twenty-one shares of preferred stock in the International Match
Corporation. T he petition set forth that the plaintiff acted upon her own
initiative and relied upon the certification made by the expert accountants
to the consolidated balance sheet and consolidated income and surplus
account of the International Match Corporation for the year 1929 and
for the year 1930.
It was further alleged by the plaintiff that the certificates made by the
defendants were fraudulent, in that the defendants purported to have
knowledge of the facts when in truth the defendants had no such knowl
edge; that the fraud was not discovered until after the suicide and death
of Ivar Krueger, which occurred in Paris on March 12, 1932; and, further,
that the bonds and stocks were at said time worthless and the International
Match Corporation was bankrupt, although not so officially declared at the
time of the purchases. By reason of these facts plaintiff claimed damages
resulting from the alleged fraud in the sum of $2,339.99.
T he defendants filed a joint answer, which, in substance, admitted the
partnership; admitted the execution of the certificates; and also pleaded a
general denial. A jury having been waived, the court below heard the
evidence and rendered judgment for the defendants.
An examination of the record discloses that each certificate executed
by the defendants was as follows:
"We hereby certify that we have examined the books of account and
record of International Match Corporation and its American Subsidiary
company at December 31, 1929, and have received statements from abroad
with respect to the foreign constitutent companies as of the same date.
* See footnote 47 supra.
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Based upon our examination and information submitted to us it is our
opinion that the annexed Consolidated Balance Sheet sets forth the finan
cial condition of the combined companies at the date stated, and that the
related Consolidated Income and Surplus Account is correct.
“Ernst & Ernst.”
On behalf of the plaintiff, proof was introduced that the International
Match Corporation was adjudicated bankrupt by the United States Dis
trict Court of the Southern District of New York on April 9, 1932. There
were introduced by stipulation copies of an audit made by Price, Waterhouse & Co., who were employed to audit the affairs of the International
Match Corporation, and these audits had been filed with the referee in
bankruptcy.
The audit made by Price, Waterhouse & Co. revealed annual net earn
ings of the International Match Corporation for the years involved to be
approximately $8,000,000, whereas the defendants had certified the net
income for 1929 and 1930 respectively to have been in excess of
$20,000,000.
The plaintiff relies largely upon the case of Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 442, 74 A. L. R. 1139. In that case a
certificate was made by Touche, Niven & Co., who were public account
ants, to the effect that they had examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co.,
Incorporated, and the certificate stated “that the annexed balance sheet is
in accordance therewith and * * * the said statement, in our opinion,
presents a true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.”
The lower court, in the Touche Case, held the accountants liable for
negligence and not liable for fraud. Both sides appealed, and Judge
Cardozo reversed both holdings and found that the accountants were not
liable for negligence, but were liable for fraud. In that case, syllabus 8
reads as follows:
“8. In action for damages for fraudulent misrepresentations of account
ants, brought by person making advances relying on certified balance
sheet, dismissal without submission to jury held error.
“The evidence indicated that, in certifying to the correspondence be
tween balance sheet and accounts, the defendant accountants made a
statement as true to their own knowledge when they had no knowledge
on the subject.”
If certified public accountants examine the books and records of a cor
poration and certify that the balance sheet reflects the true condition of
the books and records examined, and there is a substantial variation be
tween the balance sheet and such books and records, an action would no
doubt lie against the accountants, where the certification was made know
ingly, or where there was a pretense of knowledge when in fact they had no
knowledge.
In the instant case, however, the certificate made by Ernst & Ernst
clearly states that it is based both upon an examination of records and
upon statements received from abroad with respect to the foreign con
stituent companies. T h e language used in these certificates gives rise to
the indisputable inference that the accountants had not examined the
books and records of the foreign constituent companies.
The record does not establish fraud or any false or fraudulent state
ments in relation to the examination actually made of the books and
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records in this country. We do not think that the defendants can be
charged with fraud under these certificates by the very language used
therein, when they in fact disclose that some of the information and state
ments came from abroad. It is obvious that the accountants in this case
could not know whether or not the information from abroad was accurate
or inaccurate, and, inasmuch as they disclose that these certificates were
based partly upon information so received, there was no pretense of
knowledge as to the information received which would make defendants
liable.
Accordingly, the judgment of the common pleas court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

GLANZER v. SHEPARD *
Court of Appeals of New York, 1922. 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275.

Appeal, by permission, from a judgment entered January 21, 1921, upon
an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first
judicial department, which reversed a determination of the Appellate
Term, reversing a judgment of the City Court of the city of New York in
favor of plaintiffs entered upon a verdict directed by the court and affirmed
said City Court judgment.
Cardozo, J. Plaintiffs bought of Bech, Van Siclen & Co., a corporation,
905 bags of beans. The beans were to be paid for in accordance with
weight sheets certified by public weighers. Bech, Van Siclen & Co., the
seller, requested the defendants, who are engaged in business as public
weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish the buyers with a copy.
A letter to the weighers, dated July 20, 1918, informed them that the bags
were on the dock, that the beans had been sold to Glanzer Bros., the plain
tiffs, who would accept delivery Tuesday, July 23, and that the defendants
were to communicate with the plaintiffs, and ascertain whether it would
“be in order” to be on the pier Tuesday morning to weigh the beans
before delivery. The defendants did as bidden. They certified the weight
of the 905 bags to be 228,380 pounds, and were paid for the service by
the seller. T heir return recites that it has been made “by order of” Bech,
Van Siclen & Co., “for G. Bros.” One copy of the return they sent to the
seller, and a duplicate to the buyers. Later, 17 bags, containing 4,136
pounds, were withdrawn from the shipment. The others were accepted
and paid for on the faith of the certificates. The plaintiffs, upon attempt
ing a resale, found that the actual weight was less by 11,854 pounds than
the weight as certified in the return. Upon learning this, they brought
suit against the defendants in the City Court of New York for $1,261.26,
the amount overpaid. T he trial judge, upon motions made by each side
for the direction of a verdict, ordered judgment for the plaintiffs. The
Appellate Term reversed upon the ground that the plaintiffs had no con
tract with the defendants, and must seek their remedy against the seller.
The Appellate Division reversed the Appellate Term, and reinstated the
verdict. The defendants are the appellants here.
We think the law imposes a duty toward buyer as well as seller in the
situation here disclosed. T he plaintiffs’ use of the certificates was not an
* T his case is discussed at p. 31 f. supra.
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indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers. It was a
consequence, which, to the weighers’ knowledge, was the end and aim of
the transaction. Bech, Van Siclen & Co. ordered, but Glanzer Brothers
were to use. T he defendants held themselves out to the public as skilled
and careful in their calling. They knew that the beans had been sold, and
that on the faith of their certificate payment would be made. They sent a
copy to the plaintiffs for the very purpose of inducing action. All this
they admit. In such circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing
was the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose
conduct was to be governed. We do not need to state the duty in terms
of contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it has none the less
an origin not exclusively contractual. Given the contract and the relation,
the duty is imposed by law (cf. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y.
382, 390).
There is nothing new here in principle. If there is novelty, it is in the
instance only. One who follows a common calling may come under a duty
to another whom he serves, though a third may give the order or make
the payment (1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, pp. 187, 188;
Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts, 44 Am. Law Reg.
[N. S.] 209, 218, 293, 294; 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law, p. 332).
“It is the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly as he
ought” (Fitzherbert Abr., Trespass sue le Case, 94d, quoted by Bohlen,
supra, p. 293). T he surgeon who unskillfully sets the wounded arm of a
child is liable for his negligence, though the father pays the bill (Gladwell
v. Steggall, 5 Bing. N. C. 733; Pippin v. Sheppard, 11 Price, 400-411). T he
bailee who is careless in the keeping of the goods which he receives as
those of A, does not escape liability though the deposit may have been
made by B. It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even
though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting
carefully, if he acts at all (Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond, 909; Shields
v. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 158; W illes, J., in Skelton v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.,
L. R. 2 C. P. 631, 636; Kent, Ch. J., in Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84, 96).
The most common examples of such a duty are cases where action is
directed toward the person of another or his property (Street, supra). A
like principle applies, however, where action is directed toward the gov
ernance of conduct. T he controlling circumstance is not the character of
the consequence, but its proximity or remoteness in the thought and pur
pose of the actor. There are decisions that a lawyer who supplies a certi
ficate of title to a client is not answerable to a third person whom he did
not mean to serve (Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195; cf. Glawatz v.
People’s Guaranty Search Co., 49 App. Div. 465; Day v. Reynolds, 23 Hun,
131). “Neither fraud nor collusion is alleged or proved; and it is conceded
that the certificates were made by the defendant at the request of the
applicant for the loan, without any knowledge on the part of the de
fendant what use was to be made of the same or to whom they were to
be presented” (Savings Bank v. Ward, supra, p. 199). No such immunity,
it has been held, protects the searcher of a title who, preparing an abstract
at the order of a client, delivers it to another to induce action on the
faith of it (Economy Bldg, &Loan Ass’n. v. West Jersey Title Co., 64 N. J.
L. 27; Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320; Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 69 Wash. 393; M urphy v. Fidelity Abstract
Title Co., 114
Wash. 77; Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317; Western Loan Co. v. Silver
Bow Abstract Co., 31 Mont. 448; Lawall v. Groman, 180 Penn. St. 532;

196

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

cf. Scholes v. Brook, 63 L. T . [N. S.] 837, 838; aff’d., 64 id. 674). Constantly
the bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of a prospective use (Mac
pherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra, p. 393; Brett, M. R., in Coventry,
Sheppard & Co. v. Great Eastern R y Co., L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 776, 780; cf.
Bank of Batavia v. N . Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 199). We
must view the act in its setting, which will include the implications and the
promptings of usage and fair dealing. The casual response, made in mere
friendliness or courtesy (Fish v. Kelly, 17 C. B. [N. S.] 194, 205, 207;
Bohlen, supra, p. 374; Street, supra, p. 408) may not stand on the same
plane, when we come to consider who is to assume the risk of negligence or
error, as the deliberate certificate, indisputably an “act in the law” (Pol
lock, Contracts [8th ed.] p. 3), intended to sway conduct. Here the defend
ants are held, not merely for careless words (Le Lievre v. Gould, 1893, 1
Q. B. D. 491; Pollock, Torts [10th ed.], pp. 301, 302; Jeremiah Smith,
Liability for Negligent Language, 14 Harvard Law Review, 184, 195), but
for the careless performance of a service—the act of weighing—which
happens to have found in the words of a certificate its culmination and its
summary (cf. Corey v. Eastman, 166 Mass. 279, 287). T he line of separa
tion between these diverse liabilities is difficult to draw. It does not lose
for that reason its correspondence with realities. Life has relations not
capable always of division into inflexible compartments. T he moulds
expand and shrink.
We state the defendants’ obligation, therefore, in terms, not of contract
merely, but of duty. Other forms of statement are possible. They involve,
at most, a change of emphasis. We may see here, if we please, a phase or
an extension of the rule in Lawrence v. Fox. (20 N. Y. 268) as amplified
recently in Seaver v. Ransom (224 N. Y. 233). If we fix our gaze upon
that aspect, we shall stress the element of contract, and treat the defend
ants’ promise as embracing the rendition of a service, which though
ordered and paid for by one, was either wholly or in part for the benefit
of another (DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431; Rector, etc., St. Mark’s
Church v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 583). We may find analogies again in the de
cisions which treat the sender of a telegram as the agent of the recipient
(Wolfskehl v. W. U. Tel. Co., 46 Hun, 542; M illiken v. W. U. Tel. Co., 110
N. Y. 403). These other methods of approach arrive at the same goal,
though the paths may seem at times to be artificial or circuitous. We have
preferred to reach the goal more simply. The defendants, acting, not
casually nor as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an independent calling,
weighed and certified at the order of one with the very end and aim of
shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was owing, not only to him
who ordered, but to him also who relied.
Other points are made by counsel. We have not failed to consider
them, but they do not alter our conclusion. Both sides having moved for
direction of a verdict without other request, the ruling of the trial judge
stands with the same force as the verdict of a ju ry ( A d a m s v. R o s c o e
Lum ber Co., 159 N. Y. 176). If the purpose of the parties, the relation
that arose between them and the significance of the transaction may be
the subject of conflicting inferences, those most favorable to the plaintiffs
must be deemed to have been accepted.
T h e judgment should be affirmed with costs.
H iscock, Ch. J., P ound, M cL aughlin, Crane and Andrews, JJ., concur;
H ogan, J., dissents.
Judgment affirmed.
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DOYLE v. CHATHAM & PHENIX NATIONAL BANK *
Court of Appeals of New York, 1930. 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574.

A ppeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court in the second judicial department, entered July 17, 1929, affirming
a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a decision of the court at a
T rial Term, a jury having been waived.
Kellogg, J. The plaintiff is the owner of “Collateral T rust Gold
Bonds” executed by the Motor Guaranty Corporation, a Delaware cor
poration. Certain bonds were issued directly to the plaintiff for value
paid; others were issued for value to persons from whom the plaintiff
purchased. The bonds are expressed to have been issued in pursuance of
the provisions of a certain indenture of trust entered into between the
Motor Guaranty Corporation and the defendant, the Chatham and
Phenix National Bank of the City of New York, as trustee. Each of the
bonds bears a certificate, signed by the defendant as trustee, which reads
as follows: “This bond is one of the series of bonds described in the Col
lateral T rust Indenture mentioned therein.” The securities pledged by
the Motor Guaranty Corporation to protect its bond issue, which were
deposited with the defendant as trustee, have proven worthless and the
bonds are uncollectible. The plaintiff, as assignee of all causes of action
accruing to the persons from whom he purchased, and in his own right,
brings this action to recover from the defendant trustee the losses sus
tained, on the ground that its certificates were issued negligently and
without authority, and that the plaintiff and his assignors were thereby
induced to acquire worthless bonds and pay value therefor.
The collateral trust indenture was executed on the 1st day of February,
1922. It recites that the Motor Guaranty Corporation proposes from time
to time to issue its collateral trust gold bonds, to draw interest at eight
per cent, payable semi-annually; that each bond is to be written in accord
ance with a form of bond set up in the indenture. This form, with which
the bonds of the plaintiff comply, contains the statement that the bond is
“secured by the trade acceptances or notes of dealers, guaranteed by the
Motor Guaranty Corporation; cash or notes of purchasers in part payment
for motor vehicles, or other first lien mortgages, such purchasers’ notes
being endorsed by dealers and guaranteed by the Motor Guaranty Corpo
ration.” It also contains the following: “This bond is secured by said col
lateral of a face value of at least one hundred and ten percentum (110%)
of the principal amount of the bond.” It also states: “This bond shall
not be valid for any purpose until the Trustee’s certificate endorsed hereon
shall have been duly executed.” T he form of the prescribed certificate, to
be signed by the defendant as trustee, is identical with each of the certifi
cates attached to the plaintiff’s bonds, the reading of which has already
been given.
T he indenture provides that bonds shall from time to time be executed
by the Motor Guaranty Corporation and delivered to the defendant as
trustee for authentication by it; that the delivery shall be accompanied by
a request, signed by an appropriate officer of the corporation, stating the
amount, date and denomination of bonds to be issued, and demanding
* See footnote 50 supra.
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authentication of the bonds requested to be issued. It further provides
that the trustee shall thereupon, without further action by the corpora
tion, authenticate the bonds and deliver them back to the corporation,
“provided, however, there shall be delivered to and pledged with the
Trustee” certain named collateral. T he collateral to be pledged is as
follows: “ (a) Cash or current funds, and/or (b) Trade acceptances or
notes of dealers guaranteed by the Motor Guaranty Corporation, or notes
of purchasers in part payment for motor vehicles, or other first lien mort
gages, such purchasers’ notes being endorsed by dealers and guaranteed by
the Motor Guaranty Corporation.” It also provides: “The aggregate
principal amount of cash and/or of securities delivered and pledged under
subsection (b) shall always be at least equal to 110% of the amount of the
Bonds to be issued hereunder in respect thereto.” It further provides:
“Upon receipt of cash and/or notes, and/or first lien mortgages, all as
provided and described in this article, the Trustee shall be fully protected
and is authorized without further inquiry, to authenticate and deliver the
Bonds specified in such request and shall in no way be responsible to see
to the application of the proceeds of any such Bond.”
The identure further provides that the trustee may require from time
to time that the corporation furnish a certificate or certificates of the
president or a vice-president, attested by the secretary or assistant secretary,
under the corporate seal, setting forth all or any information “concerning
names and addresses of makers, acceptors, and other pertinent data re
garding such collateral and/or first lien mortgages, such lists, descrip
tions and tabulations of collateral delivered or to be delivered to the
Trustee.” It contains this: “Such certificate or certificates shall be con
clusive evidence to the Trustee of all statements therein contained and
full warrant and protection to it for any and all action taken on the faith
thereof under the terms of this indenture.”
During the year 1922 the Motor Guaranty Corporation delivered to
the defendant, for its certification as trustee, bonds of an aggregate par
value in excess of $110,000. T he defendant executed the requested cer
tificates and returned the bonds to the corporation, which issued them to
various persons upon payment of value therefor. Among these bonds were
the bonds now owned by the plaintiff. In January, 1923, the corporation
defaulted in the payment of interest and the defendant resigned as trustee.
T he fact then appeared that the corporation had, during the course of
the year 1922, deposited with the trustee, as collateral for the bonds certi
fied by it, the notes of various persons or corporations expressing an
aggregate par value in excess of $130,000, all of which, with the exception
of one note for $300, were in fact utterly valueless. W ith the same ex
ception, none of the notes given were for the purchase of an automobile;
none were made by an automobile dealer, or, for that matter, by a dealer
in goods, wares and merchandise of any description. T he makers com
prised a lawyer, a bond salesman, a ticket agent, a mining corporation,
a n d a co n stru ctio n com pany.

T h e m ak er of two notes, aggregating

$75,000, had no occupation, business or other visible means of support,
although judgments in excess of $900,000 were outstanding against him.
None of the securities held by the trustee defendant, at the time the bonds
now owned by the plaintiff were issued, with the exception noted, were
the notes or acceptances of dealers or automobile purchasers. Subse
quently to January, 1923, all the assets of the Motor Guaranty Corporation
were sold for the sum of $143.30.
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We agree that the defendant cannot be held as the guarantor of the
sufficiency or legality of the securities pledged with it, or for negligence
in not ascertaining that the securities were worthless. (Tschetinian v.
City Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 432; Green v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
223 App. Div. 12; aff’d., 248 N. Y. 627; Byers v. Union Trust Co., 175
Penn. St. 318; Jones on Corporate Bonds & Mortgages, § 287a.) “The
purpose of the certification was not to insure the sufficiency of the security.
It was to prevent an overissue.” (Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co., 174
Cal. 504, 512.) If the defendant, without investigation, chose to lend its
name to the swindling operations of a bogus finance corporation, by
acting as its trustee and certifying its bonds, provided it certified with
authority and without actual knowledge of the fraud intended, it was well
within its legal rights. The question before us for decision is this: May
the defendant be held in damages if, without authority, it certified the
bonds now owned by the plaintiff, thereby inducing the plaintiff and his
assignors to advance moneys upon the faith of securities which were
worthless?
It is clear that the defendant signed the certificates without authority.
As we have seen, it was authorized to certify “provided, however, there
shall be delivered to and pledged with the Trustee” certain securities. The
securities enumerated were the acceptances or notes of dealers or automo
bile buyers. No such securities were ever delivered to the defendant. If
the defendant had requested and obtained a statement from the appropri
ate officers of the corporation, certifying to the “pertinent data regarding
such collateral” possessed by them, its authority, without further investi
gation, to execute the certificates could not have been questioned. How
ever, it requested and received no such statement. Its authority, therefore,
remained conditional upon the fact that the notes of dealers had been
precedently deposited with it. No such securities having been deposited,
it had no authority to execute the certificates.
In Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., (88 N. J. Eq. 450; aff’d., 89 N. J.
Eq. 584) the facts considered were these: A trust agreement provided that
the mortgagor would assign to a trustee bonds and mortgages acquired by
it, which had been appraised and guaranteed by a corporation associated
in interest with the mortgagor; that, as the securities were deposited, the
trustee would certify bonds of the mortgagor to an equal amount and
deliver them to it for issuance to purchasers. T he trustee accepted bonds
secured by mortgages upon the lands of the mortgagor, rather than bonds
and mortgages owned by the mortgagor and assigned to the trustee, and
thereupon certified an equal amount of bonds which were sold subse
quently by the mortgagor. It was held that the trustee was without au
thority to execute the certificates and was, therefore, liable to compensate
the takers of the bonds for their money losses occasioned by the acquisition
thereof. In Rhinelander v . Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (172 N. Y. 519) this
court expressed the opinion that where a corporate mortgage provides for
a certification of bonds, only upon the making by the directors of the
mortgagor of a written instrument setting forth the purposes of the
issue, the certification, without such a statement made, would afford to
a taker of the bonds thus certified a cause of action against the certifying
trustee for damages resulting from the investment. Such a recovery was
there withheld, but only for the reason that the cause of action had been
barred by the Statute of Limitations. In M ullen v. Banking Co. (108
Me. 498) the facts considered were these: All the bonds authorized by a
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trust indenture had been certified by the trustee and issued by the
mortgagor. Nevertheless, on the request of a director of the mortgagor,
the trustee certified two additional bonds, which were issued for value
to the plaintiff. It was held that the plaintiff might recover from the
trustee the difference between the value of an authorized bond and the
value of the bond actually received, which was nil. The court said: “Under
these circumstances the responsibility rests upon the trustee to authenti
cate no bond that should not be authenticated.”
In Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co. (supra) the opinion was expressed
that the right of the takers of the bonds to recover damages from the
trustee, on account of its unauthorized certification, rested upon a breach
of the duty owed by the trustee to the takers as cestui que trustent. A
similar view was expressed in Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.
(supra), where the court said of the acceptance by the trustee of its trust
position: “In executing that acceptance the defendant created the rela
tion of trustee and cestui que trust between it and the future bond
holders.” Notwithstanding these expressions, it is obvious that a trustee,
in wrongly certifying bonds to prospective takers, in order that they may
become cestui que trust, cannot at that moment and before the rela
tionship is established, have violated a trust duty owed to them.
Manifestly this is true: “There is no trust or other relation between
a trustee and a stranger about to deal with a cestui que trust.” (L indley,
L. J., in Low v. Bouverie, L. R. [1891] 3 Ch. 82.) In M ullen v. Banking
Co. (supra) the court held that an unauthorized certificate executed by
a trustee was a false representation that the bond was properly issued
rendering the trustee liable upon a cause of action in deceit. T he fact
that the representation was innocently made was not material, said the
court, since the trustee, by its certificate, made an assertion of fact which,
according to information which was or should have been within its own
knowledge, was not true. In the case before us, however, it is clear that
the plaintiff may not recover damages for a false representation, as in an
action for deceit. In the first place, no such cause of action is alleged.
In the second place, there is no proof that the trustee, in issuing its certi
cates, intended to defraud the plaintiff or his assignors. “Intentional
fraud, as distinguished from a mere breach of duty or the omission to
use due care, is an essential factor in an action for deceit.” (Kountze v.
Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124; Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546.)
T h at there may be liability for damages resulting from the negligent
utterance of words is now the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction.
(Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236; International Products Co. v. Erie
R. R. Co., 244 N. Y. 331.) In the first of the cited cases a buyer of mer
chandise, in reliance upon an erroneous certificate of a public weigher
employed by the seller, made an overpayment for the goods purchased,
and was permitted to recover from the weigher the equivalent of the
moneys overpaid. In the second, a consignee of merchandise, desiring to
insure the same, inquired of a carrier, which was to warehouse them,
where the goods would be stored. T he carrier, although the goods had not
yet been received, replied that they were stored upon a certain dock, and
the consignee insured them at that place. They were subsequently re
ceived by the carrier and stored at another dock where they were destroyed
by fire. In consequence the consignee lost its insurance. It was permitted
a recovery from the carrier for the amount of its loss. No relationship had
been established, between the plaintiff and the defendant, in either of
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these cases, when the careless statement was made. In the one, the plain
tiff had no contract relationship with the weigher; in the other the re
lationship of bailor and bailee had not been initiated, for the goods had
not been received. Nevertheless the negligent statements gave rise to
causes of action.
In Glanzer v. Shepard (supra) Judge Cardozo said: “The defendants,
acting, not casually nor as mere servants, but in the pursuit of an inde
pendent calling, weighed and certified at the order of one with the very
end and aim of shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was owing,
not only to him who ordered, but to him also who relied.” In Interna
tional Products Co. v. Erie R . R . Co. (supra) Judge A ndrews named cer
tain elements which must be present, in order that a cause of action
for negligent speaking might lie. T he utterer of the statement must have
knowledge that the statement is required for a serious purpose; that those
for whom it is made intend to rely and act thereupon; that if it be false
they may be damaged. Finally, the relationship of the parties, arising
out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals and good con
science the one has the right to rely upon the other for information, and
the other, giving the information, owes a duty to give it with care. “An
inquiry made of a stranger is one thing; of a person with whom the
inquirer has entered or is about to enter into a contract concerning the
goods which are or are to be its subject is another. Even here the inquiry
must be made as the basis of independent action. We do not touch the
doctrine of caveat emptor.” T he case of Derry v. Peek (L. R. 14 A. C.
337) was cited by Judge Andrews as establishing the principle, for appli
cation in the courts of England, that no action lies for a statement, negli
gently but not fraudulently made. However, even in that case, Lord
H erschell, in laying down the general rule, made this noteworthy ex
ception: “There is another class of actions which I must refer to also for
the purpose of putting it aside. I mean those cases where a person within
whose special province it lay to know a particular fact, has given an erron
eous answer to an inquiry made with regard to it by a person desirous
of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of determining his course accord
ingly, and has been held bound to make good the assurance he has given.”
The defendant here, like the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard (supra),
occupied an independent position, and issued its certificates at the behest
of a third person. We may say with Judge C ardozo that the certificates
were made “with the very end and aim of shaping the conduct of an
other.” Like the utterer of the statement in the assumed case in Lord
H erschell’s exception, it was the “special province” of the defendant
“to know a particular fact;” it imparted information, by its certificates,
to persons “desirous of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of determin
ing” their course accordingly. W ithin the requirements laid down by
Judge A ndrews, the defendant knew that the certificates were desired for
a serious purpose by persons who intended to rely and act thereupon.
They were issued for the very purpose of establishing a relationship of
trustee and cestui que trust between the defendant and the persons who
might rely thereon. It must be remembered that this is not the case of
a buyer and seller to whose transactions the principle of caveat emptor
might apply. It is a case where the creator of a trust, accepted by the
defendant, in a solemn instrument signed by both, named the defendant
as trustee, for the special purpose, among others, that it might certify
bonds to prospective investors, to the very end that the takers of the bonds
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might receive definite assurance that the bonds were issued pursuant to
the terms of the indenture. It seems clear, therefore, that, within the
authorities cited, the defendant, in so far as its certificates constituted
misrepresentations of fact, innocently though negligently made, became
liable to the takers of the bonds, who invested their moneys upon the
faith of the certificates.
T he certificates were not to be issued, as we have seen, unless ac
ceptances and notes of dealers and automobile buyers, in excess of bonds
to be issued, had been deposited with the defendant as security therefor.
Necessarily, therefore, the certificates constituted representations that
the deposits had been made. Clearly, if the defendant, as trustee, had is
sued the certificates when no securities whatever had been deposited with
it, liability for the damage done would have arisen. Equally must this fol
low where, as in this case, the securities deposited were not the securities
specified in the trust indenture from which alone the defendant derived
its power to certify. In not ascertaining that the securities deposited were
not securities of the character named in the indenture, the defendant was
guilty of negligence. In certifying the bonds, as issued pursuant to the
terms of the indenture, it was guilty of negligently making a misrepre
sentation of fact. The plaintiff and certain assignors were induced by the
certificates to invest in the worthless bonds. If the certificates had not
been executed the bonds could not have been issued and no loss would
have accrued. Therefore, the false certificates were the proximate cause
of the losses sustained. (Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., supra; Mullen
v. Banking Co., supra; Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., supra.)
The provisions of the trust indenture in certain instances exempting
the defendant from liability for its acts or omissions as trustee, do not,
in this instance, apply. (Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., supra; Mullen
v. Banking Co., supra; Rhinelander v. Farmers Loan &Trust Co., supra.)
In Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co. (supra) the vice chancellor said: “It
accordingly seems impossible to construe an immunity clause as intended
to exempt a trustee from liability for transcending his powers as clearly
defined by the trust agreement; his engagement is to exercise the powers,
and only the powers conferred upon him, and the appropriate office and
purpose of an immunity clause forming a part of a trust agreement which
specifically and clearly defines the trustee’s powers appears to be to limit
his responsibility in matters of judgment and discretion committed to
him in the execution of those defined powers.”
T he record indicates that the plaintiff and many of his assignors took
their bonds in reliance upon the certificates and in ignorance of the char
acter of the securities deposited. T he plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages on account of the investments thus induced, on the basis of the
consideration paid therefor plus interest, less the value of the bonds ac
quired, if any. (Reno v. Bull, supra.) The record leaves it in doubt
w h eth er certain o th e r assignors were n o t fully aw are of the ch aracter of
the securities deposited and of the shady nature of the financial trans

actions in which the Motor Guaranty Corporation was engaged and, there
fore, whether or not they in good faith relied upon the certificates in
making their investments. For the determination of these questions a
new trial is necessary.
T he judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the T rial Term
should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
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C ardozo, Ch. J., P ound, Crane, L ehman, O’Brien and H ubbs, J J .,
concur.
Judgments reversed, etc.

STATE STREET TR U ST CO. v. ERNST *
Court of Appeals of New York, 1938. 278 N. Y. 104,15 N. E. 2d 416.

Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered June 4, 1937,
which unanimously affirmed a judgment in favor of defendants entered
upon an order of the court at a T rial Term granting motions by the
defendants to set aside a verdict in favor of plaintiff and for the direction
of a verdict in favor of defendants.
F inch, J. Was the evidence introduced by plaintiff so inadequate that,
resolving all contested issues and drawing all possible inferences in
plaintiff’s favor, a jury could not find that defendants were guilty of gross
negligence raising an inference of fraud, and that plaintiff relied upon
the certified balance sheet prepared by defendants, thereby suffering
damage?
The Pelz-Greenstein Company was organized in 1922 to engage in the
business of financing wholesalers or mills. Its sole business was lending
money, taking back, as collateral, inventory of the borrower and assign
ments of accounts receivable. Each borrower was referred to as a “depart
ment.” Advances were made by Pelz-Greenstein to its borrowers to enable
them to purchase or manufacture merchandise. Pelz-Greenstein was repaid
in large part by the assignment of accounts receivable resulting from the
sales of such merchandise. T he collectibility of these advances thus
depended in the first instance on the salability of the merchandise manu
factured or purchased by the funds so advanced. If the merchandise failed
to sell, not only was the repayment of the advances jeopardized, but like
wise the income of Pelz-Greenstein, for its major item of income, to wit,
commissions, was a percentage of the assigned accounts.
On January 19, 1929, the president of Pelz-Greenstein applied to
plaintiff for a line of credit and a loan of $300,000. He presented an
estimated balance sheet of the business as of December 31, 1928, and
stated that defendants, a firm of accountants, were making an audit of
the condition of the company as of that date and that a balance sheet
certified by defendants would be submitted to plaintiff when it had been
prepared. Plaintiff refused to grant the application of Pelz-Greenstein
for a time loan until it had received the certified balance sheet of
defendants and had found that it substantially corroborated the estimated
balance sheet. Pending the receipt of the certified balance sheet of
defendants plaintiff made a demand loan to Pelz-Greenstein of $300,000.
This certified balance sheet prepared by defendants was dated April 2,
1929, and issued in ten counterparts. T he defendants admit that they
knew it was to be used to obtain credit. On April 9 a copy was given
by Pelz-Greenstein to plaintiff. Plaintiff found that the certified balance
sheet substantially corroborated the estimated balance sheet. The demand
note was then surrendered and a three months’ time note taken in its
place. This note was renewed for three months’ periods, the last renewal
* This case is discussed at p. 34 ff. supra.
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being made January 9, 1930. Morgan, the lending officer of plaintiff,
testifies that he relied upon this certified balance sheet in passing upon
the application for the loan and in making the renewals. On April 26,
1930, Pelz-Greenstein was petitioned into bankruptcy. Plaintiff has
received back only a portion of its loan and brings this action for the
difference.
W ith the certified balance sheet defendants issued the following
certificate:
“We hereby certify that we examined the books of account and record
pertaining to the assets and liabilities of Pelz-Greenstein Co., Inc., New
York City, as of the close of business December 31, 1928, and, based on the
records examined, information submitted to us, and subject to the fore
going notes [not here m aterial], it is our opinion that the above con
densed statement shows the financial condition of the company at the date
stated and that the related income and surplus account is correct.”
On May 9, 1929, a month after supplying ten copies of the balance
sheet to be used, to the knowledge of the defendants, to obtain credit,
defendants sent a letter to the Pelz-Greenstein Company containing
comments on and explanations of the balance sheet. Apparently only
one copy of this letter was sent, and it did not come to the attention
of plaintiff nor, so far as the evidence shows, to any one else until after
the bankruptcy of Pelz-Greenstein. This accompanying letter contained
statements of facts discovered by defendants in the course of their audit,
and, therefore, known to them when they prepared the original certified
balance sheet, but which were not mentioned therein. One of the
defendants testified before trial that the certified balance sheet was subject
to the comments contained in the letter and the letter was sent for the
purpose of trying to prevent any one from using this balance sheet without
knowing the scope of the examination which was made.
At the close of plaintiff’s case defendants moved to dismiss the com
plaint. The trial judge reserved decision. Defendants thereupon rested
without calling any witnesses, although there would naturally be available
the men who made the audit, those who prepared or supervised the
preparation of the working papers or the certified balance sheet and
experts to refute the testimony offered by the experts called by plaintiff.
Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss and also moved for a directed
verdict. The court reserved decision and submitted the case to the jury.
After the jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff the trial judge denied the
reserved motion to dismiss, but granted a motion to set aside the verdict,
and directed a verdict for defendants. T he Appellate Division has unani
mously affirmed, and the appeal is here by permission of this court.
In the brief of respondents, Pelz and Greenstein are denominated as
deliberately dishonest. It is there conceded that they made old and
probably uncollectible accounts appear good by causing payments to be
made to Pelz-Greenstein, Inc., by another corporation owned by them
selves, which payments, credited to such old accounts, made it appear as
if the debtors had been paying their debts. They induced one Saqui, who
freely admitted his own dishonesty and testified on behalf of plaintiff, to
furnish false inventories and to assign to Pelz-Greenstein large numbers
of false and fictitious accounts. In one account of $800,000 there were
$300,000 of wholly fictitious sales. At the time Pelz-Greenstein was hope
lessly insolvent.
T o what extent may accountants be held liable for their failure to
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reveal this condition? We have held that in the absence of a contractual
relationship or its equivalent, accountants cannot be held liable for
ordinary negligence in preparing a certified balance sheet even though
they are aware that the balance sheet will be used to obtain credit. (Ultra
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170.) Accountants, however, may be
liable to third parties, even where there is lacking deliberate or active
fraud. A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the account
ants when knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion
based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no
genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon which to base liability.
A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if
sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so
as to impose liability for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance
sheet. In other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequence
may take the place of deliberate intention.
In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (255 N. Y. 170) we said with no uncer
tainty that negligence, if gross, or blindness, even though not equivalent
to fraud, was sufficient to sustain an inference of fraud. Our exact words
were: “In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already
stated in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even
when not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an
inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross” (p. 190).
To emphasize our holding that active and deliberate fraud was not
necessary to create liability, and that gross negligence, and even blindness
to the obvious may be evidence to sustain an inference of fraud, we were
careful to point out that the language in Kountze v. Kennedy (147 N. Y.
124), saying that misjudgment, however gross, or want of caution, however
marked, is not fraud, must be confined to the facts of that case, where
the trier of the facts had found the defendants guiltless, and the ruling
“amounted merely to a holding that a finding of fraud did not follow as
an inference of law.” (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra, p. 191.)
T he defendants, however, contend that they may escape all liability by
insisting that the balance sheet merely purported to reflect the condition
of the books and that it did this correctly. T he balance sheet, however,
did not correctly reflect the condition of the company even as shown by
the books, as will later appear. Nor is the duty of an accountant in prepar
ing a balance sheet confined to a mere setting up of the items from the
books. Such duties have been defined.
“His [the author’s] business is to ascertain and state the true financial
position of the company at the time of the audit, and his duty is confined
to that. But then comes the question, ‘How is he to ascertain that posi
tion?’ The answer is, ‘By examining the books of the company.’ But he
does not discharge his duty by doing this without inquiry and without
taking any trouble to see that the books themselves shew the company’s
true position. He must take reasonable care to ascertain that they do so.
Unless he does this his audit would be worse than an idle farce. Assuming
the books to be so kept as to shew the true position of a company, the
auditor has to frame a balance-sheet shewing that position according to
the books and to certify that the balance sheet presented is correct in that
sense. But his first duty is to examine the books, not merely for the
purpose of ascertaining what they do shew, but also for the purpose of
satisfying himself that they shew the true financial position of the com
pany.” (Matter of L ondon & General Bank, [1895] 2 Ch. 673, 682.)

206

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

The record is, indeed, replete with evidence, both oral and docu
mentary, to make a prima facie case against the defendants. In the first
place, we have these accountants guilty of an act which is the equivalent
of active misrepresentation. On April 2, 1929, they sent to Pelz-Greenstein
the certified balance sheet, with ten additional copies, knowing that it
was to be used to obtain credit. “Nothing was said as to the persons to
whom these counterparts would be shown or the extent or num ber of
the transactions in which they would be used * * * T he range of the
transactions in which a certificate of audit might be expected to play
a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the business that
was mirrored in the summary.” (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y.
170, 174.) Not until thirty days later did the accountants send to PelzGreenstein a letter of explanation of this balance sheet, and then ap
parently only one copy. So im portant was this covering letter in the minds
of defendants that, although the balance sheet attached to the covering
letter was in other respects substantially identical with the original bal
ance sheet, it contained the following notation, which did not appear at
all on the original balance sheet released thirty days earlier: “This balance
sheet is subject to the comments contained in the letter attached to and
made a part of this report.” One of the copartners, testifying before trial,
said: “We want to try to prevent anyone using this balance sheet, without
knowing the scope of the examination which we made, which is set forth
in paragraph 2 of the full report. * * * We have had cases where our
entire covering letter had been deleted from these reports and just the
balance sheet used.” Yet, in effect, these defendants themselves did just
this. They held back this covering letter for thirty days and issued the
balance sheet alone to the world of possible lenders. The loan by the
plaintiff was made long before this important covering letter was even
sent.
The above act of the accountants, in placing in circulation a certified
balance sheet which they practically conceded should not be used without
knowing the scope of the examination set forth in the covering letter,
and then allowing a period of thirty days to elapse before sending the
covering letter, and then only one copy, whereas there had been ten
copies of the certified balance sheet issued, was itself gross negligence
and an im portant piece of evidence raising an inference of fraud.
T he certified balance sheet, outside of capital, showed a small surplus
of $83,000. According to the evidence and the reasonable inferences
deductible therefrom, a jury might have found that instead of a surplus
of $83,000 the balance sheet should have shown a deficit and impairment
of capital of over half a million. A jury could also have found that in
addition over $768,000 of its commission accounts were in a condition
indicating the likelihood of substantial losses.
T urning now to the specific items. The second largest item in the
balance sheet was the item:
“Commission Accounts Receivable— secured by merchandise
Advances ................................................................................ $2,043,337.81
Less allowance ......................................................................
19,767.15
$2,023,570.66”
The above item represented the advances made by Pelz-Greenstein to its
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borrowers to finance their operations in the purchase or manufacture of
merchandise. These accounts, amounting to over one-fourth of PelzGreenstein’s total assets, were shown on the certified balance sheet as good
after deducting the $19,000 allowance. Yet, to the knowledge of defend
ants, according to their own statement, in the delayed covering letter, a
very large proportion of these commission accounts receivable “were
comparatively inactive during the year and appeared slow of collection.”
Out of the total of $2,043,000 an aggregate of $768,000, or over 38 per
cent of the total amount, had unpaid advances at the end of the year 1928,
amounting to 125 per cent of the total sales during the year. This meant
that these borrowers owed Pelz-Greenstein more money at the end of the
year than their total sales during the year by 25 per cent, thus indicating
stagnation of inventories. Not only did these stagnant accounts represent
over 38 per cent in amount, but they included 27 out of 55 borrowers. The
defendants had knowledge of this condition as shown by the delayed
covering letter, and this knowledge was brought home to them by their
report for the prior year, when they referred in the following manner
to similar accounts, although the percentage of advances to sales then
was only 65 per cent, as compared with 125 per cent in 1928: “The follow
ing accounts had excessive advances as measured by their sales volume
which indicated probably excessive or slow moving inventories.” It was
conceded that this was the third consecutive audit by the defendants
of the books of Pelz-Greenstein.
One of the experts for the plaintiff testified without contradiction that
the percentage of unpaid advances, amounting to 125 per cent of sales,
indicated that the accounts were in an over-extended condition and were
badly out of proportion to the amount of merchandise sold during the
year, indicating that the inventories were either excessive, slow moving or
unsalable. In his opinion this condition indicated the likelihood of
excessive losses. Furthermore, this expert testified unequivocally that the
financial condition of Pelz-Greenstein could not be truthfully expressed
without mention of this condition in the balance sheet. Professor Cole, the
other expert called by plaintiff, testified that proper accounting practice
required that defendants either establish a very large allowance for
uncollectible accounts or indicate, in connection with the balance sheet,
the existence of approximately $768,000 with a ratio of advances to sales
of 125 per cent. T he best corroboration of the testimony of both these
experts is what defendants themselves said of this condition in the delayed
covering letter. In spite of this a reserve of a mere $19,767.15 was set up
against this account. This was to cover not only those accounts of $768,000,
showing the stagnation of inventories described above, but all other
commission accounts in a total of over $2,000,000.
This small reserve of $19,000 was practically absorbed in the one
account of W. K. Wardener, which had gone into bankruptcy in 1924
and from which account Pelz-Greenstein had received nothing since May,
1924. Even if the accountants had not been informed that the W ardener
account was in bankruptcy yet a warning that this account required a
substantial reserve was given to them by the fact that an account upon
which nothing had been received since May, 1924, was being padded
year after year by monthly interest charges. From a failure to note on
the balance sheet the stagnant condition of over three-quarters of a
million of these accounts and the setting up of a totally inadequate
reserve, a jury might reasonably draw the inference that these defendants
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had no genuine belief in these figures in the balance sheet to which they
certified.
We next come to a very substantial item entitled
“Commission Account Advances—
Inactive and in L iq u id a tio n .................................................... $215,124.72.”
This item appeared on the certified balance sheet without any reserve.
The books of Pelz-Greenstein showed on their face that many of the
accounts included in this item had had no transactions for many years,
neither sales nor relaizations upon security. Furthermore, within this
time the books showed systematic inflation of these accounts by steadily
increasing interest charges. In fact, these charges were added to one
account, even though the account appeared on the face of the books to
have been in bankruptcy. T he covering letter set forth the real condition
of these accounts in detail, thus showing full knowledge on the part of
the defendants. Defendants seek to sustain the integrity of this item on
the ground that they placed it “below the line” and characterized it as
“inactive and in liquidation.” The only evidence in the record concern
ing the effect of these acts is the uncontradicted evidence of the accounting
experts that placing an item below the line means only that it is not
current but that otherwise it will be realizable in full. Furthermore, these
expert witnesses testified that the failure to set up a reserve against an
item, whether it is placed above or below the line, according to the rules
of accountancy which any one must apply in reading a balance sheet,
means that the accountants represent that they have no knowledge which
would indicate to them that these accounts are worth less than “full
value” and “that the people certifying to this balance sheet indicate this
is the value.” T he experts went on to testify without contradiction that
from the facts as shown on the face of the books a reserve of at least
$150,000 should have been set up against these accounts unless investiga
tion showed them to be of full value.
The defendants urge that these defendants were excused from investiga
tion because of a letter from Leon S. Pelz, treasurer of Pelz-Greenstein, in
which he stated that Pelz-Greenstein had in its possession “sufficient
salable merchandise to completely liquidate” these accounts. In other
words, defendants were content to certify a balance sheet knowing it
would be used to secure bank credit which contained an item of over
$125,000* of apparently dead accounts on the uninvestigated and unsup
ported statement of the party seeking the credit that these accounts were
amply secured, although it appeared on the face of the books that there
had been no realization upon this security for years. Where the books
indicate the likelihood of a substantial loss, a failure to indicate this on
the balance sheet can be justified only by an actual check-up. It does not
suffice to rely instead upon the statement of an officer of the firm the
books of which are being examined. If an accountant may disregard a
situation which indicates substantial losses because he is informed by the
person whose books are being examined that there is adequate security,
the balance sheet issued by the accountant, by its failure to point this
out, contains a misrepresentation. T he very purpose of the bank in
seeking the balance sheet prepared by the accountant is to check any
possible fraud on the part of the person seeking the loan. Yet these
* Sic. should clearly be $215,000. (Ed.)
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accountants contend that they may accept as true a statement by the
party whose books are being examined, make no check-up or investigation
on their own part, and issue a statement omitting entirely any mention
of the reason why investigation of the security was omitted.
We have explicit expert testimony, uncontradicted, that under these
circumstances it was improper accounting practice for defendants to
accept a letter from Pelz-Greenstein, and that they should have investi
gated these accounts very fully to ascertain whether the companies were
still in business and to ascertain definitely and independently what
security, if any, Pelz-Greenstein held for the payment of these accounts.
We next come to an item which is not as large as those which have
gone before, but as to which there was obvious gross negligence. In the
“Accounts Receivable” item of $3,200,000, protected only by a reserve
of $15,000, was a group of accounts totaling over $72,000 denominated
by defendants on their work sheet as “Ocean Bankrupt Accounts.” De
fendants stated that the failure to set up a reserve against this $72,000 of
bankrupt accounts was justified because they were covered by policies of
credit insurance. A mere cursory examination of the policies shows that
over $32,000 of these accounts were not covered by the policies at all.
Thus the reserve was shown to be inadequate by this one account alone.
In addition, defendants’ own work sheets showed that $14,000 of these
bankrupt accounts had been with the insurance company from three years
to fifteen months without action. There was expert testimony which a
jury was at liberty to believe that a reserve of at least $46,000 should have
been established against this account.
We find, also, a $10,000 demand note listed as part of the assets without
reserve although it had been overdue and in the hands of an attorney,
who had been unable to collect, for two years.
In connection with the foregoing items we have been concerned with
evidence from which a jury might find that defendants had actual knowl
edge that the condition of the items in the balance sheet was not as repre
sented. In the account of E. Heller & Bros., on the other hand, plaintiff
contends that the evidence was sufficient to justify a jury in finding that
there were circumstances appearing on the books which were so unusual
and suspicious that proper accounting practice required defendants to
make an investigation. T he Heller account involved over $800,000 of the
assets of Pelz-Greenstein. During the first eleven months of 1928 sales
by the Heller Company never exceeded $191,000 a month, and averaged
about $129,000. In December, just preceding the report of the account
ants, sales were listed in the books as having jumped to $491,000. The
amount included $300,000 of wholly fictitious sales. Plaintiff contends
that this sudden increase of approximately $300,000 for the month should
have put defendants on notice that something was wrong. Investigation
was at least called for and would have disclosed the fictitious accounts.
We come now to evidence from which a jury could find that these
defendants were at least heedless and reckless in purporting to reflect the
condition of the books. We have an allowance of $101,000 for “doubtfuls”
and “discounts,” $86,000 of this $101,000 being for discounts and $15,000
for doubtfuls in the item of Accounts Receivable for $3,200,000. There
was evidence that these figures for doubtfuls and discounts were arrived
at, not by computation on the basis of business done during the year 1928,
but by accepting the figures used for the year 1927. T he working papers
used by defendants for 1927 showed that in that year the amount of dis

210

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

counts had been based originally upon usual accounting practice, and
was much larger than the final figure adopted by the accountants. Also,
the original allowance for doubtfuls was greater than the final figure. On
the basis of these higher figures, however, the profit for the year 1927 was
less than the amount of dividends declared for that year. T he reserves for
discounts and for doubtfuls were then reduced so as to establish a profit
in excess of the dividends for the year. T he haphazard method used in
arriving at these figures and the failure to follow usual accounting practice
supports the contention urged by plaintiff, without answer or explana
tion upon this record, that defendants, in preparing this balance sheet,
were negligent to such an extent as to amount to a reckless disregard for
the accuracy necessary for a balance sheet to give the proper reflection
of the condition of the business.
T he record contains many other im portant items of evidence to
enumerate which would unduly extend this opinion, now beyond reason
able limits.
T he foregoing presents abundant evidence from which a jury could
find that defendants knew facts which vitally affected the financial worth
of Pelz-Greenstein, and which defendants totally suppressed on the certi
fied balance sheet but disclosed to Pelz-Greenstein alone in the one copy
of the covering letter sent thirty days later. T he jury further could have
found that the computation of reserves on the certified balance sheet was
a misrepresentation which did not reflect the facts as known to defendants,
and which they in good faith should have revealed. Where the record
shows acts on the part of the accountants, as outlined above, we cannot
say, as a m atter of law, that plaintiff has failed to make out a case for
the jury.
This brings us to the question of reliance. Defendants contend that
the difference between the estimated balance sheet furnished by PelzGreenstein and the certified balance sheet prepared by them was such
that as a m atter of law plaintiff must have disregarded their certified
balance sheet in making the loan and decided to make the loan solely
on the basis of the estimated balance sheet of Pelz-Greenstein. In so con
tending defendants disregard the uncontradicted evidence that the certi
fied balance sheet substantially corroborated the estimated balance sheet,
the differences being only those which an audit would ordinarily produce.
A mere comparison of the two balance sheets discloses that there was
ample evidence from which a jury could find that the certified balance
sheet was a substantial corroboration of the estimated balance sheet.
When the items of cash receivable, commission accounts receivable and
subscriptions on the two balance sheets are totaled they show a total for
the estimated balance sheet of $7,760,000 and for the certified balance
sheet of $7,650,000, the latter figure being net after deducting reserves
of about $121,000. As the estimated balance sheet showed no reserves, the
actual discrepancy in assets between the estimated and certified balance
sheet was only about $11,000. Furthermore, the only substantial difference
between the balance sheets was that defendants listed a number of items
as non-current assets which the estimated balance sheet had listed as
current assets. It cannot be said, therefore, that there was no evidence
that the certified balance sheet substantially corroborated the estimated
balance sheet. It is undoubtedly true that, in making the loan, there was
reliance upon the then reputations of Pelz and Greenstein. But this does
not preclude reliance also upon defendants’ certified balance sheet. Evi-
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dence of such reliance is to be found in the uncontradicted testimony of
the witnesses testifying for the plaintiff. Also it is to be found in the fact
that the plaintiff would not make any but a demand loan until receipt of
the certified balance sheet, and that it was only after it had received and
examined the certified balance sheet that it made the time loan. The
fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of defendants need not be the
sole inducing cause of the damage. It is sufficient if such representations
be an inducing cause. (Ochs v. Woods, 221 N. Y. 335; Laska n. Harris,
215 N. Y. 554.)
In addition the defendants rely on the fact that plaintiff renewed the
note on several occasions so as to extend it for more than a year, and that
when the precarious condition of Pelz-Greenstein Company was discovered
plaintiff agreed to participate in a pooling of assets agreement with several
other banks. Defendants knew that Pelz-Greenstein Company was seeking
a line of credit from plaintiff and that the original note, if granted, would
be extended subsequently. There is abundant evidence to show that these
extensions were made in reliance upon the certified balance sheet, and,
although other factors may have been considered, they do not constitute
a sole and independent cause which brought about the loss rather than
the misstatements in the balance sheet. (See Hotaling v. Leach &Co., 247
N. Y. 84, 93.) The pooling agreement was to plaintiff’s advantage and
helped to minimize the loss.
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff was not damaged by reason
of the balance sheet because at the time it was issued plaintiff already
had made a demand loan of $300,000, and the company, according to
plaintiff’s allegations, was insolvent at that time. There can be no doubt
that if at the time the balance sheet was issued plaintiff had been in
formed of the true condition of Pelz-Greenstein Company it would have
insisted upon immediate payment of the demand loan, and there is evi
dence from which it can be found that at that time full payment of the
loan could have been obtained.
Upon all the evidence it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiff
has failed to make out a prima facie case against defendants.
T he judgments should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs
in all courts to abide the event.
L ehman, J. (dissenting). T he defendants, a firm of accountants, were
employed by the Pelz-Greenstein Company to examine the books of the
company and to prepare a certified balance sheet of its financial position.
T o their employers they owed a duty to perform their work with care
and with the skill which they represented they had, as professional ac
countants. They owed no such duty to persons who might deal with PelzGreenstein Company, upon the basis of the certified balance sheet pre
pared by the defendants. T o such persons they owed only the duty to
refrain from making any fraudulent misrepresentation. (Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 225 N. Y. 170.) T he courts below have held, without
dissent, that the evidence is insufficient to perm it an inference of fraud
as defined in that case.
T he only representations made by the defendants are contained in the
balance sheet which they prepared after examining the books of account
of the Pelz-Greenstein Company and the certificate appended thereto. The
certificate states: “We hereby certify that we examined the books of ac
count and record pertaining to the assets and liabilities of Pelz-Greenstein
Co., Inc., New York City, as of the close of business December 31, 1928,
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and, based on the records examined, information submitted to us, and
subject to the foregoing notes [not material here], it is our opinion that
the above condensed statement shows the financial condition of the com
pany at the date stated and that the related income and surplus account
is correct.”
T o prepare a balance sheet, accountants must, of course, examine the
books and accounts submitted to them, and from such examination and
any other information which may be furnished to them, they must pre
pare a balance sheet which, in their opinion, reflects the true financial
position of the business. The certificate of the defendants constitutes an
express representation of fact that they have “examined the books of
account and record pertaining to the assets and liabilities of PelzGreenstein Co., Inc.” The balance sheet itself represents and was under
stood to represent only the “opinion” of the defendants based “on the
records examined” and on information presented to the defendants.
It is undisputed that the defendants did examine the books and ac
counts of Pelz-Greenstein Company and that the balance sheet is based
upon entries in those books and accounts. It is also undisputed that the
balance sheet did not show the true financial position of the business.
According to the balance sheet, the corporation had assets of about
$8,000,000 and debts of less than $5,000,000; its capital of over $3,000,000
was unimpaired and it had, a surplus of about $83,000. In fact the cor
poration was insolvent; its liabilities exceeded the fair value of its assets.
T he defendants did not, however, warrant, or certify, the accuracy of the
balance sheet; they represented only that the balance sheet was in “their
opinion” correct. May they be held responsible for loss caused to the
bank by reliance on this expression of opinion? T h at is the problem
presented upon this appeal.
T he defendants are not liable for error of judgment; they are not liable
even for lack of care in arriving at their opinion. They are liable only if
the opinion expressed was not only erroneous, but was fraudulently ex
pressed. Actual bad faith and intent to deceive is not always, it is true,
an essential element in a cause of action for deceit. Such a cause of action
may be established against the defendants without proof that they ex
pressed an opinion which they knew was incorrect; at least, however,
there must be evidence of a ruthless disregard of whether the opinion
was correct or not—the expression of an opinion where “the grounds sup
porting it are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no
genuine belief back of it.” (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra, p. 186.)
In that case we said that “negligence or blindness, even when not
equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an inference of
fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross” (p. 190). T h at rule
was not new; it had been applied in earlier cases cited in the opinion.
Again and again, however, in that opinion, as in the cases cited, the court
pointed out that even gross negligence is not equivalent to fraud. It may,
in proper case, furnish sufficient evidence to justify an inference of fraud,
but that is true only when the proof of gross negligence shows that the
grounds supporting the opinion are in fact “so flimsy as to lead to the con
clusion that there was no genuine belief back of it. Further than that this
court has never gone.” (Italics are mine.) (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
supra, p. 186.)
Judge F inch has, in his opinion, referred to the evidence upon which
he Bases his conclusion that it establishes fraud. I shall try to avoid repeti-
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tion of that evidence. The most im portant of the alleged errors in the
balance sheet is the failure to provide sufficient reserves for the collection
of “commission accounts receivable.” T he amount of reserves which
should be set aside to take care of loss that may be suffered by reason of
inability to collect such accounts is a m atter of judgment. T he defendants
knew of circumstances which it is said pointed clearly to the conclusion
that a reserve of $21,000 is insufficient to take care of these accounts of
over $2,043,337.81. Perhaps the defendants here showed a lack of caution.
T heir letter sent thirty days after the certified balance sheet was sent,
shows that they knew that the reserve might prove insufficient. None the
less, the amount of probable loss even with these circumstances known
remained uncertain; the estimate of one per cent loss was doubtless overoptmistic, yet the estimate was based on facts which were not “so flimsy
as to lead to the conclusion that there was no honest belief back of it”
(p. 186).
The next error which, it is argued, shows negligence so gross as to indi
cate a lack of honest belief based on substantial grounds is that no allow
ance was made for “commission account advances.” Many of these
accounts were old. Again there are circumstances which perhaps should
have acted as a warning signal to a cautious accountant. T he defendants
saw the signal—that is shown by the supplementary letter—but decided,
nevertheless, to make no allowance. Again it would, doubtless, have been
better if the defendants had given to those who might rely upon the
balance sheet, the warning signal they had seen. They did, however, give
notice on the balance sheet that accounts were “inactive and in liquida
tion” and they removed them from the current assets of the business and
placed them “below the line.” T he owners of the business, men who at
that time had a fine reputation, assured the defendants that they had
sufficient security to liquidate these dead accounts. I can find here no
justification for any argument that a balance sheet which shows that no
allowance or reserve has been made for inactive accounts in liquidation
may be held to be a fraudulent representation that no allowance or
reserve is necessary.
I agree that the jury might find gross negligence in failure to provide
a reserve of $46,000 against a group of bankrupt accounts aggregating
$72,000. Even gross negligence in regard to an item of $46,000 in a balance
sheet showing assets of almost $8,000,000 can hardly be regarded as sub
stantial evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation. I do not take up in
detail the other items where it is said the jury might find gross negligence.
Each one involves the exercise of judgment; in none does it appear that
there was no ground for honest exercise of judgment.
Certainly there is here no deliberate intention to deceive, no state
ment of fact made without actual knowledge, no statement of an opinion
which the defendants did not honestly hold; nor, with the possible ex
ception of the one item of $46,000. is there any evidence of an expression
of opinion made by a person careless as to whether it was based on suffi
cient knowledge. T he case is entirely different from that presented by
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche (supra). There the defendants certified
that the balance sheet corresponded with accounts which the jury might
find had not been examined by the defendants, or had been disregarded
by them; and the court pointed out “that in certifying to the correspond
ence between balance sheet and accounts” (p. 192), the defendants made
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a statement as true to their own knowledge, when they had, as a jury
might find, no knowledge on the subject.
Here the defendants examined adequately the books and data which
they certified they had examined, and they are not charged with either
bad faith or even neglignce in making their examination. T he balance
sheet corresponds with the books and if the defendants were negligent,
their negligence, whether gross or slight, consisted only in failure to give
to the information, which they obtained through such examination, the
effect which expert witnesses testify should, in their opinion, be given
to it. T he defendants realized that this information might reasonably
affect their judgment. T he explanatory letter which they sent later shows
that. The jury might find that the defendants’ judgment was bad, but
the court pointed out in the Ultramares case that liability cannot be
predicated upon error however great in the exercise of judgment. The
error of judgment does not indicate a willful expression of a false opinion,
or an expression of opinion based on grounds so flimsy that the jury
might conclude that the opinion was not based on genuine belief. T o
permit recovery in a case where the evidence does not sustain such a
conclusion is to wipe out the distinction which this court has always
drawn and which it reiterated in the Ultramares case.
The judgment should be affirmed.
O’Brien, L oughran and R ippey , JJ., concur with F inch, J.; L ehman, J.,
dissents in opinion in which Crane, Ch. J., concurs; H ubbs, J., taking no
part.
Judgments reversed, etc. (See 278 N. Y. 704.)

O’CONNOR v. LUDLAM *
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Second Circuit, 1937.
92 F.2d 50, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 758.

Swan, Circuit Judge. This is an action for deceit brought against the
members of the firm of Haskins & Sells, certified public accountants.
Haskins & Sells audited the books and accounts of G. L. Miller & Co.,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, as of the close of business August 31, 1925,
and delivered to the corporation a balance sheet purporting to show its
financial condition as of that date after giving effect to proposed new
financing, namely, the sale of 30,000 shares of preferred stock at par—
$3,000,000. This balance sheet was used by the corporation in selling
its preferred stock to the public, and Haskins & Sells knew that it was to
be so used. The plaintiffs are persons who purchased shares of the pre
ferred stock between October 24, 1925, and June 3, 1926, in reliance upon
the balance sheet, which they assert was fraudulently false and misleading.
In Septem ber, 1926, the c o rp o ra tio n was a d ju d ic a te d b a n k ru p t, its assets

were insufficient to pay the allowed claims of creditors, and the plaintiffs
lost their investments in their entirety. This action was begun in October,
1928. Jurisdiction of the District Court rests upon diversity of citizenship,
and each of the plaintiffs sued on his own behalf for $3,000 or more. T heir
separate causes of action were tried together for convenience. After a
trial lasting thirteen weeks, the jury found a verdict for the defendants.
* This case is discussed at p. 40 ff. supra.
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Judgment thereon was entered May 18, 1934. Seventeen of the plain tiffs
have appealed. T he appellees are the original defendants, excepting
Charles S. Ludlam, against whom the action had abated by death. T he
enormous record on appeal, consisting of more than 4,000 printed pages
and several hundred documentary exhibits, was not filed until January,
1936, and the case did not come on for argument until a year later. The
errors assigned relate solely to refusals to charge as requested, no excep
tions having been taken by the appellants to the charge as given.
G. L. Miller & Co., Inc., was organized under the laws of Delaware in
October, 1930. It took over the assets, good will, and liabilities of G. L.
Miller & Co., a Florida corporation, and issued therefor 1,000 shares of no
par value stock. This was issued to Mr. G. L. Miller, who remained
throughout the owner of all the common stock of the corporation, except
for qualifying shares issued to employee-directors. T he net book value of
the assets, exclusive of good will, so taken over was about $7,500 after
deducting liabilities. In 1923 the corporation declared a common stock
dividend of 100 per cent. Thus there were 2,000 shares outstanding at
the time of the proposed new financing in 1925. T he business of the Miller
Company consisted in underwriting mortgage bonds on real estate, usually
on buildings to be constructed, acting as trustee under the mortgage in
dentures, and selling the bonds to the public. T he common course of
business involved three agreements: An underwriting agreement under
which Miller & Co. purchased the mortgagor’s bonds; a trust indenture,
under which Miller & Co. as trustee was to receive from the mortgagor in
equal monthly installments sums sufficient to enable it to pay semi
annually to the bondholders the yearly interest, the federal income tax
thereon (up to 4 per cent.), and the amount required for annual re
demption of the bonds, which m atured serially; and a disbursing agree
ment, under which Miller & Co. agreed to advance the amount of the
mortgage loan as construction progressed. For the money thus advanced
Miller & Co. depended upon the sale of the mortgage bonds.
At the time of the audit in question Miller & Co. had received from
mortgagors for interest, income tax, and bond-redemption payments due
under the trust indentures funds totalling approximately $1,377,000.
These were held by it as trustee for the bondholders, but were commingled
with its own cash, and the audit is claimed to be intentionally fraudulent
in not adequately disclosing the amount of cash held in trust. Another
ground of attack relates to payments made by Miller & Co. to complete the
construction of mortgaged buildings. In selling bonds Miller & Co. repre
sented that the mortgagor had agreed to provide the money necessary to
complete the building under construction, and had furnished a surety
bond guaranteeing completion free of all liens prior to that of the m ort
gage indenture. In fact, surety bonds were not furnished, and frequently
the mortgagor defaulted in completing the structure. T o make good such
defaults Miller & Co. advanced very large sums out of its own funds. These
were represented by notes of affiliates or subsidiaries of Miller & Co. and
were shown in the audit as “secured,” although, as the District Judge
charged, they w ere n o t secured. F u rth e rm o re , in nu m ero u s instances

Miller & Co. had itself guaranteed to bondholders completion of the
buildings under construction, and the audit made no mention of such
contingent liabilities running into many millions of dollars. It is also
charged that the defendants made a false certificate as to the net earnings
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of Miller & Co. for the year 1924 and the first eight months of 1925. The
audit is printed in the margin.1
The specific items which are challenged will be referred to hereafter in
discussing the alleged errors of the court in refusing to charge as requested.
T he charge which Judge Patterson delivered to the jury was an excep
tionally clear exposition of the applicable law. Since there was no con
tractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, liability
could be imposed only for fraud; a mistake in the balance sheet, even if it
were the result of negligence, could not be the basis of a recovery. Ultra
mares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 74
A. L. R. 1139. Fraud presupposes not only an untrue statement but also
a fraudulent intent. On the question of falsity of the representations the
jury was told that the issue was whether the defendants’ representations,
“in the sense to be taken by an ordinary reasonable man,” were, in fact,
true or untrue—whether a true or a false impression was created. On the
question of intent, the jury was told that fraud may be established by
showing that a false representation has been made, either knowingly, or
1 G. L. MILLER & CO.
Incorporated
General Balance Sheet, August 31, 1925
After Giving Effect to Proposed New Financing
ASSETS

Cash, Including Time Certificates of Deposit.................................................... $4,663,099.93
Temporary Investments in Outside Securities:
Free Securities ...................... $335,861.38
In Escrow ............................... 131,038.44
Total temporary investments in outside securities.....................................

466,899.82

Bonds Secured by First Mortgages on Real Estate........................................ 7,621,918.92
Notes and Accounts Receivable and Accrued Interest — Secured.............. 2,987,411.69
Deferred Debit Items ..........................................................................................
162,126.42
Furniture and Fixtures, Less Reserve for Depreciation.................................
52,038.30
Good-Will .............................................................................................................
1.00
Total............................. $15,953,496.08
LIABILITIES
Due to Mortgagors — For Bonds Underwritten —
Payable as Construction Progresses......................................................... $8,757,379.86
Accounts Payable and Sundry Accruals.............................................................
88,258.24
Customers’ Partial Payments ............................................................................
124,099.69
Funds for Bond Interest and Redemption........................................................ 1,966,938.40
Deferred Credits to Income ..............................................................................
234,624.80
Reserves:
Bond issue expenses ..............................................................$116,576.82
Taxes ...................................................................................... 171,894.43
General .................................................................................. 30,000.00

Total reserves.....................................................................

318,471.25
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without belief in its truth, or in reckless disregard of whether it be true or
false; and that the issue was whether the defendants had an honest belief
that the statements made by them were true. “If they did have that honest
belief, whether reasonably or unreasonably, they are not liable. If they did
not have an honest belief in the truth of their statements, then they are
liable, so far as this third element [scienter] is concerned.” T he jury
was also told that an intent to deceive may be inferred from a lack of
honest representation; and that, so far as alleged concealments or omis
sions were concerned, the issue was whether the omission to state certain
matters was deliberate and intended to conceal. It was further charged
that, if the audit made “was so superficial as to be only a pretended audit
and not a real audit, then the element of knowledge of falsity of their
representations is present, and they may be held liable.” Reading the
charge as a whole, it seems to be in strict conformity with the established
law. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven &Co., 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E.
441, 74 A. L. R. 1139; Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States,
13 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 2); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Drovers’ State Bank,
15 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 8); Panther Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of
Int. Rev., 45 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 1). And apparently the plaintiffs them
selves thought it accurate and satisfactory at the time, for in response to
the court’s invitation to state exceptions to the charge as delivered, counsel
replied that he had none. However, both sides had previously handed to
the court requested instructions, and at the conclusion of the charge
Judge Patterson remarked that many of the requests had been given in
substance and that, to the extent not thus covered, the requests were
refused an exception granted in each instance. The requests handed
up by the appellants numbered 82; and their assignments of error involve
40 alleged refusals to charge as requested, although they had failed to
point out any errors in the charge as given. A similar grant of blanket ex
ceptions has been criticized for the burden it passes to an appellate court.
People v. Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 103 N. E. 305, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 501. In
Capital and Surplus:
Preferred capital stock, 8% cumulative participating
(authorized and to be issued 30,000 shares of $100.00
each) ................................................................................ $3,000,000.00
Common capital stock (authorized 5,000 shares of no
par value: issued 2,000 shares)....................................... 200,000.00
Surplus ................................................................................ 1,263,723.84
Total Capital and Surplus ....................................................

4,463,723.84

Total .............................................................................. $15,953,496.08
Note: The Company carries life insurance on the life of Mr. G. L. Miller, President,
for $500,000.00.
Our audit of the books and accounts of the G. L. Miller Company, Incorporated,
discloses that the net earnings of the Company for the year ended December 31, 1924,
were in excess of 2½ times the dividend requirements of the contemplated issue of
30,000 shares of 8% cumulative preferred stock, and that the net earnings for the eight
months ended August 31, 1925, were in excess of 3 times the dividend requirements of
said stock for the said eight months.
New York, September 30, 1925/

HASKINS & SELLS.
Certified Public Accountants.
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the federal courts the doctrine is firmly established that exceptions should
be specifically taken so that the trial judge may have an opportunity to
reconsider the matter and remove the ground of exception. Where the
exceptions are not specific, an appellate court is under no duty laboriously
to relate each of the requested instructions to the charge as given, in order
to determine that no error was committed. American Sugar Refining Co.
v. Nassif, 45 F. (2d) 321, 326 (C. C. A. 1) and authorities there cited.
Nevertheless, if a refused instruction constituted plain error and had re
sulted in a miscarriage of justice, we should hesitate to ignore it because
exceptions were taken as they were in the case at bar. Accordingly, we
have examined all of the errors assigned, but we shall discuss only those
relating to requested instructions which appear to be the most significant.
The Subject of Trust Funds: T he first item of assets on the general
balance sheet is “Cash, Including Tim e Certificates of D eposit........ $4,
663,099.93.” This figure was obtained by adding to the actual cash the
estimated proceeds from sale of the new preferred stock. T he actual cash
included $1,477,000 of trust funds which Miller & Co. as trustee had re
ceived from mortgagors on account of payments due under trust inden
tures. Miller & Co. was itself the beneficiary of $100,000 of these trust
funds, but the remainder, $1,377,000, was held in trust for other bond
holders. The inclusion of this sum as a general cash asset of the company
without further explanation would plainly give a false impression as to the
company’s cash position. T he main defense against this charge was the
defendants’ contention that an adequate explanation was supplied by
the item on the liability side of the balance sheet, “Funds for Bond Interest
and R ed em p tio n ........$1,966,938.40.” In round figures this sum repre
sented the aforesaid amount of $1,477,000 actually received from mort
gagors plus an amount of $489,000 which was accrued and treated on
the company’s books as received, although in fact it had not been. The
defendants point out that the word “Funds” necessarily meant trust funds,
since the “Bond Interest and Redemption” referred to could relate only
to bonds on mortgaged property, Miller & Co. having no bond issue of its
own. On the question whether there was ambiguity in this item, there
was testimony both ways and the judge so charged, after calling the jury’s
attention to the respective contentions of the parties. He had previously
stated that the sum of about $1,400,000.00 was received by Miller & Co.
as trustee under the mortgages.
The appellants complain because their requested instructions num 
bered 25 to 31, inclusive, were not given. They urge that the jury was
simply left with the conflicting contentions of counsel on the subject of
trust funds. In substance, their complaint seems to be that the court did
not point out with particularity how to apply to this subject the general
rules he laid down for determining whether representations were false
and made with fraudulent intent. Such a complaint is not well taken.
T he judge was under no obligation to discuss in detail the evidence re
lating to each item of the alleged misrepresentations, and particularly is
this true where no request was made to amplify the charge as given. Re
quest No. 25 was to the effect that cash received as trustee can form no part
of the company’s assets. It is incredible that the jury did not so under
stand. The court had charged that about $1,400,000 was held in trust, and
the issues between the parties, as shown by the court’s statement of their
respective claims and the general charge, was whether the balance sheet
disclosed this trust obligation to the ordinary reader, and whether the
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accountants could honestly believe that it did. Several of the requested
instructions, for example, No. 28, assumed that the balance sheet con
cealed the true financial condition by failure to disclose the trust. This
was for the jury to decide, and such requests were properly refused. Re
quest No. 26 asserted that it was the duty of Haskins & Sells to show
clearly on the balance sheet that these trust funds did not belong to
Miller & Co. As a principle of correct accounting we should suppose this
to be true, but the issue for the jury was not that, but was whether a false
impression of financial worth was intentionally created. Request No. 31
asserted that prospective investors in the preferred stock were entitled to
know whether Miller & Co. had been guilty of breach of trust and that
“the misuse of trust funds is the normal incident of a hopeless financial
condition.” T he inclusion of the final sentence, above quoted, was enough
to justify refusal of the instruction in the form presented. We think the
charge as given was adequate on the subject of trust funds and no preju
dicial error occurred in the refusal of requested charges on this subject.
The Subject of Secured Notes: T he fourth item of assets in the balance
sheet is “Notes and Accounts Receivable and Accrued Interest—Se
cured .......$2,987,411.69.” T he main dispute as to this item relates to notes
of corporations amounting to $1,434,764.76. They represented advances
made by Miller & Co. for the completion of mortgaged buildings. They
were signed by affiliated or subsidiary corporations. Although stated in
the balance sheet to be “Secured,” they were not secured as a m atter of
law. T he plaintiffs contend that the defendants knew they were not
secured. They further claim that the notes were of little value, to the
defendants’ knowledge, and, finally, that the notes signed by subsidiaries
should have been shown as such.
W ith respect to listing the notes as secured, the defense is that Peed
honestly, even if erroneously, believed them to be secured. He testified
that he based his opinion on a provision in the trust indentures empower
ing the trustee to make advances “for payment of taxes, insurance premi
ums, or any other purpose for preserving the property and the lien of this
instrument,” or on similar provisions. As to this the trial judge charged:
“As m atter of law it is my opinion, and I charge you, that these advances
to complete unfinished buildings are not the kind of advances that are
secured under the trust deeds. T he point, however, is not so clear that
persons reading such parts of the deed might not, in good faith, entertain
different opinions; and the good faith of the defendants in representing
these advances as secured is one of the questions of fact for you to deter
mine under all the evidence applicable to these notes, and under the rules
which I will later explain to you.”
Of their several requests dealing with this subject, the appellants urge
No. 38 as the most significant. This informed the jury that, if they should
find that the statement as to security was false and “that the defendants
represented to the plaintiffs that this was true to their own knowledge,
as distinguished from belief or opinion, they are guilty of making a false
balance sheet, even if they believed it to be true.” It is urged that the
Ultramares Case in 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139, points
directly to the correctness of this request, but we cannot so construe it.
Accountants profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an agree
ment between the audit and the entries in books audited, but there is no
suggestion in the cases relied upon that a statement by an auditor that
notes are secured by the provisions of a trust deed is an assertion of
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knowledge rather than an expression of opinion. T o suggest that a title
examiner was guilty of fraud if he erroneously certified a title because he
had honestly misconceived the legal significance of a provision in a deed
would doubtless horrify counsel for the appellants no less than other mem
bers of the legal profession. There is no reason to hold accountants to a
higher standard, when they deal with legal documents. The issue of
the defendants’ good faith was rightly left to the jury.
Complaint is made of the refusal to charge request No. 67 to the effect
that, if the defendants knowingly overvalued doubtful assets [the notes],
then they were guilty of false representations. We cannot doubt that the
jury were sufficiently informed of so obvious a proposition by the general
charge as given. This request was repeated in various alternative forms
covering specific details of the evidence. T h at the trial judge was under
no duty in such a case as this to discuss in detail the evidence relating to
each alleged misrepresentation we have already stated.
Request No. 65 relates to the failure to show that the notes were those
of subsidiary or affiliated companies. T he court made reference to this
and to the conflicting testimony of experts as to whether good accounting
practice required it. We think this was sufficient. Here also the issue was
the defendants’ intent, and questions of the effect of concealment and of
a pretended rather than real audit were covered in the general charge.
Contingent Liabilities: We can see little excuse for omitting from the
balance sheet mention of contingent liabilities. These were principally
guaranties of completion of buildings under construction and might run
into millions of dollars should the mortgagors default, which was not a
remote possibility as shown by Miller & Co.’s prior experience. Neverthe
less, Palmer, one of the defendants’ experts, testified that it was proper
to omit the items; and Klein and Madden said that the showing of con
tingent liabilities is frequently a m atter of judgment and that they need
not be shown when, as here, with respect to the guaranties of completion,
the primary obligation was shown under the heading “Due to Mortgagors
—For Bonds Underwritten—Payable as Construction Progresses........
$8,757,379.86.” T he plaintiffs’ expert contradicted this. The charge
called attention to the conflicting testimony and instructed the jury to
weigh it. T he refused requests were to the effect that omission of the
contingent liabilities made the balance sheet false. In view of the con
flicting testimony, such a charge was properly refused. Even if it were an
abuse of good accounting practice to omit them, such an abuse was not
fraud unless accompanied by an intent to conceal. T he issue of fraudulent
concealment was fairly put to the jury in the general charge.
Finally, the appellants complain of the refusal to charge that, if the
balance sheet represented Miller & Co. to be in a sound financial position
when in fact the defendants knew it was not, then they were guilty of
fraud. Variations of this proposition were contained in requests 13 and
14. Undoubtedly they were correct statements of law, but they were
adequately covered by the general charge.
In conclusion, we may say that the trial was entirely fair to the ap
pellants. A clear and accurate charge was delivered under which the jury
might well have found a verdict for the plaintiffs. There was much in the
evidence which tended to cast doubt upon the good faith of the account
ants, but it did not persuade the jury. An appellate court cannot set at
naught a jury’s verdict merely because they might have reached a different
conclusion had they been sitting as the jury. Finding no error in the
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charge as given and nothing clearly wrong in refusing requested instruc
tions, we affirm the judgment.

CANDLER v. CRANE, CHRISTMAS & CO. *
Court of Appeal, 1951. 2 K.B. 164, 1 The Times L.R. 371.

The defendants, a firm of accountants, had been employed to write
up the books and prepare the accounts of a limited liability company, and
they instructed F. their clerk to do so. W hen the accounts had been pre
pared and were ready for certification by the accountants, F., at the
request of the managing director of the limited liability company, showed
the accounts to the plaintiff who, to the knowledge of F., was considering
whether he should invest money in the company. F. had been careless in
the preparation of the accounts so that they were defective and deficient
and did not correctly represent the financial position of the company.
T he plaintiff, after seeing the accounts, invested £2,000 in the company.
Subsequently the company was wound up and there were no assets. The
plaintiff sued the defendants on the ground that he had lost his invest
ment through breach of duty of care of the defendants to him.
Held, that F. was acting within the scope of his authority in showing
the plaintiff the accounts.
There being no contractual or fiduciary relationship between the
parties, Held, also, by C ohen and A squith, L.JJ. (Denning, L.J.,
dissenting), that the plaintiff had no cause of action in tort against the
defendants.
Le Lievre v. Gould (9 The Times L. R. 243; [1893] 1 Q. B. 491) which
was held to have been neither overruled nor qualified by Donoghue v.
Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494; [1932] A. C. 562), followed.
Per A squith, L.J.—There was not a word of disapproval by Lord
Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) of the decision in Le Lievre v.
Gould (supray th ough he referred to the case as annexing a valid and
essential qualification to the formula of Lord Esher, M. R., in Heaven
Pender ((1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503). T he principle laid down by Lord Atkin
in Donoghue Stevenson (supra) in answer to the question: “who, then,
in law, is my neighbour?’’ had never yet been applied where the damage
complained of was not physical, to either person or property.
Per D enning, L.J., dissenting; Accountants owed a duty to use care
in their reports and in the work which resulted in their reports. Their
calling required special knowledge and skill. They owed that duty not
only to their employers, but to any third person to whom they showed the
accounts or to whom they knew that their employer was going to show
them so as to induce him to invest money or take some other action on
them. T he duty only extended to those transactions for which the
accountants knew their accounts were required. He would not call in
question the decision in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) which was distinguish
able from the present case. Surveyors, valuers and analysts were under
a similar duty to use care in statement.
This was the appeal of the plaintiff, a Mr. Candler, in an action in
which he claimed damages for negligence against the defendants, Messrs.
* See footnote 70 supra.
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Crane, Christmas and Company, a firm of accountants. T he defendants
were the accountants to a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic T in
Mines, Limited (referred to as the company). In the circumstances stated
in the case the accountants prepared the accounts of the company (which
were produced to the plaintiff by an employee of the accountants) and in
doing so were, as the trial Judge found, careless in the preparation of
them and that accordingly the accounts were “defective and deficient.”
The plaintiff, relying on the accounts, invested £2,000 in the company and
lost it because the company turned out to be a failure.
It was submitted for the plaintiff that, although there was no contract
or fiduciary relationship between him and the defendant accountants,
nevertheless the relationship between them was so close and direct that
the accountants owed him a duty of care within the principles stated in
Donoghue v. Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494; [1932] A. C. 562). For
the accountants it was submitted that the only duty which they owed was
a purely contractual duty which they owed to the company, and therefore
that they were not liable for negligence to a person to whom they were
under no duty.
By his action against the accountants, the plaintiff pleaded that he had
lost his £2,000 through the defendants’ breach of duty of care in respect
of the accounts which Mr. Fraser placed before him, and he claimed
that sum in damages. He also alleged fraud at the trial. Alternatively, the
plaintiff alleged that the accountants, as auditors of the company, owed
a duty to him as a shareholder to give him the accurate information which
they should have given him when he was a prospective investor.
Mr. Justice Lloyd-Jacob dismissed the action. He found that there
was no fraud and that no damage flowed from the alternative claim of
the plaintiff as a shareholder. On the claim for breach of duty he found
that the accounts were defective and deficient and presented a position
of the company which was “wholly contrary to the actual position” and
that Mr. Fraser was extremely careless in the preparation of the accounts.
He said that the damage which the plaintiff suffered was plain, but he held
that the accountants were under no duty of care to the plaintiff. Their
only duty was to produce accounts which they honestly believed to be
the draft accounts of the company.
The plaintiff appealed, but no longer alleged fraud. On the appeal
the defendants contended: (1) that Mr. Fraser was not acting in the
course of his employment, and (2) that, even if he was, they owed no duty
to the plaintiff.
Mr. Neil Lawson appeared for the plaintiff; Mr. John Foster, K. C.,
and Mr. Phineas Quass for the defendants.
T he following judgments were read.
Lord Justice C ohen.—I will ask Lord Justice Denning to read his
judgment first.
Lord Justice D enning.—In September, 1946, Mr. Candler invested
£2,000 in a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic T in Mines, Limited
(which I will call the company) and he has lost it because the company
turned out to be a failure. He now brings this action against the com
pany’s accountants and auditors, Crane, Christmas and Company (whom
I will call the accountants) claiming that he was induced to invest the
money because of erroneous accounts which they put before him and on
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the faith of which he invested his money. T he Judge has found that the
accounts were “defective and deficient” and presented a position of the
company which was “wholly contrary to the actual position”; that the
accountants were “in fact extremely careless in the preparation of the
accounts” ; and that the damage which Mr. Candler suffered was “plain”;
but nevertheless the Judge dismissed his claim because in his opinion the
accountants owed no duty of care to Mr. Candler.
T he case raises a point of law of much importance, because Mr.
Lawson, on behalf of Mr. Candler, submitted that, although there was no
contract between Mr. Candler and the accountants, nevertheless the
relationship between them was so close and direct that the accountants
did owe a duty of care to him within the principles stated in Donoghue v.
Stevenson (48 The Times L.R. 494; [1932] A.C. 562); whereas Mr. Foster,
on behalf of the accountants, submitted that the duty which the account
ants owed was purely a contractual duty owed by them to the company,
and therefore they were not liable for negligence to a person to whom they
were under no contractual duty.
Before discussing this point of law, I must set out the facts in some
detail so as to see what exactly the relationship was between Mr. Candler
and the accountants. T he story centres round the activities of a Mr.
Donald Ogilvie in connexion with some surface tin workings in Corn
wall. In November, 1944, he formed the company to work the tin, with
himself as chairman and managing director for life. In March, 1946, he
told the accountants that he wanted them to prepare the accounts of
the company and to write up the books. T he accountants entrusted the
work to one of their clerks named Henry Fraser, but he had not done
much towards it when in June, 1946, Mr. Ogilvie told the accountants that
he had decided “to go out for substantially more capital” and asked them
to insert an advertisement in a newspaper as quickly as possible. They
arranged it for him, and it appeared on July 8, 1946, in these words:
“£10,000 established T in Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks
further capital, instal additional milling plant, directorship and active
participation open to suitable applicant.—Apply” &c.
Mr. Candler, the plaintiff, answered that advertisement in these words:
“I should be interested to take an active part in a Cornish T in Mine and
have about £2,000 to invest. W ill you let me have particulars?” T he
accountants sent that letter unopened to Mr. Ogilvie, who got into touch
with Mr. Candler. As a result, in the first half of September, 1946, Mr.
Ogilvie showed Mr. Candler the Cornish workings and told Mr. Candler
that, if he invested £2,000, he would get a directorship in the company
and a service agreement for two years at £10 a week. Mr. Candler said,
however, that he wanted to see the balance-sheet of the company first.
As a result of Mr. Candler’s request, Mr. Ogilvie started pressing the
accountants to get out the accounts. He told their clerk, Mr. Fraser, that
he wanted the accounts got out as quickly as possible, and that the
accounts were required to show to a potential investor in the company,
whose name was Candler. Mr. Fraser was asked in the witness box: “Did
you assume at that time that the accounts that Mr. Ogilvie was pressing
for had some relation to his negotiations with Mr. Candler?”, and he
answered: “I thought there would be a connexion, of course. Yes, I
suppose so.”
Mr. Fraser accordingly, in the middle of September, 1946, worked on
the accounts very intensively, going to Mr. Ogilvie’s flat two or three times
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a day for his explanation of various items. He was, as the Judge found,
under the mistaken impression that it was, in substance, Mr. Ogilvie’s
business, and he accepted Mr. Ogilvie’s statements without verification.
On Monday, September 16, 1946, Mr. Ogilvie asked Mr. Fraser to meet
Mr. Candler the next day so as to give him information relating to the
accounts of the company; and accordingly, on Tuesday, September 17,
Mr. Fraser went with Mr. Ogilvie to meet Mr. Candler and took with him
the draft accounts which he had by that time prepared. At the meeting
Mr. Ogilvie introduced Mr. Fraser to Mr. Candler as the representative of
Crane, Christmas and Company, the accountants and auditors of the com
pany, who were preparing the accounts, and he introduced Mr. Candler
to Mr. Fraser as a man who was contemplating an investment in the com
pany. Mr. Fraser knew, of course, of the advertisement which his firm
had inserted for new capital; and he knew, when the meeting began, that
the negotiations depended on Mr. Candler’s being satisfied with the
balance-sheet of the company.
At that meeting on September 17, Mr. Fraser produced the draft
accounts. They already had, on them, at that time, a certificate ready for
signature by the accountants, stating in the usual formula: “We have
audited the balance-sheet as above set forth. We have obtained all the
information and explanations we have required and we report that such
balance-sheet is in our opinion properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs, according to the
best of our information and the explanations given to us and as shown by
the books of the company.” T h at certificate was not signed at the time;
but Mr. Fraser told Mr. Candler that that certificate would be signed with
a clear docket subject to one or two small alterations which he wished to
consider for another two or three days.
At that meeting of September 17, Mr. Candler took down in his own
handwriting a copy of the accounts, because he wanted to put them
before his own accountant for advice. There was a conflict of recollection
how he came to take them down, but the judge said that it did not matter
because Mr. Fraser clearly assented to Mr. Candler’s taking a copy. The
Judge said: “Having regard to the fact that Mr. Fraser was plainly aware
of the purpose for which the draft accounts were required, I entertain no
doubt at all that he was aware of and acquiesced in the showing of these
accounts to Mr. Candler: indeed, the meeting would have been wholly
pointless but for that purpose.” Mr. Fraser drew Mr. Candler’s attention
to the fact that some of the items in the draft balance-sheet might need
revision and the parties arranged to meet again on September 20, 1946.
T he Judge expressly found that, when the meeting of the 17th broke up,
Mr. Fraser must have been satisfied, not only that Mr. Candler was con
sidering an investment in the company, but was taking with him and rely
ing on the draft accounts which Mr. Fraser had prepared.
The parties met again on September 20. By that time Mr. Fraser had
concluded his examination of the books and drew Mr. Candler’s attention
to some modifications which are for present purposes immaterial. Mr.
Fraser said that the accounts had been passed by the directors and would
be signed in the next few days. Meanwhile Mr. Candler had himself
obtained advice from his own accountant and put queries to Mr. Fraser
about the accounts which Mr. Fraser answered. Nothing now turns on
those queries. At the end of the meeting Mr. Candler told Mr. Ogilvie
and Mr. Fraser that he was satisfied and would invest £2,000 in the com
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pany. He sent off a cheque for £500 that day to Mr. Ogilvie and the
balance of £1,500 on September 25, 1946.
The Judge has found that, to Mr. Fraser’s knowledge, Mr. Candler was
induced to believe that the accounts, as modified on September 20, 1946,
would be the certified accounts as they emerged from the accountants, and
that is what did in fact happen. On September 27, 1946, the accounts were
certified by the accountants in precisely the same form as Mr. Fraser had
shown them to Mr. Candler at the meeting of the 20th without any
alteration at all.
It has subsequently turned out that the accounts gave an altogether
inaccurate picture of the position of the company. Instances were given
to us which show that there was no verification whatever by the account
ants of the information which Mr. Ogilvie gave them. Thus, among the
assets were inserted “Freehold cottages (at cost) £650.” In fact the com
pany had no title deeds for the cottages. The cottages stood in Mr. Ogil
vie’s name and he had mortgaged them to the bank for his own overdraft.
Again, “Leasehold buildings (at cost) £650.” The company had no leases,
but they stood in Mr. Ogilvie’s name and were ultimately forfeited for
non-payment of rent. Yet again, the assets were said to include £3,280
expended on capital development, whereas the propriety of that figure
depended on whether, out of the total expenditure of the company, a
proper allocation had been made between capital and revenue expendi
ture; and the accounts contained no indication that any such allocation
had been necessary, or had indeed been made. It appears that much too
high a figure was allocated to capital, thus making the assets appear
larger than they in fact were. It was admitted that Mr. Fraser had entirely
failed to use proper care and skill in the preparation and presentation
of the accounts.
The result was disastrous for Mr. Candler. In September, 1946, he
entered the service of the company and moved down to Cornwall and
worked at the mine. Indeed, he invested in November, 1946, another £200.
But a little later his suspicions became aroused because he discovered that
his £2,000 had not been applied for the purposes of the company’s busi
ness. Ultimately he discovered that the company was in a very bad way.
It was not even able to pay his salary. He himself issued writs against
the company on May 1, and June 30, 1947, for salary and money lent.
On August 11, 1947, he presented a petition for winding up and on De
cember 15, 1947, a winding up order was made. There are no assets.
T he bank took the freehold cottages for Mr. Ogilvie’s debt. The lessors
forfeited the leasehold property. Mr. Ogilvie became a bankrupt. Mr.
Candler lost his £2,000 altogether, and he says it is due to the carelessness
of the accountants, because if they had put before him accounts which had
been properly prepared, the true position of affairs would have been dis
closed and he would never have invested his money in the company. The
only defences raised by the accountants at the hearing of the appeal were:
(1) that Mr. Fraser was not acting in the course of his employment; (2)
that, even if he was, they owed no duty of care to Mr. Candler.
The Judge seems to have treated it as beyond question that Mr. Fraser
was acting in the course of his employment, and I agree with him. There
is no doubt that Mr. Fraser was acting within his actual authority in writ
ing up the books and preparing the accounts, and indeed his action in so
doing was ratified and confirmed by the senior partner who signed the
certificate. But it is said that Mr. Fraser had no authority to show the
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draft accounts to Mr. Candler, or to answer his queries, at any rate not
without asking his principals for permission to do so. The senior partner
admitted that it was a very common thing for accountants at the request of
the chairman or person in control of a company to give details of the
company’s accounts to a prospective investor so as to induce him to invest
money, but he said that it was for the principal of the firm to do it, and
not for a clerk. T h at may well be so. It may not have been within Mr.
Fraser’s actual authority, but that is not the point. A master is often made
responsible for the unauthorized or forbidden acts of his servant when
he has for his own purposes put the servant in a position where he can do
the acts. Practical good sense demands that, even though the master is
not at fault himself, he should be responsible if the servant conducts him 
self in a way which is injurious to others. He takes the benefits of the serv
ant’s rightful acts and should bear the burden of his wrongful ones; and
he is, as a rule, the only one who has the means to pay. So, here, I have
no doubt that the accountants are responsible for the way in which Mr.
Fraser conducted himself in preparing the accounts and showing them
to Mr. Candler who, after all, was perfectly innocent in the m atter and
had not the slightest idea that Mr. Fraser had no authority to do what
he did.
I now come to the great question in the case: did the accountants owe
a duty of care to Mr. Candler? If the m atter were free from authority, I
should have said that they clearly did owe a duty of care to him. They
were professional accountants who prepared and put before him these
accounts, knowing that he was going to be guided by them in making
an investment in the company. On the faith of those accounts he did make
the investment, whereas if the accounts had been carefully prepared, he
would not have made the investment at all. T he result is that he has lost
his money. In the circumstances, had he not every right to rely on the
accounts being prepared with proper care; and is he not entitled to re
dress from the accountants on whom he relied? I say that he is, and I
would apply to this case the words of Lord Justice Knight Bruce in an
analogous case 90 years ago: “A country whose administration of justice
did not afford redress in a case of the present description would not be
in a state of civilization”: Slim v. Croucher ( (1860) 1 De G. F. and T. 518,
at p. 527).
T urning now to authority, I can point to many general statements of
principle which cover the case made by some of the great names in the law:
Lord Eldon, L. C., in Evans v. Bicknell ((1801) 6 Ves. 174, at p. 183), Lord
Campbell, L. C., in Slim v. Croucher (supra), Lord Selborne, L. C., in
Brownlie v. Campbell ((1880) 5 App. Cas. 925, at pp. 935 and 936), Lord
Herschell in Derry v. Peek ( (1889) 5 The Times L. R. 625, at p. 629; 14
App. Cas. 337, at p. 360), Lord Shaw in Nocton v. Ashburton (30 The
Times L. R. 602; [1914] A. C. 932, at p. 972), and Lord Atkin in Dono
ghue v. Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494, at p. 499; [1932] A. C. 562,
at p. 580). But it is said that effect cannot be given to those statements
of principle because Le Lievre v. Gould (9 The Times L. R. 243; [1893]
1 Q. B. 491) is an actual decision of this Court to the contrary.
Before I consider the decision in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) itself, I
wish to say that, in my opinion, current legal thought at the time it was
decided was infected by two cardinal errors. T he first error was an error
which appeared time and time again in nineteenth-century thought—
namely, that no one who is not a party to a contract can sue on it or on
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anything arising out of it. This error has had unfortunate consequences
both in the law of contract and in the law of tort. So far as contract is
concerned, I have said something about it in Smith v. River Douglas
Catchment Board (65 The Times L. R. 628; [1949] 2 K. B. 500). So far as
tort is concerned, it led the lawyers of that day to suppose that, if one of
the parties to a contract was negligent in carrying it out, no third person
who was injured by that negligence could sue for damages on account of
it: see W interbottom v. W right ((1842) 10 M. and W. 109), Alton v. M id
land Railway Company ((1865) 19 C. B. (N. S.) 213), and the notes in
Pasley v. Freeman ((1789) 3 Term. Rep. 51; 2 Sm. L. C. (13th ed., 1929,
pp. 103 to 110)); except in the case of things dangerous in themselves, like
guns: see Dixon v . Bell ((1816) 5 M. and S. 198). This error lies at the
root of the reasoning of Lord Justice Bowen in Le Lievre v. Gould ([1893]
1 Q. B., at p. 502) when he said that the law of England “does not con
sider that what a man writes on paper is like a gun or other dangerous
instrument,’’ meaning thereby that, unless it was a thing which was
dangerous in itself, no action lay. This error was exploded by the great
case of Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra), which decided that the presence of
a contract did not defeat an action for negligence by a third person, pro
vided that the circumstances disclosed a duty by the contracting party
to him.
T he second error was an error as to the effect of Derry v. Peek (supra),
an error which persisted for 35 years at least after that decision—namely,
that no action ever lies for a negligent statement, even though it is in
tended that the plaintiff should act on it, and he in fact acts on it to his
loss. This error led the Court of Appeal in Low v. Bouverie (7 The Times
L. R. 582; [1891] 3 Ch. 82) to deny the correctness of Slim v. Croucher
(supra); and in Le Lievre v . Gould (supra) to deny the correctness of
Cann v. Willson ( (1888) 4 The Times L. R. 588; 39 Ch. 39). T he cases
thus denied were so plainly just that the very denial of them was itself
an error. The error was, however, exposed by the im portant case of
Nocton v. Ashburton (supra), which decided that an action did lie for a
negligent statement where the circumstances disclosed a duty to be care
ful; and that all that is to be deduced from (though not decided by)
Derry v. Peek (supra) is that in the particular circumstances of that case
there was no duty to be careful. Lord Haldane, L. C., observed signifi
cantly ([1914] A. C., at p. 947) that the authorities subsequent to Derry
v. Peek (supra) had shown “a tendency to assume that it was intended
to mean more than it did.” In my opinion the decisions of the House
of Lords in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) and Nocton v. Ashburton
(supra) are sufficient to entitle this Court to examine afresh the law as
to negligent statements, and that is what I propose to do.
Let me first be destructive and destroy the submissions which Mr.
Foster put forward. His first submission was that a duty to be careful
in making statements arose only out of a contractual duty to the plaintiff,
or a fiduciary relationship to him. Apart from such cases no action, he
said, had ever been allowed for negligent statements, and he urged that
this want of authority was a reason against its being allowed now. This
argument about the novelty of the action does not appeal to me in the
least. It has been put forward in all the great cases which have been mile
stones of progress in our law, and it has always, or nearly always, been re
jected. If the great cases of Ashby v. W hite ((1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938),
Pasley v. Freeman (supra), and Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) are read it
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will be found that in each of them the Judges were divided in opinion.
On the one side there were the timorous souls who were fearful of allow
ing a new cause of action. On the other side there were the bold spirits
who were ready to allow it, if justice so required. It was fortunate for
the common law that the progressive view prevailed. Whenever this argu
ment of novelty is put forward I call to m ind the following emphatic
answer which Chief Justice Pratt gave nearly 200 years ago in Chapman
v. Pickersgill ((1762) 2 Wils. 145, at p. 146): “I wish never to hear this
objection again. This action is for a tort: torts are infinitely various; not
limited or confined, for there is nothing in nature but may be an instru
ment of mischief.” Lord Macmillan gave the same answer in Donoghue
v. Stevenson when he said (48 The Times L. R. 494, at p. 510; [1932]
A. C., at p. 619): “T he criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself
to the changing circumstances of life. T he categories of negligence are
never closed.” It needs only a little imagination to see how much the
common law would have suffered if those decisions had gone the other
way.
T he second submission of Mr. Foster was that a duty to take care only
arose where the result of a failure to take care will cause physical damage
to persons or property. It was for this reason that he did not dispute two
illustrations of negligent statements which I put in the course of the argu
ment, the case of an analyst who negligently certifies to a manufacturer of
food that a particular ingredient is harmless, whereas it is in fact poison
ous, or the case of an inspector of lifts who negligently reports that a par
ticular lift is safe, whereas it is in fact dangerous. T he analyst and the lift
inspector would, I should have thought, be liable to any person who was
injured by consuming the food, or using the lift, at any rate if there was no
likelihood of intermediate inspection: Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra),
Haseldine v. Daw and Son, Lim ited (58 The Times L. R. 1; [1941] 2 K. B.
343). Mr. Foster said that that might well be so because the negligence
there caused physical damage, but that the same would not apply to negli
gence which caused financial loss. He referred to some observations of
Mr. Justice Wrottesley which were in his favour on this point (Old Gate
Estates, Lim ited v. Toplis and Harding and Russell ((1939) 161 L. T.
Rep. 227)). But I must say that I cannot accept this as a valid distinction.
I can understand that in some cases of financial loss there may not be a
sufficiently proximate relationship to give rise to a duty of care; but if once
the duty exists I cannot think that liability depends on the nature of the
damage.
The third submission of Mr. Foster was that the duty which the
accountants owed was purely a contractual duty, and, therefore, that they
were not liable for negligence to a person to whom they were under no
contractual obligation. This seems to me to be simply a repetition of
the nineteenth century fallacy stated in Alton v. M idland Railway (supra)
and exploded by Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra).
Let me now be constructive and suggest the circumstances in which I
say that a duty to use care in statement does exist apart from a contract in
that behalf. First, what persons are under such duty? My answer is those
persons such as accountants, surveyors, valuers and analysts, whose profes
sion and occupation it is to examine books, accounts, and other things,
and to make reports on which other people—other than their clients—
rely in the ordinary course of business. T heir duty is not merely a duty
to u se care in their reports. They have also a duty to use care in their
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work which results in their reports. Herein lies the difference between
these professional men and other persons who have been held to be under
no duty to use care in their statements, such as promoters who issue a
prospectus: Derry v. Peek (supra) (now altered by statute), and trustees
who answer inquiries about the trust funds: Low v. Bouverie (7 The
Times L. R. 582; [1891] 3 Ch. 82). Those persons do not bring and are
not expected to bring, any professional knowledge or skill into the prepa
ration of their statements: they can only be made responsible by the law
affecting persons generally, such as contract, estoppel, innocent misrepre
sentation or fraud.
But it is very different with persons who engage in a calling which
requires special knowledge and skill. From very early times it has been
held that they owe a duty of care to those who are closely and directly
affected by their work apart altogether from any contract or undertaking
in that behalf. Thus, Fitz-Herbert in his new Natura Brevium ((1534)
94D) states that “if a smith prick my horse with a nail, I shall have my
action on the case against him, without any warranty by the smith to do
it well,” and he supports it with an excellent reason: “for it is the duty of
every artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly as he ought.” This rea
soning has been treated as applicable not only to shoeing smiths, surgeons
and barbers, who work with hammers, knives and scissors, but also to shipbrokers and clerks in the Custom House who work with figures and make
entries in books, “because their situation and employment necessarily
imply a competent degree of knowledge in making such entries”: see
Shiels v. Blackburne ((1789) 1 Hy. Bl. 159, at p. 163, per Lord Lough
borough), which was not referred to by Mr. Justice Devlin in Heskell v.
Continental Express, Lim ited ([1950] 1 All E. R. 1033, at p. 1042).
T he same reasoning has been applied to medical men who make re
ports on the sanity of others: see Everett v. Griffiths (36 The Times L. R.
491, at pp. 493 and 501; [1920] 3 K. B. 163, at pp. 182 and 217). I t is, I
think, also applicable to professional accountants. They are not liable,
of course, for casual remarks made in the course of conversation, nor for
other statements made outside their work, or not made in their capacity as
accountants: compare Fish v. Kelly ( (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 194). But they
are, in my opinion, in proper cases, apart from any contract in the matter,
under a duty to use reasonable care in the preparation of their accounts
and in the making of their reports. Secondly, to whom do these profes
sional people owe this duty? I will take accountants, but the same reason
ing applies to the others. They owe the duty, of course, to their employer
or client; and also I think to any third person to whom they themselves
show the accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show
the accounts so as to induce him to invest money or take some other
action on them. But I do not think the duty can be extended still further
so as to include strangers of whom they have heard nothing and to whom
their employer without their knowledge may choose to show their ac
counts. Once the accountants have handed their accounts to their em
ployer they are not, as a rule, responsible for what he does with them
without their knowledge or consent.
A good illustration is afforded by the decision in Le Lievre v. Gould
(supra) itself, which I certainly would not wish to call in question. T he
facts are somewhat differently stated in the various reports, but collecting
them together they come to this: A surveyor there surveyed work for a
building owner and handed certificates to him so that he could know
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the amounts which he had to pay the builder. T he building owner then
chose to show the certificates to his own mortgagees who advanced money
on them instead of on the certificates of their own surveyor. T he mort
gagees then said that the owner’s surveyor owed a duty of care to them.
T h a t was obviously untenable, because they should have had the work
surveyed by their own surveyor. Indeed, they had actually stipulated for
it. T he relationship was therefore one in which the inspection of an
intermediate person might reasonably be interposed, and was consequently
too remote to raise a duty of care: see per Lord Atkin in Donoghue v.
Stevenson (48 The Times L. R., at p. 499; [1932] A. C., at p. 582). But
excluding such cases as those, there are some cases—of which the present is
one—where the accountants know all the time, even before they present
their accounts, that their employer requires the accounts to show to a third
person so as to induce him to act on them; and then they themselves, or
their employers, present the accounts to him for the purpose. In such cases
I am of opinion that the accountants owe a duty of care to the third
person.
T he test of proximity in these cases is: Did the accountants know that
the accounts were required for submission to the plaintiff and use by him?
T h at appears from Langridge v. Levy ( (1837-8) 2 M. and W. 519) as ex
tended by Baron Cleasby in George v. Skivington ( (1869) L. R. 5 Ex. 1, at
p. 5); and from the decision of that good Judge, Mr. Justice Chitty, in
Cann v. Willson (supra), which is directly in point. In that case a valuer
made a valuation of property for the very purpose of enabling his client to
raise a mortgage on it; and, in order to further the transaction, the valuer
himself actually put the valuation before the mortgagee’s solicitor saying
that it was a very moderate valuation and not made in favour of the bor
rower. The mortgagee advanced money on the faith of the valuation, but
it turned out that the valuer had been grossly careless, and the mortgagee
lost his money. Mr. Justice Chitty held that the valuer was liable in
negligence, apart from any contract at all. He said (39 Ch. D., at p. 42)
that the valuation was sent by the valuer direct to the mortgagee’s solicitor
“for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff and his co-trustee to lay out the
trust money on mortgage. It seems to me that the defendants knowlingly
placed themselves in that position, and in point of law incurred a duty
toward him to use reasonable care in the preparation of the document
called a valuation. I think it is like the case of the supply of an article—
the supply of the hairwash in the case of George v. Skivington (supra).’’
T h a t reasoning seems to me to be good sense and good law. I know that
in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) the Court of Appeal said that Cann v.
Willson (supra) was wrongly decided; but it must be remembered that
at that time the general opinion of the profession was that George v.
Skivington (supra), on which Mr. Justice Chitty relied, was itself wrongly
decided, or at any rate that the principle stated in it by Baron Cleasby was
wrong: see per Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Cave, and Lord Justice
Bowen and Lord Justice Cotton, in Heaven v. Pender ( (1882) 9 Q. B. D.
302, at pp. 306-7; (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503, at pp. 516-7), and per Mr. Justice
Hamilton in Blacker v. Lake and Elliott ( (1912) 106 L. T . Rep., at p. 533).
If George v. Skivington (supra) was wrong, then, of course, Cann v. Willson (supra) was wrong, for it was based on it. But in Donoghue v.
Stevenson (supra) the House of Lords fully restored George v. Skivington
(supra), and Lord Atkin himself approved the reasoning of Baron Cleasby
(see 48 The Times L. R., at p. 500; [1932] A. C., at pp. 584-5). It seems
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to me that by so doing the House of Lords have implicitly restored Cann
v. Willson (supra), because they have restored the case on which it was
based; and if Cann v. Willson (supra) is good law, it follows that in the
present case the accountants owed a duty of care to Mr. Candler, for the
circumstances are indistinguishable.
Thirdly, to what transactions does the duty of care care extend? It
extends, I think, only to those transactions for which the accountants knew
their accounts were required. For instance, in the present case it extends
to the original investment of £2,000 which Mr. Candler made in reliance
on the accounts, because the accountants knew that the accounts were
required for his guidance in making that investment; but it does not
extend to the subsequent £200 which he made after he had been two
months with the company. This distinction, that the duty only extends to
the very transaction in mind at the time, is implicit in the decided cases.
Thus, a doctor, who negligently certifies a man to be a lunatic when he is
not, is liable to him, although there is no contract in the matter, because
the doctor knows that his certificate is required for the very purpose of
deciding whether the man should be detained or not; but an insurance
company’s doctor owes no duty to the insured person, because he makes his
examination only for the purposes of the insurance company: see Everett
v. Griffiths (supra), where Lord Justice Atkin proceeded on the self-same
principles as he fully expounded later in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra).
So, also, a Lloyd’s surveyor who, in surveying for classification purposes
negligently passes a mast as sound when it is not, is not liable to the owner
for damage caused by its breaking, because the surveyor makes his survey
only for the purpose of classifying the ship for the yacht register and not
otherwise: Humphrey v. Bowers ( (1929) 45 The Times L. R. 297). Again,
a scientist or expert (including a marine hydrographer) is not liable to his
readers for careless statements in his published works. He publishes his
work simply for the purpose of giving information, and not with any
particular transaction in mind at all. But when a scientist or an expert
makes an investigation and report for the very purpose of a particular
transaction, then, in my opinion, he is under a duty of care in respect of
that transaction.
It will be noticed that I have confined the duty to cases where the ac
countant prepares his accounts and makes his report for the guidance of
the very person in the very transaction in question. T h at is sufficient for
the decision of this case. I can well understand that it would be going too
far to make an accountant liable to any person in the land who chooses to
rely on the accounts in matters of business, for that would expose him to
“liability in an indeterminate amount for an indtetrm inate time to an
indeterminate class”: see Ultramares Corporation v. Touche ( (1931) 255
N. Y. Rep. 170, at p. 179; 174 N. E. Rep. 441, at p. 444), per Chief Justice
Cardozo. W hether he would be liable if he prepared his accounts for the
guidance of a specific class of persons in a specific class of transactions, I
do not say. I should have thought he might be, just as the analyst and lift
inspector would be liable in the instances I have given earlier. It is per
haps worth mentioning that Parliament has intervened to make the pro
fessional man liable for negligent reports given for the purposes of a
prospectus: see sections 40 and 43 of the Companies Act, 1948. T h at is an
instance of liability for reports made for the guidance of a specific class
of persons—investors, in a specific class of transactions—applying for
shares, That enactment does not help one way or the other to show what
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result the common law would have reached in the absence of such provi
sions; but it does show what result it ought to reach.
My conclusion is that a duty to use care in statement is recognized by
English law, and that its recognition does not create any dangerous prece
dent when it is remembered that it is limited in respect of the persons by
whom and to whom it is owed and the transactions to which it applies.
One final word. I think that the law would fail to serve the best interests
of the community if it should hold that accountants and auditors owe a
duty to no one but their client. Its influence would be most marked in
cases where their client is a company or firm controlled by one man. It
would encourage accountants to accept the information which the one
man gives them, without verifying it; and to prepare and present the
accounts rather as a lawyer prepares and presents a case, putting the best
appearance on the accounts they can without expressing their personal
opinion of them. This is, to my way of thinking, an entirely wrong
approach. There is a great difference between the lawyer and the account
ant. T he lawyer is never called upon to express his personal belief in the
truth of his client’s case; whereas the accountant, who certifies the accounts
of his client, is always called upon to express his personal opinion whether
the accounts exhibit a true and correct view of his client’s affairs; and he
is required to do this not so much for the satisfaction of his own client but
more for the guidance of shareholders, investors, revenue authorities, and
others who may have to rely on the accounts in serious matters of business.
If we should decide this case in favour of the accountants there will be no
reason why accountants should ever verify the word of the one man in a
one-man company, because there will be no one to complain about it.
T he one man who gives them wrong information will not complain if they
do not verify it. He wants their backing for the misleading information
he gives them, and he can only get it if they accept his word without veri
fication. It is just what he wants so as to gain his own ends. And the
persons who are misled cannot complain because the accountants owe no
duty to them. If such be the law, I think it is to be regretted, for it means
that the accountants’ certificate, which should be a safeguard, becomes a
snare for those who rely on it. I do not myself think that it is the law. In
my opinion accountants owe a duty of care not only to their own clients,
but also to all those whom they know will rely on their accounts in the
transactions for which those accounts are prepared.
I would therefore be in favour of allowing the appeal and entering
judgment for Mr. Candler for damages in the sum of £2,000.
Lord Justice Asquith.—On two points I entirely agree with the judg
ment which Lord Justice Denning has delivered and I agree that the
cause of action based on an alleged breach of duty occurring after the
plaintiff became a shareholder cannot be made out if only because the
damaged relied on preceded the breach. I also agree, for the reasons which
he has given, that Mr. Fraser was clearly acting within the scope of his
employment by the defendant firm in showing the draft accounts and
giving certain other information to the plaintiff.
But I have the misfortune to differ from Lord Justice Denning on the
more im portant point raised in this case. T he point may be put in this
way: Assume that Mr. Fraser’s negligent misrepresentations had been
made by his employers, the partners in the defendant firm. Assume
further, as the fact is, that there was no fraud and no contract or fiduciary
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relationship between them and the plaintiff. W ould they, in those events,
have been liable to the plaintiff in respect of damage incurred by him
through acting on those negligent misrepresentations? T he defendants
say, “No.” They do not question that in the absence of fraud, contract
and fiduciary relationship, there are cases in which A. may be under a
legal obligation to B. to use reasonable care for some purposes. T heir
proposition is that under the conditions assumed in this case the defend
ants were under no duty, sounding in tort, to the plaintiff to take care that
their representations of fact should be true. They rely in support of this
contention on Le Lievre v. Gould (9 The Times L. R. 243; [1893] 1 Q. B.
491), a decision binding on this Court. I agree with the trial Judge in con
sidering that authority to be conclusive in their favour unless it can be
shown to have been overruled or to be distinguishable.
The plaintiff’s case is that whatever may have been the position before
Donoghue v. Stevenson (48 T he Times L. R. 494; [1932] A. C. 562), the
rule which the majority of the House of Lords applied in that case neces
sarily involves the consequence that (even where fraud, contract and
fiduciary relationship are absent) A. will be liable to B. for any negligent
misrepresentations on which B. acts to his detriment, provided always that
there exists between A. and B. the necessary degree of so-called “prox
imity.” It is argued that there was sufficient proximity on the facts of this
case.
It may make for clearness first to consider some of the authorities pre
ceding Donoghue’s case (supra) (as for short I will call it); and, secondly,
to inquire what difference, if any, that case has made. I do not think it
useful to go back farther than Derry v. Peek ((1889) 5 The Times L. R.
625; 14 App. Cas. 337). In that case the plaintiff subscribed for shares in
a limited company in reliance on a prospectus issued by the directors who
included the defendants. The prospectus contained a negligent misstate
ment made in good faith. T he claim on the writ as amended was for
damages for deceit; for that and nothing else. There was no independent
alternative claim in respect of negligent or innocent misrepresentation.
The Court of Appeal held that fraud would be sufficiently established by
proof that the directors had no reasonable grounds for believing the state
ment they made. T he House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal,
held that this was not enough to constitute fraud. If the defendants
believed what they said it matters not how credulous they were or how
groundless their belief. Fraud necessarily connotes dishonesty and no
degree of mere stupidity can serve in its place. T he case is therefore
primarily, and according to one view solely, a decision on the meaning of
the word “fraud,” and is therefore not directly relevant to the main issue
in the present case from which fraud, though originally alleged, has been
eliminated. Nevertheless it is indirectly relevant and illuminating. For,
although it does not decide in terms, it clearly assumes or implies, that a
merely negligent misrepresentation made by a director to potential sub
scribers for shares, on which some of them act to their detriment, affords
the latter no remedy. T he notion that Donoghue’s case (supra) was
intended parenthetically or sub silentio to sweep away this substratum of
Derry v. Peek (supra) seems to me quite unconvincing.
After the Court of Appeal had given its decision in Derry v. Peek
(supra), but before it had been reversed by the House of Lords, a case
came up for determination at first instance on facts not materially dis
tinguishable from those of the present case. In Cann v. Willson ( (1888) 4
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The Times L. R. 588; 39 Ch. D. 39) Mr. Justice Chitty, relying on the
decision (then unreversed) of the Court of Appeal in Derry v. Peek
(supra), held that the plaintiff could recover damages in respect of a
negligent but (according to what we now know the word “fraud” means)
non-fraudulent misrepresentation. This was the view implicitly con
demned by the House of Lords when Derry v. Peek (supra) reached
them; and Cann v. Willson (supra) was consequently on this assumption
expressly overruled by the Court of Appeal in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra).
As I have indicated, this last decision is binding on this Court and dis
poses of the appeal, in my view, unless it can be shown to have been (a)
overruled or (b) distinguishable.
I will consider these points in turn, premising that the principle on
which Gould’s case (supra) was decided was, in the words of Lord Esher,
M. R., (9 The Times L. R., at p. 244; [1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 498) this: “All
that he” (the defendant) “had done was to give untrue certificates
negligently. Such negligence, in the absence of contract with the plain
tiffs, can give no right of action at law or in equity.” Both he and Lord
Justice Bowen treated Derry v. Peek (supra) as deciding not merely that
fraud was not established in that case, but that nothing short of fraud
could in the circumstances of that case have given a cause of action, for
example, that negligent misrepresentation could not do so.
T h at being so, the first question is whether the principle laid down in
Gould’s case (supra) has been modified or overruled, either expressly or
by necessary implication, by the decision in any other case of superior
authority. It has been qualified by Nocton v. Ashburton (30 The Times
L. R. 602; [1914] A.C. 932) to this extent, that in the passage cited
above, after the words “in the absence of contract with the plaintiff,” the
further words,“or in some circumstances where a fiduciary relationship
exists between the defendant and the plaintiff,” ought to be written in.
Subject to this gloss, has it been overruled? It has certainly not there
been overruled expressly. Has it, then, been overruled by necessary
implication? Lord Atkin in Donoghue’s case (supra) referred pointedly
to Gould’s case (supra) without a hint or a suggestion that it was wrongly
decided, or that the memorable formula which he himself was pro
pounding was inconsistent with it. As regards the two minority judg
ments, one of them, that of Lord Buckmaster, also mentions the case, and
without disapproval.
On the other hand, it is arguable (though the argument does not carry
conviction to my mind) that whether or not Lord Atkin realized the fact
or directed his mind to the question, the formula which he laid down
does in fact logically invalidate the principle laid down, and acted on in
Gould’s case (supra). This contention must be squarely faced. Lord
Atkin pointed out that the law governing the duty owned by A. to B. in
the absence of fraud, contract or fiduciary relationship has been built up
piecemeal—built up, if one may pursue the metaphor, in disconnected
slabs exhibiting no organic unity of structure. Certain classes owed
duties of care to certain other classes: road users to other road users;
bailees to person entrusting property to them; doctors and surgeons (and
originally barbers) to persons entrusting their bodies to them; occupiers
of premises to persons whom they invite or permit to come on the
premises; and so on. These categories attracting the duty had been added
to and subtracted from from time to time. But no attem pt had been
made in the past to rationalize them, to find a common denominator
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between road users, bailees, surgeons, occupiers, and so on, which would
explain why they should be bound to a duty of care and some other
classes who might be expected equally to be so bound should be exempt
—no attempt, that is, save that of Lord Esher, M. R., (from which his
colleagues dissociated themselves) in Heaven v. Pender ((1883) 11
Q. B. D. 503). Yet, said Lord Atkin, there must be such a common
denominator, or at any rate some general conception of relations present
in the cases in which a duty arises, and absent in cases in which it does
not.
Very tentatively (and prefacing his observation with a warning that
it might go beyond the province of a Judge to make such an attempt) he
suggested the formula which has now become classic, but which neverthe
less it is desirable here to quote afresh (48 The Times L. R., at p. 499;
[1932] A.C., at p. 580): “You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure
your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems
to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when
I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in
question. This appears to me to be the doctrine of Heaven v. Pender
(supra) as laid down by Lord Esher, when it is limited by the notion of
proximity introduced by Lord Esher himself and Lord Justice A. L.
Smith in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra).”
This passage, if read literally and without regard to the qualifying
effect of its context, or of the subjecta materies, might be taken to com
prehend not only conduct causing physical injury to person or property
through setting a certain kind of chattels in motion or in circulation (the
case immediately under review), but also conduct of any kind through
any means (including negligent misstatement) causing damnum of any
kind recognized by the law, whether physical or not, to anyone who
could bring himself within Lord Atkin’s definition of a “neighbour.” I
cannot believe that so broad an application was intended by Lord Atkin
himself. T he case may not decide quite so little as is contained in the
somewhat conservative headnote in the Law Reports, which purports to
confine it to the act of a manufacturer launching into circulation a neg
ligently manufactured chattel which is calculated to injure and in fact
injures the ultimate consumer or user in circumstances in which neither
he nor any intermediate party has a reasonable opportunity of examining
it. In fact, it has since been applied somewhat outside this limited ambit:
for instance, to physical injury caused by negligent failure to repair a
lift: Haseldine v. Daw (58 The Times L. R. 1; [1941] 2 K. B. 343), and to
physical injury suffered when unloading timber from a barge: Denny v .
Supplies and Transport Company, Lim ited (66 The Times L. R. (Pt. 1)
1168; [1950] 2 K. B. 374), or by the negligent adoption of a system of
working. It has, however, I think, never been applied where the damage
complained of was not physical. Mr. Justice Wrottesley in Old Gate
Estates v. Toplis and Harding and Russell ((1939) 161 L. T . 227) held
its application was limited to cases where the injury was to life or limb.
I think that this is too narrow a view, and that physical injury to property
may suffice, but it has never been applied to injury other than physical.
Apart, however, from any limitation which should be read into Lord
Atkin’s language by reference to the facts of the case before him—the
subjecta materies—it seems to me incredible that, if he thought that his
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formula was inconsistent with Gould's case (supra), he would not have
said so. This case, now nearly 60 years old, had at that time stood for
nearly 40 years. He must have considered it closely. Yet his only reference
to it is as annexing a valid and essential qualification to Lord Esher’s
formula in Heaven v. Pender (supra). Not a word of disapproval of the
decision on its merits. The inference seems to me to be that Lord Atkin
continued to accept the distinction between liability in tort for careless
(but non-fraudulent) misstatements and liability in tort for some other
forms of carelessness, and that his formula defining “who is my neighbour’’
must be read subject to his acceptance of this overriding distinction.
Counsel for the appellant was unable to point to any clean decided case,
standing unreversed, either before or after Donoghue’s case (supra), in
which (always apart from fraud, contract and fiduciary relationship) A.
had ever been held liable to B. in damages for a careless misrepresentation.
But he anchored certain hopes on George v. Skivington ( (1869) L. R. 5
Ex. 1), and on certain observations of Lord Herschell in Derry v. Peek
(supra). I will say a word now on each of these cases.
George v. Skivington (supra), a decision “battered but unbowed,” was
in the end vindicated by the House of Lords in Donoghue’s case (supra).
T he case was tried on demurrer. T he declaration averred, inter alia, “that
the defendant carried on the business of a chemist, and in the course of
such business professed to sell a chemical compound made of ingredients
known only to the defendant, and which he represented and professed to
be fit and proper to be used for washing the hair, which could and might
be so used without personal injury to the person using the same, and to
have been carefully and skilfully and properly compounded by him the
defendant; and thereupon the plaintiff Joseph George, bought of the de
fendant, and the defendant sold to him at a certain price, a bottle of the
said compound, to be used by the plaintiff Emma for washing her hair as
the defendant then knew, and on the terms that the same was then fit and
proper to be used and could be safely used, by her for the purpose afore
said, without personal injury to her, and had been skilfully, carefully, and
properly compounded by the defendant,” and that the wife suffered con
sequent injury.
Thus it was averred that the defendant put into circulation, knowing it
was intended to be used by the purchaser’s wife, a negligently compounded
and deleterious hairwash. She used it, sustained physical injury, and an
action was brought by her or on her behalf in which she succeeded on the
issue raised by the demurrer. So far, the case is on all fours with Donog
hue’s case (supra) according to its narrowest interpretation, and it is not
surprising that Donoghue’s case (supra) affirmed it. But the declaration
also averred that the defendant had said the hairwash was safe.
T he present plaintiff, basing himself on this last averment, contended
that it—an averment of negligent misstatement—standing alone would
have evoked the same decision—namely, that the facts averred amounted,
if proved, to a good cause of action. This I venture to doubt. It seems to
me that the essence of the decision resided in the averment of negligent
compounding and setting in motion by the defendant of a physical thing
with knowledge that the plaintiff would or might use the physical thing so
compounded and with resulting injury to the plaintiff; and that the
parallel between Donoghue’s case (supra) and the hairwash case lay ex
clusively in these features.
T urning to the decision in Derry v. Peek (supra), it is said that among
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decided cases Derry v. Peek (supra) also lends indirect support to the plain
tiff’s case. This contention is based on a dictum of Lord Herschell’s
(5 The Times L. R., at p. 629; 14 App. Cas. at p. 360). Lord Herschell, in
deciding that the defendants were not liable for a non-fraudulent misrep
resentation in their prospectus, said that he excluded from his purview
cases “where a person within whose special province it lay to know a par
ticular fact has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry made with regard
to it by a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of deter
mining his course.”
Here, again, is a statement which if construed in its literal breadth
might seem to fit the present case. Lord Herschell’s dictum was, however,
later interpreted both by the Court of Appeal in Low v. Bouverie (7 The
Times L. R. 582; [1891] 3 Ch. 82) and later by the House of Lords in
Nocton v. Ashburton (30 The Times L. R., at p. 604; [1914] A.C. 932, at
p. 950). It seems clear from the latter case (in which the former was also
considered and affirmed) that Lord Herschell’s proposition has been held
only to hold good where (to use its terms) the “person within whose spe
cial province it lays to know a particular fact” occupies a contractual or
fiduciary position vis-à-vis the “person desirous of ascertaining that fact.”
The cases which had decided otherwise are one by one dismissed by Lord
Haldane as defensible if at all only on some other ground; warranty,
estoppel, or whatnot. He affirmed that liability for negligence in word
had in material respects been developed in our law differently from lia
bility for negligence in act. T he cases cited in support of Lord Herschell’s
dictum are all based, according to Lord Dunedin in Nocton v. Ashburton
([1914] A.C., at p. 964). “upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship,
and, subsequently, the breach of duty subsequently arising.”
In what has gone before it has been assumed that the two Law Lords
who agreed with Lord Atkin’s opinion or result accepted the broad for
mula about "my duty to my neighbour” which he laid down, as well as
in the narrow proposition limited to the liability of the negligent m anu
facturer of a chattel which reaches the consumer without an opportunity
of intermediate examination and injures him. This assumption seems to
me more than questionable. Lord Thankerton, though he said (48 The
Times L.R., at p. 506; [1932] A.C., at p. 604) that he entirely agreed
with Lord Atkin’s discussion of the authorities, was clearly considering
the authorities in their application to the narrow ambit of a manufactur
er’s liability, chattels and physical injury. His judgment does not travel
outside those limits. Nor do I read Lord Macmillan’s judgment as en
dorsing the wider proposition. There is a passage in which he laid down
certain general propositions (48 The Times L. R., at p. 510; [1932] A.C.,
at p. 619). It would have been easy for him to have adopted Lord Atkin’s
formula in terms if he had thought so broad a proposition justified. But
when he said in an oft-quoted phrase, “the categories of negligence are
never closed,” he is not, in my view, accepting an acid test of liability
valid in all circumstances—he does not mention the word “neighbour”;
he is merely saying that in accordance with changing social needs and
standards new classes of persons legally bound or entitled to the exer
cise of care may from time to time emerge—in this case by the addition
of a careless manufacturer or circulator of a chattel—as parties bound,
vis-à-vis consumers or users as parties entitled. In other words, what Lord
Macmillan envisaged was the addition of another slab to the existing edi
fice, not a systematic reconstruction of the edifice on a single logical plan.
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For these reasons I am of opinion that Donoghue's case (supra) neither
reverses nor qualifies the principle laid down in Gould's case (supra).
If I am wrong in thinking that Lord Atkin’s formula was not accepted
by the majority of the House, there remains the question whether, assum
ing that Gould's case (supra) was well decided on its own facts, the facts
of the present case are not so far different as to justify and require a
different conclusion. The suggestion here is that the conclusion in Gould’s
case (supra) could be defended consistently with the principle of Dono
ghue’s case (supra) being applicable to negligent misrepresentation, if
in Gould's case (supra) there was insufficient “proximity” between the
parties to attract the Donoghue principle; and that a conclusion favour
able to the plaintiff in the present case could properly be reached on the
ground that in the present case there was sufficient “proximity.” The
contention under this head is, in other words, first, that Donoghue's case
(supra) overrules Gould’s (supra) so far as the latter places careless mis
statements on a different and privileged level as compared with some other
forms of careless behaviour; but, secondly, that the actual result of Gould's
case (supra) was right because the principle in Donoghue's case (supra)
required “proximity” as a condition of liability and there was in Gould's
case (supra) no sufficient “proximity”; and, thirdly, that this accounts,
inter alia, for Lord Atkin’s omission to say that Gould’s case (supra) was
wrongly decided.
This argument also seems to me invalid. The only difference, quoad
“proximity,” between the present case and Gould’s (supra) is that in the
present case Mr. Fraser knew when he made his representation the identity
of the man who was likely to rely on his representations, whereas Gould
did not know this: he did not know that the parties who were to make
the advances were the mortgagees, the plaintiffs, or at least he did not
know the contents of the mortgage deed. But consider what he did know.
He knew before any mortgage was effected that his certificates were
required because advances were going to be made by someone to the
builder on the security of the work performed up to date as vouched by
his certificates. T h at someone could only be the building owner or some
other lender relying on the same security.
I take the following passage from the statement of facts ([1893] 1 Q. B.
492) premising that H unt was the owner of the land on which two houses
were to be built; Lovering was the builder; Dennes was the mortgagee
who ultimately made advances; and Le Lievre, the plaintiff, was Dennes’
assign. “H unt arranged with the plaintiff Dennes that he should advance
the £850 to Lovering upon the security of a mortgage from him. H unt
also agreed with the defendant Gould, who was an architect and surveyor
at Ilfracombe, that he should give certificates from time to time that the
work had reached the respective stages at which the respective instalments
were to be advanced as provided by the schedule of advances, a copy of
which was given to the defendant. This agreement with the defendant
was made before the execution of the mortgage.”
On those facts, to say that there was insufficient proximity in the Gould
case (supra) seems to me wrong. Lord Atkin, in affirming the Donoghue
type of liability, and annexing to it the condition of proximity, did not
say: “There is no proximity unless the defendant can identify the ultimate
victim of his carelessness in advance.” T he manufacturers of the peccant
bottle of ginger beer had no idea who would in the end consume it. All
they knew was that someone would. You may adopt the formula Certum
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est qui certum reddi potest. T he unidentifiability in advance of the ulti
mate consumer and victim did not, by displacing the notion of proximity
or in any other way, protect them from liability. I am therefore of opinion
that this argument fails.
Singular consequences would follow if the principle laid down in Dono
ghue’s case (supra) were applied to negligent misrepresentation in every
case in which the representee were proximate to the representor. T he case
had been instanced by Professor Winfield and referred to by Lord Justice
Denning of a marine hydrographer who carelessly omits to indicate on
his map the existence of a reef. The captain of a liner, in reliance on the
map and having no opportunity of checking it by reference to any other
map, steers her on the unsuspected rocks, and she becomes a total loss.
Is the unfortunate cartographer to be liable to her owners in negligence
for some millions of pounds damages? Yet what line can be drawn between
him and the defendants in the present case? If it be said that there is no
proximity between the cartographer and those for whose use his map is
designed, the reply surely is that there is just as much as there was between
the manufacturer of the peccant ginger beer bottle and its ultimate
consumer.
In the present state of our law different rules still seem to apply to the
negligent misstatement on the one hand and to the negligent circulation
or repair of chattels on the other; and Donoghue’s case (supra) does not
seem to me to have abolished these differences. I am not concerned with
defending the existing state of the law or contending that it is strictly logi
cal—it clearly is not—but I am merely recording what I think it is. If this
relegates me to the company of “timorous souls,” I must face that con
sequence with such fortitude as I can command.
I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.
Lord Justice C ohen.—T he Judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. He
found “no fraud” and from this part of his judgment the plaintiff does not
appeal. He also found that the only duty which the defendants owed to
the plaintiff was to produce accounts which they honestly believed to be
the draft accounts of the company. In other words, he found that they
owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. From that part of his judgment the
plaintiff appeals on two grounds.
He says, first, that, since to the knowledge of the defendants’ employee,
Mr. Fraser, the plaintiff was a prospective investor in the company and
was asking for information about the accounts of the company to assist
him in reaching a decision whether to make the investment, the defend
ants, in accordance with the principles laid down by Lord Atkin in Dono
ghue v. Stevenson (48 The Times L. R. 494; [1932] A.C. 562) owed a duty
to the plaintiff, when giving him that information, to exercise care to see
that it was accurate. Secondly, he says that since the information given to
the plaintiff was inaccurate in material particulars owing to the negli
gence of the defendants’ employee Mr. Fraser, the defendants are liable in
damages. Alternatively, the plaintiff alleges that as he became a share
holder in the company and the defendants were the auditors of the com
pany, they owed a duty to him as shareholder to give him the accurate
information which they should have given him when he was a prospec
tive investor. This duty, he says, was broken and accordingly he is entitled
to damages.
So far as the second ground is concerned, I entirely agree with the Judge
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that no damage flowed from the breach of such duty as is owed by the
defendants as auditors to the plaintiff as a shareholder. The £2,000 had
been irretrievably invested before the relationship had become operative.
I would add that I doubt whether the defendants’ alleged duty as auditors
extends to cover information given to the plaintiff before he became a
shareholder.
T he first ground presents more difficulty, but in spite of Mr. Lawson’s
able and lucid argument I have come to the conclusion that we are bound
by authority to hold that the Judge came to the right conclusion.
Mr. Foster submitted, first, that Mr. Fraser was not acting within the
scope of his employment in giving to the plaintiff information as to the
accounts and therefore the defendants could not be liable for his negli
gence in the preparation thereof. So far as this point is concerned, I have
nothing to add to the reasons given by my brethren for thinking that it
cannot be sustained. Secondly, he said that the principle of Donoghue v.
Stevenson (supra) had never been applied to a case of negligent misstate
ment. A defendant could only be liable for negligent misstatement where
there was a contractual nexus or a fiduciary relationship between him and
the plaintiff. In the absence of such a relationship the decision in Derry v.
Peek ((1889) 5 The Times L. R. 625; 14 App. Cas. 337), as interpreted in
Nocton v. Ashburton (30 The Times L. R. 602; [1914] A.C. 932) is, Mr.
Foster said, authority that no liability in negligence exists. This argument
is, I think, well founded.
In Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) as in all the other cases to which our
attention was called, the breach of duty alleged has been one which has
resulted in damages to the person of the plaintiff: see Hazeldine v. C. A.
Daw and Son, Lim ited (58 The Times L. R. 1; [1941] 2 K. B. 343);
Denny v. Supplies and Transport Company, Lim ited (66 The Times L. R.
(Pt. 1) 1168; [1950] 2 K. B. 374). In Old Gate Estates v. Toplis and Har
ding and Russell ( (1939) 161 L. T . Rep. 227) Mr. Justice Wrottesley re
fused to apply the principle of Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) to a case
where a company had paid too much for a property owing to an over
valuation by the defendants, who had been instructed by the promoters to
value it for the purpose of the promotion. The company, which was the
plaintiff, was not formed at the time of the valuation. Mr. Justice Wrottes
ley, rejecting an argument based on Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) and
(161 L. T . Rep., at p. 229): “The conception which runs through all these
cases, both in those applications of the principle and in Donoghue v.
Stevenson (supra) itself, is that something was negligently created or put
into circulation which was dangerous either to life or limb”—those are,
I think, the very words of Lord Atkin himself and the other learned Lords
who delivered opinions, or the opinions of a majority, in Donoghue v.
Stevenson (supra)— “or else that something carelessly handled, made, or
mended, which would become dangerous to life or limb or health. It is as
true to-day as it was in 1893, when Le Lievre v. Gould (9 The Times L. R.
243; [1893] 1 Q. B. 491) was decided, that, to use the words of Lord Justice
Bowen ([1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 502): ‘It is idle to refer to cases which were
decided under totally different aspects, and upon totally different consid
erations of the law. Take, for example, the case of an own er of a chattel,
such as a horse, a gun, or a carriage, or any other instrument, which is in
itself of such a character that, if it be used carelessly, it may injure some
third person who is near to it; then it is as plain as daylight that the
owner of that chattel, who is responsible for its management, is bound
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to be careful how he uses it. Exactly in the same way with regard to the
owner of premises. If the owner of premises knows that his premises are
in a dangerous condition, and that people are coming there to work on
them by his own permission and invitation, of course he must take reason
able care that those premises do not injure those who are coming there.
. . . How has it any application to the present case? [that was, of a certifi
cate given by an architect.] Only, I suppose, on the suggestion that a man
is responsible for what he states in a certificate to any person to whom
he may have reason to suppose that the certificate may be shown. But the
law of England does not go to that extent: it does not consider that what
a man writes on paper is like a gun or other dangerous instrument, and,
unless he intended to deceive, the law does not, in the absence of contract,
hold him responsible for drawing his certificate carelessly.’ ”—I think
that that is as true to-day as it was when it was said by Lord Justice Bowen.
—“There is nothing in my opinion, in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra)
which makes that bad law. T he exceptions laid down by Donoghue v.
Stevenson (supra)”— the exceptions to the rule that a man is obliged to
be careful only to those to whom he owes a duty by contract—“are, as I
understand the decision, confined to negligence which results in danger to
life, danger to limb, or danger to health, and, the present case not being
one of those exceptions, the plaintiffs have, in my opinion, no cause of
action on the analogy of that case.” Mr. Foster submitted that those ob
servations constituted a correct statement of the law at any rate if the
words “or property” were added after the words “or danger to health.”
The question of liability for negligent misstatement was also considered
by Mr. Justice Devlin in Heskell v. Continental Express Lim ited ([1950]
1 All E.R. 1033), a case where, through carelessness, a bill of lading had
been issued for goods which had not been shipped. Mr. Justice Devlin
said (at p. 1041): “In my judgment, therefore, the plaintiff has not estab
lished any contractual relationship with Strick giving rise to any particu
lar duty owing to him. In putting forward the wider proposition that
Strick owed a duty to the public not carelessly to circulate a document
of title knowing it would be used as such, counsel for the plaintiff acknowl
edged the difficulty he encountered because of Le Lievre v. Gould (supra)
and other similar decisions which make it plain that negligent misstate
ment can never give rise to a cause of action.” Read literally, this state
ment is too wide, since negligent misstatement can give rise to a cause of
action not only where there is a contractual relationship, but also where
there is a fiduciary relationship: see Nocton v. Ashburton (supra). But
with this limitation the statement is, in my opinion, correct.
So far as I am aware, there is only one reported case involving negligent
misstatement which supports the plaintiff’s claim. T h at is the decision of
Mr. Justice Chitty in Cann v. Willson ((1882) 4 The Times L. R. 588; 39
Ch. D. 39). In that case (I am reading from the headnote in the Law
Reports): “An intending mortgagor, at the request of the solicitors of an
intending mortgagee, applied to a firm of valuers for a valuation of the
property proposed to be mortgaged. A valuation at the sum of £3,000 was
sent in by the valuers direct to the mortgagee’s solicitors, and the mortgage
was subsequently carried out. Default having been made in payment by
the mortgagor, and a loss having resulted to the mortgagee, he commenced
an action against the valuers for damages for the loss sustained through
their negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of duty. The Court being
satisfied on the evidence that the defendants knew at the time the valua
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tion was made that it was for the purpose of an advance, and that the
valuation as made was in fact no valuation at all:—Held, that, under the
circumstances, the defendants were liable on two grounds: (1) that they
(independently of contract) owed a duty to the plaintiff which they had
failed to discharge; (2) that they had made reckless statements on which
the plaintiff had acted.”
If the first ground of decision was good law, it would support Mr. Law
son’s argument; but this Court considered the case in Le Lievre v. Gould
(supra), and Lord Esher, M. R., Lord Justice Bowen and Lord Justice
A. L. Smith all agreed that Cann v. Wilson (supra) must be treated as
overruled by Derry v. Peek (supra). The facts in Le Lievre v. Gould
(supra) differed somewhat from those in the present case, but I do not
think the Court thought the differences material, for Lord Esher stated
the problem with which the Court was then faced in the following terms
([1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 496): ‘‘Then it is said that, even if there was no
contract between the plaintiff Dennes and the defendant, nevertheless
the defendant is liable to the plaintiffs for having given certificates which
contained untrue statements; for it is said, the defendant owed a duty to
the plaintiffs to exercise care in giving the certificates, because he knew
that the plaintiffs would or might act upon them by advancing money
to Lovering.”
Lord Esher in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) then proceeded to consider
the problem. He treated Heaven v. Pender ((1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503),
which was the foundation of Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra), as good law,
saying (9 The Times L. R. at p. 244; [1893] 1 Q. B., at p. 497): “If one
man is near to another, or is near to the property of another, a duty lies
upon him not to do that which may cause a personal injury to that other,
or may injure his property. For instance, if a man is driving along a
road, it is his duty not to do that which may injure another person whom
he meets on the road, or to his horse or his carriage.” He then considered
Cann v. Willson (supra) and said it was not good law, and finally came
to the conclusion that the action failed, saying, in the last two or three
lines of his judgment: “Such negligence, in the absence of contract with
the plaintiffs, can give no right of action at law or in equity. All the
grounds urged on behalf of the plaintiffs fail, and the appeal must be
dismissed.” Lord Justice Bowen and Lord Justice A. L. Smith gave
judgment to the same effect. I need not, I think, refer to any passages in
their judgments, because I have referred to the material passage in Lord
Justice Bowen’s judgment which Mr. Justice Wrottesley cited in Old Gate
Estates v. Toplis and Harding and Russell (supra).
The principle of that decision seems to me directly in point in the pres
ent case. It is binding on us unless it can be said to be inconsistent with
some other decision of this Court or of the House of Lords. I am unable
to find any such decision. Mr. Lawson asked us to say that it is inconsis
tent with the principle laid down by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Steven
son (supra). It is to be observed that in Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra)
Lord Atkin himself cited with approval some passages from the judg
ments of Lord Esher and Lord Justice A. L. Smith in Le Lievre v. Gould
(supra), and I am unable to believe that if he had thought the ratio
decidendi in that case was wrong he would have cited those passages
without making it clear that he was not approving the decision. I
think, therefore, that, although the passages (48 The Times L. R ., at p.
499; [1932] A.C., at pp. 580-1) in Lord Atkin’s speech are couched in such
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general terms that they might possibly cover the case of negligent mis
statement, that question was not present to Lord Atkin’s mind or intended
to be covered by his statement.
Mr. Lawson further submitted that Derry v. Peek (supra) was purely a
case of fraud and did not touch the question of negligent misstatement.
It is true that the cause of action in Derry v. Peek (supra) was one of
fraud, but it is, I think, implicit in the speeches that their Lordships
would have reached the same conclusion had there been an alternative
plea of negligence. I am fortified in this conclusion by the observations of
two of their Lordships in Nocton v. Ashburton (supra). Lord Haldane,
L. C., said ([1914] A.C., at p. 947): “The discussion of the case by the
noble and learned Lords who took part in the decision appears to me to
exclude the hypothesis that they considered any other question to be
before them that what was the necessary foundation of an ordinary action
for deceit.” He is examining the decision in Derry v. Peek (supra). “They
must indeed be taken to have thought that the facts proved as to the rela
tionship of the parties in Derry v. Peek (supra) were not enough to estab
lish any special duty arising out of that relationship other than the gen
eral duty of honesty.”
Again, Lord Shaw in Nocton v. Ashburton ([1914] A.C., at p. 971)
cited with approval the following passage from the judgment of Lord
Justice Bowen in Low v. Bouverie (7 The Times L. R. 582; [1891] 3 Ch.
82, at p. 105): “ ‘Derry v. Peek (supra) decides . . . that in cases such as
those of which that case was an instance, there is no duty enforceable at
law to be careful in the representation which is made. Negligent misrep
resentation does not certainly amount to deceit, and negligent misrepre
sentation can only amount to a cause of action if there exist a duty to be
careful—not to give information except after careful inquiry. In Derry v.
Peek (supra) the House of Lords considered that the circumstances raised
no such duty. It is hardly necessary to point out that, if the duty is
assumed to exist, there must be a remedy for its non-performance, and
that therefore the doctrine that negligent misrepresentation affords no
cause of action is confined to cases in which there is no duty, such as the
law recognizes, to be careful.’ ”
Derry v. Peek (supra) was a case where the action was founded on
an allegation of a false statement in a prospectus, and I find it difficult
to imagine a case where the proximity test laid down by Lord Atkin in
Donoghue v. Stevenson (supra) would more clearly be satisfied if the prin
ciple of that case is applicable to negligent misstatement. Mr. Lawson
submitted that there was a distinction between Derry v. Peek (supra) and
the present case in that a prospectus is issued to the world at large,
whereas Mr. Fraser’s statements were addressed to the plaintiff in particu
lar. This seems to me to be a distinction without a difference in principle.
For these reasons I think the decision in Le Lievre v. Gould (supra) is
still good law and is conclusive of the present case. I might perhaps add
that the conclusion which I have reached appears to accord with the views
of the textbook writers. T he learned editor of Salmond on the Law of
Torts expresses the view that with certain exceptions not material to the
present case, “A false statement is not actionable as a tort unless it is
wilfully false. Mere negligence in the making of false statements is not
actionable either as deceit or as any other kind of tort” (10th ed., p. 580).
He regards the rule as anomalous. Winfield’s Textbook of the Law of
T ort (4th ed., pp. 386 and 387) expresses his dislike of it in more forcible
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language, be he recognizes that decisions of this Court are definitely
against the existence of any action in tort for nelgigent statement. He
thinks that it is open to the House of Lords to take the contrary view. On
this point I need express no opinion.
Before parting with the textbook writers, I ought perhaps to mention
that Mr. Charlesworth, in his book on the Law of Negligence (2nd ed.,
p. 16) suggests an explanation of the alleged anomaly in the rule. He
states: “The duty to take care is ultimately based on the possible con
sequences which will occur if care is not taken. W hat the consequences
may be of any particular act or omission is often a very difficult problem
involving inquiry into questions of causation. This inquiry is difficult
enough in cases where physical damage is concerned in which the cause,
whether it be defective vehicles or machinery or lack of care and skill in
management, can usually be accurately traced. T o regard the issue of a
certificate, an opinion, or a report as carrying the same duty of care as the
delivery of a defective chattel would be to introduce a most disturbing
factor into the m utual intercourse of society.” I do not find this explana
tion entirely satisfactory, but I am unable to suggest a better one. Be that
as it may, I am satisfied that on the authorities, as they stand, we have no
alternative but to dismiss this appeal.
Since writing this judgment my attention has been directed by Professor
Goodhart to a case in the New York Reports where a similar point was
considered. T he case is Ultramares Corporation v. Touche ((1931) 255
N. Y. Rep. 170; 174 N. E. Rep. 441). It has the merit that the decision
of the Court was given by Mr. Justice Cardozo. In that case the account
ants had certified the annual report of a company which, in order to
finance its operations, required extensive credit and borrowed large sums
from banks and other lenders.
T he facts are stated quite shortly and sufficiently for my present pur
pose (at pp. 173 and 442 of the respective reports): “In January, 1924, the
defendants, a firm of public accountants, were employed by Fred Stern
and Co., Inc., to prepare and certify a balance-sheet exhibiting the con
dition of its business as of December 31, 1923. They had been employed at
the end of each of the three years preceding to render a like service. Fred
Stem and Co., Inc., which was in substance Stern himself, was engaged in
the importation and sale of rubber. T o finance its operations, it required
extensive credit and borrowed large sums of money from banks and other
lenders. All this was known to the defendants. T he defendants knew
also that in the usual course of business the balance-sheet when certified
would be exhibited by the Stern company to banks, creditors, stockholders,
purchasers or sellers, according to the needs of the occasion, as the basis
of financial dealings. Accordingly, when the balance-sheet was made up,
the defendants supplied the Stern company with 32 copies certified with
serial numbers as counterpart originals. Nothing was said as to the per
sons to whom these counterparts would be shown or the extent or number
of the transactions in which they would be used. In particular there was
no mention of the plaintiff, a corporation doing business chiefly as a fac
tor, which till then had never made advances to the Stern company,
though it had sold merchandise in small amounts. The range of the trans
actions in which a certificate of audit might be expected to play a part
was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the business that was
mirrored in the summary.”
The Court held that mere negligence did not make the defendants
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liable to the plaintiff, who had made advances on the strength of the certi
fied accounts, though they in fact found that there was evidence of negli
gence by the defendants in making their report. Mr. Justice Cardozo said
(at pp. 179 and 444): “We are brought to the question of duty, its origin
and measure. T he defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by
law to make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of
contract to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling.
Fraud includes the pretence of knowledge when knowledge there is none.
T o creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate,
the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there was
notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer did not intend
to keep it to himself.” I pause there to say that there follow citations,
but I do not propose to burden this judgment with the citations of the
Judge except where they are of English cases. Mr. Justice Cardozo
continued:
“A different question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty
to these to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists,
a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery be
neath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indetermi
nate class. T he hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implica
tion of a duty that exposes to these consequences. We put aside for the
moment any statement in the certificate which involves the representation
of a fact as true to the knowledge of the auditors. If such a statement was
made, whether believed to be true or not, the defendants are liable for
deceit in the event that it was false. T he plaintiff does not need the
invention of novel doctrine to help it out in such conditions. The case
was submitted to the jury and the verdict was returned upon the theory
that, even in the absence of a misstatement of fact, there is a liability also
for erroneous opinion. T he expression of an opinion is to be subject to
a warranty implied by law. W hat, then, is the warranty, as yet unform u
lated, to be? Is it merely that the opinion is honestly conceived and that
the preliminary inquiry has been honestly pursued, that a halt has not
been made without a genuine belief that the search has been reasonably
adequate to bring disclosure of the truth? Or does it go farther and in
volve the assumption of a liability for any blunder or inattention that
could fairly be spoken of as negligence if the controversy were one between
accountant and employer for breach of a contract to render services for
pay?
“T he assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favourite subject of
juridical discussion. . . . In the field of the law of contract there has
been a gradual widening of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y.
268) until to-day the beneficiary of a promise, clearly designated as
such, is seldom left without a remedy. . . . Even in that field, however,
the remedy is narrower where the beneficiaries of the promise are inde
terminate or general. Something more must then appear than an inten
tion that the promise shall redound to the benefit of the public or to
that of a class of indefinite extension. T he promise must be such as to
‘bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation directly to the
individual members of the public, if the benefit is lost’. . . . In the field
of the law of torts a manufacturer who is negligent in the manufacture
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of a chattel in circumstances pointing to an unreasonable risk of serious
bodily harm to those using it thereafter may be liable for negligence,
though privity is lacking between manufacturer and user. . . . A force or
instrument of harm having been launched with potentialities of danger
manifest to the eye of prudence, the one who launches it is under a duty
to keep it within bounds. . . . Even so, the question is still open whether
the potentialities of danger that will charge with liability are confined
to harm to the person, or include injury to property. . . . In either view,
however, what is released or set in motion is a physical force. We are now
asked to say that a like liability attaches to the circulation of a thought
or a release of the explosive power resident in words.”
T he Judge then considered three cases which were said to support the
plaintiff’s action, and continued (at pp. 185 and 447): “From the fore
going analysis the conclusion is, we think, inevitable that nothing in our
previous decisions commits us to a holding of liability for negligence in
the circumstances of the case at hand, and that such liability, if recognized,
will be an extension of the principle of those decisions to different con
ditions even if more or less analogous. T he question then is whether such
an extension shall be made. The extension, if made, will so expand the
field of liability for negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite,
coterminous with that of liability for fraud. Again and again, in decisions
of this Court, the bounds of this latter liability have been set up, with
futility the fate of every endeavour to dislodge them. Scienter has been
declared to be an indispensable element except where the representation
has been put forward as true of one’s own knowledge . . . or in circum
stances where the expression of opinion was a dishonourable pretense. . . .
Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be found to be
fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead to the
conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it. Farther than that
this Court has never gone. Directors of corporations have been acquitted
of liability for deceit though they have been lax in investigation and negli
gent in speech. . . . This has not meant, to be sure, that negligence may
not be evidence from which a trier of the facts may draw an inference of
fraud . . . but merely that if that inference is rejected, or, in the light
of all the circumstances, is found to be unreasonable, negligence alone is
not a substitute for fraud. Many also are the cases that have distinguished
between the wilful or reckless representation essential to the maintenance
at law of an action for deceit, and the misrepresentation, negligent or
innocent, that will lay a sufficient basis for rescission in equity. . . . If this
action is well conceived, all these principles and distinctions, so nicely
wrought and formulated, have been a waste of time and effort. They have
even been a snare, entrapping litigants and lawyers into an abandonment
of the true remedy lying ready to the call. T he suitors thrown out of
Court because they proved negligence, and nothing else, in an action for
deceit, might have ridden to trium phant victory if they had proved the
self-same facts, but had given the wrong another label, and all this in
a State where forms of action have been abolished. So to hold is near
to saying that we have been paltering with justice. A word of caution or
suggestion would have set the erring suitor right. Many pages of opinion
were written by Judges the most eminent, yet the word was never
spoken. We may not speak it now.”
T he final passage which I wish to read (at pp. 188 and 448) is this: “Lia
bility for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many callings
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other than an auditor’s. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the
validity of municipal or corporate bonds with knowledge that the opinion
will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to the in
vestors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same extent
as if the controversy were one between client and adviser. T itle companies
insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge that at an approaching
auction the fact that they have insured will be stated to the bidders, will
become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a policy without
payment of a premium.
“These illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go little, if any,
farther than we are invited to go now. Negligence, moreover, will have
one standard when viewed in relation to the employer, and another and
at times a stricter standard when viewed in relation to the public. Expla
nations that might seem plausible, omissions that might be reasonable,
if the duty is confined to the employer, conducting a business that pre
sumably at least is not a fraud upon his creditors, might wear another
aspect if an independent duty to be suspicious even of one’s principal is
owing to investors. 'Everyone making a promise having the quality of a
contract will be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise,
but under another duty, apart from contract, to an indefinite num ber of
potential beneficiaries when performance has begun. T he assumption of
one relation will mean the involuntary assumption of a series of new
relations, inescapably hooked together’. . . . ‘T he law does not spread its
protection so far’. . . . O ur holding does not emancipate accountants from
the consequences of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been
so negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its
adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less
than this is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement nor
insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing
liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is
to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made.
We doubt whether the average business man receiving a certificate with
out paying for it, and receiving it merely as one among a m ultitude of
possible investors, would look for anything more.”
I am glad, therefore, to find that the conclusion which I have reached
on the basis of the English authorities seems to accord with the opinion
of so eminent a student of the common law as Mr. Justice Cardozo.
I would only add that, despite the observations of Lord Justice Den
ning, I do not think that the conclusion which I have reached will encour
age accountants to fall short of the high standard of conduct which the
institutes to which they belong have laid down for their members.
In the result the appeal will be dismissed.

DURO SPORTSWEAR, INC. v. COGEN
Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, 1954. 131 n . y . law journal 7.

W asservogel, Referee. Plaintiffs seek to recover from defendants the
sum of $20,000 as damages allegedly resulting from malpractice by the
defendant Cogen, a certified public accountant, and the fraudulent repre
sentations by all defendants as to the financial condition of the plaintiff
corporation as of December, 1950.
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Prior to January 6, 1951, plaintiff Schwartz and defendant Louis Leff
owned the entire capital stock of the plaintiff corporation, the shares
of which were registered in the names of their respective wives. On or
about January 6, 1951, plaintiffs and the defendants Leff entered into a
written agreement which provided, among other things that: (1) Schwartz
would acquire all of the capital stock of the corporation; (2) Schwartz
would loan $10,000 to the corporation without interest; (3) defendant
Louis Leff would be relieved of certain liabilities then due and owing
by him and would remain as an employee of the corporation at a fixed
salary plus 25 per cent of its net profits; and (4) defendant Louis Leff
would remain liable for one-half of the deficit of the corporation as it
then existed. T he defendant Cogen, a son-in-law of the defendants Leff,
was employed to audit the books of account of the plaintiff corporation
and to present to the parties a statement of its financial condition in order
to determine the amount of deficit, in accordance with the terms of the
above-mentioned agreement.
T he record shows that when the agreement was entered into by the
parties, the defendant Cogen, at the request of the individual plaintiff,
certified as correct a statement of the financial condition of the corpora
tion which fixed its deficit at $3,458.84. Subsequent thereto, however,
and in or about March 1951, Cogen delivered to Schwartz a “Statement of
Adjustments’’ which indicated that the deficit of the corporation was in
creased to $5,534.84. It is plaintiffs’ claim that Cogen and the other
defendants knowingly caused the deficit of the plaintiff corporation to be
understated by approximately $12,000 in order to induce the individual
plaintiff to acquire all of the stock of the corporation and to relieve the
defendant Louis Leff of certain liabilities, as set forth in the agreement
entered into on January 6, 1951.
T he documentary evidence and credible testimony adduced upon
the trial clearly established that Schwartz consented to acquire the stock
of the corporation at a time when defendant Cogen advised him that its
deficit was not in excess of $3,600, whereas, in fact, the deficit was greater
than $9,000. The difference between the amount indicated in Cogen’s
original financial statement and the actual deficit consists, for the most
part, of a series of bills which were not entered on the books of the
corporation as of December 26, 1950, the closing date of the financial
statement prepared by Cogen, but which were purportedly entered sub
sequent thereto. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to prove that de
fendants, or any of them, willfully, deliberately, or fraudulently caused
these bills to be omitted from either the original books of account or
the financial statement prepared by Cogen. Contrary to plaintiffs’ con
tention, it appears most unlikely that defendants could have fraudu
lently concealed any substantial bill which had to be paid by the cor
poration, inasmuch as the record shows that Schwartz was in charge
of the office, made the purchases, paid the bills, made entries in the
original books of account, kept a diary of due dates of bills, and, thus,
had an independent source of knowledge of the finances of the cor
poration. T he mere fact that plaintiff established that the defendant
Louis Leff had failed to approve certain bills which were not entered
in the corporate books of account prior to Cogen’s audit thereof is in
sufficient to establish plaintiffs’ claim of fraud, particularly in view of
the evidence which shows that it was the practice of Schwartz and other
employees of plaintiff corporation to delay the posting and entry of
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such bills for at least several weeks after they were received. In the
absence of other proof, therefore, it necessarily follows that plaintiffs’
second cause of action against all of the defendants, which is predicated
upon allegations of fraud, must be dismissed upon the merits.
However, although there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate
fraudulent intent on the part of any of the defendants, Cogen’s unqual
ified certification of the financial statement and his method of preparing
same is sufficient to sustain plaintiffs’ claim that at the very least he is
guilty of malpractice. It cannot be disputed that at the time the certified
statement was delivered to plaintiffs, it did not accurately reflect the
true financial condition of the corporation. Cogen’s testimony that he
took into consideration “all bills then available,” is inconsistent with
his certification, which was absolute and not qualified in any manner.
There is sufficient evidence to establish that Cogen failed to fully in
vestigate the probability that the original books of account did not
reflect outstanding bills due as of the date of his financial statement,
although such bills had been received by the corporation but had not
been entered or posted by either the individual plaintiff, the defendant
Louis Leff, or any employee of the plaintiff corporation. Cogen, however,
was associated with the plaintiff corporation for a considerable length
of time prior to his preparation of the financial statement. He, there
fore, was fully familiar with the customary delay in posting and entering
bills in the books of account. Despite his knowledge of this practice, he
nevertheless failed to take it into consideration and qualify his certi
fication accordingly. His apparent refusal to realize the effect of an ab
solute certification and his evident reckless disregard of the consequences
of such action, in the opinion of the court, is sufficient to constitute
malpractice.
Moreover, it further appears that defendant Cogen, in April, 1951,
made a journal entry wherein he added $10,000 to the corporation’s
surplus account by crediting “Surplus” and debiting “Accountants Pay
able—Chic Style,” a dress contracting business wholly owned by the in
dividual plaintiff, his son and wife. It was Cogen’s contention upon the
trial that his authority for such entry was the January 6, 1951, agreement
executed by the individual plaintiff and the defendants Leff. T he record,
however, establishes that Cogen did not post the $10,000 charge against
the Chic Style account in the “Accounts Payable” ledger of the plaintiff
corporation, as good accounting practice required. Likewise the journal
entry made by Cogen does not in any manner reflect a loan as con
templated by the parties at the time of the execution of their agreement.
Nowhere in this agreement is there any provision which justifies the
journal entry as made by Cogen, which, in effect, reflects a complete
forgiveness of the money due and owing Chic Style by the corporation.
If this journal entry had been correctly made and in accordance with
the provisions of the January, 1951, agreement, the total liabilities of
the corporation would not have decreased by $10,000, which was the
effect of Cogen’s act. T he individual plaintiff had merely agreed to
make a loan to the corporation and a proper $10,000 loan entry would
not have had the effect upon the capital, surplus, or deficit of the
corporation as indicated in the financial statement prepared by Cogen.
It clearly appears, therefore, that the defendant Cogen, as a certified
public accountant, improperly recorded the intention of the parties in
the books of account and, at the very least, must be deemed negligent
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in the preparation of the financial statement relied upon by the parties
prior to the actual execution of the agreement on January 6, 1951.
Plaintiffs’ claim for damages is obviously based upon the opinion of the
Court of Appeals in the case of Ultramares Corporation v. Touche (255
N. Y., 170). In view of the holding by this court, as above noted, that
plaintiffs have failed to establish fraud on the part of any of the de
fendants, the Ultramares case is not applicable. In the cited case, the
Court of Appeals, in substance, held that in the absence of fraud, an
accountant’s liability for negligence “is one that is bounded by * * *
contract, and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract
has been made” (supra, p. 189). In the instant action, there is no privity
of contract between Cogen and Schwartz. T he record is clear that Cogen
was employed only by the plaintiff-corporation and not by Schwartz.
The mere fact that he gratuitously prepared personal income tax re
turns for Schwartz and his family is not sufficient basis for concluding
that an employer-employee relationship existed between them within
the intendment of the Ultramares case. Likewise, the fact that Cogen
was employed by Schwartz to audit the books of Chic Style Company
does not impose a contractual obligation upon Cogen with respect to
Schwartz to use care and diligence in the preparation of his accounting
statements for plaintiff-corporation. Plaintiff corporation and Chic Style
Company are two separate entities with no legal relationship. There is
no claim in this action that Cogen was negligent insofar as his work for
Chic Style Company was concerned. T he fact that he was an employee
of this company as well as the plaintiff-corporation is not material to
the issues before the court.
Although the corporation, as Cogen’s employer, was joined in the
action as a party-plaintiff, the claim for damages in its behalf, in effect,
was abandoned by counsel in the briefs submitted to the court after
trial. In any event, there is nothing in the record which shows that the
corporation suffered any loss as a result of Cogen’s negligence or mal
practice which would enable it to recover damages under the Ultramares
case.
In a subsequent case, however, the Court of Appeals made it clear
that under certain circumstances accountants may be held liable to third
parties even where there is lacking deliberate or active fraud (State
Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y., 104, 112). In order for Schwartz
to recover damages, it would be necessary for the court to find that Cogen
was guilty of gross negligence rather than mere faulty judgment. In
the opinion of the court, the relevant facts of the instant action clearly
require such finding.
Cogen’s heedlessness and wanton disregard of the consequences of
his incorrect financial statements take the place of a deliberate intention
to defraud. Even under the principles set forth in the Ultramares case,
“negligence or blindness, even when not equivalent to fraud, is none the
less evidence to sustain the inference of fraud. At least this is so if the
negligence is gross” (supra, p. 190). As already stated, this court has
found that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant a specific finding
of fraud. Nevertheless, the proof establishes that Cogen was derelict in
his duty to thoroughly investigate the status of the corporate books of
account prior to the preparation of his initial financial statement, and
more particularly in view of the fact that he had personal knowledge
of the practice of the corporation’s bookkeepers to delay the entering
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and posting of such bills in these books of account. His unqualified
certification and his failure to note the possibility of such unentered
bills in the financial statements are matters which have not been ex
plained to the satisfaction of the court. As a licensed certified public
accountant, Cogen must be deemed to be aware of the reliance which
normally is attached to an absolute certification of a financial report.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that Cogen knew about specific unentered
bills on or before March 25, 1951, at which time he delivered a supple
mental financial statement to Schwartz. His repeated failure to include
such bills in this statement is inexcusable, as is the fact that he in
correctly reflected Schwartz’ loan of $10,000 to the corporation in the
journal book of account. Thus, the record is replete with the foregoing
evidence and other proof, both oral and documentary, showing Cogen’s
“refusal to see the obvious * * * and his failure to investigate the
doubtful,” which are sufficient to impose liability upon him for dam
age suffered by Schwartz (State Street Trust Co., supra).
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the mere fact that the damage
to Schwartz cannot be measured with absolute mathematical certainty,
is not sufficient to preclude his recovery herein. Where it is certain that
damages have been caused by a wrong and the only uncertainty is as to
the precise amount, there can rarely be good reason for refusing any
damages whatever for the wrong on account of such uncertainty (Wake
man v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N. Y. 205; Nat. Concert &
Artists Corp. v. Murray, 281 App. Div., 230, 233; Alexander’s Depart
ment Stores, Inc., v . Ohrbach’s Inc., 269 App. Div., 321, 328-29). A
wrongdoer may not escape liability simply because the ordinary standards
for measuring damages are not available. In any event, there is suffi
cient evidence in this record from which the court can reasonably
evaluate the loss to Schwartz. Credible and disinterested expert tes
timony establishes that the actual deficit of the corporation as of January
6, 1951, was $9,448.68. Prior to the execution of the agreement entered
into on the same date, Schwartz, as one-half owner of the stock of the
corporation, was liable for one-half of such deficit, to wit, $4,724.34. As
a result of the agreement, Schwartz consented to acquire the corporation
with a deficit of $3,458.84, as reported to him by Cogen. This amount,
subtracted from the remaining one-half of the actual deficit which
Schwartz was obligated to take over on January 6, 1951, to wit, $4,724.34,
leaves a balance of $1,265.50 above the amount of the deficit Schwartz
had agreed to assume in reliance upon Cogen’s financial statement. This
amount, therefore, represents the damage to Schwartz.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, there is no merit to the claim that
Schwartz was additionally damaged to the extent of $10,000, which
amount allegedly represents moneys advanced by him to the corporation
in reliance upon Cogen’s reports. This sum of $10,000 is part of the
liabilities set forth in the financial statements here involved and is al
ready taken into consideration in reaching the foregoing deficit of the
corporation as above set forth. Furthermore, nothing in the record war
rants the conclusion that Schwartz agreed to advance additional capital
to the corporation in sole reliance upon Cogen’s financial statements.
The credible testimony adduced upon the trial shows that Schwartz
had agreed to make such loans prior to the preparation of any report
by Cogen. Concededly, the financial statement submitted to Schwartz
in January, 1951, did not reflect the true condition of the corporation.
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Nevertheless, Schwartz had already committed himself to make certain
advances to the corporation and was cognizant of its insolvency, al
though he was not aware of the exact amount of the deficit. His own
testimony indicates that it was because of known past losses that he
was compelled to make loans to the corporation. Plaintiffs have failed
to establish that Schwartz was induced to lend an additional $10,000
in reliance upon Cogen’s financial statements and thereby incur any
loss other than that already considered by the court in fixing the damage
he sustained.
Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Schwartz against defendant
Cogen on the first cause of action for the sum of $1,265.50, with interest
thereon from January 6, 1951. Judgment is rendered in favor of de
fendants dismissing the second cause of action upon the merits. The
above constitutes the decision of the court as required by the applica
ble provisions of the Civil Practice Act. The defendant Cogen may have
a thirty day stay of execution.

SECTION 4

LIA BILITY TO TH IRD
BY STATUTE

PARTIES

SHONTS v. HIRLIMAN *
District Court of the United States, S. D. California, 1939. 28 F. Supp. 478.

T he plaintiffs, who were purchasers of stock in Condor Pictures, In
corporated, brought three actions against certain officers of the corpora
tion and Webster, Atz & Company, the auditors, to recover damages, the
price paid for the stock, under the provisions of the Securities Act of
1933, section 11, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k, establishing civil liability against
certain persons for falsity in the registration statement. T he cases were
consolidated for trial. T he falsity relied on related to misrepresentations
and omissions concerning a lease by the Condor Pictures, Incorporated,
and Western Service Studios, and, more particularly, the failure to set
forth in the amendments to the registration statement, dated January 23,
1937, and February 1, 1937, that Condor Pictures, Incorporated, was obli
gated under the lease to use the studio a minimum of one hundred days
a year at a total rental of thirty-five thousand dollars. T he form in which
the alleged false statements appeared on the respective dates in the sec
ond and third amendments was:
T he second amendment to Registration Statement, paragraph No. 3
read:
“The issuer is fully equipped to carry out its present program and
business. It owns no substantial physical properties or studios but carries
on its production program at the present by rental of the use of studio and
equipment at RKO Pathe Studio, Culver City, California. This policy
will be continued by the issuer until such time as it becomes advantageous
to purchase or build its own studio. At the present time this does not
appear advisable as there are fully equipped operating studios available
for rental one of which the issuer is now leasing and using and which is
more than ample for the present requirements. There are sufficient space,
equipment and facilities to meet issuer’s requirements even should
the present production program be doubled. T he issuer’s leasing arrange
ment with the studio provides the issuer with all necessary equipment for
the production volume above stated in addition to all necessary offices
for production staff.
“It is not necessary for the issuer to make any substantial investment in
equipment because the studio lease provides the issuer with the essentials.
“T he affiliate of the issuer, T he Van Beuren Corporation, does not
* T his case is discussed at p. 48 supra.
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own any physical property or equipment of material account, neither does
it require the ownership of such property or equipment for the present
or proposed program. T he properties and studio or location and equip
ment used by said Company are likewise leased. T he volume that may be
produced with properties and equipment so leased is more than double
the present program.”
T he third amendment read:
“T he issuer is fully equipped to carry out its present program and busi
ness. It owns no substantial physical properties or studios but carries on
its production program at the present by rental of the use of studio and
equipment at the Western Service Studios, Hollywood, California. This
policy will be continued by the issuer until such time as it becomes advan
tageous to purchase or build its own studio. At the present time this does
not appear advisable as there are fully equipped operating studios avail
able for rental one of which the issuer is now leasing and using and which
is more than ample for the present requirements. There are sufficient
space, equipment and facilities to meet issuer’s requirements even should
the present production program be doubled. T he issuer’s leasing arrange
ment with the studio provides the issuer with all necessary equipment
for the production volume above stated in addition to all necessary
offices for production staff.
“The Western Service Studios are rented to the registrant by Grand
National Films, Inc., the present lessee, for a period of approximately
one (1) year from the date of this registration statement with options to
renew granted solely to the registrant for a further nine (9) year period
terminable only by the registrant at the end of any year during the first
four (4) years of the 9-year period but not terminable during the suc
ceeding five (5) year period if the registrant exercises its option to renew
at the commencement of said 5-year period. T he rental basis is at the
rate of $350 per shooting day with no payments for any days on which
there is no shooting. “It is not necessary for the issuer to make any sub
stantial investment in equipment because the studio lease provides the
issuer with the essentials.
“T he affiliate of the issuer, T he Van Beuren Corporation, does not
own any physical property or equipment of material account, neither
does it require the ownership of such property or equipment for the
present or proposed program. T he properties and studio or location and
equipment used by said Corporation are likewise leased. T he volume that
may be produced with properties and equipment so leased is more than
double the present program.”
Paragraph No. 46 read:
“T he registrant has entered into a rental agreement with Grand Na
tional Films, Inc., the present lessee of the Western Service Studios in
Hollywood, California, whereby space, facilities and equipment to meet
the requirements of the registrant’s production program, even should it
be doubled, together with all necessary offices for production staff are
rented to the registrant. T he studio is a fully equipped operating studio
and the amount of space varies and is made available according to the
stage and settings required.
“T he Western Service Studios are rented to the registrant by Grand
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National Films, Inc. for a period of approximately 1 year from the date
of this registration statement with options to renew granted solely to the
registrant for a further 9-year period terminable only by the registrant
at the end of any year during the first 4 years of the 9-year period but not
terminable during the succeeding 5-year period. T he rental basis is at the.
rate of $350 per shooting day with no payments for any days on which
there is no shooting. A copy of this agreement is to be filed as a post
effective amendment to the registration statement.”
T he evidence showed that a formal lease was not entered into until
March 9, 1937. However, a telegram signed by the President of Western
Service Studios, dated January 31, 1937, committed the company to a
rental arrangement to be followed by a formal leasing. This telegram,
however, did not refer to a minimum guarantee. On May 11, 1937, the
Securities Exchange Commission issued a stop order by reason of the
alleged misrepresentations in the registration statement. T he auditors,
in their certificate dated January 19, 1937, did not set up the obligation
to pay a minimum rental of $35,000 as a contingent liability. T he de
fendants stipulated, without conceding the materiality of the matter,
that the stock had no market value. T he plaintiffs did not offer any
evidence as to the actual value of the stock at the time the actions were
instituted. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case, the defendants moved
to dismiss the complaints upon the ground that no damage had been
shown and that the actions were barred by Section 13 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77m.
Yankwich, District Judge (after stating facts as above). T he problems
presented by these motions must be solved by an analysis of the statute
or by reference to similar statutes or claims of similar character, because,
owing to the newness of the Securities Act of 1933, there are no cases
determining them.
T he Congress of the United States, for the first time in its history,
undertook in 1933, to pass a statute similar to the state Corporate Securi
ties statutes, commonly known as “blue sky laws”. They take their name
from their object, which is to prevent promoters of corporate securities
from selling “the blue sky” to investors, or at least, from promising it
to them. Most of these statutes are regulatory only. They regulate the
securities which may or may not be issued or sold in a state and set up
agencies for the granting of permits to issue or sell securities. They do
not, as a rule, create any special claim of a civil nature for falsity in the
application for a permit. T he person who feels defrauded, by any mis
representation relating to the stock, must resort to the law action of
deceit or to the equity suit of rescission.
This Act, however, creates a civil liability of a specific character. It
provides that if any part of the registration statement contains an untrue
statement of material facts or omits to state material facts, the person who
acquires the security, without knowledge of the untruth or omission, may
sue either at law or in equity, the person who signed the registration state
ment, the officers or directors of the corporation which applied for the
registration, and the accountants or others who certified to the registra
tion statement or prepared it. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k.
The measure of damages is not the one which usually obtains in fraud,
—the difference between the value of the thing bought and what: it would
have been if it had been as represented.
I refer, for illustration of the latter rule, to Hines v. Brode, 1914, 168
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Cal. 507, 143 P. 729, and to a later case, in which I was of counsel for the
defendant, Palladine v. Imperial Valley Farms Lands Association, 1924,
65 Cal. App. 727, 225 P. 291. I quote from Hines v. Brode, supra [168
Cal. 507, 143 P. 730]: “The price paid may be considered only as. evi
dence of value. Therefore, in a proper case, a wronged plaintiff may
assert, as here, and, if possible, show, that the actual value of the property
was only $100, and that its value, if the property had been as represented,
was $4,000. He may also show and recover for the depreciation in the
value of the improvements which he may have placed upon the property—
a depreciation resulting from the fact that the actual value was not the
represented value; and he may also recover for any other legitimate ex
penditures he may have made.” This rule was abolished in California by
the Amendment of 1935 to Section 3343 of the Civil Code (St. 1935, p.
1612).
If we study the Securities Act of 1933, and especially Section 11, which
creates a right of action which would not otherwise exist, we find that
the Congress did not adopt this rule, but made the measure of recovery
that which had always obtained in actions for fraud in the courts of the
United States. Thus, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Bolles, 1889, 132 U.
S. 125, 129, 130, 10 S. Ct. 39, 40, 33 L. Ed. 279:
“T he measure of damages was not the difference between the contract
price and the reasonable market value if the property had been as repre
sented to be, even if the stock had been worth the price paid for it; nor,
if the stock were worthless, could the plaintiff have recovered the value
it would have had if the property had been equal to the representations.
W hat the plaintiff might have gained is not the question, but what he
had lost by being deceived into the purchase. T he suit was not brought
for breach of contract. T he gist of the action was that the plaintiff was
fraudulently induced by the defendant to purchase stock upon the faith
of certain false and fraudulent representations, and so as to the other
persons on whose claims the plaintiff sought to recover. If the jury be
lieved from the evidence that the defendant was guilty of the fraudulent
and false representations alleged, and that the purchase of stock had been
made in reliance thereon, then the defendant was liable to respond in
such damages as naturally and proximately resulted from the fraud. He
was bound to make good the loss sustained,—such as the moneys the plain
tiff had paid out and interest, and any other outlay legitimately attribu
table to defendant’s fraudulent conduct; but this liability did not include
the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation. T he reasonable market
value, if the property had been as represented, afforded, therefore, no
proper element of recovery.
“Nor had the contract price the bearing given to it by the court. W hat
the plaintiff paid for the stock was properly put in evidence, not as the
basis of the application of the rule in relation to the difference between
the contract price and the market or actual value, but as establishing the
loss he had sustained in that particular. I f the stock had a value in fact,
that would necessarily be applied in reduction of the damages. ‘T he dam
age to be recovered must always be the natural and proximate conse
quence of the act complained o f,’ says Mr. Greenleaf (volume 2, § 256);
and ‘the test is,’ adds Chief Justice Beasley in Crater v. Binninger, 33
N.J.L. [4 Vroom] 513 [518, 97 Am. Dec. 737], ‘that those results are
proximate which the wrong-doer, from his position, must have con
templated as the probable consequence of his fraud or breach of contract.’
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In that case the plaintiff had been induced by the deceit of the defendant
to enter into an oil speculation, and the defendant was held responsible
for the moneys put into the scheme by the plaintiff in the ordinary course
of the business, which moneys were lost, less the value of the interest
which the plaintiff retained in the property held by those associated in
the speculation.” (Italics added.)
And see, Sigafus v. Porter, 1900, 179 U. S. 116, 21 S. Ct. 34, 45 L. Ed.
113; Tooker v. Alston, 1907, 8 Cir., 159 F. 599, 16 L. R. A., N. S., 818;
Towle v. M axwell M otor Sales Corp., 8 Cir., 1928, 26 F. 2d 209.
T he Act, in section 11, subdivision (e), provides that the recovery shall
be of such damages as shall represent the difference between the amount
paid for the security and “ (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit
was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have been
disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which such
security shall have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if
such damages shall be less than the damages representing the difference
between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at
which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof as of
the time such suit was brought.” 15 U. S. C.A. § 77k (e).
It is evident that the Congress intended to make the action, notwith
standing its origin in fraud, purely compensatory. And so, it provided for
the recovery of the price paid. It anticipated three possible contingencies:
(1) Where there has been no sale of the stock; (2) where there has been a
sale of the stock before the action was brought or (3) a sale after the action
was brought.
Where there has been no sale of the stock, the recovery is for the
difference between the value of the stock when purchased, and its value
as of the time suit is brought. Where there has been a sale, the recovery
is for the difference between the price received by the seller and the price
he paid.
Before disposing of this question and the question of limitation, I
comment briefly on the evidence in the record as it relates to the elements
of the action created by the statute.
I am satisfied that the omission from the statement of the minimum
requirements in the leases, which obligated Condor Pictures, Inc., to
shoot at least 100 days a year, is material. It is not of any great significance
that the lease was not actually entered into until later. For that reason,
I am of the view that there is no falsity in the statement that they had
certain rental arrangements with a particular company. I think the oral
negotiations and the telegram of January 1, 1937, showed a commitment
which the parties themselves considered binding, and which was to be
later embodied in a more formal instrument. The effect of these con
clusions is this: No misstatement or omission appears in the registration
statement until after the last certificate of Webster, Atz & Co., dated
January 19, 1937. Prior to January 31, 1937, there were merely discus
sions of rental, and no definite undertaking by either side or guarantee
of a minimum, which was binding on the company. T he failure of the
certificate of Webster, Atz & Co. to set up the rental undertaking and the
minimum guarantee of $35,000 as a contingent liability, is not the
omission of anything which existed then. T he rental arrangement was
not called to their attention. There was no entry on the books at their
disposal, from which, by further inquiry, they might have discovered
that there was such an undertaking. Absent these, they cannot be

258

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

charged with a misrepresentation which was made later—long after their
certification.
In sum, we cannot, as to Webster, Atz & Co., take the subsequent omis
sions and retroject them to the date of January 19, 1937, so as to “tie”
them to a certificate, which they made on the basis of facts as they then
existed and which showed no rental arrangement of any kind.
We return to the element of damages. It is stipulated that, at the time
the actions were begun, the stock had no “market value.” But it is not
conceded that it had no intrinsic value. In the view I take, this value is
of utmost importance. T he object of the statute is not to penalize pro
moters or auditors for the full value of the stock, merely because the
stock—which may be that of a new corporation—might not have a
“market value.” T he object of the Congress was to compensate a person
for the depreciation in the value—the actual value of his security.
Mark you, the object of this section is compensatory. No penalties are
intended. The object is not to recover the full value of the stock, under
all circumstances. T he plaintiffs are not required, as a condition precedent
to recovery, to surrender for cancellation to the defendants or to the
court, the stock, or even to tender it back. They retain it. If, as counsel
claim, they may retain the stock and then recover its full value by
showing that there is no market for it at a particular time, then we
have this situation: A person might recover the full value of the stock,
retain his position as a stockholder in the corporation, exercise his full
rights as such, and then, at some future time, when the stock had acquired
a “market value,” reap the full benefit of his investment, after he has
already been repaid it. This would be a penalty, inconsistent with the
compensatory nature of the Act.
T he finding of insolvency in the reorganization proceedings is not
proof that the stock was valueless. A petition for reorganization was filed
on November 29, 1937. U nder Section 77B of the old Bankruptcy Act, 11
U. S. C. A. § 207, and Chapter 10 of the Chandler Act, a petition for
reorganization may be filed either if a corporation is insolvent, or if it is
unable to pay its debts as they mature. 11 U. S. C. A., Ch. 10, § 530 (1).
Insolvency here is interpreted as it is defined in clause (19) of Section 1
of the new Bankruptcy Act, namely: A condition existing when the
aggregate of a debtor’s property, exclusive of any property which he may
have concealed, transferred or removed with intent to defraud, is not, at a
fair valuation, sufficient in amount to pay his debts. 11 U. S. C. A., Ch. 1,
§ 1 (19).
A corporation may seek the benefit of corporate reorganization, without
being insolvent. T he only object of determining insolvency is to dispense
with the need for the assent of a majority of the stockholders to the plan
of reorganization. T h a t was the rule under 77B and is the rule under the
present Act, subdivision 8 of Section 216, which provides that protection
for stockholders shall not be required after the Judge determines that the
debtor is insolvent. 11 U.S.C.A. § 616 (8).
A reorganization differs from an ordinary proceeding in bankruptcy,
whether upon a voluntary or involuntary petition. In an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy, it is usually alleged that the defendant is insolvent
and has committed certain acts of bankruptcy. 11 U. S. C. A., Ch. 3, § 21.
If, later on, the issue is tried, the finding of insolvency reverts to the date
of the filing of the petition. 11 U. S. C. A., Ch. 1, §1 (13). For that is the
issue presented by the pleadings. I think that this is the principle which
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counsel had in mind in urging that the finding of insolvency in the
reorganization proceedings of Condor Pictures, Inc., on the 30th of
December, 1938, reverted back to the filing of the petition. W hen a
petition for reorganization is filed, by either the debtor or some of its
creditors, the object is to subject at once the property to the equity powers
of the court. And the court is not called upon, in approving the petition,
to determine whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent. When, in the
course of the proceedings, it becomes necessary to determine the voting
rights of the stockholders, the court may make a finding of insolvency.
This finding is merely for the purpose of reorganization. For if reorganiza
tion fails, either through the failure of the plan formulated and approved
by the court, to receive the assent of the requisite num ber of creditors or
because the court is satisfied that no reorganization is possible, the court
has the choice of liquidating or of dismissing. If the court liquidates, then
its finding of insolvency becomes effective, and liquidation is ordered
through a trustee. 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 636-638.
I refer to these matters in order to point out how provisional all acts
done in the course of a reorganization proceeding may be until there is
actually a reorganization or liquidation.
Now, to get back to the specific order. T he m inute order of Judge
Ralph E. Jenney says specifically: “This m atter coming on for hearing
on (8) motion of Ben Pivar, et al, creditors to dismiss the proceedings
numbered 31,013-C, Bankruptcy, the court finds the corporation insolvent
in both the bankruptcy and the equity sense at this time.”
Judge Jenney did not order liquidation. H ad he ordered liquidation, it
might be argued that we are in bankruptcy and ought to consider it as
though an adjudication had been made upon an involuntary petition,
and that it refers back to the date of the petition. But, he did not do so.
He continued the efforts at reorganization. His only object in making the
finding was to say to the reorganizers: “You may proceed to formulate a
plan, and if that plan is approved by me, it will be confirmed when you
secure the assent of two-thirds of the creditors. You do not need the assent
of a majority of the stockholders.”
We cannot retroject into the past this finding, which says that in
solvency exists “at this tim e ” so as (in the language of the street) “to pin”
insolvency on the corporation as of November 29, 1937.
The documentary evidence offered to show insolvency is insufficient.
We have an auditor’s summary of the books of the company, which shows
an operating loss, during a certain period of time. But an operating loss
is not the equivalent of insolvency, either in the sense of inability to meet
debts—which, of course, would not help us here—or in the sense that
the assets, at a fair valuation, are less than the liabilities.
I am of the view, therefore, that the evidence does not show insolvency,
so as to warrant the court in concluding that, on the date when these
suits were instituted, between March and October, 1937, the stock was of
no value, so as to entitle the plaintiffs to recover without proof of value.
I realize that there may be difficulties in proving value. But this type
of legislation is novel. We know the opposition encountered when such
legislation is so u g h t to be enacted.

A n d , n o d o u b t, because of this

opposition, on the part of persons whose affairs had not been, heretofore,
regulated by federal law,—an opposition which, indubitably, expressed
itself in the Congress—a compromise had to be reached and the law made
less harsh.
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Counsel themselves have adverted to the fact that recovery was greater
under the original enactment. This indicates that, ultimately, the counsel
of those prevailed who thought that liability should not be penal in
nature, but merely compensatory, limited to the actual loss suffered. And
as there can be no claim unless there is loss, the requirement that the
plaintiff prove loss by showing depreciation in the value of his security,
merely makes him prove what any person who has an action purely
compensatory, must prove in a court of law. There is no such proof of
loss here.
We now pass to another matter—the effect of the one-year limitation
contained in Section 13, which reads: “No action shall be maintained to
enforce any liability created under section 11 [77k] or section 12 [77l]
(2) unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue state
ment or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by
the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability
created under section 12 [77l] (1), unless brought within one year after
the violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action
be brought to enforce a liability created under section 11 [77k] or Section
12 [77l] (1) more than three years after the security was bona fide offered
to the public, or under section 12 [77l] (2) more than three years after
the sale.” 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 (m).
Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. They are based upon
the thought that the law should aid the diligent, and not him who sleeps
on his rights. United States v. Oregon Lum ber Co., 1922, 260 U. S. 290,
299, 300, 43 S. Ct. 100, 67 L. Ed. 261. They do not wipe out the debt.
They merely destroy the remedy. So much so that the due process clause
is not violated if a limitation is changed. See Canadian Northern R. Co.
v. Eggen, 1920, 252 U. S. 553, 559, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. Ed. 713.
In interpreting limitations, the general rule is that the statute begins
to run from the time the right of action accrues. And the right of action
accrues when an act, amounting to either a breach of contract or a breach
or violation of duty takes place, regardless of concealment or discovery.
T he extent to which courts have gone in applying this principle to statutes
of limitation is illustrated by Staples v. Zoph, 1935, 9 Cal. App.2d 369,
49 P.2d 1131, which arose before me while a Judge of the Superior Court
of California. A woman sent an anonymous letter to another person
reflecting on the character of the plaintiff—also a woman. T he plaintiff
did not discover the identity of the sender until after the expiration of one
year, which is the California statutory limitation in actions for libel. The
plaintiff alleged that fact in an endeavor to take the case out of the statute.
I held that there were no exceptions to the rule which starts the running of
statutes of limitations from the accrual of the right of action, except in
the case of fraud, and that the fraudulent concealment of the identity of
the defendant did not extend the period of limitation.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeals, Second District, affirmed the
judgment, stating: “Concealment of the identity of the party liable
cannot be deemed the same as concealment of a cause of action. * * *
This rule does not operate unjustly to plaintiff, since at any time within
one year after accrual of her cause of action she could have filed suit
naming a fictitious defendant.” As stated, the only exception to this rule
is that obtaining in fraud cases. In California, an action for relief, upon
the ground of fraud or mistake, must be brought within three years. But
the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by
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the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. Califor
nia Code of Civil Procedure, § 338.
W hile the wording of this section is different from the limitation in
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, the meaning of both sections is the
same. They both mean that the action must be brought within one year
after discovery. More, the statute under discussion goes further. Instead
of merely speaking of discovery, it gives recognition to imputed discovery,
i. e., discovery which should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.
I think that, ultimately, the courts would have interpreted the statute
in like manner. For that has been the general rule. See, Foster v . Mans
field, Coldwater, etc. Ry., 1892, 146 U. S. 88, 13 S. Ct. 28, 36 L. Ed. 899;
Johnston v. Standard M ining Co., 1893, 148 U. S. 360, 370, 13 S. Ct. 585,
37 L. Ed. 480; Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 1920, 184 Cal. 226, 193 P. 243;
Bancroft v. Woodward, 1920, 183 Cal. 99, 190 P. 445; Consolidated, etc.,
Co. v. Scarborough, infra. W hen we deal with the statute of limitations
as applied to fraud, discovery becomes a part of the cause of action.
In Lady Washington Consolidated Co. v. Wood, 1896, 113 Cal. 482,
45 P. 809, 810, the court says: “T he right of a plaintiff to invoke the aid
of a court of equity for relief against fraud, after the expiration of three
years from the time when the fraud was committed, is an exception to the
general statute on that subject, and cannot be asserted unless the
plaintiff brings himself within the terms of the exception. It must appear
that he did not discover the facts constituing the fraud until within three
years prior to commencing the action. This is an element of the plaintiff’s
right of action, and must be affirmatively pleaded by him in order to
authorize the court to entertain his complaint.”
This case has been followed consistently. In Original M ining M illing
Company v. Casad, 1930, 210 Cal. 71, 290 P. 456, the court gives the allega
tions which the complaint must contain in order to show discovery. They
are: (1) When the fraud was discovered; (2) the circumstances under
which it was discovered; (3) facts to show that plaintiff is not at fault in
failing to discover the fraud sooner, and that the plaintiff has no actual or
presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry. Among
the latest California cases on the subject is Consolidated Reservoir &
Power Co. v. Scarborough, 1932, 216 Cal. 698, 16 P.2d 268, where the older
cases are reviewed and approved. These cases express a general rule,
which has the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Wood v . Carpenter, 1879,101 U. S. 135, 140, 25 L. Ed. 807, the court,
in interpreting the Indiana statute relating to limitations of actions in
fraud, laid down a similar rule: “In this class of cases the plaintiff is held
to stringent rules of pleading and evidence, ‘and especially must there be
distinct averments as to the time when the fraud, mistake, concealment, or
misrepresentation was discovered, and what the discovery is, so that the
court may clearly see whether, by ordinary diligence, the discovery might
not have been before made.’ [Citing case.] ‘This is necessary to enable
the defendant to meet the fraud and the time of its discovery.’ * * *
A general allegation of ignorance at one time and of knowledge at another
are of no effect. I f the plaintiff made any particular discovery, it should
be stated when it was made, what it was, how it was made, and why it was,
not made sooner.” (Italics added.)
T he opinion concludes;
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“There must be reasonable diligence; and the means of knowledge
are the same thing in effect as knowledge itself.
“The circumstances of the discovery must be fully stated and proved,
and the delay which has occurred must be shown to be consistent with
the requisite diligence.” (Italics added.)
And see, Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 1935, 5 Cir., 78 F.2d 924;
United States v. Christopher, 1934, 10 Cir., 71 F.2d 764.
As the basis of the right to recover under the Securities Act is fraud, and
the limitation is made dependent upon discovery, these principles should
be applied to it.
The rule which allows discovery to be the starting point of limitation
is made for the benefit of the person who claims to be injured by the
fraud of another. It works to the disadvantage of the person charged with
the fraud. If we apply it to stockholders seeking redress under the civil
liability sections of the Security Act, no hardship or injustice results.
Stockholders are in a position to inquire, and to detect fraud on the part
of the officers of a corporation, in matters of record, as they have access
to its books and records.
T he maximum time provision in Section 13, to the effect that, in no
event, shall an action be brought more than three years after the security
was offered to the public, does not extend the lim itation period. This
provision means that if discovery is not made within three years, no action
lies, under any circumstances. Otherwise put, if more than three years
have elapsed since the offer of the security, the discovery of defendant’s
fraud comes too late. The object of this clause is merely to set the
maximum period during which a person might be held liable, under any
circumstances, by reason of any false statements in the registration state
ment. It does not dispense with the requirement that any person who
brings an action within the three year period, must do so also within one
year after the discovery of the falsity of the statement or the omission.
There is no proof as to the date of discovery, although the complaints
contain allegations of discovery in May, 1938. Nor were facts stated in
the complaint or proved at the trial explaining why discovery was not
made sooner. Unless I hold that such proof is unnecessary, the actions are
clearly barred. For the reasons stated, I cannot so hold.
It follows that the motions to dismiss should be granted as to all the
defendants. It is so ordered. T he causes are also dismissed as to
defendants named but not served.

SECTION 5

WORKING PAPERS
IPSWICH MILLS v. DILLON *
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1927. 260 Mass. 453, 157 N. E. 604.

Suit in equity by the Ipswich Mills against William Dillon and an
other, to require defendants to turn over to plaintiff papers and docu
ments in their possession. On reservation and report. Decree to be
entered for plaintiff in accordance with opinion.
Carroll, J. The question involved in this suit in equity is the owner
ship of certain papers. T he plaintiff is a manufacturer of hosiery. The
defendants are accountants, father and son, who have been partners since
January 1, 1921. In 1912 or 1913 the father, and later the firm, were
employed by the plaintiff as accountants to make an annual audit, to
prepare tax returns, and to perform services on matters of bookkeeping,
cost accounting and statements for banks. This employment continued
until December, 1925. In 1922 or 1923 the defendants were employed
to conduct a federal tax case before the Bureau of Internal Revenue as at
torneys in fact for the plaintiff. W hile a federal revenue agent was making
an examination of the plaintiff’s returns for the years 1922, 1923, 1924, he
was sent by the plaintiff to the defendants to examine certain papers in
their possession relating to the plaintiff’s affairs, more particularly the
defendants’ “work sheets” relating to the revaluation of the plant assets
and to certain adjusted inventories developed in their work on the tax
case. T he defendants refused the revenue agent access to these papers.
On January 6, 1926, the plaintiff demanded of the defendants “all papers
in your possession belonging to Ipswich Mills.” No papers were delivered
and this suit was instituted.
All the papers involved which were in the defendants’ possession were
produced by them at the trial. They were examined by the parties,
grouped, initialed and impounded, awaiting the final decision of the
case. Group A consisted of papers that originated in the plaintiff’s office
or in the office of its selling agents, or of some one associated with them,
including papers relating to the 1917 federal tax return of the plaintiff.
The defendants conceded that the plaintiff is the owner of these papers
in group A, and entitled to possession of them. Group B included copy
of the amended federal tax return of the plaintiff for the year 1918, and
certain papers (not work sheets) relating thereto. In group C there were
copies of the plaintiffs tentative and amended tax return for 1919 with
work sheets and correspondence in connection therewith. In group D
were papers and work sheets of the revaluation of the plaintiffs plant
assets. T he papers in group E were the defendants’ work sheets of their
July, 1922, report. Group F included papers, reports, returns, copies,
* T his case is discussed at p. 54 f. supra.
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work sheets, data, correspondence and memoranda respecting the tax
case, together with some letters originating in the plaintiff’s office.
It was found by the trial judge that work sheets m eant papers on
which original compilations, computations and analyses are made by
accountants, which later are gathered together in a summary form and
the figures rendered in a schedule, exhibit, report or return upon which
the accountant is working. T he judge ruled that the plaintiff was the
owner of the papers in groups B, C, D and E, and entitled to the imme
diate possession of them, the defendants being entitled to take and pre
serve such photostatic copies as they desired. W ith reference to the
papers initialed F, the judge ruled that the parties were jointly interested
in these particular papers, with the right in the plaintiff to take them
temporarily from the defendant. An order for a decree was made. T he
case was then reported to this court.
Concerning the papers marked B, which consist of “copy of amended
federal tax return of the plaintiff for 1918 and certain papers (not work
sheets) relating thereto,” the judge found:
“T h e defendants were under employ as accountants—auditing, checking u p and
verifying, and making a research for the original costs of the plaintiff’s p lan t assets then
in use and applying depreciation figures decided upon by the directors w ith respect to
the different classes of property. It was work of a character requiring accounting skill
and experience, and good judgm ent in reaching sound and dependable conclusions
where original entries were obscure or vouchers missing. It was fully paid for by the
plaintiff.”

We assume that the original tax return was delivered to the plaintiff
and the copy of this return retained by the defendants. T he defendants
were not the agents or servants of the plaintiff, they were independent
contractors. In the making of the documents and papers and in collect
ing the information involved in them, the defendants were independent
accountants engaged in their own occupation. See Pearl v. West End
Street Railway, 176 Mass. 177, 179, 57 N. E. 339, 49 L. R. A. 826, 79 Am.
St. Rep. 302; Leverone v. Arancio, 179 Mass. 439, 443, 61 N. E. 45. They
had the right to make and retain copies of the tax return. It might be
necessary to have possession of the copies if the accuracy of their work
was questioned. There was nothing in the contract of employment which
required the defendants to surrender this copy and in the absence of
such an agreement they could not be compelled to surrender it.
T he other papers relating to the federal tax return of 1918, mentioned
in group B, we understand are office copies of letters sent by the de
fendants. T he defendants could retain copies of these letters as well as
copies of the schedules which are indicated by the evidence as being a
part of the “papers * * * relating thereto.” This copy of the return
and the papers relating thereto may have contained information of im
portance to the plaintiff. The right of the plaintiff to restrain its publi
cation is not before us. Even if it be assumed that the defendants could
be enjoined from the publication of the contents of these papers, the title
to them was in the defendants.
Group C consisted of (1) carbon copies of letters from the defendants
to the plaintiff; (2) original letters from the plaintiff to the defendants;
(3) original letters to the defendants from the plaintiff’s attorneys; and
(4) carbon copies of letters from the defendants to the collector of internal
revenue.
T he carbon copies of the defendants’ letters to the plaintiff were the
property of the defendants, The plaintiff did not own these copies and
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was not entitled to their possession. T he contract of employment did
not require the defendants to furnish these copies to the plaintiff.
T he original letters from the plaintiff to the defendants belonged to
the defendants. They were the recipients, and therefore owned them. It
was decided in Baker v . Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 606, 97 N. E. 109, 37 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 944, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 551, after an exhaustive review of the
authorities, that as a general rule the publication of letters may be re
strained by the author, but in the absence of some special arrangement
the recipient of the letter is the owner. “T he author parts with the
physical and material elements which are conveyed by and in the envelope.
These are given to the receiver. T he paper upon which the letter is
written belongs to the receiver. Oliver v . Oliver, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 139;
Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush (65 Ky.) 480, 486, 92 Am. Dec. 509;
Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 341; Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co.
(C. C.) 142 F. 827, 830. A duty of preservation would impose an un
reasonable burden in most instances. It is obvious that no such obliga
tion rests upon the receiver, and he may destroy or keep at pleasure.”
The same principle is applicable to the letters sent from the plaintiff’s
attorneys to the defendants. As the defendants were the receivers of these
letters, they were the property of the defendants.
T he carbon copies of the defendants’ letters to the collector of internal
revenue did not belong to the plaintiff. Whatever right it may have to
examine these copies, or take copies of them, which point we are not called
upon to decide, the defendants’ copies did not belong to the plaintiff;
they were owned by the defendants. T he fact that the copies of these
letters concern the plaintiff is not a sufficient reason for depriving the
defendants of their property. In writing the letters the defendants were
not the plaintiff’s servants.
In group C there are copies of federal tax returns. These, as we under
stand from the record, were the defendants’ office copies. The record
shows that copies of all returns and schedules prepared by the defendants
for the plaintiff were sent to the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff has a
right to require further copies, a question not involved in this suit, it
has no right to demand of the defendants the surrender of these office
copies. They were the property of the defendants.
T he work sheets, as defined by the trial judge, were the defendants’
property. They were made by them while engaged in their own business.
The paper on which the computations were made belonged to them.
They were not employed to make these sheets. T he sheets were merely
the means by which the work for which the defendants were employed
might be accomplished. T he title to the work sheets remained in the
defendants after the computations were made. In the absence of an
agreement that these sheets were to belong to the plaintiff, or were to
be held for it, they were owned by the defendants. It may be that these
papers contained information confidential in its nature and of impor
tance to the plaintiff; but the defendants did not receive this information
as the plaintiff’s servants. It has been held that plans prepared by an
architect employed for that purpose belong to the one for whom they are
made. Walsh v. St. Louis Exposition & Music Hall Association, 101 Mo.
534, 535, 14 S. W. 722; Gibbon v. Pease [1905], 1 K. B. 810. See Kutts v.
Pelby, 20 Pick. 65, 66. But it has never been decided so far as we know
that the preliminary plans and sketches of an architect belong to the
person by whom the architect is employed, see in this connection Rutan
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v. Coolidge, 241 Mass. 584, 136 N. E. 257; nor has it been held so far as
we are aware that the preliminary sketches and drawings of an artist em
ployed to paint a portrait belong to the sitter; or that memoranda made
by a physician of his examination of a patient, or the notes and records
of a lawyer, his preliminary drafts of legal documents or his minutes of
testimony, belong respectively to the patient or client. See Anonymous
Case, 31 Me. 590; In re Wheatcroft, 6 Ch. Div. 97. As to property rights
in a negative where a photograph is taken for pay in the usual course,
see Boucas v. Cooke [1903], 2 K. B. 227, 238; Pollard v. Photographic Co.,
40 Ch. Div. 345. T he interest of the plaintiff in the information collected
and copied by the defendants and the confidential nature of this informa
tion do not give title to the plaintiff of the defendants’ working papers.
They were made by the defendants solely for their own assistance in pre
paring the tax returns.
W ith reference to group F, the letters addressed to the defendants,
copies of letters written by the defendants, copies of returns furnished
to the plaintiff, and work sheets relating to the tax case, are the sole prop
erty of the defendants, and this true of the papers and reports collected
by the defendants in the preparation of the tax case. T he plaintiff is not
jointly interested with the defendants in these documents. We do not
understand that any of these reports, papers and returns were property
of the plaintiff which had been placed in the defendants’ custody by the
plaintiff or merely delivered to the defendants. If there are any papers
belonging to the plaintiff which were lent to the defendants, the plaintiff
is entitled to them; but as we construe the record, the papers referred
to in group F were gathered and collected by the defendants in the course
of their business, and were not papers of the plaintiff placed by it in the
defendants’ possession.
On the record of the evidence disclosed in this case the defendants
were under no legal obligation to surrender their working sheets or other
papers to the plaintiff. T he testimony of Leonard and Dillon does not
prove that the defendants gave the plaintiff any right or title in them.
It is apparent that at one time papers in the possession of the defendants,
including their working papers, were turned over to the plaintiff, for
which receipts were given by the plaintiff to the defendants. These papers
were again returned to the defendants. T he plaintiff contends that by
this transaction the plaintiff’s rights of property and possession of all
these papers were settled. Dillon testified that these papers were merely
lent to the plaintiff. An investigation of the letters and receipts, and an
examination of the record, do not satisfy us that the defendants in placing
these documents in the possession of the plaintiff intended to part with
their title and property in them.
It follows that the papers in group A belong to the plaintiff. The
other papers and documents belong to the defendants. A decree is to
be entered for the plaintiff, directing that the plaintiff is the owner and
entitled to immediate possession of the documents described in group A
Ordered accordingly.

Estate of WILLIAM H. DENNIS *
Surrogate’s Court of New York County, 1936. 95 n . y . law journal 827.

This was a proceeding for an accounting in which numerous objections
* T his case is discussed at p. 56 supra.
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by creditors were first disposed of. T he Court then continued:
The executrix of the estate and the beneficiary named in clause F ourth
of deceased’s will ask for a construction of it. Its text is:
Fourth: I give and bequeath all of my office files and records to Amelia Dale, residing
at 147 West 55 Street, Borough of M anhattan, New York, N. Y.

Deceased was an accountant by profession. In his office files no doubt
are papers which represent work done by him for clients and such papers
contain no doubt information given to deceased in confidence. In respect
of such working papers and data of a confidential nature it is the duty
and obligation of the executrix to return to the clients of deceased such
copies of papers or other data as they furnish to deceased, or if that cannot
be done to destroy such papers. T he executrix should likewise destroy the
work sheets of deceased relating to such confidential work. Before taking
the irrevocable step of destruction of any record, the executrix must assure
herself that there is no basis for claims against the estate which would
require the preservation of the papers for the protection of the estate. In
so far as the office files and records are non-confidential they will pass
under this provision of the will. Though the accounting has shown that
such items have no value they are nevertheless tangible things which are
capable of manual delivery and so the executrix should make them avail
able to the legatee so that the latter may take them at her own cost. If
possession of them is not sought by the legatee within a reasonable time
after notice that they are available, such articles may be destroyed by the
executrix.

In re FRYE *
Supreme Court of Ohio, 1951. 155 Ohio St. 345, 98 N. E. 2d 798.

Syllabus by the Court
1. In the absence of a privilege created by constitution or statute not
to disclose available information, a witness may not refuse to testify to
pertinent facts in a judicial proceeding merely because such testimony
comprehends a communication or report from himself as agent to his
principal or as independent contractor to his employer, no matter how
confidential may be the character of the communication itself or the
relationship between the parties thereto.
2. A witness possessing knowledge of facts material to the vindication
of the rights of another may be compelled by judicial process to appear
and as to such facts give evidence or produce documents and papers
within his possession and control in behalf of such other, notwithstanding
the evidence thus coerced may involve the private papers of the witness.
3. A witness who is not a party to a legal proceeding has no right,
upon the taking of his deposition in such proceeding, to refuse to answer
any question upon the advice of his counsel merely because such counsel
believes that the testimony sought is irrelevant, incompetent or im
material.
4. Section 55 (f) (1), T itle 26 U. S. C. A., a part of the Internal Revenue
Act, which provides, among other things, that “it shall be unlawful * * *
for any person to print or publish in any manner whatever not provided
* T his case is discussed at p. 57 ff. supra.
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by law any income return, or any part thereof or source of income,
profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income return,” does
not inhibit the disclosure by a witness as evidence in a proper judicial
inquiry of the operative financial data relating to the business of a tax
payer, even though such data comprehends the elemental facts and in
formation from which his income tax return is necessarily made up.
In November 1948 Raymond J. Saile instituted an action against Meri
dian Plastics, Inc., hereinafter called Meridian, in the Common Pleas
Court of Guernsey County, which action is still pending. Saile was a
sales agent employed by the defendant. In the first cause of action set out
in his petition he alleges that a certain amount of money is due him as
commissions earned under a contract with Meridian to be computed on a
percentage basis on all sales of merchandise made by Meridian to dis
tributors established by him and on all sales made by him directly to
retail outlets. In the second cause of action he alleges there is due him
from Meridian on a quantum meruit basis a certain amount of money.
Saile in the prosecution of that action served a subpoena duces tecum
on Marion A. Frye, a resident of Lorain county, a certified public ac
countant and auditor for Meridian, to appear before a notary public
in Cuyahoga county for the purpose of giving testimony. She is not a party
to that action.
T he material part of the subpoena reads as follows: “Please bring with
you all records or copies of records in your possession relating to the
financial condition or operation of M eridian Plastics, Inc., from the date
of its organization to the present day; including copies of all * * * tax
returns, state or federal * * *.”
Upon receiving notice of the taking of Frye’s deposition and before
it was taken, counsel for Meridian filed a motion for an injunction, as
follows: “Now comes the defendant and moves the court that the plaintiff
or his attorneys be enjoined from taking the deposition of Marian A.
Frye which deposition is scheduled for hearing on the 16th day of Decem
ber, 1948, at 10 a. m. * * *.”
T h at motion was overruled, whereupon Meridian perfected an appeal
to the Court of Appeals for Guernsey county, and that court, in January
1949, affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court.
In a written opinion, that court, in part, said: “It would be impossible
for this court in advance to know what questions would be asked or what
answers might be given by said witness. We do not know whether they
would be incompetent or irrelevant. This court cannot speculate on these
matters, and in the final analysis the competency or relevancy of the
testimony must be determined by the trial judge.”
No appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and
the time for such appeal has expired.
On February 7, 1949, Saile, pursuant to the subpoena theretofore
served, proceeded to take the deposition of Frye, he and Meridian each
being represented by counsel. Frye was not represented generally by
counsel. She testified, without objection, that she had been M eridian’s
auditor since its organization; and that she had present the papers called
for by the subpoena and had her work sheets covering the account of
Saile as to commissions owing to him from Meridian for the years 1946,
1947. She submitted them to be marked as exhibits in connection with
her testimony. In all, 30 exhibits, consisting of examination reports on
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the books of the company, financial statements and commission statements,
were identified by the witness.
T he taking of the deposition was adjourned until February 14, 1949,
for the purpose of having photostats made, when Frye appeared with her
own counsel who objected to the introduction in evidence as a part of
the deposition Frye’s personal work sheets or photostatic replicas thereof.
On that date, on examination of Frye by her own counsel, she testified
that she was not an officer or employee of Meridian, but did work for it
as an independent contractor in the capacity of auditor; that she had no
records which belonged to Meridian; that the records which she had
previously identified were her own personal records; and that when she
made up the tax returns for the company she gave it the originals and
copies for its files and the company did the filing.
Counsel for Frye then stated that he refused to permit either the origi
nal work sheets or the photostatic copies to be made a part of the deposi
tion. Upon Frye’s refusal to surrender the exhibits which had previously
been identified by her, she was placed under technical arrest and tech
nically committed to jail by the sheriff of Cuyahoga county.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the release of Frye was filed
in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. T he issues were made
up by the submission of an agreed statement of facts by counsel for Saile
and Frye.
The stipulation covered a copy of the petition in the Saile action, a copy
of a motion for injunction, the appeal proceedings in the Court of Appeals
for Guernsey County, a copy of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, a
copy of the journal entry of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment
of the Common Pleas Court, a copy of the transcript of the deposition,
in which Frye substantiated the fact that plaintiff’s exhibits 1 through
30 were her work sheets and copies of her reports made as auditor of
Meridian, a copy of the articles of commitment of Frye by the notary
public and a statement that the taking of the deposition, the subpoena
of the witness, the attendance of the witness and the taking of her testi
mony were all in conformance to law.
Frye was discharged from custody by the Common Pleas Court of
Cuyahoga County. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment
of the Common Pleas Court was affirmed without opinion, one judge
dissenting. T he cause is now in this court by reason of the allowance of
a motion to certify the record.
H art, Judge. T he general rule is that a witness, especially when not
a party to the controversy, may be required to testify upon any subject
concerning which judicial inquiry is made and upon which he possesses
specific personal information. T o this general rule, there are certain
well recognized exceptions. A witness may always claim as privileged that
which tends to incriminate him. Article V, Amendments, U. S. Constitu
tion, and Section 10, Article I, Constitution of Ohio.
Also, under Section 11494, General Code, a witness who stands in either
of several relationships named in the statute shall not testify, with certain
exceptions, because the subject m atter under the statute is privileged.
See, generally, In re Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N. E. 2d 388; In re
Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 79 N. E. 2d 224; In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307,
85 N. E. 2d 550; Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E. 2d 245, 169
A. L. R. 668.
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Frye seeks to broaden the area of these privileges. In the first place,
she claims that the papers and documents sought to be introduced in evi
dence through her are her own personal property—work sheets and
memoranda made by her, not as an employee but as an independent con
tractor in her private and confidential employment as a public account
ant, from the private books and papers of her employer made at large
expense to the latter; and that she should not be required to disclose this
confidential information and to part with her property for attachment
to an official court document.
In support of her position she relies on the case of Ipswich Mills v.
Dillon, 260 Mass. 453, 157 N. E. 604, 53 A. L. R. 792. In that case, a
corporation, to gain possession of certain documents, brought a suit in
equity against certified public accountants who had been theretofore
employed by it to make annual audits, prepare tax returns and statements
for banks and to conduct a federal tax case before the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. It appeared that there had been no special agreement between
the parties as to the ownership of the documents. All the papers involved
which were in the possession of the accountants were voluntarily produced
by them at the trial, were examined by all the parties and were submitted
to the trial court as evidence in the case. The court held that the public
accountants were not the agents or servants of the corporation but were
independent contractors and as such owned and had a right to retain
their work sheets and copies made by them of papers and documents of
the corporation used in its business. In that case the papers were not
under subpoena in the hands of the accountants to produce them in court.
Doubtless they were subject to subpoena but this question was in no way
before the court. T he sole question determined was the ownership of
the papers. Doubtless in a proper case a court will protect the owner
of papers and documents so far as their custody is concerned by requiring
the party calling for them for evidential purposes to make photostatic or
other proper copies of the same so that the owner may retain the originals.
Such an offer was made to Frye by the plaintiff in the instant case but the
offer was rejected.
A further claim is made by Frye that the papers and documents sought
to be introduced in evidence are not the best evidence and are therefore
incompetent. T he answer to this claim is that it is not the function of
the witness to pass upon the relevancy or competency of evidence to be
offered in any court action. T h at is the function of the trial court.
This question was decided by this court in In re Martin, Jr., supra
[141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N. E. 2d 389], wherein this court held: “A witness
who is not a party has no legal right upon the taking of his deposition
to refuse to answer any question, upon the advice of his attorney, merely
because the attorney believes that the testimony sought is irrelevant, in
competent or immaterial.” See, also, In re Hyde, supra.
F u rth e rm o re , it is im possible, befo re the tim e of the tria l of a case

in which the deposition is taken, to determine what is the “best evidence,”
as such determination depends upon other circumstances surrounding the
case appearing at the time of trial.
As a further reason for Frye’s refusal to again produce documents to
be attached to her deposition, notwithstanding she had already produced
and identified them, and notwithstanding they had already been intro
duced in evidence, she claims that by so producing them she may in
criminate herself and possibly subject herself to a federal criminal prose

WORKING PAPERS

271

cution, and to a possible revocation of her license as a certified public
accountant. She predicates her claim in this respect on the provisions
of Section 55 (f) (1), T itle 26, U. S. C. A., the pertinent parts of which
are as follows: “It shall be unlawful * * * for any person to print or
publish in any manner whatever not provided by law any income return,
or any part thereof or source of income, profits, losses, or expenditures
appearing in any income return * * *.”
This claim is necessarily based upon the assumption that the docu
ments sought to be produced through the witness are federal tax returns
or copies of the same. T he deposition itself does not support this assump
tion. No income tax returns or copies of tax returns were offered in evi
dence. She testified on this subject only that she had made up tentative
tax returns and had sent them to Meridian for it to execute and forward to
the proper revenue collector. T he record does not show any violation
or proposed violation of the statute.
Furthermore, there is no infraction of the statute involved in this
proceeding. T he latter part of the statute above quoted prohibits any
person from printing or publishing tax returns or sources of income,
profit, losses or expenditures appearing in any income return, in any man
ner “not provided by law.” This statute does not and could not legally
inhibit the disclosure, as evidence in a proper judicial inquiry or where
required by law, of the operative financial data relating to the business
of a taxpayer, even though such data comprehends the elemental facts
and information from which his income tax return is necessarily made
up. T he law could never sanction such a sweeping prohibition of dis
closure of the essential facts of the business world. It must be evident
that the statute in question has no such purpose or intent.
This statute, penal in nature, must be strictly construed in favor of a
witness called upon to testify concerning business transactions affecting
a taxpayer. T he court in the case of United States v. Baltimore Post Co.,
D. C., 2 F.2d 761, 764, in construing this specific statute said: “T o ‘publish’
is to make public; to make known to people in general. In the statute,
it does not cover the private communication by one person to another.
It is not synonymous with ‘communicate,’ as it may be in the law of
libel or slander. Other provisions of the law make this clear.”
Frye could not be guilty of any criminal intent and therefore is not
amenable to the statute, under the circumstances here presented. She
is called upon to make certain disclosures under the compulsion of court
process. In so doing she is protected from criminal prosecution. 12 Ohio
Jurisprudence, 69, Section 23.
Finally, assuming there was no self-incrimination involved, there has
been a complete waiver of any privilege on the part of Frye, if she ever
had one, from testifying in the Saile action. She has already testified
freely and without objection to all phases of the subject m atter disclosed
by the books of Meridian relating to the issues involved in the Saile action.
In connection with her testimony she has identified all the exhibits sought
to be attached to her deposition. It is now too late to refuse to allow
them to be made a part of her deposition in regular course, especially
since Saile is w illin g to reim b u rse h e r fo r any expense in p ro d u c in g copies
of the exhibits to be used in lieu of the originals. Burke v. State, 104 Ohio
St. 220, 229, 135 N. E. 644; 42 Ohio Jurisprudence, 66, Section 52.
In the absence of a privilege created by constitution or statute not to
disclose available information, a witness may not refuse to testify t o

272

ACCOUNTANTS’ LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

pertinent facts in a judicial proceeding merely because such testimony
comprehends a communication or report from himself as agent to his
principal or as independent contractor to his employer, no m atter how
confidential may be the character of the communication itself or the
relationship between the parties thereto. See Robertson v. Com., 181 Va.
520, 25 S. E. 2d 352, 146 A. L. R. 966. And where one possesses knowledge
of facts which are pertinent to a judicial inquiry, he may be required
to testify or to produce papers and documents as to such facts.
In discussing this subject, 58 American Jurisprudence, 40, Section 32,
states the rule as follows: “It is a general rule that a witness possessing
knowledge of facts material to the vindication of the rights of another
may be compelled by judicial process to appear and give evidence in
behalf of that other party, notwithstanding the evidence thus coerced
may uncover the witness’s private business. This rule is also generally held
applicable when the information sought is contained in books and papers.
Accordingly, it has been held that it is no ground for the refusal of a
witness to produce books and papers, when required by lawful authority,
that they are private. T he duty of witnesses to disclose the details of their
private business for the benefit of third persons when required in the
administration of justice, is one devolving on them as members of a
civilized community.” See McMann v. Securities and Exchange Commis
sion, 2 Cir., 87 F.2d 377, 109 A. L. R. 1445.
Since a commissioner or notary public is not invested with the ultimate
authority to pass upon the relevancy, competency or materiality of testi
mony taken before him on deposition, Ex parte Bevan, 126 Ohio St.
126, 184 N. E. 393, he may order the witness to answer any question, even
though objection is made thereto, subject only to the exclusion of the
testimony by the court when offered at the trial. A witness refuses to an
swer any question at the risk of commitment for contempt, even though
an answer would infringe any personal privilege or right granted by the
Constitution or statutes of the state. If committed for contempt, the
witness is entitled in a habeas corpus proceeding to have the relevancy
and competency of the matters inquired about in taking his deposition
determined by the court. In re Martin, Jr., supra.
It must be recognized that this is cumbersome procedure with which
to determine the rights and privileges of a witness whose deposition is
being taken before a commissioner appointed by a court or before a
notary public. In cases where the nature and subject m atter of the testi
mony sought by deposition can be anticipated in advance of the taking
of the deposition, a witness may protect himself from the enforced dis
closure of a privileged or harmful subject m atter by an appeal to a court
of equity where equitable principles may be applied in determining the
specific rights of a witness.
An attem pt to follow this method of procedure was made in the Saile
action, so far as the rights of Meridian were concerned, but the courts
denied the remedy because the injunctive relief sought was either too
broad or lacked merit, or both.
T he judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is
remanded to the Common Pleas Court for proceedings according to law,
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.

SECTION 6

PRIV ILEG ED

COM M UNICATIONS

In re FISHER *
District Court of the U nited States, S. D. New York, 1931. 51 F. 2d 424.

In Bankruptcy. In the m atter of A. Edward Fisher, bankrupt. William
Bernstein, being called to testify, refused to answer certain questions upon
the basis of privilege arising from the attorney-client relationship with
bankrupt.
Knox, District Judge. It appears that the witness W illiam Bernstein
acted as bankrupt’s accountant for a num ber of years, and, after his ad
mission to the bar, also acted as bankrupt’s attorney. Upon the basis of
the privilege arising from the attorney-client relationship, he has re
fused to answer questions relating to bankrupt’s books and to produce
in evidence monthly account sheets made by accountants in his employ
in course of auditing bankrupt’s books.
There is no privilege with regard to communications made to ac
countants. T he information given to the witness and to the accountants
in his employ for the purpose of making financial statements and doing
other work characteristically performed by accountants is not privileged,
despite the fact that the witness may also have rendered legal advice on
the basis of such data. See M atter of Robinson, 140 App. Div. 329, 125
N. Y. S. 193, where it was held that an attorney for a corporation, who
was one of its directors, could not refuse to disclose information about
corporate affairs by claiming his professional privilege.
Furthermore, the privilege accorded to an attorney is the privilege
of the client and not of the attorney. Baumann v. Steingester, 213 N. Y.
328, 107 N. E. 578, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 1071. For this reason the attorney
cannot claim privilege where the client has already disclosed the sub
stance of the communication. Baumann v. Steingester, supra. Nor can
he claim privilege where the communication was made with the under
standing that it was to be imparted to third parties. Rosseau v. Bleau,
131 N. Y. 177, 30 N. E. 52, 27 Am. St. Rep. 578.
In the case at bar it appears that the bankrupt has already testified
with respect to the matters contained in his books and records. And the
income tax returns and financial statements drawn up from the com
munications made by bankrupt to the witness were obviously intended
to be communicated to others.
F o r these reasons, th e w itness sh o u ld be d ire c te d to testify w ith regard

to the bankrupt’s books and to produce in evidence the monthly work
sheets made by the accountants.
* T his case is discussed at p. 61 f. supra.
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HIMMELFARB v. UNITED STATES *
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Ninth Circuit, 1949.
175 F. 2d 924, cert. denied, 338 U. S. 860.

Stephens, Circuit Judge. Sam Ormont and Phillip Himmelfarb were,
on January 22, 1947, jointly charged by a federal grand jury with four
counts under Section 145 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A.
§145 (b). Count one charged that Ormont and Himmelfarb attempted
to defeat and evade federal income tax owed by Ormont for the calendar
year 1944 by filing a false tax return understating Orm ont’s net income
and income tax for that year. Count two contained similar charges
against both in connection with Himmelfarb’s return for income and
income tax for 1944. Counts three and four contained similar charges
against Ormont as to his returns for the years 1942 and 1943. Individual
returns were filed by Himmelfarb and Ormont at the proper times as to
income received in the conduct of the Acme Meat Co. An information
return was subsequently filed by them for “Miscellaneous Enterprises,”
asserted by them to be a joint venture, for the fiscal year beginning May 1,
1944, and ending April 30, 1945, in the sum of $71,388.84 with no deduc
tions or other information stated and disclosing an equal division between
them of income.
There is much in this opinion which applies to the cases of both
defendants-appellants. There is considerable in the opinion which applies
solely to either one or the other of the defendants-appellants. Generally
speaking it will be obvious what portions appertain to either or both.
Where it has seemed useful we have plainly stated the defendantappellant concerned.
Motion for dismissal of the indictment was denied and a motion for a
bill of particulars was denied in part and granted in part. Pleas of not
guilty to each of the counts were entered. T he court dismissed counts
two, three and four as to Ormont and count one as to Himmelfarb. A
jury trial was had, and Ormont was found guilty upon count one and
Himmelfarb guilty on count two. Motions for acquittal and for a new
trial were denied and each has separately appealed.
T he evidence discloses that Sam Ormont owned and operated a whole
sale meat business under the fictitious name of Acme Meat Co. in Vernon,
California, and employed Phillip Himmelfarb who, prior to May 1,
1944, had been a government licensed meat wholesaler and packer. After
this latter date the two operated the business in partnership until (at
least) April 30, 1945. T he books of the Acme Meat Co. were kept on a
calendar year basis. Shortly before the filing of the joint return, here
tofore mentioned, investigations were made concerning the income tax
returns of both appellants for the years 1942 to 1944 inclusive. Accord
ing to the evidence, income from sales of meat, made within ceiling
prices under OPA, were reported on invoices and recorded in th e com 
p an y books and appellants’ returns for 1944 were based on these figures.
It is indicated that “bonus” or “overceiling” payments of additional cash
sums paid by customers of Acme Meat Co. were received but not reported
on the books nor were they reported for income tax purposes for the
year 1944; as to all of which both appellants were well aware.
Further, there is testimony that income from certain sales was shown on
* T his case is discussed at p. 62 supra.
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invoices which were not transmitted to the appellants’ bookkeeper and
therefore were never entered nor included in the books from which the
income returns were made. These unreported invoices or lists were kept
in a desk drawer at the plant. There is also indication of some falsity
in keeping of records which goes to the general intent of appellants to
misrepresent their income.
Evidence is in the record of a partnership return declaring additional
income of some $71,000.00, claimed to have come from the so-called
“Miscellaneous Enterprises,” bank records and bank documents pertain
ing to each appellant, records of business dealings, invoices, canceled
checks, transcripts of portions of the records of the Acme Meat Co. and
bond records.
There is testimony that Ormont made admissions to Internal Revenue
Agents which were adverse to his interest and which were recorded at
the time made in an affidavit signed by Ormont, and that Ormont later
retrieved the affidavit by subterfuge and destroyed it. There is also testi
mony to the effect that the appellants operated a partnership and divided
profits therefrom equally; that the $71,000.00 claimed to have come from
“Miscellaneous Enterprises” came from so-called “bonuses” received in
the Acme Meat Co. business and not recorded in the company’s books.
However, there is evidence that a private record thereof was kept by
Ormont in a small memorandum book claimed to have been seen by
government witness Bircher, Special Agent for the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. He stated that he saw a page in the back of the book on which
an amount a little in excess of $35,000.00 was itemized, something in
excess of $11,000.00 being recorded as having been earned from secret
and unrecorded charges or bonuses from May 1, 1944, to January 5, 1945,
and the balance or some $23,000.00 being recorded as earned from such
sources from January 5, 1945 to April 30, 1945.
* * * *
Objections are entered to any and all testimony offered by the govern
ment witness, William S. Malin, an accountant employed by appellants’
attorney, Mr. Mirman, who acted for Mr. Ormont and Mr. Himmelfarb
jointly. It is claimed that such testimony is within the rule of privilege
and inadmissible. Testimony concerned a list of bonds and other exhibits
and the mailing thereof. It is argued that communications between a
client and his attorney and the latter’s agents include all persons acting
as such, and are privileged, citing Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 8, 3rd Ed.,
p. 584. T he record is not clear as to the source of the information recorded
by Malin in the various exhibits offered through him by the Government.
He testified that Mirman contacted him by telephone on May 21, 1945,
requesting an appointment to discuss income tax matters of M irman’s
clients, Ormont and Himmelfarb, that he first met Ormont on May 21,
1945, at his office in the company of Mirman, that there was another meet
ing on May 22, 1945, at M irman’s house, at which both Ormont and
Himmelfarb were present. Certainly, not all of the data was supplied
Malin at those meetings. We consider it unnecessary to determine whether
the factual basis for the preparation of the written exhibits had its source
in information, books, or documents, given or showed to Malin by either
or both of the accused, or disclosed at the above meetings, or given by
Ormont or Himmelfarb to Mirman who, out of the presence of either
or both of the accused, informed or showed them to Malin. Privileged
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communications are not recognized as between a client and his accountant.
Of course, communications from a client to his attorney are generally
privileged. Assuming that Malin was M irman’s agent (it appears that
Mirman engaged Malin) and that disclosures were made at the meetings
to Mirman and overheard by Malin, were such communications privi
leged? Where the presence of a third person is indispensable in order for
the communication to be made to the attorney, the policy of the privilege
will protect the client, that is, his presence is required in order to “secure
the client’s subjective freedom of consultation.” 8 Wigmore on Evidence
(3rd Ed.), § 2311, p. 602. M alin’s presence was not indispensable in the
sense that the presence of an attorney’s secretary may be. It was a con
venience which, unfortunately for the accused, served to remove the privi
leged character of whatever communications were made. Of course, com
munications made by the client to such a third party in the presence of the
attorney are not within the privilege. On the other hand, if the data
was obtained through voluntary and indirect disclosures by the attorney
of matters received in confidence from his clients, admission in evidence of
what was disclosed would violate the privilege as much as would the
attorney’s voluntary disclosures on the stand. However, granting that
such voluntary extrajudicial disclosures by the attorney are generally
inadmissible, we feel that special circumstances may show that the client
impliedly authorized the attorney to make disclosures to the third person.
See 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.), § 2325, p. 628. If such authority is
found, the problem is no different than where the communication is
made to the attorney in the presence of a third person who is not indis
pensably necessary to the communication. Here, Ormont and Himmel
farb were aware of M alin’s employment and even participated in one
or more meetings with Malin and Mirman relative to their income taxes.
Some of the exhibits offered indeed were signed by the accused at M alin’s
request. It is reasonable to conclude that whatever disclosures were made
by Mirman to Malin were authorized by the accused.
*

*

*

*

[Judgments affirmed.]

GARIEPY v. UNITED STATES *
Court of Appeals of the U nited States for the Sixth Circuit, 1951. 189 F. 2d 459.

[Gariepy was convicted in the District Court of attempting to defeat
and evade income taxes by filing false and fraudulent returns, and he
appealed. This opinion is by Circuit Judge Simons.]
* * * *
The accountant’s testimony was not privileged. There is no evidence
to show that the accountant, at the time he received and relayed the in
formation to the investigators, was in the employ of counsel for the
appellant, but even if so there is respectable authority that denies him the
privilege status. Himmelfarb v. United States, 9 Cir., 175 F.2d 924;
8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed. § 2325.
* * * *
[Judgment affirmed.]
* T his case is discussed at p. 63 supra.
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UNITED STATES v. STOEHR *
District Court of the U nited States, M. D. Pennsylvania, 1951. 100 F. Supp. 143,
aff’d, 196 F.2d 276, cert. denied, 344 U. S. 826.

M urphy, District Judge. Defendant, found guilty by verdict of a jury
of three violations of § 145 (b), Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. A.
§145 (b), moves for a judgment of acquittal and in the alternative for
a new trial. Defendant was charged with having wilfully and knowingly
attempted to defeat and evade a large part of his income taxes due and
owing to the United States of America for 1943, 1944 and 1945 by filing
and causing to be filed a false and fraudulent income tax return for each
year wherein he knowingly understated his net income and the amount
of tax due thereon.
Defendant, as sole owner and proprietor, operated a retail household
furnishing store at Scranton, Pennsylvania, under the name of Robert E.
Stoehr, trading as Stoehr and Fister. Edith Passetti as bookkeeper was
in charge of the books of original entry. August W. Tross, defendant’s
office manager, did all the posting, was in charge of the general ledger
cards, and prepared defendant’s financial statements. Donald C. Griffiths,
a certified public accountant prepared defendant’s income tax returns.
He never made an audit of or examined defendant’s book of account but
relied solely on information prepared by Tross and submitted by de
fendant or at his direction.
* * * *
In each of the three years after the true net income for the year was
ascertained, two sets of financial statements were prepared, one set true
for the eyes of defendant and Tross only, the other set false to be sub
mitted to Griffiths for preparation of defendant’s income tax return. At
defendant’s request and direction and with his knowledge, in order to
reduce apparent net income and the amount of income taxes defendant
would have to pay, false entries were made whereby a portion of inven
tory was dropped, purchase and expenses overstated, sales understated.
Likewise defendant’s living expenses, the purchase of $110,000 in United
States government bonds, and the payment of $32,847.57 personal life
insurance premiums, were disguised on defendant’s records—personal
expenses charged as business expenses, life insurance premiums charged
as furniture, carpet and drapery purchases. Bonds were not listed as an
asset or as a reduction in capital account. None of the foregoing was
shown on the statements furnished to Griffiths.
* * * *
March 15, 1946, defendant sold the business. In early 1947 Griffiths
made repeated requests for a balance sheet and reconciliation of capital
account in order to prepare defendant’s income tax return for 1946. When
the information was not forthcoming, a return was prepared without the
basic information and filed with a certificate that no audit of defendant’s
books of account was made.
In order to get the facts involved, a meeting was arranged with de
fendant and Tross. After much insistence he finally learned from papers
then submitted that the figures furnished him for 1944 were false. When
he confronted the defendant with this fact and asked if the same was
* See footnote 101 supra.
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true as to the other years, defendant broke down and admitted that the
statements furnished Griffiths had been falsified to reduce defendant’s
income taxes; that while he did not know the amounts, he knew what it
meant, felt very bad about it, and offered to pay Griffiths any price, any
fee, if he would keep the m atter quiet.
On the witness stand defendant admitted that he signed the returns,
caused them to be filed and paid the tax stated to be due thereon; that the
1943 return was false; that in 1943 and 1945, sales and purchases were
incorrectly stated; that they obviously varied from those shown in a private
personal record prepared by Tross for defendant’s eyes only and kept in
his possession; that the three years in question he paid far less taxes than
were due; that Peterson, his accountant, advised him that for the three
years there were taxes owed and unpaid of $278,000.
He insisted that he never examined more than the front page of the
return; never compared the figures thereon with those in his possession,
or checked the calculations made. Despite his many years experience and
his close attention to details of his business he testified that he was not
aware of what profits he made. He stated—and all the evidence is to the
same effect—that Griffiths was in no m anner responsible for the variance
between defendant’s records and his returns. He denied making any
requests or giving any directions to Tross to falsify his records on his be
half, insisted he never had any knowledge that such things were done.
As to the accuracy of his books and records he relied on Tross. As
to the correctness and accuracy of his returns he relied on Tross and
Griffiths.
When Griffiths was unable to obtain the facts in connection with de
fendant’s returns, prepared and filed by him and attested as having been
correct, he reported the m atter to the Group Chief of the Internal Revenue
Office at Scranton, Pennsylvania, on April 23, 1947, advising that the
defendant and Tross had admitted to him that the information furnished
to him to prepare defendant’s returns was falsified, and that he no longer
represented the defendant. An investigation was commenced immediately.
Defendant was indicted March 1, 1950.
* * * *
Placed in their proper context, the lack of merit in defendant’s com
plaints will be amply demonstrated. See Gariepy v. United States, 6 Cir.,
1951, 189 F.2d 459, at page 464. Tross testified that without his working
papers then in defendant’s possession he could not state the amount of
taxes defendant wanted to pay in 1943, 1944 and 1945, or identify re
stored items. Defense counsel handed the witness a large “batch of
papers,” apparently not in their regular order. See United States v.
Michener, supra, 152 F.2d at page 885. Included were defendant’s private
copies, papers of Stoehr & Fister, of the three corporations and of de
fendant’s business from 1939 to 1946. Upon the court’s insistence they
were marked and identified as defendant’s Exhibits 3 to 23 inclusive.
The witness, asked by defense counsel to examine and describe each
paper, was in the act of doing so (see R. p. 290-291) when defense counsel
inadvertently or otherwise prodded him with a “Go ahead.” T he wit
ness asked not to be hurried; the court advised he would not be. The
net result was that Tross testified that the papers contained the true and
false income for each year but that the amount of taxes as such was never
reduced to writing.

****
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We see no error (15F) in perm itting defendant to be questioned and
to state that he always thought Griffiths had a high reputation for
integrity.
* * * *
There was obviously no attem pt on defendant’s part over the years
to make a voluntary disclosure. Defense counsel sought to introduce
evidence as to the Treasury Department’s policy in regard thereto (R.
pp. 1151, 1179, 1182, 1690); to cross examine Griffiths as to his knowledge
thereof, and as to why, after he had been deceived by the defendant, he
did not advise him as to such policy and afford him an opportunity to
make a voluntary disclosure before he reported the m atter to the Internal
Revenue Department.1 Did defendant already know the policy? W ould
he make a voluntary disclosure? W ould he disclose that he had committed
fraud? W ould the Commissioner, notwithstanding, recommend prose
cution? In the absence of a statute the right to immunity is only an
equitable one. See United States v. Levy, supra, 153 F.2d at page 997, and
see opinions of Attorneys General, Vol. 38 (1934-1937) p. 94; Mertens Op.
Cit. supra, § 55.32, footnote 88. Defendant did not file an amended return
or pay his taxes up to the time of trial. T he answers to these questions are
pure speculation; they presented collateral matters. See Ferreria v. Wilson
Borough, 344 Pa. 567, 570-573, 26 A.2d 342. T he answers thereto would
not in our judgment in any way impeach the credibility of Griffiths, nor
were the questions competent to show bias on his part. For these reasons
they were excluded (5, 6) and we declined to include any reference thereto
in our charge (14.49, 52).
[Defendant’s motion for a new trial denied.]

Petition of BORDEN CO. *
District Court of the U nited States, N. D. Illinois, 1948. 75 F. Supp. 857.

Barnes, District Judge. The petition of The Borden Company to
quash a subpoena duces tecum issued out of the office of the clerk of this
court and commanding that company to produce before a grand jury
of this court on December 12, 1947, certain contracts, agreements, re
ports, studies, memoranda, notes and other documents, came on to be
heard and was heard on Tuesday, December 30, 1947.

****
It is contended that the reports made by public accountants for The
Borden Company, called for by the subpoena duces tecum in question,
are privileged. Section 51, Chapter 110½, Illinois Revised Statutes 1947,
provides:
“A public accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge
information or evidence which has been obtained by him in his con
fidential capacity as a public accountant.”
It is doubtful whether the privilege granted by this section to a public
l H imm elfarb v. U nited States, supra, 175 F.2d at page 939. “Privileged comm uni
cations are not recognized as between a client and his accountant.” And see United
States v. Hiss, 2 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 822, at page 832.
* T his case is discussed at p. 66 supra.
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accountant extends to his written report after he has released it, b u t it
is unnecessary for the court to decide whether the privilege created by
the section does extend to the report after its release for the reason that
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U. S. C. A. follow
ing section 687, provides:
“The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges
of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these
rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience.”
At common law the reports of public accountants are not privileged.
No act of Congress and no one of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides otherwise. Accordingly, the court concludes that the reports
of public accountants are not privileged.
[Petition denied.]

FALSONE v. UNITED STATES *
Court of Appeals of the U nited States for the Fifth Circuit, 1953.
205 F.2d 734, cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 103.

R ives, Circuit Judge. An Internal Revenue Agent, acting under au
thority of 26 U. S. C. A. 3614 (a),1 served appellant, a certified public
accountant, with summons to appear before him and testify in the m atter
of the tax liability of Salvatore Italiano and his wife, Maria, for the years
1947 to 1951, inclusive, and to bring with him the following books and
papers:
“All books, papers, records or memoranda in your files relating to:
(1) Individual income tax returns of Salvatore Italiano and Maria Italiano
for the years 1940 to 1946, inclusive. (2) Corporation income tax returns
of Anthony Distributors, Inc., for 1940 to 1951, inclusive.”
In response to the summons, appellant appeared at the agent’s office
but refused to produce the books, papers, records and memoranda called
for in the summons or to testify regarding said documents.
T he United States then filed in the District Court a petition to enforce
the summons under 26 U. S.C. A. 3633 (a).*12 Upon an ex parte hearing,
* T his case is discussed at p. 66 supra.
1 “Sec. 3614. Examination of books and witnesses
“ (a) To determine liability of the taxpayer. T h e Commissioner for the purpose of
ascertaining the correctness of any retu rn o r for the purpose of making a retu rn where
none has been made, is authorized, by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, including the field service, designated by him for th at purpose, to examine
any books, papers, records or mem oranda bearing upon the m atters required to be
included in the return, and may require the attendance of the person rendering the
return or of any officer or employee of such person, or the attendance of any other
person having knowledge in the premises, and may take his testimony w ith reference
to the m atter required by law to be included in such retu rn , w ith power to administer
oaths to such person or persons.” See 26 U. S. C. A. 3615 for Collector’s sim ilar authority
to summon witnesses and require the production of books of account.
2 “Sec. 3633. Jurisdiction of district courts
“ (a) To enforce summons. If any person is summoned under the internal revenue
laws to appear, to testify, o r to produce books, papers, or oth er data, th e District Court
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the District Court entered an order directing the appellant to obey the
summons and to retain all of said documents in his possession for com
pliance with the summons or such other disposition as the court might
direct.
A motion to vacate that order and to quash the summons of the In
ternal Revenue Agent was filed by the appellant. After a hearing, the
District Court denied that motion and ordered the appellant to appear
before another special agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, to pro
duce the documents requested, and to give testimony pursuant to the
summons. From that order this appeal is prosecuted.
Although the appellee has not moved to dismiss the appeal, it is never
theless incumbent upon this Court to ascertain whether the order of the
District Court is final and appealable, and, hence, whether this Court has
jurisdiction. T he question is not without difficulty; it has apparently
been answered in the affirmative by the Eighth C ircuit3 and by the N inth
Circuit,4 while a closely related question, the summons having been issued
by the Collector under 26 U. S. C. A. 3615, has been answered in the
negative by the Seventh Circuit.56 In a similar proceeding, an appeal from
an order entered earlier than the reported opinion in Torras v. Strandley,
(Dist. Ct. Ga.) 103 F. Supp. 737, the present writer has heretofore denied
supersedeas, because he was then of the opinion that the order of the
District Court was not final.
It is settled that an order of the District Court denying a motion to
quash a subpoena duces tecum requiring one to appear with papers and
testify before a grand jury is not a final and appealable decision. Cobble
dick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323. The power granted to the Com
missioner of Internal Revenue by 26 U. S. C. A. 3614 is inquisitorial in
character and has been compared to the power vested in Federal grand
juries. Bolich v. R ubel (2nd Cir), 67 F. 2d 894, 895; Brownson v. United
States (8th Cir.), 32 F.2d 844, 848. An im portant difference, however,
is that, while the reports of grand juries are made to the court, the results
of tax investigations are reported to the Commissioner and it is for him
to determine what action, if any, is required under the law in view of
the facts revealed.
Judge Learned Hand has indicated that the distinction to be observed
is between orders which are merely interlocutory steps in judicial pro
ceedings and are not appealable and court orders ancillary to an ad
ministrative proceeding and final because they complete the court’s action.
Capital Company v. Fox (2nd. Cir.), 85 F.2d 97, 99. Professor Moore
seems to follow the same distinction. Moore’s Commentary on the United
States Judicial Code (1949), pages 501, 502.6 In Cobbledick v. United
States, supra, at p. 330, the Supreme Court recognized the difference
of the U nited States for the district in which such person resides shall have jurisdiction
by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books,
papers, or other data.”
See 26 U. S. C. A. 3615 (e) for enforcement of Collector’s summons.
3Brownson v. U nited States (8th Cir.), 32 F.2d 844.
4 M artin v. Chandis Securities Co. (9th Cir.), 128 F.2d 731.
5 Jarecki v. W hetstone (7th Cir.), 192 F.2d 121.
6 T h a t distinction m ight explain cases where the administrative agency was p ro 
ceeding under other statutes, such as Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U. S. 186; Endicott Johnson Corp., et al., v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501; N.L.R.B. v. Anchor
Rome Mills (5th Cir.), 197 F,2d 447. Compare the enforcement of agency subpoenas
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. A. 1005 (c).
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between a proceeding “self-contained, so far as the judiciary is concerned”
where the District Court’s direction to testify “is the end of a proceeding
begun against the witness” and controversies “arising out of court pro
ceedings unrelated to any administrative agency.”
In First National Bank of Mobile v. United States, 267, U. S. 576, the
Supreme Court affirmed an order of the District Court [United States v.
First National Bank of Mobile (Dist. Ct. Ala.), 295 Fed. 1942] requiring
an employee of a bank to appear before an Internal Revenue Agent and
to testify and produce books and records as to the transactions of one of
the bank’s depositors; and, as the Eighth Circuit has aptly commented,
“T he affirmance of the order necessarily involved a holding that the order
was appealable.” Brownson v. United States, supra, at p. 846. We hold,
therefore, that the order in the present case was final and that this court
has jurisdiction.
The pleadings which frame the issues for our decision consist of the
petition to enforce the summons and the motion to vacate the ex parte
order and to quash the summons. Attached to the petition was an af
fidavit of the agent stating that, in his official capacity at the direction of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, he was investigating the tax
returns of Salvatore Italiano and his wife, Maria, for the years 1947
through 1951 for alleged evasion of income tax; that his investigation
had revealed that from the years 1942 through 1951 the taxpayers reported
income of approximately $303,000.00, while their expenditures during
that period had been in the approximate amount of $466,000.00; that it
is necessary to make a determination of their income by means of the socalled net worth-expenditures method,7 and in order to determine net
worth as of January 1, 1947, it is necessary to reconstruct the financial
history of the taxpayers in prior years; that the official records of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue disclosed that at times during the period
1942 through 1951 Salvatore Italiano, as General Manager of Anthony
Distributors, Inc., engaged in the purchase and sale of beverages over
the O. P. A. Ceiling Prices to his personal benefit.
Appellant’s sworn motion and affidavit denying the District Court’s
right to issue the order enforcing the summons is based essentially on the
following facts and circumstances therein stated:
1. T he appellant, Frank J. Falsone, is a certified public accountant of
the State of Florida and enrolled to practice before the Treasury Depart
ment; and Salvatore Italiano, Maria Italiano and Anthony Distributors,
Inc., are “clients” of his whom he represents in Federal tax matters.
2. T h at the books, papers, records and memoranda in appellant’s files
ordered produced by the District Court are of two classifications: (a)
Those which are the personal and private books, papers, records and
memoranda of his clients entrusted to him for the purpose of enabling
him to prepare their tax returns; and the return of these has now been
demanded by the clients. (b) Those which are the work papers and work
products of the appellant based on information given to the appellant by
his clients.
3. Concerning the information and documents for some of the years
requested: (a) T he statute of limitations has run. (b) The returns have

7See U nited States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 503, 517; Kenney v. Commissioner (5th
Cir.), 111 F .2d 374; Pollock v. U nited States, No. 14,126 (5th Cir.), M /s, Decided Feb.
27, 1953; Montgomery v. U nited States, No. 14,115 (5th Cir.), M/s, Decided April 17,
1953.
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once been audited and fully examined by the Internal Revenue Bureau
and the taxpayers have paid all taxes found to be due by said examina
tions and audits.
In considering appellant’s contentions based on privilege, we make
two preliminary assumptions in favor of the appellant: (1) T h a t the
conduct of investigations under this statute is subject to the same testi
monial privileges as judicial proceedings.8 (2) T h a t since the “client” is
not a party, the agent or accountant may claim the privilege in his behalf.9
T he taxpayer is required to keep records, 26 U. S. C. A. 54 (a) and the
Commissioner, for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any
return, is authorized by any officer or employee of the Bureau to examine
the taxpayer’s books and records and to require the attendance of the
person rendering the return and the taking of his testimony, 26 U. S. C. A.
3614. (Footnote 1, supra.) Statutes granting such authorities have been
held constitutional as against the contentions that they provide for un
reasonable searches and seizures and compel the taxpayer to be a witness
against himself. Ann. 103 A. L. R. 523; 47 Am. Jur., Searches and Seizures,
Sec. 62; 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec. 671; see also Bolich v. Rubel, supra;
Shushan v. United States (5th Cir.), 117 F. 2d. 110, 117; Nicola v. United
States (3rd Cir.)., 72 F. 2d 780, 784; Stillman v. United States (9th Cir.)
177 F. 2d 607, 617; cf. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141; Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 32.
T he books and papers of a taxpayer, even though received by an at
torney for purposes of consultation, cannot be regarded as privileged
communications. (Footnote 9, supra.) Grant v. United States, 227 U.S.
74, 79; 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 501. According to the last cited text,
“T he reason is obvious; the administration of justice could easily be
defeated if a party and his counsel could, by transferring from the one
to the other im portant papers required as evidence in a cause, thereby
prevent the court from compelling the production of im portant papers
on a trial.” Or, as more succinctly stated, “If documents are not privileged
while in the hands of a party, he does not make them privileged by merely
handing them to his counsel.” Edison Electric Light Co. v. U. S. Electric
Lighting Co. (Cir. Ct., N. Y.), 44 Fed. 294, 297; 45 Id. 55. It seems clear,
therefore, that, even if we should consider the relation between a taxpayer
and his certified public accountant as confidential as that between client
and attorney, the accountant would, nevertheless, be required to produce
the books and records of the taxpayer.

8In McMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission (2nd Cir.), 87 F.2d 377, Judge
Learned H and said: “Therefore, although we assume, as we do, th at the conduct of
investigations under these statutes is subject to the same testimonial privileges as judicial
proceedings, it will not serve McMann; he m ust erect a new privilege ‘ad hoc.’ ’’
9 “Furtherm ore, the privilege n o t being the attorney’s b u t the client’s, the attorney
is not justified (when the client is a party to the cause) in refusing to obey a ruling
(though erroneous) against the privilege; the client is the one to protect himself by
appellate proceedings . . . ” 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 2321, p. 626.
See also 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Secs. 519, 520, id. Secs. 48 and 49; Rogers v. United
States, 340 U. S. 367, 370.
“It follows, then, th at when the client him self w ould be privileged from production
of the document, either as a party at common law, or as a third person claiming title,
or as exem pt from self-crimination, the attorney having possession of the docum ent is
not bound to produce; and such has invariably been the ruling. On the oth er hand,
if the client would be compellable to produce, either by motion or by subpoena or by
bill of discovery, then the attorney is equally compellable, if the document is in his
custody, to produce under th e appropriate procedure." 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd
ed.), Sec. 2307, pp. 592-593.
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T he only other documents claimed to be in possession of the appellant
and concerning which he might be required to testify are his work papers
and notes. T he terms of the subpoena are broad enough to require the
production of such work papers and notes and, if it should appear to this
court that the subpoena is too broadly drawn, it may be modified ac
cordingly. N. L. R . B. v. Anchor Rom e Mills, Inc. (5th Cir.), 197 F. 2d
447, 449; Jackson Packing Co., et al. v. N . L. R . B. (5th Cir.), Ms. No.
14,446, decided May 29, 1953. T he motion avers:
“T h a t the remaining books, papers, records and memoranda in the
Respondent’s files are work papers and work products of the Respondent
based upon information given to Respondent by the above-named clients
and as such are privileged communications and Respondent is not legally
empowered or authorized to divulge such information.”
Further, the terms of the subpoena are broad enough to authorize
examination of the witness as to any matter, whether referred to in the
books and memoranda or not, relevant to the tax liability of Salvator
and Maria Italiano for the years 1947 to 1951, inclusive.
Appellant concedes, as he must, that at common law no privilege was
attached to communications from “client” to accountant. If such a
privilege exists, it can only arise from some Federal or state statute. Apel
lant’s insistence is based upon both. He contends: (1) that the attorneyclient privilege extends to certified public accountants who, like appel
lant, are enrolled before the Treasury Department; and (2) that the
State of Florida, by specific statute, has made privileged all communica
tions between certified public accountants and their clients.
Professor Wigmore has stated the conditions necessary to the establish
ment of a privilege,10 and has further cautioned us as follows:
“For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a funda
mental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord H ard
wicke) has a right to every m an’s evidence. W hen we come to examine
the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption
that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving,
and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional being
so many derogations from a positive general rule. . . .
“. . . T he investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial
duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges. They
should be recognized only within the narrowest limits required by prin
ciple. Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, without any real
10 “Looking back upon the principle of Privilege, as an exception to the general
liability of every person to give testimony upon all facts inquired of in a court of
justice, and keeping in view th at preponderance of extrinsic policy which alone can
justify the recognition of any such exception (ante, Secs. 2192, 2197), four fundam ental
conditions may be predicated as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the
disclosure of communications between persons standing in a given relation:
“ (1) T h e communications must originate in a confidence th at they will n o t be
disclosed;
“(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties;
“(3) T h e relation must be one which in the opinion of the community m ust be
sedulously fostered; and
“(4) T he injury th at would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communi
cations must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of

litigation.
“These four conditions being present, a privilege should be recognized; and not
Otherwise.” 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 2285, p. 531,
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necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice.” (8 Wigmore on
Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 2192, pp. 64, 67.)
On the other hand, Professor Wigmore has suggested that logically
the reasons justifying a privilege for communications between clients
and their attorneys practicing before a court of justice apply also to com
munications between clients and their agents practicing before an ad
ministrative tribunal, if its regulations treat the persons who appear be
fore it representing parties in interest as a licensed body having the re
sponsibility of attorneys, and subject to professional discipline. (8 Wig
more on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 2300 (a), pp. 583, 584.) He states, how
ever, that judicial precedent in this field is scanty, and such rulings as he
cites hold the relationship of client and agent not to be within the
privilege.11
T he Treasury Department has promulgated, pursuant to Section 3,
Act of July 7, 1884, 23 Stat. 258,12 certain rules and regulations governing
recognition of attorneys and agents representing persons before the Treas
ury Department. This Circular 230 as revised December 9, 1951, known
as Part 10 of Sub-Title A of T itle 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
governs the admission of attorneys and agents and the conduct of such
attorneys and agents before the Bureau of Internal Revenue and for
“disbarment” proceedings.13
11 Professor W igmore’s footnote to the text that, “N aturally, judicial precedent in
this field is scanty” reads:
“T h e only rulings discovered to date are the following: McKercher v. VancouverIowa Shingle Co., [1929] 4 D. L. R. 231, Br. C. (a p atent agent is not w ithin the privi
lege); 1892, B runger v. Smith, C. C. Mass., 49 Fed. 124 (patent interference proceeding;
an agent practicing before the Commissioner of Patents was held not privileged to
w ithhold inform ation obtained from his client; the reasons offered in his argum ent are
convincing, b u t the opinion is curt and gives no attention to the reasoning).” T he
decisions later than th at footnote are likewise against the extention of the privilege.
See U nited States v. U nited Shoe Machinery Corporation, 89 F. Supp. 357, 360; Kent
Jewelry Corp., et al., v. Kiefer, 113 N. Y. S. 2nd 1 2 , 18.
12 T h e pertinent p art of 23 Stat. 258 reads as follows:
“Provided, th a t the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules and regulations
governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing claimants
before his D epartm ent, and may require of such person, agents and attorneys, before
being recognized as representatives of claimants, th at they shall show th at they are of
good character and in good repute, possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable
them to render such claimants valuable service, and otherwise competent to advise and
assist such claimants in the presentation of their cases. And such Secretary may after
due notice and opportunity for hearing suspend, and disbar from fu rth er practice before
his D epartm ent any such person, agent, or attorney shown to be incom petent, dis
reputable, or who refuses to comply w ith the said rules and regulations, or who shall
with intent to defraud, in any m anner willfully and knowingly deceive, mislead, or
threaten any claimant or prospective claimant, by word, circular, letter, or by advertise
m ent.” T his provision is brought forward as 5 U. S. C. A. 261.
13 P art 10.2, Sec. (f), provides the following:
“An agent enrolled before the Treasury D epartm ent shall have the same rights,
powers, and privileges and be subject to the same duties as an enrolled attorney: P ro
vided, T h a t an enrolled agent shall not have the privilege of drafting o r preparing any
w ritten instrum ent by which title to real or personal property may be conveyed or
transferred for the purpose of affecting Federal taxes nor shall such enrolled agent
advise a client as to the legal sufficiency of such an instrum ent o r its legal effect upon the
Federal taxes of such client; And P rovided F urther, T h a t nothing in these regulations
in this p art shall be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to practice
law."
In Section 10.3 T itle 1 Code of Federal Regulations qualifications for enrollm ent are
set forth, and in p a rt say:
“(a)(1) Persons o f the follow ing classes who are found, upon consideration o f their
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T he rules and regulations of the Treasury Department grant to en
rolled agents the same “rights, powers, and privileges . . . . as an enrolled
attorney” in order to provide for the effective discharge of the duties of
such agents. There is no provision that a client’s communications to an
enrolled agent are privileged, and after all, the privilege, if any, belongs
to the client and not to the agent. (See Footnote 9, supra.) If, however,
the rules and regulations could be construed as so providing, then, it
seems to us that they would be in conflict with the statute, 26 U. S. C. A.
3614(a), (Footnote 1, supra), and that the statute must prevail.
Section 473.15, Florida Statutes 1951 (F. S. A. Sec. 473.15 formerly St.
1927 c. 12290, Sec. 17, Comp. G. L. 1927 Sec. 3933) provides as follows:
“All communications between certified public accountants and public
accountants and the person for whom such certified public accountant
or public accountant shall have made any audit or other investigation in
a professional capacity, and all information obtained by certified public
accountants and public accountants in their professional capacity concern
ing the business and affairs of clients shall be deemed privileged com
munications in all of the courts of this state, and no such certified public
accountant or public accountant shall be permitted to testify with respect
to any of said matters, except with the consent in writing of such client
or his legal representative.”
Appellant insists that this is a civil case, and, as such, subject to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, citing Rules 1, 81 (a) (3); McCrone v .
United States, 307 U. S. 61; and, further, that under those rules the com
petency and privilege of witnesses is governed by state laws. Rule 43 (a),
5 Moore’s Federal Practice (2nd ed.), Secs. 43.06, 43.07, pp. 1330-1333.
Both insistences might be conceded and it still would not follow that the
privilege provided by the Florida statute would be applicable to appel
lant’s testimony before the Internal Revenue agent under 26 U. S. C. A.
3614. Appellant has failed to observe the im portant distinction between
the administrative proceeding under that section and the court action
to enforce the summons under 26 U. S. C. A. 3633(a). Rule 81(a)(3)
makes the Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to “proceedings to compel
the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with
a subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States. . . .” T hat
means that the rules are applicable to the court action to enforce the sum
mons under 26 U. S. C. A. 3633 (a). T o contend that the proceeding itself
before the Commissioner or the Internal Revenue agent is also a civil case
subject to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly to Rule 43 (a)
as to the admissibility of evidence, would be going too far. For, speaking
generally, the system of rules of evidence in force for trials by jury or
even in courts of equity is not applicable, either by historical precedent,
or by sound practical policy, to inquiries of fact determinable by ad-*
applications, to possess the qualifications required by the regulations in this p art may
be adm itted to practice before the Treasury D epartm ent as attorneys o r agents re
spectively:
“(i) Attorneys at law who have been adm itted to practice before the courts of any
State or T erritory, o r the District of Columbia, and who are lawfully engaged in the
active practice of their profession.
“(ii) Certified public accountants who have duly qualified to practice as certified
public accountants in their own names, under the laws and regulations of any State or
T erritory, or the District of Columbia, and who are lawfully engaged in active practice
as certified public accountants."
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ministrative tribunals or officers.14 T h a t is generally true as to Federal
administrative officials [1 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 4c, p.
44] and is more specifically applicable to disputes arising between tax
payers and the Federal Government under the Internal Revenue Laws
[1 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), Sec. 4c, sub-div. 14, pp. 58, et seq.;
see also 26 U. S. C. A. 1111, Rule 31; Sec. 3614, Sec. 3632; Whitlow v. Com
missioner (8th Cir.), 82 F. 2d 569, 571]. Clearly, in the part of Rule 81
(a) (3) quoted, supra, when construed in connection with Rule 43 (a),
it was not intended to make so radical a change in administrative pro
cedure as to require that such agencies be restricted by the rigid rules of
evidence.15
We have heretofore noted that the power granted to the Commissioner
by 26 U. S. C. A. 3614 is inquisitorial in character and is similar to the
power vested in Federal grand juries. As said by the Eight Circuit in
Brownson v. United States, supra, at p. 848, . . the statutes involved . . .
should receive a like liberal construction in view of the like important
ends sought by the Government.” O r as stated in United States v. M ur
dock, 284 U. S. 141, 149, “Investigation for Federal purposes may not be
prevented by matters depending upon state law.” See also Doll v. Com
missioner (8th Cir.), 149 F. 2d 239. Or in the language of this Court,
“These statutes, enacted to effectuate a Constitutional power, are the
supreme law of the land. If they are in conflict with state law, constitu
tional or statutory, the latter must yield.” Shambaugh v. Scofield (5th
Cir.), 132 F. 2d 345, 346.
The appellant next insists that Section 3631, Internal Revenue Code,16
prohibits unnecessary investigations and is a limitation on the power of
the Bureau and of the Commissioner and not merely a personal right
available to the taxpayer, citing Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., supra,
and First National Bank of Mobile v. United States (5th Cir.), 160 F. 2d
532, 535. T h at much might be conceded, but it does not appear that the
investigation in aid of which this summons issued was unnecessary. True,
the statute of limitations has run against the returns for some of the
earlier years, but in order to determine tax liability under the net worthexpenditures method (see Footnote 7, supra), the Commissioner is re
quired to establish a sound starting point and may well have to reconstruct
the financial history of the taxpayers in prior years. It is not claimed that
there has been any examination of the taxpayers’ returns for the years
1949, 1950 and 1951.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment or order of the Dis
trict Court is therefore affirmed.
14 Federal T rade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 705, 706; Opp Cotton
Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 155; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305
U. S. 197, 229, 230; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44; Southern
Stevedoring Co. v. Voris (5th Cir.), 190 F.2d 275, 277; Woolley v. U nited States (9th
Cir.), 97 F.2d 258, 262; 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, Sec. 129, p. 461; 1
Wigmore on Evidence 3rd ed.), Sec. 4a, p. 25.
15 In the Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules as to 81(a)(3) appears the
following: “. . . the provision allows full recognition of the fact th at the rigid application
of the rules in the proceedings themselves may conflict w ith the summary determ ination
desired. . . . ”
16 26 U. S. C. A. Sec. 3631, reads as follows:
“No taxpayer shall be subject to unnecessary examinations or investigations, and
only one inspection of a taxpayer’s books of account shall be made for each taxable
year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Commissioner, after investiga
tion, notifies the taxpayer in w riting th a t an additional inspection is necessary.”
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HOPKINS v. THE PEOPLE *
Supreme Court of Colorado, 1931. 89 Colo. 296, 1 P.2d 937.

[Defendant was convicted of embezzlement. On this appeal he con
tends, inter alia, that it was error to admit the testimony of a certified
public accountant who had been employed by the county to examine the
court records of the estate for which the defendant was administrator.]
*
*
*
*
3. Complaint is made to the admission and refusal to adm it certain
evidence. One Lindsay, a certified public accountant, was called by the
people to testify to certain facts learned by him in the examination of the
record in the Miers Fisher estate in the county court. T he county court
record was long and very much involved, and the evidence of Lindsay
assisted the jury materially in determining certain facts which the district
attorney considered im portant and which the trial court held to be
proper evidence. It affirmatively appears from this record that Lindsay
was employed by the county or county court, and that he had no business
or professional connection with defendant. T he testimony of Lindsay
was objected to by defendant because of the provisions of section 1, par. 6,
page 644, chapter 185, Session Laws of Colorado 1929, which provides that
a certified public accountant shall not, under certain circumstances with
out the consent of his client, be examined as a witness. T he employment
of Lindsay was not by defendant, and, in the absence of proof that de
fendant was Lindsay’s client, the statute has no application whatever to
the facts in this case.
* * * *
[Judgment affirmed.]

T his case is discussed a t p. 68 supra.

